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Legislation and Exposition

Critical Analysis of Differences between the Philosophy of Kant and Hegel

Meiner

HEGEL-STUDIEN

In Verbindung mit der Hegel-Kommission der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

herausgegeben von

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Beiheft 24

BOUVIER VERLAG HERBERT GRUNDMANN · BONN

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1984

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AUTHOR'S NOTE

The present book, though not unrelated to the author's previous books on KANT and Hegel, aims explicitly to juxtapose the two systems. It refers to some of the major issues common to them but attempts to show the structural difference pertaining to them. It goes without saying that *Legislation* refers to KANT while *Exposition* refers to Hegel. The analysis of the systems leads to a critical evaluation of them. That evaluation is not an external addendum to the analysis; it is meant to emerge out of the analysis as such. In that criticism, with all the due reservation, an attempt is made in the direction of a certain — reserved as it may be — preference for KANT. In this respect the trend of the book is similar to that of the author's *Wege zur Erkennbarkeit*, Freiburg 1983.

I would like to thank here Professor Dr. OTTO PÖGGELER who was kind enough to encourage me to write the book when I first conceived it and agreed to include it in the series of Beihefte to Hegel-Studien.

Jerusalem 1983 NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

„In einer transcendentalen Logik isoliren wir den Verstand ... und heben bloß den Teil des Denkens aus unserem Erkenntnis heraus, der lediglich seinen Ursprung in dem Verstande hat ... Der Teil der transcendentalen Logik also, der die Elemente der reinen Verstandeserkenntnis vorträgt, und die Principien, ohne welche überall kein Gegenstand gedacht werden kann, ist die transcendentale Analytik und zugleich eine Logik der Wahrheit."

Kr. d. r. V. 87

„... was sie [sc. die Logik] ist, kann es sie daher nicht voraussagen, sondern ihre ganze Abhandlung bringt dies Wissen von ihr selbst erst als ihr Letztes und als ihre Vollendung hervor."

Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik. Einleitung. 1

„Ich habe dann das Wort *Begriff* gebraucht in einer Bedeutung ... er sey das Gesetz des Werdens; ich kann hier folglich, vielleicht deutlicher sagen, Gesetz der Entwicklung."

J. H. Erdmann: Vorlesungen über Glauben und Wissen. 1837.258

Chapter One
UNITY AND HIERARCHY

1.

In our attempt to analyse the structures of the KANTian and Hegelian systems, we employ various comparative tools.* Towards this end, we may try to present a resumé of these systems despite all the reservations which have to accompany such an attempt.

KANT established a hierarchical system and was guided in his enterprise by several considerations. He started off with the dichotomy of sensuality and intelligence (although the term does not appear in KANT's own presentation). Intelligence comprises understanding *(Verstand)* and reason *(Vernunft)*. Yet there is a built-in superiority in that duality attributed to intelligence, since its manifestation as understanding, let alone as reason, is endowed with activity. Hence it goes out towards the data given by the sensuality. The

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* The book is based on a close interpretation of the texts. Hence the many references and quotations. At the same time the trend of the book is not to be a textual interpretation only but also a critical analysis. In any case, the many quotations carry with them a difficulty and a fault: not so much of misquotations, but of mistakes as to the volumes referred. An effort has been made to avoid that possible fault, but "errare" etc.

The texts referred to have been quoted in the following way: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is referred to within the sequence of the analysis as B and A editions respectively. The number of the page mentioned after the semi-colon (;) relates to the English translation of NORMAN KEMP SMITH New York/Toronto 1965.

All other books of KANT refer to the edition of the *Akademie*. After the semicolon the reference is made to the English translations (1) *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* by LEWIS WHITE BECK; Indianapolis 1956; (2) *Kritik der Urteilskraft* by JAMES CREED MEREDITH, Oxford 1964; (3) *Prolegomena*, by LEWIS WHITE BECK, Indianapolis 1950.

The number of the page after the semi-colon refers to those editions.

(4) The smaller writings of KANT relevant for several aspects of the exploration are mentioned in their English translation by way of the reference to the collection. On History edited by LEWIS WHITE BECK, Indianapolis 1963. KANT'S other books in their translation are quoted in so far as a translation is available. The specifics of the translations appear in the footnotes. Hegel's works are referred to in the Freundesvereinsausgabe or in the critical edition: *Gesammelte Werke*. Hamburg (Meiner).

Philosophie des Rechtes is quoted also in the English translation by T. M. KNOX: *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Oxford. The references to that translation appear after the semi-colon.

As to the present book itself, parts of it previously published have been rewritten.

active aspect is not present on the level of the data in spite of the fact that there are valid pure forms of sensuality and not only forms of understanding. Once the aspect of superiority comes in, either explicitly or not, we discern that understanding is a manifestation or contraction of reason being the highest faculty within the spectrum of elements of knowledge. Reason is the legislative faculty *par excellence. Pari passu* we come to the conclusion that there is no knowledge unless there is legislation, that is to say, the constitution of the objects by way of a synthesis between data and forms. Once reason is posited as the top of the hierarchy we are led to an additional aspect, namely, that in consciousness we can discern the highest manifestation of activity as enclosed in consciousness itself. This architectonic consideration leads KANT to the discernment and analysis of the aspect of transcendental apperception and this will be the topic of the first stage of our exploration.

Anticipating the next stage of our analysis we can say that unlike KANT Hegel does not take the hierarchical structure as the model of his system. Hence he interprets reason not as the peak of the hierarchy but as the comprehensive sphere. Because of that basic difference in the architectonics Hegel does not posit the transcendental apperception as the anchor of the system. He presents spirit as its basic theme and focus of convergence of the various manifestations discerned in their presence in the world not as data but as manifestations. This structure will be the second stage of our examination.

2.

Having outlined the broad context of the first step of our analysis the task before us is to deal with KANT's notion of "I think" and to examine the reasons for establishing the position of that notion and its corresponding noematic position within the structure of the system. We begin with some of KANT's own statements related to the features of the "I" or of the "I think".

KANT mentions the aspect of one's consciousness of oneself in the context of the contradistinction between the consciousness of the self and the knowledge of the self (58; 169). It can be taken as an established feature in KANT's eyes that the consciousness of the self is essential for the meaning and the position of the "I". Sometimes KANT is more cautious in pointing to that feature when he says, for instance, that this "I" is as little an intuition as it is a concept of any object. It is the mere form of consciousness (382; 353). Apparently there is an implied identity between consciousness of oneself, which is consciousness and not knowledge proper, and the mere form of consciousness. The self-referring character of the "I", since it is only self-referential as a form, is "the poorest of all representations" (408; 369). In spite of that statement KANT makes a step in the direction of a further description of

the position and meaning of the "I" when he says that because the "I" is conscious of itself the "I" is identical with itself. The self-referential character connotes here the self-identity which is, after all, a statement about a kind of a constant character implied in the notion of the "I". One could suggest that this step from self-consciousness, or the position of the form, to the awareness of self-identity becomes explicit in the identification of the "I" with the thinking subject. KANT says, for instance: "The consciousness of myself in the representation 'I' is not an intuition, but a merely *intellectual* representation of the spontaneity *(Selbstätigkeit)* of a thinking subject" (279; 247).

Analysing this statement we arrive at the following four points: a) The consciousness of the consciousness of myself employs the juxtaposition of intuition and intellectual representation; or putting it differently, it employs the fundamental awareness of the difference between intuition and the intellectual or *mere* intellectual meaning of the position of myself. b) This implies that the interpretation of the form or mere form is identical with the component or meaning of being intellectual. c) Such a position is interpreted as amounting to self-activity. Already at this point we may pose the question what is the more precise meaning of the self involved in the activity: Is it the self referring to himself or reflecting about himself, or is it the self whose activity finds manifestations beyond himself, as say in the direction of the data. d) The self is presented as a thinking subject or sometimes as a logical unity of the subject.

What leads KANT to that consummating statement in which the activity of thinking or self-reflection is presented as subject? Perhaps the very notion of subject implies a kind of permanence or constancy which may lead in the direction of a substratum. This is so in spite of the fact that elsewhere KANT says explicitly that beyond the logical meaning of the "I" we have no knowledge of the subject in itself "which as substratum underlies the 'I', as it does all thoughts" (350; 334). The distinction between the position of subject and the position of substratum is relevant because KANT wants to maintain the view that there is no line of continuity leading from subject to soul. Still KANT himself uses the term "the subject" which, with all the attempts of presenting a line of demarcation between it and the substratum — let alone the substance — still connotes not only a self-activity but a rounded position of that activity as well as a kind of a basic stratum *(substratum)* of that activity.

Furthermore, in the same context, KANT asserts that consciousness accompanies all concepts (404; 331) in that the "I" is the one condition which accompanies all thought (398; 362). In spite of the fact that the "I" or the self is void of any representations or any concepts, self-awareness is the condition of any concept and representation. And what's more: "It is known

only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any concept whatsoever, but can only revolve in a perpetual circle, since any judgement upon it has always already made use of its representation" (404; 331). One can assume that thoughts are described here as predicates, because of the connotation of the "I" as the subject, with all that goes along with that connotation. Yet, though we realize the circularity of the various statements, this does not prevent KANT from positing the "I" as a condition or even a super-condition of all our concepts, thoughts and representations. In this sense, a particular position is attributed to the "I"; its involvement in the circularity does not prevent the separation if the "I". In traditional philosophical terms or pointing to the philosophical development after KANT, one could say that the "I" is always and essentially a condition and cannot be, in any sense, of a conditioned position. Here we must ask wherefrom does the "I" know of that position or, put differently, whether self-awareness which is the essential feature of the "I" implies the awareness of being un-conditioned. To be sure, this question is critical for the entire structure of the system.

3.

Some supplementary aspects of the "I" come to the fore when we look into a cognate topic in KANT's presentation, namely the concept of apperception. "Self-consciousness is therefore the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and itself is unconditioned". Preceding that statement KANT says "Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which on their part represent nothing but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, insofar as the manifold has unity in apperception" (401; 365). There is a correlation between self-consciousness in its unconditioned position and the concepts, since one's self-consciousness is the condition of all unity. Yet we face also the correlation of self-consciousness qua apperception and the manifold, whereby the manifold is immediately understood as the manifold of intuition. As such it cannot stand alone or be self-enclosed. It points to its correlate which, by the same token, is not only a correlate on the equal level with the manifold but also implies the superior position of condition qua unity and self-awareness. Self-awareness is not only in this sense, as the verbal meaning would imply, the awareness of the self of himself. It is also the awareness of the correlate in terms of the manifold and in terms of the dependence of that manifold on the apperception. At this point one could ask the question related to KANT's contradistinction between self-awareness and knowledge: the self knowing himself knows also his position as a condition as well as the position of the manifold as a correlate of the condition. The self refers to the manifold and refers to himself by bringing the manifold within the scope of self-awareness. This is

a significant point from the systematic perspective, because as long as KANT insisted on the distinction between thinking and knowing he could take thinking as self-consciousness as an analytic unity. But in terms of apperception (as presented before in KANT's own language) we are bound to refer to a synthetic unity of the apperception. This is what KANT calls, in paragraph 16 of *The Critique* "the original synthetic unity of apperception". When we look into the wording of the paragraph we realize that it might be rather difficult to maintain the suggested distinction between an analytic and a synthetic unity whereby the analytic would refer to self-consciousness as such, while the synthetic would refer to the manifold which appears within the horizon of the apperception. KANT says: "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me... All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to that 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found ... I call it *pure apperception* to distinguish it from empirical apperception, or, again, *original apperception,* because it is that self-consciousness which, by generating the representation 'I think' (a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other representations and which in all consciousness is one and the same) cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. The unity of this apperception I likewise entitle the *transcendental* unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of *a priori* knowledge arising from it." (131-132; 152-153).

This sounds very problematic, given the position of the "I" or of the identity of apperception. We take up the task of analysing this statement.

4.

First of all, we encounter in KANT's presentation a certain ambiguity in relation to the identity of the "I" which is, and this goes without saying, self-identity. In one context the identity is one of reflection: the "I" reflects upon his concepts and that very reflection, which again is an activity and not a status, amounts to the position of the "I". In a second context we encounter not only reflection but what might be described as the intentionality of the "I" to data and, by the same token, to the categories unifying those data. KANT distinguishes between different modes of the identity of apperception. He speaks, for instance, about the synthetic unity and says the following: "Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as generated *a priori,* is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes *a priori* all my determinate thought... Understanding alone ... is nothing but the faculty of combining *a priori,* and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception. The principle of apperception is the highest

principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge" (134-135; 154). Cognate to that statements is the well-known one: "For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot be dissolved, since only as having been combined *by the understanding* can anything that allows for analysis be given to the faculty of representation. But the concept of combination includes, besides the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the manifold" (130; 152). The distinction between the analytic and the synthetic unity is not made clear by KANT's footnote, which reads as follows: "The analytic unity of consciousness belongs to all general concepts, as such. If, for instance, I think red in general, I thereby represent to myself a property which ... can be found in something or can be combined with other representation; that is, only by means of a presupposed synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytic unity. A representation which is to be thought as common to *different* representations is regarded as belonging to such as have, in addition to it, also something *different.* Consequently, it must previously be thought in synthetic unity with other ... representations, before I can think in it the analytic unity of consciousness, which makes it a *conceptus communis.* The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore the highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself." (134-135; 154, footnote). Yet elsewhere, KANT says that "all the variety of *empirical consciousness* must be combined in one single self-consciousness, is *absolutely* first and synthetic principle of our thought in general." (117; 142)

Here we are brought to the realization that KANT employs the expression "synthetic unity" as connoting the combination of different representations in one representation or the combination of different concepts in one concept; that unity, which is a constructed or created unity by the positing consciousness, is prior to the analytic unity which appears as a summary of the steps taken in bringing about, through synthesis, the unity. The product of that synthesis is the common concept which is identified as an analytic unity of consciousness connoting, in the context, the separation of the common features from the acts of comparison and bringing them together — which preceded the consummation in the common concept. Yet, on the other hand, the "I" who represents to himself a property, seems to be the phenomenological feature of the representations in general, whether synthetic in KANT's sense or analytic, that the "I" attributes to himself as a property the theme or the *noema,* disregarding the particular steps he is taking vis-à-vis the *noemata,* that is to say whether he constructs them or just grasps them. Further still, the distinction between the synthetic and analytic is introduced here into the discussion in terms of the representations. But at

the same time KANT deals with that distinction in terms of the very position of the apperception or the original apperception. He refers to the dependence of empirical consciousness on one single self-consciousness which in turn, because of that dependence, is attributed the position of the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought in general.

To put it more simply, KANT uses the distinction between analytic and synthetic in terms of the representations and concepts. Because a construction is involved in the very combination of representations — that construction is designated as a synthesis. Yet at the same time he uses the terms "synthetic" or "synthesis" in the sense of attributing representations or concepts to the self-consciousness, and thus establishing the belonging of the representations or concepts to the consciousness by positing them within the horizon of the self-consciousness. The distinction between synthetic and analytic in the first sense relates to the context of the representations and the concepts themselves, while in the second sense it relates to the presence of the representations and the concepts within thought and its inherence in consciousness.

Here we return to our previous comment as to the two directions of the notion of self-consciousness or apperception: consciousness goes out, as it were, to grasp representations and from the angle of this direction of it it does not matter whether the act of grasping or awareness refers to single representations, or whether it compares them or constructs a common representation. Yet, concurrently with that act of "going out" of consciousness the "coming back" of it, as it were, emerges. The coming back is brought about by the very awareness of the representations accompanied by self-awareness or self-consciousness. Hence, the synthetic dimension of consciousness is present in both directions. Only because of that doubleway presentness could KANT speak at all of one single self-consciousness and its absolute position.

We are bound to ask ourselves whether these variations on the analytic and synthetic component in self-consciousness coalesce with the previous distinction between the reflective character of self-consciousness and its intentional character. We are bound to ask that question because the component of intentionality in consciousness is present in it, by definition, in terms of its reference to representations. It is not clear whether the reflecting component of consciousness accompanies intentionality or is emerging out of the direction of attributing representations made aware in intentionality to self-consciousness. The second possibility is precluded because it would be impossible to assume the attribution to self-consciousness, were not self-consciousness present to itself in the first place. Only in this sense can self-consciousness be regarded as an absolute condition. If this is so then we find in KANT — and it is not essential here to dwell on the question whether or not

he was aware of that — a kind of two directions of synthesis, one inherent in intentionality in its two directions, namely to the representation and towards attribution and one inherent in the reflection itself. How these two directions of synthesis relate do one another KANT does not make clear.

We may pose a systematic question whether one of these directions underlies them both and if so what kind of priority has to be considered here: chronological or structural. We could say that chronologically, in terms of the development of the cognitive faculty, intentionality preceded reflection. The self becomes aware of itself only by thinking thoughts. Thus thinking about thinking accompanies that structure with the awareness that it thinks about different thoughts — but it still *thinks*. Thus it discerns in its thinking the aspect of the dimensions of self-consciousness as connoting the breadth of thinking (since different thoughts can be entertained by thinking) and the depth of thinking (since thinking as such is both related to different thoughts and is independent not only of each one of them but also of all of them).

5.

There are some additional nuances in KANT's presentation. He introduces the position of the unity of consciousness via the notion of the unity of rule. He says that this unity determines all manifold. The concept of this unity is the representation of the object (105; 135). This statement is meant to convey the notion that all knowledge demands a concept; a concept as such is a unity, or if we put it in a dynamic form, is a unifying notion or principle. When we speak e. g. about the concept of body we imply the unity of a manifold. That unity is brought about by our thinking or by our thought which amounts to a rule in our knowledge, since the unity is apparently not an accidental one but has a structure and for the presence of that structure we can put forward a justification. Again, KANT says that a rule is a rule because it brings together in a necessary way the ingredients of the manifold.

We come across that which we designated before as the non-accidental character of the unity. For instance — in the concept of the body there is a relation between the representation of extension, impenetrability, shape; one representation leads necessarily to another. In the concept or in the thought we unify these different components; the very notion of the necessary connection connotes that prescribed unification.

At this point KANT says again that the necessary reproduction of the manifold is related to the synthetic unity in our consciousness of the given appearances of which the manifold is composed. He sums up this description by saying: "All necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition. There must, therefore be a transcendental ground of the

unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold in all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general ... A ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions ... This original and transcendental condition is no other than *transcendental apperception"* (106-107; 135-136). When we look into this statement and examine the introduction of the notion of unity and transcendental apperception, we realize that KANT presents here not the act of representation as such, neither the act of attribution of representation. He presents the awareness of the necessity which is inherent in the notion of unity in the transcendental sense of that term. We have to look, therefore, to some of the aspects of the notion of "transcendental" in order to see whether and how it relates to the different shades of the unity of the apperception to which we referred before.

6.

Several descriptions of the concept of "transcendental" or "transcendentality" call for an analysis in the present context. KANT says that the dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of concepts *a priori* by looking for them in the understanding alone, is the proper task of a transcendental philosophy (90; 103). The question which has to be explored here is the following: whether the understanding alone, which is the birth-place, in KANT's metaphoric expression, of the concepts, is to be understood in the sense of being accompanied by self-awareness, or whether we are concerned with concepts *a priori* whose characteristic feature is not only their grounding in understanding but also their *a priori* applicability to data which are given to understanding and are not stemming from it. Again, KANT says about transcendental philosophy that it treats only of the understanding and of reason in a system of concepts and principles which relate to objects in general (873; 662). The emphasis is placed on the relation or intentionality to objects in general – and there is no mentioning of the reflective character of understanding or of reasoning. This presentation is reinforced by a statement that although the highest principles and fundamental concepts of morality are *a priori* or are belonging to *a priori* knowledge they have no place in transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy in this sense is a philosophy of pure and merely speculative reasoning.

We can add that knowledge as such relates to data and this character cannot be transplanted to the area of moral philosophy since moral philosophy as such does not refer to data. Empirical concepts, as KANT says, must necessarily be brought into the concept of duty. But when this is the case and the empirical concepts appear within the horizon of moral philosophy they re-

present either a hindrance which by the way of the moral imperatives we have to overcome, or they represent an allurement which, again in terms of the moral philosophy, we must make into a motive. Hence we have to translate that allurement into the incentive of pure or practical reasoning (29; 61). Within transcendental philosophy proper there is always present the pull of data to which the concepts have to be applied. In that sphere there is a built-in duality, while within practical reasoning there is a self-contained structure of reason alone. We shall come back to the practical aspect when we deal with freedom and ask there the question about the presence or lack of self-consciousness in the context of freedom. What is already clear is that the aspect of transcendentality as such is unequivocally related to the dimension of intentionality. Consequently, it does not carry in itself, or with itself, the aspect of self-consciousness.

To what extent the concept of transcendentality describes a particular area of cognitive concern can be observed in an additional statement of KANT's when speaking about transcendental philosophy as being unique in the whole field of speculative knowledge. The characteristic feature of that aspect of transcendentality is" ... that no question which concerns an object given to pure reason can be insoluble for this same reason ... That very concept which puts us in a position to ask the question must also qualify us to answer it ... the only question to which we have the right to demand a sufficient answer bearing on the constitution of the object" (505-506; 431). In this statement we find a formulation of the correlation pertaining between the position of the question and the position of the answer. Our concern is with the constitution of the object and is related to the fact that the object must be given empirically. These are specifications of the correlation between the concept and the datum and are stated from the point of view of transcendentality. We move here within the sphere prescribed by the correlation of the two. Self-consciousness, if it would be brought into that structure, would amount to a kind of looking from above which, as such, would be on the one hand a position of an observer above the transcendental concept and, on the other hand the empirical data or objects. To put it differently, self-consciousness would amount to an additional dimension which would bring a horizontal aspect to the structure in addition to the vertical relation pertaining between concepts and data. KANT did not suggest a transition or a deduction from self-consciousness to the plurality of transcendental concepts and their functional position within the structure of knowledge.

To be sure, transcendental concepts and the structure of correlation are grounded in the very distinction between intuitions and concepts. In this sense, KANT says that all intuitions as sensuous *(sinnlich)* rest on affections while concepts rest on functions (93; 105). It is appropriate at this point to

look into the description of the meaning of the term "function" as well as of the "birthplace" — to come back to that metaphor describing the functions. The relevant statement reads as follows: "By 'function' I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation. Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impression" (93; 105). Function, in this sense, is the act of constructing a common representation and not, or not only, the explicit form of that construction, for instance the category of causality or substance. Because of the emphasis placed on the functional or active character of the unity — we could say of the unification — KANT speaks *immediately* about concepts based on the spontaneity of thought. In this context, spontaneity would connote not only the power of producing representation from itself but also the self-activity or the ongoing activity. To put it differently, spontaneity would mean not only the independence of the function but also the creativity implied in the active character of the function as against the product of it or the construct. Again, though KANT refers here to that aspect of spontaneity, connoting functions of unity or unification, he does not point to a possible concomitant of these functions in terms of self-consciousness, though one could perhaps expect that shift given the sphere in which the whole presentation is formulated.

Hence the question arises: why did not KANT make that step from spontaneity to self-consciousness, in spite of the affinity which no doubt is present in his system? The answer seems to lie in what has been presented at the beginning of this part or our analysis, namely that the structure of correlation did not lead KANT to the isolation of the full scope of spontaneity which would include also the reflective character of spontaneity qua consciousness. This implicit and explicit distinction between the intentional and reflective aspect would eventually point to a basic structural fact that KANT did not suggest a deduction of the functional concepts from spontaneity as such. In other words, KANT presents a metaphysical deduction of the categorial forms from forms of judgement or propositions but not from spontaneity as such. KANT assumed that a kind of a mediator between spontaneity *per se* and spontaneity of functions in their plurality is needed. This is so since there is no transition from the reflective self-consciousness as the very essence of it to the plurality of forms, in spite of the fact that the functions qua forms are manifestations of spontaneity. This aspect of the system is prominent in KANT's notion of the categories. We turn now to this central issue in the system in order to draw additional conclusions as to the different levels present in KANT's architectonics and also in order to draw additional systematic consequences which will go beyond KANT's presentation in its wording and possibly in its implications.

7.

The notion of function is a link between our previous analysis and that which is before us now. In the well-known statement KANT says: "The same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a judgement* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition;* and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgement, also introduces a transcendental content into its representation, be means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general. On this account, we are entitled to call these representations pure concepts of the understanding, and to regard them as applying a priori to objects" (105; 112-113). KANT uses here the distinction between analytic and synthetic unity which we explored before. But again KANT does not say that the synthetic unity would be a correlate of self-consciousness. It is synthetic in the sense of being related or applicable to the manifold and thus going beyond the pure conceptual realm of understanding as a self-enclosed activity.

KANT says explicitly that (a) the position of the pure concepts being a priori in their origin and (b) their application to objects, the application which is again a priori and thus safeguarded or guaranteed, — these are two aspects of the functions of the synthesis at stake. The emphasis is placed on the functions in unity in judgements (94; 106) and not on the self-enclosed unity or unification which is the other side of the coin of self-consciousness. Judgements or propositions are formulations of certain relations and they do not amount to self-relation with which reflection as such is imbued. Here again it is not by chance that there is no attempt to construct the deduction of the various forms of relations from the unification *per se* characteristic of reflection. The notion of deduction presupposes a level of mediation which amounts to the reference to and to the grounding in logical forms which in turn can be used or taken advantage of for the sake of formulating the transcendental forms qua categorial propositions. The intuitions or the data appear in the horizon of the forms of the unification in the transcendental sense. But that presence is not accompanied, even not for the sake of symmetry, by the position of the summit of self-consciousness. As a matter of fact there are two poles: unity of spontaneity at one pole and variety or even chaos of data at the other.

Within the realm of transcendental philosophy the dimension of intentionality becomes predominant because that dimension implies a primary relationship between unity and multiplicity. Thus it enables any further move in the direction of presenting modes of applicability of forms to data and the attempts to guarantee that applicability. But in what sense is the syn-

thetic unity as such essential for the categorial propositions, or to put it differently, whether the "I think" is really essential and necessary — as KANT presents this? At this point we have to look into the concept of freedom as it becomes prominent in KANT's moral philosophy and in terms of that analysis we may raise again the issue as to the position of the "I think" which has been taken by KANT as occupying such a prominent position. The question arises therefore whether from within the system that position is warranted by the edifice in its completeness. Having analysed this additional aspect of KANT's system some systematic conclusion would follow.

8.

The reason that we are addressing ourselves to the concept of freedom, and it goes without saying that "phenomenon" does not connote in the context that which goes terminologically by that term in KANT's system, lies in the very approach of KANT to freedom. KANT says that what in the speculative critique could only be thought is from the point of view of practical critique confirmed by fact (*KdpV* 6; 6) — and this is precisely the statement which has to be closely considered. If freedom is conceived or pointed to as a fact it can only mean that it is a fact within reason or within the scope of consciousness and not in the context of nature of world. As such, freedom would connote an attitude or an activity of self-consciousness, underscoring the independence of consciousness and its spontaneity. Yet a closer examination is about to show that this is not completely the case; freedom is imbued with its own particular intentionality which leads it beyond the confinement of self-consciousness.

In the first place the well-known distinction presented by KANT between freedom in the cosmological sense and freedom in the practical one is relevant in the context. Freedom is placed in contradistinction to Nature — or put differently there are two kinds of causality, either according to nature or one arising from freedom. What is characteristic of freedom is the power of beginning a state out of itself *(von selbst)*. The emphasis on the beginning out of itself is significant since it is meant to bring into prominence the major feature of freedom: the initiating a state of affairs itself does not have a cause (560-561; 464). KANT himself says that "reason creates for itself the idea of spontaneity which can begin to act of itself" (561; 465). The major aspect to be observed is that the notion of spontaneity is applied also in the context of the cosmological idea, that is to say, in the notion referring to the structure of the universe and not only to the spontaneity of reason or will in the strict sense of those terms. Indeed, when KANT moves to freedom in the practical sense he refers immediately to the will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses (562; 465). The structure inherent in freedom in the cos-

mological sense recurs within the context of freedom in the practical sense; in the first case we find the contradistinction between sensuous impulses and self-beginning which is synonymous with the will's independence. In the first case there is nature connoting a chain of causes, whereas freedom connotes spontaneity. In the second case the chain is epitomized through the coercion by sensuous impulses. These are a manifestation of nature within the practical realm.

At this point we face the question: whether this correlative position of freedom versus nature or versus sensuous impulses is only a methodological step taken by KANT in order to introduce into the scope of this analysis the concept of freedom — or perhaps the contradistinction is inherent in the very meaning of the phenomenon of freedom. Freedom connotes a causative factor detached from the structure of nature. This feature of freedom comes already into relief when freedom is understood as an active detachment from nature or from sensuality. The question whether it calls for consciousness or self-consciousness to apprehend or conceive that feature as characteristic of freedom or of reason in itself — is an open question.

When KANT emphasized in this context that there is in man a power of self-determination independently of any coercion through the sensuous impulse — he points again to a fact. Yet precisely because of that facticity we have to raise the issue whether a fact of this sort can be at all a mute or brute fact, i. e. not necessarily accompanied by self-awareness. This question is reinforced by what KANT says elsewhere, namely that freedom in the practical sense is a position in which reason possesses causality (*Prolegomena.* vol. IV. 344 footnote; 53; 92 footnote). Here again the question arises whether it would be altogether possible to ground freedom in reason without self-consciousness, or whether reason is not imbued *ab initio* with self-consciousness. If this grounding is necessary for the very characterization of freedom we cannot but ask ourselves whether freedom can be a self-enclosed situation. Essentially, it has not only its negative counterpart in sensuality but has also, and this is KANT's main point, a positive counterpart in imperatives or laws of reason — and this component of freedom goes beyond self-consciousness proper. If there is a positive counterpart then the question which arises concerns the relationship between the structure of bringing together spontaneity and imperatives and self-consciousness — a question which KANT apparently did not analyze.

Before moving to some observations on this particular issue it is apposite to mention that KANT describes the position of freedom also in terms of its built-in circularity, when he says that we must be free in order to be able to make use of our powers in freedom, (*Die Religion.* vol. V. 338, note; 176, note). This circularity is meant to underline the primary fact that freedom is not only a position where there is no determination stemming from outside

itself, but also that freedom qua spontaneity amounts to what we could describe as self-generation. Self-generation would be a kind of a positive description of the position of seclusion from nature or from sensuality. Precisely because of that circular character the point must be raised about the relationship between the circularity of freedom and the circularity of self-reflection — and here again we find a kind of a link missing in KANT's analysis. This, in fact, is reinforced by the particular correlation which is present in KANT in terms of freedom.

9.

The inherent correlation between freedom and a law is stressed by KANT: "So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law." "Pure reason is practical of itself alone, and it gives (to man) a universal law, which we call the *Moral Law.*" (*KdpV* 32; 32) And further — that independence which was a way of introducing the concept of freedom altogether is only freedom in the negative sense, while the intrinsic legislation of pure, and thus practical freedom, is freedom in the positive sense. (*KdpV* 30; 29) Hence, the correlation between spontaneity and legislation is an essential aspect of freedom, whereas the independence inherent in freedom would be only a step taken in order to bring us into the scope in which the analysis of freedom takes place, and in which freedom becomes paramount. If this positive correlation is essential then we notice that freedom cannot be viewed as a self-enclosed phenomenon since it is imbued with reference to a law and acceptance of it.

We could add that in the understanding of the law the intentionality is twofold: (a) in the direction of the law and its meaning (b) in the direction of making the law into an incentive and guiding principle of the spontaneity. In the context KANT seems to think that the consciousness of freedom and what he calls the intelligible consciousness of its existence are coterminous. Here again we do not encounter an analysis of the relationship between self-consciousness, the awareness of freedom, and the two-way correlation between that awareness and the moral law. (*KdpV* 99; 102) This correlation is expressed in very strong terms, when KANT says that nothing more could be done than to show the relation between the possibility of freedom of an efficient cause and the necessity of the moral law and the supreme practical law of rational beings. (*KdpV* 94; 97) This statement may lead us even beyond the previously pointed out correlation and perhaps even beyond the distinction between negative and positive freedom.

There might be a possibility of interpreting this because there lies within the horizon of consciousness the moral imperative or the moral law. That imperative as such brings about the detachment — in the active sense — from nature and sensuality and creates for itself a kind of an anchor in conscious-

ness or will qua spontaneity. To pursue this line to its extreme it would mean that freedom as acceptance of the moral imperative is eliciting freedom as detachment or independence, that is to say, that in a more extreme analysis we reach the conclusion that positive freedom establishes even the negative one. If this is so, then we would say that as long as there is a balance between the negative and the positive aspect of freedom, consciousness and the spontaneous character of it serve as an intermediary between the two aspects. When we move to the supremacy of the positive aspect of freedom, consciousness becomes determinable by freedom. Perhaps even the self-reflective character of it ceases to be central or, at least, becomes secondary in terms of the superiority of the core of the moral law. In this sense, understanding or acceptance grounded in understanding becomes the central feature of consciousness and self-reflection loses the centrality, which it would maintain whenever the emphasis is placed on spontaneity as such.

We can dinstinguish, therefore, between the aspect of activity which is but one of the explications of self-consciousness and the thematic or normative aspect which leads to the determination of will by the moral imperative. In this sense, the determination is self-determination and the activity is preserved because of the emphasis on "self". Yet paradoxically, the spontaneity or the activity are more prominent in freedom qua independence than in freedom qua intentionality directed to the moral norm and the acceptance of that norm as a guiding principle of intentions and behaviour. Somehow KANT did not maintain the equilibrium between self-consciousness and the normative aspect of practical reason in spite of the fact that his whole analysis refers to reason. When we recall that we started the present exploration with the "I think" in terms of knowledge we are bound to come to the conclusion that the "I think" is not established in terms of practical reason. Hence, we may make now a further step which will not be confined to the analysis of KANT's text but will lead us to a critical evaluation of the whole position, namely whether the transcendental "I" is essential both for the cognitive as well as for the moral activities. The hierarchical structure guides KANT in his presentation, at least more so than an exploration of the two spheres proper — of knowledge and morality.

10.

The concept of the "I" or of consciousness in general evoked in the 19th century philosophy different interpretations, including that which attempted to identify the consciousness in general with the consciousness of the human species.[1] These interpretations call for an elaboration or a critical stand since

[1] Consult *Hans Amrhein: Kant's Lehre vom „Bewußtsein überhaupt" und ihre Weiterbildung bis auf die Gegenwart.* Kant-Studien. Ergänzungshefte. Berlin 1909.

they presuppose that the "I" is bound to be a kind of an entity, though it is difficult to identify that entity and its locus.

At this juncture we return to the reasons which lead KANT to assume or to identify the "I think". What is the meaning of the "must accompany" in that position of the "I"? Elsewhere KANT says that I must presuppose the "I". This aspect of the presupposition would perhaps indicate that the "must" does not have a connotation of a postulate but rather a connotation of a position which is inherent in our thinking and knowledge. In this sense, the "I" is meant to be a necessary presupposition. Hence we raise the issue of the aspect of necessity — is it an aspect of a logical necessity or can it be encountered phenomenologically? It seems that KANT was not clear as to that possible distinction. Certainly he did not point to the "I" as a factum in consciousness as he did point to freedom as a factum of reason.

The presupposition of the "I" seems to be related to the very activity and structure of thinking. The "I" would be in this sense a kind of amplification of that activity and structure. When KANT says (*Prolegomena.* 304; 22) that thinking is uniting representations in one consciousness we may wonder whether that activity of uniting or unification presupposes the consciousness of the "I", or rather constitutes it. This question emerges since elsewhere KANT says that the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected. "This act I name synthesis" (102; 111). The point of departure is therefore the synthesis which can be looked at from two angles — as an activity or as a structure. Since that activity is present, being the very characteristic feature of thinking and of knowledge, in which thinking is one element, we could say that the "I think" amounts to a sort of isolation, or to the act of it, of that activity and structure. It ceases to be manifest only in the forms of thinking or in the categorial propositions and is presented as a superior and thus independent element. If this is so then the "I think" and the necessity of its identification are arrived at by a kind of deduction from the plurality of the modes of thinking or knowledge, whereas the unity underlying those modes is posited as occupying a special position which in turn is identified as a necessary presupposition. In this sense, we could not conclude that we discover and come across the "I think". We should rather assume that we arrive at that position by clinging to the distinction or to the two levels of plurality of the forms which cannot be left alone. We are presumably bound to assume that the forms are to be encompassed in the unity of the consciousness in order to bring into prominence the polarity: the manifold of the data on the one hand and the unity of consciousness on the other.

When we return to KANT's presentation of the transition from the form of judgements or propositions to the categorial statements, the following could be observed: "The form of judgements (converted to a concept of the

synthesis of intuitions) yielded categories which direct all employment of understanding in experience" (378; 315). Elsewhere KANT says: "I finally referred this function of judging to objects in general". (*Prolegomena.* 324; 371) Coming back to the analogy of the deduction of the "I think" or the highest synthesis, the following is to be emphasised: Since the judgements or propositions are from their own status functions of the unity constituting the objects, it follows that the highest synthesis is the unity of unity or unities.

The question which cannot be escaped is whether that unity of unities is a given factum of consciousness or whether it is a structure introduced for the sake of the unification of the plurality of functions or for the sake of preserving the parallelism between the focus of the objects and the focus of the thinking. Since thinking as such is unification, KANT possibly attempted to isolate that aspect by introducing the transcendental apperception or the "I think". If this conjecture is correct then KANT *constructs* the "I think". He does not *discern* it in the analysis of the forms of judgement or proposition or the forms of synthesis made manifest by those forms. At this juncture we are bound to refer again to the issue of the reason, from the systematic point of view, as the hierarchical peak enabling the introducing into the architectonics of the system the position of the "I" in the transcendental sense. One could assume in this context that there is bound to be an affinity or homogeneity between the "I" as being endowed with reflection or self-consciousness and the "I" as KANT understood it, in the transcendental sense, as the principle of synthesis or unification.

11.

We may distinguish in the position or in the meaning of the "I" three components: a) the "I" amounts to self-consciousness. On the empirical level one can wonder whether self-consciousness is an ongoing activity or whether it amounts to an entity. It is clear that KANT did not want to apply the notion of an entity to the "I" on the transcendental level, because that notion would carry in it the possibility of confusing the "I" and the substance. Hence the analogy to self-consciousness leads rather in the direction of emphasizing the activity or the spontaneity of the "I" than emphasizing the permanence of it. b) The other side of the same coin would be the formal unity of self-consciousness, that is to say, whatever we think in our consciousness is a manifestation of the self-same consciousness. There is an identity inherent in self-consciousness. Yet the question is whether that identity has to be amplified and posited on the transcendental level, since there is no transition from forms on one level to forms on another level, unlike the case in terms of the transition from formal to transcendental logic. c) The third element to be

identified in self-consciousness is its spontaneity. When consciousness is apprehending itself — this is an act of intentionality of consciousness which is created by consciousness itself. As such it is present on the empirical level. In order to emphasize the component of spontaneity there is no need to make the step from the empirical to the transcendental level.

This point could be rendered in a different form by saying: reflection is the very characteristic of consciousness. It is identical with self-consciousness. Reflection amounts to the turning of the intentionality of consciousness to consciousness itself. As there is self-activity in intentionality as such so there is self-activity in this particular direction of intentionality which is described as reflection. Hence the three elements of unity or unification which apparently KANT has visualized and which brought him to presuppose transcendental self-consciousness qua unity are present already on the empirical level. There is no need to step over that level and its structure and introduce the level of transcendentality in terms of the "I". KANT was probably bothered by the possibility of assuming that the empirical consciousness can entertain trans-empirical structures or transcendental categorial statements. He attempted to safeguard, as it were, the symmetry between the trans-empirical on the level of structure of thinking and the trans-empirical on the level of activity of thinking, i. e. transcendental apperception in its various formulations. Yet this seems to be the vulnerable spot in the whole systematic position — and on this topic additional comments are apposite since we are concerned both with the exposition of KANT's arguments as well as with the systematic validity of those arguments.

The first point to be made is one of identification or description: knowledge is an activity performed by subjects. But when they know, when they establish their findings, prove them or are looking for justification of them, they use non-personal forms, non-personal in the sense of transcending their biographical identity or unity as subjects; they are applying transpersonal structures for the sake of establishing knowledge or refuting it. Indeed, this might be a built-in dialectical situation of knowledge which can be put negatively from the different end: one does not need to presuppose a transcendental subject in order to safeguard knowledge as an activity and as a sum-total of findings. Thinking is a structured activity; that structure is indeed introduced into or is present in knowledge concerned with data. But in order to maintain structures we do not have to introduce into the scope of our knowledge a non-empirical subject, because the double-faced situation of knowledge is precisely that the empirical subject entertains transcendental forms or structures. These are built-in in thinking and its manifestations.

An additional consideration is apposite: the fact that thinking is made manifest in a plurality of forms does not call for a presupposition of a unifying self-consciousness. The very analogy or similarity between the various struc-

tures as structures of unification or of categorial statements brings into prominence the kinship between these structures. They are unifying and as such they do not need to be grounded in the transcendental apperception. To put it again in the terms employed before: such a unity would be a postulate introduced or demanded because of architectonic considerations but not because of the character of the activity of knowledge and its basic synthesis — the term does not have a KANTian connotation — between being empirical on the one hand and entertaining a transcendental structure on the other. It is, therefore, not fortuitous that KANT could not point to the facticity of the transcendental apperception as he pointed to the facticity of freedom.

Yet precisely that correlation between the empirical status of the subject and his consciousness and the non-empirical status of structures comes also to the forefront when we look back to the correlation between consciousness or will on the one hand and the moral imperative on the other.

12.

Moving to the exploration of the theme of transcendentality in the realm of ethics, we realize that the issue is related to what in KANT's well-known expression goes by the term "noumenal character".[2] The reasoning behind KANT's introduction of that notion and term can be summed up in the following way: there is a response to the moral norm or imperative. The moral imperative becomes in itself and out of itself an incentive for the moral behaviour. Since the moral norm is of a non-empirical content then it seems to follow that for the sake of the parallelism the non-empirical character is introduced also as the addressee for that norm. Negatively speaking — and this is in a sense a tacit presupposition — empirical human beings could not respond to the non-empirical norm. Hence the non-empirical correlate on the end of the subject is introduced into the scope. The subject in the sphere of knowledge is the non-empirical or transcendental subject; in the sphere of morality the position of the subject is to be determined by the moral imperative.

Again we have to raise the doubt whether this sort of parallelism is grounded or inherent in the sphere of ethics or perhaps is introduced by KANT for the sake of symmetry in order to maintain a symmetrical correlation between the non-empirical norm and the non-empirical subject, that is to say that the non-empirical aspect will be essential both on the end of the norms and on the end of the agent. This symmetry brings us to the aspect of freedom since

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[2] The relationship between the empirical elements and the ethical imperative in Kant is dealt with in the author's book: *Practice and Realization.* Studies in Kant's Moral Philosophy. The Hague 1979.

KANT tries to explain the reason behind the introduction of a trans-empirical subject whose position is to correspond to the trans-empirical moral norm; he relates the issue to that of freedom. KANT says: "The union of causality as freedom with the causality of the mechanism of nature, the first being given through the moral law and the latter to the natural law, and both as related to the same subject, man, is impossible unless man is conceived by pure consciousness as a being in itself in relation to the former, but by empirical reason as appearance in relation to the latter. Otherwise the self-contradiction of reason is unavoidable." (*KdpV* 6 note; 6)

Yet it seems that this reasoning cannot be considered as valid. In the first place, we notice that KANT himself points to the relationship between the moral law and the causality as freedom. Freedom is not separated as a causality from its intrinsic correlation to the moral law, but the moral law, by evoking te response in the human subject, establishes the freedom of the subject. The original reads here: "*feststeht*". We cannot assume that there is a free subject expecting, as it were, the presence of the moral law in his consciousness and through that presence the correlation between freedom as causality and the moral law would be established. Perhaps we can say the opposite of that: the significance and the supremacy of moral law is such that the law influences the human subject. That influence itself is establishing in the human subject the freedom as a response to the moral law. KANT's reasoning seems to be grounded in a transplantation of the notion of potentiality — referring to the human subject, and interpreting that notion of potentiality as implying freedom as causality in the trans-empirical sense. Yet, if we apply the notion of potentiality we have to be rather consistent and point to the fact that the empirical human being is endowed with the potentiality of responding to the moral law. In this case potentiality would be inherent in the empirical level. Hence it does not call for a trans-empirical level of freedom as causality. The supremacy of the moral law in the strict KANTian sense becomes prominent in that the moral law in itself and out of itself is a causative factor. This is the meaning of KANT's own view when he refers to the moral imperative as an incentive or as a norm evoking reverence, etc. Perhaps at this point KANT was too much involved in his conception about the structure of interaction or correlation in the sense indicated before, namely that he attempted to show that there is a parallelism between the trans-empirical meaning of the norm and the trans-empirical position of the subject. KANT refers here to the self-contradiction of reason — and this is the second point to which we have to address ourselves and express also some doubts as to its validity. Empirical consciousness within the realm of knowledge is not totally determined by the causality as connoting the mechanism of nature. The intentional reference of the empirical subject to the data of his knowledge is not an act engendered by the mechanism of nature. We can say that the presence of the data is due to

that mechanism but the intentionality, and the same applies obviously to reflection too, is not elicited by the mechanism of nature. Intentionality of the empirical subject, and reflection is a particular mode of direction of intentionality, is a primary act directed to data or referring to them. The correlation on the level of empirical knowledge is a correlation between data and intentionality; the two are not on the same level in terms of their structure and factors shaping and directing them. To make one step further we can say that intentionality in itself is an expression of freedom.

Hence the turn towards the moral norm and the acceptance of its guiding significance are eventually grounded in intentionality. As such they are presupposed by the moral field. The acceptance of the moral norm is a manifestation of the intentionality which in turn is not exhausted in the reference to the norm and its acceptance, but becomes prominent also in the attempt to transform that acceptance into an attitude shaped by the meaning of the norm. If we take intentionality to be an overriding phenomenon, characteristic of consciousness in its essence, there is no justification for attributing primacy neither to the cognitive subject nor to the moral subject. This is so because intentionality is a universal feature of the subject, which finds its different expressions in the cognitive and moral spheres respectively. The major difference between the two fields would lie in the fact that in the cognitive field the intentionality is directed in the first place to data whereas in the moral field the intentionality is directed to an abstract norm (and norm is abstract by definition) and not to data. But the very intentionality as a mediator between consciousness and norm is in a sense also safeguarding the very possibility that the norm will enter the horizon of the empirical subject and become a pervasive principle of his behaviour. The problematic situation of the moral field lies precisely here: following KANT's own line we could say that the acceptance of the moral norm by freedom in the trans-empirical sense is safeguarded by the affinity of the two trans-empirical factors, between freedom as causality and the norm as a guiding principle of that causality. Yet we know from KANT's own system that the himself was not satisfied with that affinity. This absence of satisfaction comes to prominence in his view about the incentives of practical reason but also in the notion of radical evil, that is to say, that human beings know the norm but do not absorb it into their actual behaviour and dispositions. These topics will be in the center of the present exploration in the forthcoming parts of it, including the analysis of religion.

13.

We are arguing against the hierarchical structure which amounts to the overcoming of the empirical subject both in the sphere of knowledge and of

morality. Overcoming does not connote Hegel's *Aufhebung.* The correlation, to which we refer, between the empirical subject and the moral norm, which is parallel to the correlation between the empirical subject and trans-personal structures of thinking embodied in categorial propositions, is to be encountered in the fact that the empirical subject can be and is influenced by motivations which are of an empirical character like drives, urges, ambitions, aspirations, etc. The moral norm or dilemma lies in the basic possibility of being determined or motivated by different incentives. The empirical subject is open to these different motivations. He ponders on the meaning of the moral norm within the context of his empirical situation, or else he might be inclined to interpret his motivation grounded in the situation as the motivation grounded in the norm. This is a parallel phenomenon to what is present in the sphere of knowledge, since within the field of knowledge the cognitive subjects are motivated by ways of knowing prevailing in their surroundings, *Zeitgeist,* accepted hypotheses, etc. But on the other hand they are meant to be motivated by the principle of truth whose motivation leads, or may lead, also to a continuous checking of the accepted or prevailing notions and beliefs. In both fields, that is to say, in knowledge and in ethics, it is the empirical subject who occupies the in-between position: he wavers between the motivations related to the situation and those related to the principles, i. e. that of truth and that of goodness. KANT thought apparently that it is not enough to point to that position of the subject or consciousness. Hence he attempted to establish two parallel layers in the two respective fields: that of transcendental consciousness in the field of knowledge and that of freedom as causality in the field of ethics.

Looking at these considerations we may sum up KANT's position and the reasoning behind it in the following way: in the field of knowledge the categorial propositions represent modes of universalization, characteristic of knowledge since knowledge would be meaningless were it not universal in its direction or in its goal. If this is the case, a second aspect comes to the forefront in KANT's analysis. There is a plurality of categorial propositions or forms. The plurality cannot be, to put it like that, the last word. We need, as it were, a unity above plurality and that unity is the universal transcendental consciousness which accompanies all the different modes of unification and categories and is, in itself, the birth-place of those modes of unification. To some extent KANT followed here, knowingly or not, the PLATONIC model of the plurality of ideas and the apex of that plurality which is the idea of the good, as the ideas are above the plurality and to some extent, at least, even generating that plurality. Still we may doubt whether that model is valid, because the plurality in KANT's system is intrinsically endowed with a sort of unity, that is to say the very direction towards unification and universalization. Data are not left alone; they are moulded through the forms of the categorial

propositions. As such they are removed from their scattered position or from the encounter with personal-empirical subjects, in the limited sense of that notion. The trend towards unification being inherent in the categorial propositions does not call for a super-unity in the transcendental consciousness. The "I" is there on the level of the empirical subject whose cognitive acts are already a primary synthesis between reference to data and modes of unification. In this sense we can retain the whole notion of the transcendental philosophy and the Copernican hypothesis without being led in the direction of the transcendental "I".

An analogous argument is applied — *mutatis mutandis* — to the correlation Kant discerned in the sphere of ethics. The universal character of the norm is expressed in the very meaning of the norm which calls the agent to go beyond the frontiers of this personal existence in adhering to humanity or in accepting the universal law as a maxim for his deeds. The universality is, to use that term, of a substantive character embedded in the content of the norm. It does not call for the assumption of a trans-empirical subject to conform to that universality. One could even say that a universal subject would conform to the moral norm from the very beginning and the whole question of overcoming motivations which are outside the moral norm or against it would not arise at all. Clinging to Kant's distinction between the two subjects may create a parallelism between one mode of motivation which is of a sensuous character and another mode of motivation which is grounded in the moral norm. But such a parallelism, which indeed is a duality or a dichotomy, would leave aside a very significant aspect of the moral situation, namely the overcoming of the situational motivation. Kant himself was aware of the significance of that aspect and tried to illustrate that that overcoming is not a utopian situation. This being so leads us to the conclusion that a trans-empirical subject in the moral realm, if we introduce that concept at all, is created continuously by the overcoming of urges and drives which Kant refers to the mechanism of nature. Since such an overcoming is not a permanent — even static — position but expresses itself from time to time, here and now, in the formative acceptance of the moral norm, there is no continuing reality of a trans-empirical subject as a free subject. There is at the most a continuous establishment of such a subject without the warrant that the next step in acceptance of the moral norm will be safeguarded by the previous step. Again this is a situation parallel to that pertaining in the sphere of knowledge: by attempting to know through the adherence to the principle of truth as well as through the employment of trans-personal categorial structures we are not in a position to assume a safeguard guaranteeing that that attempt will be eventually realized. The duality and the tension is present and what counts here, as is the case also with the moral field, is the awareness of the tension and the decision to give supremacy to the trans-per-

sonal structures as well as to the norm. Yet that decision, in turn, is carried out by the empirical subject endowed with intentionality and reflection — the first referring to contents and the second referring, among other aspects, to the comparison between what has been done and what had, i. e. ought, to be done according to the principle and to the norm. Self-criticism becomes one of the manifestations of the empirical consciousness and thus again one of the expressions of the double-faced position of that subject.[3]

Winding up this exploration of KANT's position and before moving on to the exploration of Hegel's system in its basic structure, it is apposite to attempt again to identify the argument underlying KANT's position. Structurally speaking KANT starts with the primacy of reason since he is presenting the unity of what he calls rules of understanding subjected to principles. In other words, he presents the primacy of principles. That primacy in turn is justified by the logic of the system according to which there is no knowledge unless it is constructed. A construction presupposes or calls for principles according to which it is carried out. Essentially it does not matter whether the principles are comprised under the term reason, spontaneity or das *Prinzip des Ursprungs* (COHEN).

KANT made a further step, namely that he did not leave the sum-total of principles and reason in their trans-personal position. He presented a level of consciousness which perhaps does not occupy the same position as the principles, but nevertheless is still the corollary of the principles. As consciousness it is inherent or manifestied in an "I". It is an argument which leads KANT in the direction of the transcendental apperception. Precisely this architectonic consideration or a kind of parallelism between reason and consciousness calls for a critical reservation, since it places between the empirical subject and reason a kind of a mediator embodied in the transcendental apperception. As we have seen, the search for the mediator finds its expression in the realm of ethics as well, assuming freedom or a free agent in the total sense and not satisfying itself with the free acts of the empirical subjects. In a way, the primacy of spontaneity within the realm of knowledge, as well as within the realm of ethics, is made more prominent when reason or spontaneity have their impact upon the empirical subject than when the "pure mediator" is introduced, who as "pure" is already within the impact or juris-

[3] In the contemporary literature two discussions of the problem are to be mentioned: *P. F. Strawson: The Bounds of Sense — An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.* London 1968, and: *Günther Patzig: Immanuel Kant: Wie sind synthetische Urteile a priori möglich?* In: *Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen.* Hrsg. von J. Specht. Göttingen 1982, 9 ff. See also *Richard E. Aquilla: Personal Identity and Kant's Refutation of Idealism.* In: Kant-Studien. 10 (1979), Heft 3, 259 ff. The topic of the empirical subject has been dealt with systematically in the present author's book, *Spirit and Man: an Essay on Being and Value.* The Hague 1963. 3 ff., 157 ff.

diction of pure reason or pure spontaneity. Apparently, KANT assumed that there can be no reason unless there is consciousness accompanying it.

When we turn now to the exploration of Hegel's notion of spirit we shall find a similar argument though the consciousness is shifted from the orbit of the "I" to the orbit of totality. This will be the thread of our exploration of the concept of spirit, adhering to the notion of the replacement of the "I" with spirit. This line of exploration might shed light upon the fundamental difference between the two notions.[4]

[4] It might be apposite to refer here to Johann Edward Erdmann and take his statement as a motto for our forthcoming exploration of Hegel. Erdmann says: "We say e. g. that reason is in the world, and we mean by that not that in the world there are particular subjects . . . but we want to say by it, that what manifests itself in the world, the reason *(Vernunft)* is divine, that is to say therefore that reason is not in our head, but it exhibits itself also in reality." *Vorlesungen über Glauben und Wissen.* Berlin 1837. 147.

Chapter Two

BEYOND UNITY TOWARDS TOTALITY

1.

The previous critical comments on KANT's conception of the transcendental "I" were meant to show that phenomenologically speaking there is no need for the clear-cut distinction between concrete acts of cognition and the transcendental "I". Since the acts are imbued with meanings and aim at statements guided by the principle of truth, the acts of cognition are from the very beginning endowed with a trans-empirical meaning. The same applies to the relationship between decisions or acts and freedom — in the broad sense of that term.

This criticism, however, is of a minor importance. The major critical challenge, thematically and historically speaking, is posed by Hegel's system. This system centers around the comprehensive spirit as opposed to the isolated acts as presented by KANT. The "I" is characterised by Hegel as the becoming of immediacy or as immediacy itself (*Phän.* 25). The very description of the "I" as immediate points to the fact that the "I" is given or is the point of departure; as such it contains implicit data which stand in need of explication — and explication is indeed the task of the system. The "I" equals the "I"; nothing outside the "I" is distinguished or known (*Phän.* 606-607). This is, of course, due to the fact that the major characteristic feature of the "I" is its pure relationship to itself. The self-contained "I" in relationship to itself can be seen as what Hegel describes as the root of the infinite essence but not as that essence as such. In other words, the "I" is pure form and by the same token also the content of form (*Phil. Propädeutik*, § 12). Hence there is no content which has to be, as it were, brought back to the "I"; all content falls initially within the boundaries of the "I". This brings us back to the description of the "I" as immediate or subjective. As a matter of fact, this description amounts to the conclusion that the "I" is totally empty (*Phil. d. Rechts*, § 4): it is like a point, simple but active in its simplicity. Hegel concludes that KANT encounters difficulties moving from the "I" qua unity of self-consciousness to the determinations of the "I" qua the categories. After all, there are several categories, and each is a formulation of a certain structure of relations of functions. Yet the "I" itself is totally abstract and completely lacking deter-

mination (*Enz.* § 42). Hence the question is not only how the transition from the categories as propositions to data comes about (JACOBI: "how do we make the first knot"); the question is — placed on a higher level: how the initial transition from the "I" to concepts or propositions on the level of understanding is possible. The "I" has the instrinsic, subjective particularity of excluding anything which is different from it — and this is only another description of the abstraction inherent in the empty self-consciousness. To be sure, Hegel sees an affinity between the abstract "I" in and of itself, and spirit, since self-relation is also characteristic of the spirit. In other words, since spirit is the most comprehensive and constituting entity, whatever exists, exists within its realm and thus necessarily contains elements of self-relation. Yet there still exists this basic difference between the "I" and spirit: the "I" is merely subjective and amounts only to the certainty of itself (*Enz.* § 413). As subjective and bound up with subjective certainty the "I" cannot be comprehensive. It is only fair to mention that KANT never assumed that the "I" is comprehensive; on the contrary, KANT presented the "I" as the apperception or self-consciousness meant to accompany our representations or serve as a subject of our thought — and indeed Hegel acknowledges this (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 565 ff, 577-578). After all, one of the points Hegel makes is that this quality brings the "I" into a positive agent and thus leads to idealism, the ill of the modern age (*Gesch. d. Phil.* d 2. 4-5). Hegel sees that the KANTIAN *positing* "I" must be isolated. Hegel, in his system, replaces KANT's notion of *positing* with another that of *comprehending.* The Hegelian notion of comprehending links up with that of spirit, for spirit is not a positing agent but the exposition and explication of that which is implied in its immediacy in the "I". Spirit eventually comes to replace the "I". Hegel's criticism of the abstract character of the law on KANT's account, and of KANT's characterisation of the law as being isolated and separated (*Wiss. d. Logik.* 194) is but an extension if his criticism of the isolated character of the KANTIAN "I" and its legislation; essentially it does not matter whether Hegel's criticism of the law is meant to apply to society or the state, since it can be generalized to include the notion of law as such, characteristic of the activity of reason in KANT's sense.

2.

An additional aspect of Hegel's criticism of KANT's concept of the "I" appears in the characterisation of the nature of transcendental philosophy. Hegel maintains that transcendental philosophy as KANT understood it does not go beyond the categories, but presents the origins of that which can become transcendental or, to put it another way, refers only to the origin of the categories. The origin turns out to be consciousness itself (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 559). For Hegel, the distinction between the origin of our modes of thought

and its full-fledged explication — which amounts to the system or to spirit — is the basis of transcendental philosophy. Because KANT took self-consciousness as its basis, his philosophy does not make possible the reference to any thing outside the self.

What has been said about the "I" applies also to the nature of consciousness, since in it we find cognition on the one hand and negative objectivity on the other (*Phän.* 36). One of the characteristic features of the process of transition from immediacy to the spirit is the overcoming of that gap between the two and the bringing about of their synthesis. It is a task of philosophy to abandon the distinction between transcendental and empirical consciousness and thus to sublate *(aufheben)* the whole notion of pure consciousness (*Differenz*-Schrift.78 f). The abstract character of the "I" inherent in consciousness is its generality, and is similar to that of the co-ordinates "now", "here" or "this" in general. As these co-ordinates are abstractions from experienced situations, so is the "I" an abstraction (*Phän.* 86). This is in turn related to the characterisation of that which is abstract in its general form; it must be extricated from something and thus lacks the alleged self-sufficiency. The abstract is by definition imbued with a negation: it is a negation of that from which it has been abstracted. In this sense, there is a distinction between reality and abstraction; it is a mistake to assume that abstraction amounts to the simple (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 334). In a different sense, the abstract is finite and only the concrete is the truth or the infinite object (*Phil. d. Rel.* 226). The common notion that philosophy is of an abstract character runs counter to the real essence of philosophy which is very hostile to the abstract and leads back to the concrete. (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd. 1. 53) Hence, the attribute of abstractness which is essential for the notion of the transcendental "I" cannot be seen as corresponding to the essence of philosophy. It has validity which as such has not undergone the process of progressing. In a different rendering, we find that only the form can be seen as abstract; the essential content is concrete since it is the unity of distinguished determinations (ibid). If we are philosophically concerned with the conformity between content and form we cannot even preserve the distinction between form and content; the comprehensive sphere i. e. that of the spirit, leads us to the assertion of the adequacy or even of the unity of the content and the form. Again, we can say, anticipating the subsequent detailed analysis, that the spirit is that sphere where the adequacy and the unity of the content and the form are realised.

3.

Yet in terms of the notion of the beginning, we have to add one significant reservation. The distinction between consciousness and the object is already

inherently present in the essence of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, by definition, is self-reference in which the distinction is present between the referring "I" and the referred-to object, which is the very same "I". Hence, the notion of self-consciousness is implicitly a synthesis. This enables Hegel to say that the concept of spirit is already present in the concept of self-consciousness (*Phän.* 147). To interpret this statement we may suggest that the notion of self-consciousness is a sort of an anticipation of the concept of the spirit. On the one hand, the substance estranges itself from itself and becomes self-consciousness; on the other hand, self-consciousness estranges itself and becomes what Hegel calls every so often thinghood *(Dingheit)* (*Phän.* 574). Hence we could say that self-consciousness is the beginning of the spirit or is the spirit in its essence though still lacking the explication; it is a stage in the process from immediacy to the spirit. But this would be Hegel's attempt to draw a conclusion from the nature of self-consciousness which runs counter to the nature of self-consciousness in KANT's system: self-consciousness which as such is self-contained in KANT's system becomes here a point of departure for Hegel's own interpretation of the affinity between self-consciousness and the spirit.

4.

There is an additional aspect in the interpretation of the nature of self-consciousness which is by the same token a critical elaboration of KANT's notion. If consciousness presupposes the juxtaposition between cognition and its object (in Hegel's terms — the negativity) and if self-consciousness contains in itself the distinction between consciousness and its object then what the system is after is the synthesis of consciousness and thinghood and by the same token of self-consciousness and its self-sufficiency. This synthesis is the truth of the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, and that truth of the unity amounts to reason (*Enz.* § 437). Reason has to be understood in this context not only as an abstract concept, not only as the place or the level of a logical idea; it is an idea which evolved itself to the position of self-consciousness (ibid.) It is clear that the idea for KANT, pointing to something which is beyond experience, is a unity anticipated in the process of knowledge or cognition but cannot be seen as being endowed with self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is for KANT the anchor of experience and not a characteristic feature of the end of the process of cognition or evolvement of knowledge. Since Hegel attempts to bring about or to explicate the synthesis between the beginning and the end, and the end is not to be seen as a focus but as a comprehension and comprehensiveness, one of the characteristic features of spirit is that it remains in itself; as such it is endowed with self-consciousness i. e. being conscious of itself.

5.

The same applies to Hegel's criticism of KANT's practical philosophy since its main tenet is that the will is free, i. e. determines itself. Self-determination with respect to the spirit in its comprehensiveness is not confined to a faculty or to an agent; it cannot be confined to self-consciousness which lacks reality or in which we cannot discern being. Self-determination is essentially a characteristic feature of empirical self-consciousness and not of self-consciousness in its true nature since truth cannot be one-sided or antithetical (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 44-45). Thus Hegel's criticism of KANT has a definite direction since it is meant to show that even transcendental self-consciousness, on KANT's account, cannot be seen as transcendental in the strict sense of the term. KANT, as it were, transfers and imposes on the transcendental "I" features characteristic of empirical consciousness, once we identify as the essence of the empirical sphere contra-distinctions which have not been overcome. Once we grant that the "I" is transcendental, we are bound to go beyond KANT's position, which is essentially empirical, and not transcendental, as KANT supposed or pretended.

To sum up these introductory remarks on Hegel's concept of the spirit, and we shall come time and again to the comparisons between Hegel and KANT, we can say that there are different trends in Hegel's criticism. Hegel criticises the very nature of the transcendental "I" as being at most a point of departure but certainly is not a philosophical concept which as such is bound to go beyond the starting-point as well as beyond that which is immediately given. In addition, Hegel tries to show that the very dichotomy between the transcendental and the empirical is not only a mistake (because accepting dichotomies as the ultimate word is a mistake), but also because it grafts empirical features onto the transcendental notion. Finally, Hegel tries to show that if we examine the implicitly present structure of self-consciousness, we already find self-consciousness to be an anticipation of the truth because of he synthesis characteristic of it. Here self-consciousness is taken as being a step in the direction of discernment of the spirit — and this is a kind of concession which Hegel makes to KANT's notion of the "I" as self-consciousness, though obviously that concession is only a step in the direction of a full explication of the concept of spirit.

One additional point should be made here on account of our concern with concreteness and our question whether going beyond concreteness is at all necessary for the phenomenological characterisation of acts of knowledge and acts of decision and their corresponding validity. Hegel's conjunction of the absolute and the concrete which is a characterisation of the spirit (*Enz.* § 164) — points to his understanding of the notion of concreteness which is the unity of essentiality, universality and particularisation (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 201). Hegel criticises KANT because, on his own account, KANT did not

recognise that the subjective in itself is concrete or (alternatively) that the categories are concrete. Hence, concreteness is for him the unification of the unconditioned with the conditioned — and this is one of Hegel's particular glosses on the notion of conreteness. Hegel, to put it negatively, does not consider the possibility that the empirical, qua concrete, contains in itself by virtue of cognitive and ethical acts a kind of self-transcendence which amounts to the process of arriving at a comprehensive sphere. Acts are scattered but are not in their intentionality towards validity comprised by the totality of the spirit.

We now turn to a detailed analysis of Hegel's concept of spirit.

6.

We begin our analysis of Hegel's concept of spirit with some brief comments on the transformations of that concept taking into account its long and variegated tradition in philosophy. It can be said, observed JOHANNES HOFFMEISTER, that Christianity's shaken faith in God has been replaced by a faith in the metaphysical actuality and activity of spirit.[5] This saying, applied to HÖLDERLIN and Hegel, implies that the very concept of spirit has a primary religious meaning, which is indicated by the Biblical terms "ruah" in its Hebrew version, and "spiritus" or "pneuma" in the Latin and Greek versions. Though it will not be our task to explore the transformation of the meanings of the Biblical scriptures for the purpose of understanding Hegel's concept of spirit, it has to be noted that we find in the Biblical scriptures a kind of an elevation of the meaning of the term "ruah" from connoting breath to signifying the source and the essence of the higher capacities of man. Thus, for instance, reference is made to "ruah" as the breath of his lips (*Isayah,* 11;4); as wind (*Exodus,* 15;10); as excitement in the sense "that ruleth his spirit" (*Proverbs,* 16;22). The last reference is related in turn to the affinity between God and spirit, which became the central concept in the *New Testament.* As such spirit, being related to the Holy Ghost, is a gift to man (*Epistle to the Hebrews,* 6;4) — "and God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God" (*The First Epistle to the Corinthians,* 2;10). Hence we find in the later development of Christianity the concept of *"creator spiritus"*[6] in the sense that God is the locus of

[5] *Johannes Hoffmeister: Zum Geistbegriff des deutschen Idealismus bei Hölderlin und Hegel.* In: Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte. 10 (1932), 1-44.

[6] *Ernst Benz: Creator Spiritus, die Geistlehre des Joachim von Fiore.* In: Eranos Jahrbuch. 55 (1956), 285 ff; Consult the footnore p. 287. — Cf. *Hans Dreyer: Der Begriff Geist in der deutschen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel.* Berlin 1908; *Michael Theunissen: Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat.* Berlin 1970. — See also: *Werner Beierwaltes:*

life and its carrier — not of life as it is manifest in particular entities, but in the world at large. The philosophical concept of spirit absorbed, as hinted at before, the transformations of the Biblical notions. It has to be added in this context that in the Biblical text the spirit of God appears as akin to the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and the fear of the law (*Isayah*, 11;2); wisdom in its intellectual quality is already integrated into the broad meaning of "ruah". With the absorption of the philosophical notion of *nous*, spirit became even more intellectualized, if we may use that expression. Within the philosophical tradition these various nuances, to be traced both to the Biblical sources and to the philosophical term proper, appear to coalesce.

In daily parlance we use the term "spirit" as connoting a non-material essence or entity, as distinct from material entities. The term spirit or inspiration appears as being close to animation or to the principle of vivacity: recently it has been suggested that the German *Geist* is related to the notion of *Regsamkeit* and *Munterkeit*, and not so much to the transformation of the basic meaning of breath and wind. In this sense we use also, for instance, the juxtaposition of spirit and letter, where we speak of the letter and spirit of the law: spirit is related to the animating principle of the formulation, and at the same time to the latter's basic core or content.

7.

For our attempt at an understanding of Hegel's concept of *Geist*, we shall present some of the features of that concept and place them against the immediate philosophical background rather than against the broad history of ideas briefly summed up before.

We start with the characterization of spirit as the knowledge of itself in its externalization. Spirit is the entity of the essence which is the movement and the movement in turn retains in its otherness the equality or identity with itself (*Phän.* 313). The first feature to be underlined in the context is that of movement *(die Bewegung)*. That quality confers on spirit from the very beginning its dynamic character. That dynamic does not move aimlessly. On the contrary, as a movement it posits something which is external to the initiating or promoting principle. Thus we find within the spirit the distinc-

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Visio absoluta — Reflexion als Grundlage des göttlichen Prinzips bei Nicolaus Cusanus. In: Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Heidelberg 1978, mainly 30 ff. — On Hegel's development in the context see: *Hartmut Buchner: Hegel im Übergang von Religion zu Philosophie.* In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch. 78 (1971), 82-97. — On the relationship to Aristotle consult: *Walter Kern: Die Aristotelesdeutung Hegels.* Die Aufhebung des Aristotelischen "Nous" in Hegel's „Geist". In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch. 78 (1971), 238 ff. Consult also *Kenneth L. Schmitz: Hegel's attempt to forge a logic for Spirit.* In: Dialogue. 10 (1971), 653 ff.

tion between the movement and that at which the movement arrives as *Anderssein.* Yet despite this distinction the identity between the principle, the movement and its external manifestation, is retained. This is not an opaque structure; it is basically imbued with knowledge, that is to say, with self-knowledge; in this sense, in addition to the quality of movement, the quality of awareness is brought to the fore. To put it differently, the identity is not a mere fact but is also imbued with self-consciousness. Therefore, spirit is the knowledge of itself in its externalization.

This notion of self-equality or self-identity makes spirit an essence or an entity which is both in itself and outside itself. Being in itself renders spirit identical with freedom, since freedom is precisely this: to be at itself while being at something external. It is the determining of itself *(das Bestimmende seiner selbst; Enz.* § 24 Zus.). On the other end, while being at itself, it is also the sublation *(Aufhebung)* of the externality, and that sublation can be viewed as amounting to ideality (*Enz.* § 381 Zus.).Since ideality connotes the sublation of the external being it connotes this in terms of spatiality, temporality, material structure and being apart *(auseinander).* That ideality can be attained only through knowledge (*Enz.* § 383). This basic quality of going out and returning, that is to say the quality of a closed circle, turns spirit into an essence or an entity which is both infinite and finite but also neither this nor that (*Enz.* § 386). Having started with the quality of movement, and, as said before, not an aimless one, we encounter here a progress of spirit as development, whose aim is the objective fulfilment, and thus also the attainment of the freedom of its own knowledge (*Enz.* § 482). In this sense freedom in its ethical connotation and knowledge in its cognitive one coalesce. Indeed, the actual free will is the unity of the theoretical and practical spirit (*Enz.* § 481).

8.

Having sketched the broad outline of Hegel's concept of spirit, we may take a further step in the direction of what might be called a structural or phenomenological analysis of that concept. Our point of departure lies in Hegel's own tendency to conceive of spirit as *belebendes Gesetz* — in the sense of GOETHE: *des Lebens Leben Geist.* Spirit as the animating principle — if we may put it like that — is not a hidden principle, but one manifest in external occurrences which, by the same token, cease to be merely external. This is perhaps the basic notion or, in BERGSON's term, basic intuition of Hegel's concept of the spirit. Starting from this point, it is our task to see the various components which are comprised in that basic notion.

In the first place, in terms of the philosophical terminology or philosophical concepts, it can be said that Hegel's notion of the spirit is an amplification

of the concept of *causa sui*, about which Hegel said that it is its own cause and by that the effect of itself. This it is the mediation which sublates itself (*die sich selbst aufhebende Vermittelung; Phil. d. Rel.* 511; *causa sui* is a fully speculative concept; *Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd. 3. 142). At this point we have to observe that the meaning of speculation is related to the concept of mediation: it is not enough to say that *causa sui* connotes that the reality is its own beginning, and hence there can be no cause outside the total reality; being a cause of the total reality is concurrently being an effect. Hegel introduces into the concept of *causa sui* the self-referential character of reality or, to use a medieval concept, we could say that being a *causa sui* is concurrently *sibi causa.*

Hence the aspect of movement, to which we referred before, while quoting Hegel's description of spirit, is introduced into the scope of the concept of spirit, since the duality of cause and effect and their very identity imply *ab initio* a dynamic structure. Indeed, Hegel says early in his systematic development, that the movement is nothing but the eternal restoration of the identity out of the difference, and the new creation of the difference.[7] That movement is not necessarily a movement in time or space, but a dynamic relationship between aspects or components which as such constitute an essential interrelation. This brings the dialectic and the movement close together, since a thing as a moving thing has its own dialectic while the nature of the movement is to become something different or to sublate itself (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd. 2. 329). This aspect of movement or dialectic, which comprises both negativity and continuity, that is to say that the other is both different from the anchor at the beginning and still a continuation of it, makes movement either a model for the structure of the concepts, or at least germane to that structure (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd. 2. 334).

The combination of the aspects of *causa sui* with the dynamic aspect of movement leads us to emphasize an additional component in the structure of the spirit, namely that of determining, determination — *bestimmen, Bestimmung.* Hegel had in mind the logical meaning of determination, implying the features of a concept which refer to its content and its extension. As such they serve the purpose of the identification of the concept as well as its delineation from other concepts. The notion of *Bestimmung* was perhaps imbued also with FICHTE's interpretation of that notion, namely that the ego posits itself as determined by the non-ego, and the ego posits the non-ego as determined by itself. Yet there is a specific aspect of determining or determination in Hegel, namely self-determination. Obviously the emphasis would lie on "self", which in turn emerges as an amplification of the *causa*

[7] Cf. *Dissertatio philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum.* Werke. 16. 23.

sui aspect. Self-determination implies that all the qualities contained in the concept are manifestations, and are thus self-explications, of that concept. Moreover, for Hegel self-determination, in order to appear in its fullness, does not remain within the boundaries of "conceptual" qualities; self-determination leads eventually to coming into existence. Self-determination implies that the concept becomes something outside itself. The external is again brought back to the point of departure, which is the concept *in nuce,* as it were, before it became explicit and explicated. We notice again the affinity between *causa sui,* movement, explication and exposition (*Phil. d. Rel.* 91).

This interpretation, which brings together the three previously mentioned aspects, is reinforced by the application of the notion of freedom to the idea of spirit. The substance of spirit, Hegel says, is freedom. Freedom is interpreted in a twofold way: lack of dependence upon something else and self-reference (*sich auf sich selbst beziehen; Enz.* § 382). The first aspect of freedom could be interpreted as a negative aspect of it, or from a different angle, as a static and positional aspect of freedom. While the second aspect is by its very description of a dynamic character, since it points to the relation pertaining to the substance of spirit: the relation of self-reference. The *causa sui* aspect appears as reinforcing the notion of freedom or as reinforced by it, since freedom amounts to that which is being through itself (*Ästh.* Bd 2. 3). Yet the aspect of freedom does not only point to the ultimate position of the total reality, but also to what we described before as the self-referential character of that reality, since freedom is that determination — *Bestimmung* — which determines or creates itself. The movement towards the external is in one of its manifestations. It is the movement towards necessity, which in turn corresponds to the movement towards reality, taking the shape of the world. By the same token freedom takes the shape of necessity. Eventually that necessity, when conceived dialectically, is the rational concept of freedom *(der vernünftige Begriff der Freiheit)* which contains the necessity as sublated in itself (*Enz.* § 483). Again, it can be said that the only way to preserve freedom in the totalistic sense is by separating it from the structure of the correlation between freedom and necessity and by placing it on the level of a total reality, originating in itself, in which the necessity is posited. As such, necessity is the dialectical correlate of freedom but eventually it is brought back to the originating factor of freedom.

That aspect leads us to the conclusion that spirit amounts to a self-contained dynamic entity. As such it was understood by Hegel as amounting to the absolute, since the absolute is the explication *(das Auslegen)* as its own deed (*Tun; Wiss. d. Logik* II. 5). Hence the absolute as spirit is understood as the highest definition of the absolute, whereby the emphasis is placed on the aspect of self-consciousness and infinite creativity (*Enz.* § 384). Let us dwell first on self-creativity or on the self-created aspect of spirit qua absolute, or

the other way round, absolute qua spirit. This creativity is but another version of the active character of spirit, continuously creating itself and manifesting itself. Eventually the product and the activity as well as the beginning are comprised in one entity, and therefore the essence of spirit is its own deed (*Phil. d. Rel.* 435). All these descriptions are meant to be explications of spirit as the animating principle, which as such cannot go together with the distinction, even that hinted at before, between spirit and letter, since letter — understood here of course metaphorically — is an essential part of the animating spirit. To emphasize this total *Gestalt*, Hegel takes advantage of the notion of determination. To emphasize the active independence or the active self-containment of spirit, he brings into the scope of the description of the concept the aspects of freedom, activity, and eventually the aspect of being absolute.

Yet there is an additional aspect which has to be seen within the structure of spirit, which in turn is related to two mutually reinforcing components, namely the intelligibility of spirit and its self-reflective or self-observing character. Spirit in its essence is of an intelligible and thus transparent character: the agent or subject knowing that essence is but spirit itself. We move to an analysis of this additional aspect of spirit related as it is to consciousness and to knowledge.

9.

We approach the aspects of knowledge and self-knowledge which presuppose another aspect which can be described as the intelligibility of reality, the latter being to some extent Hegel's axiomatic presupposition in general and his point of departure in the direction of the concept of spirit in particular. We first mention the reference that knowledge is not primarily the condition of an object, but the identification of all empirical consciousness with pure knowledge (*Differenz*-Schrift. 78 ff). To be sure, it cannot be denied that knowledge represents the subjective side of cognition; therefore the object is the other (*Phil. d. Rel.* 132). At the same time knowledge, by establishing the subject's relation to the object as the other, ties the other to the subject. Thus we find concurrently in knowledge the aspect of reference to the other as well as the aspect of bringing the other into the orbit of the self. That bringing together or bringing back is accomplished by knowledge and not by the object, in so far as the object is retained in its primary position as being cognized but still as being strange to cognition. Hence, phenomenologically speaking, knowledge is both a partial relationship and an encompassing one. As such it is not only a bridge towards the other, but also a bridge whose vector is directed towards knowledge itself, by accomplishing that twofold relationship which can be described as going out and

going back. This description makes knowledge germane to the movement with which we started our analysis, as well as to the self-enclosed character of spirit a further manifestation of which will be discerned presently.

At this point we discern the affinity between knowledge in its broad description and self-consciousness. Characteristic of the "I" in Hegel's view is the content of the relationship as well as the relationship itself (*das Beziehen selbst; Phän.* 132). This is one of the central descriptions of the position of the "I" as well as of the position of knowledge and awareness; here we discern the "I" as the pole but also as a process. As a process, as said before, it goes out to the object. But it also internalizes the object in the structure of the "I", which is concomitant with its awareness — and as such it is a pole, which internalizes the process and the object. This double aspect finds its additional expression in the fact that self-consciousness, by being the object, is by the same token both an "I" and an object (*Phän.* 139). Self-consciousness appears as a model of the self-enclosed character of reality in general or, put differently, the "I" as self-consciousness occupies a paradigmatic position for the structure of reality, which supposedly is the same self-enclosed totality written large, as it were. At this point Hegel says that because of that structure the concept of spirit is already existing *(schon vorhanden).* We understand here self-consciousness as a manifestation of spirit, or conversely, spirit is the amplification of self-consciousness. Central is here this relationship between knowledge and object, which does not leave the two as correlates, but brings them into a realm which comprises both. Self-consciousness as such is not the totality or eventually the absolute free reason (*absolut freie Vernunft, Enz.* § 417); there is a progressive development from one self-consciousness to another. Through that development or explication self-consciousness is fundamentally congenial to free reason qua spirit. The basic relationship between these levels is that between the paradigm and its full realization, or from the other end self-consciousness is a manifestation of *Vernunft.* Still, it is significant to emphasize that a structural element of self-consciousness is what Hegel calls *Bei-sich-selbst-sein* (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 22). Hence the process or movement is not meant to place the beginning outside itself, but to develop the beginning in such a manner that the steps taken do not remove it from its primary position. It is one of the points of criticism voiced by Hegel against Kant, namely that Kant had not seen this essence of self-consciousness. In so far as we understand self-consciousness as one's knowledge of oneself, we can perhaps ask the question: what is the incentive or the initiating factor of that self-knowledge? Hegel says that it is God who impels us in that direction of self-knowledge, but God is but — *das eigene absolute Gesetz des Geistes* — the absolute law of the spirit (*Enz.* § 377). This is a very telling statement, because it is meant to imply that it is in the nature of spirit to know itself. In this sense self-knowledge im-

plies a basic affinity between itself and its motivating factor. Self-knowledge is, at least, a partial manifestation of spirit. As long as we remain within human boundaries, we realize that the inspiration present in self-knowledge or the inspiration motivating and eliciting it is by the same token a paradigm for self-knowledge. We are not inspired in self-consciousness by something outside ourselves which is just greater than we are. Our self-knowledge is structurally a kind of imitation of the structure of spirit. Because of that relationship self-knowledge is so central in the direction from spirit to itself as well as in the reverse direction. The self-referential character of spirit makes it akin to self-knowledge, and vice versa.

At this point it is appropriate to comment on the relationship between the religious connotation of the concept of spirit and the Hegelian, i. e. the speculative, connotation. In so far as in the religious tradition man's creativity is inspired by God or his spirit, it does not necessarily imply that the inspiration is of a translucent structure, for instance that it carries with itself both the difference between the subject and the object as well as the identity of the two. On the contrary, inspiration is sometimes taken as an external factor, whose structure is unknown. As such man is carried away by it, but does not necessarily follow or imitate that structure in his own realm. Hegel, by describing the relation between self-consciousness and spirit, regards self-consciousness as inherent in spirit *ab initio*, or as partaking in it. Thus the inspiring factor is greater in terms of the total reality, but not in terms of, if we may put it like that, the molecular structure. This leads to one of the most significant characteristic features of spirit, namely its intelligibility, since, as mentioned before, the structure of spirit is akin to the structure of self-knowledge. This is exemplified by the relationship between the idea and the reality. We turn now to the analysis of that aspect which is, perhaps, again one of the presuppositions of Hegel's system.

10.

Our analysis until now can be summed up in the following way: Hegel in and through his concept of spirit presents variations on the theme of *causa sui* as well as on the concept of substance. Referring to substance, Hegel presupposes that substance is that which is in itself and is understood from itself in the way SPINOZA put it in one of his definitions. Hegel adds — and this is perhaps the step taken from substance to subject — that, substance, to be understood from itself, is coterminous with understanding itself. Thus the notion of self-consciousness is taken to be inherent in the notion of substance. The step from substance to subject amounts to, or is mediated by, the essential status of self-consciousness. The difference between Hegel and KANT on this issue is obvious.

A similar reasoning applies to another aspect of *causa sui*, namely, that to be a cause of itself amounts to the notion that the definition includes existence. Were we take a step further by asking: what can be a closer meaning of that inclusion? Hegel says, for instance, by way of a definition of reality *(Wirklichkeit)*, that it is the unity of the essence and of the existence (*Wiss. d. Logik.* I. 184). What is even more significant: the real *(das Wirkliche)* is identified with manifesting itself. This means that it is itself in its externality and is in it (ibid. 201). Hence each real or actual is real or actual only inasmuch as it contains in itself the idea and expresses it. This seems to be the crucial aspect: the position of being real or actual is already a manifestation, i. e. a manifestation of the idea. Through this statement the equivalence of actuality and rationality receives its explanation. To look at reality or actuality as a unity of essence and existence, is to look at them as manifestations of a rational content, i. e. of the idea, since everything real or actual, in as much as it is true, is the idea.[8]

We have to explore the interconnection between the self-referential character of knowledge, and hence of self-consciousness, and the inner circle of the idea and its manifestation in reality and actuality. About the idea, says Hegel, criticizing KANT's notion of the idea, that it is the unification of the subjective and the objective. Every real or actual is an idea, since the idea indicates how the reality is determined by the concept (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 53; Bd 3. § 74). The position, in which the real things are not congruous with the idea, is but the other aspect of their finitude, and hence their lack of truth (*Phil. Propädeutik.* 94) This character of the idea amounts to the concreteness of it as the unity of distinct determinations. It is the task of philosophizing to show that the true, that is to say the idea, does not consist of empty generalities, but of a general or universal, which in itself is the particular or the determined. Again, this understanding of the idea is meant as a criticism of KANT, since for KANT the idea is the abstract general, and hence the indeterminate (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 239). We are about to deal separately with the notion of idea and ideal.

Though we usually refer to self-consciousness as embodying self-reflection or self-reference, for Hegel, self-reference is simultaneously a characteristic feature of actuality, as it is a characteristic feature of self-consciousness. We can even make a further step in this context by saying that reality or actuality, were it not derived from the structure of self-consciousness, would lack the quality of being a totality. Eventually, the unity of the subjective and the objective amounts to the position that actuality itself is imbued with self-con-

[8] See for instance the presentation in *Enz.* § 213; transl. 423 ff.

sciousness; self-consciousness is not an essential feature of subjectivity only. On the level of actuality, there is no room left for mere facticity of the real on the one hand and the self-enclosed self-consciousness on the other. Since this is so, reality or actuality cannot be conceived as mere data. They themselves are revelations, not revelations of a *deus absconditus*, but of a content or structure which, by virtue of being rational, can be described as the idea. The idea does not manifest itself in the sum-total of particulars furnishing the structure of the universe, neither does it reveal itself in the "work of God" as the call or the message. The idea, being the universal content, reveals itself as the totality of the universe and in it. This is the meaning of spirit in Hegel's conception: spirit is self-enclosed, and as such it is the unity of the idea and the existence on the pole of actuality, and the unity of the subject and object on the pole of self-consciousness.

In terms of the transformations of the notion of spirit, the following can be added: if the spirit is conceived as the wellspring of inspiration, there cannot be a disparity between the wellspring and that which is inspired by it. If knowledge is considered as the principal manifestation of the spirit, knowledge cannot contrapose its source, nor can the source be less than knowledge. If knowledge were both inspired by its wellspring and be different from its inherent structure, the wellspring would fall short of its effect or expression. This is unacceptable, because it would amount to a situation in which the manifestation is different and perhaps more significant than its essence and source. If we refer to becoming or to self-evolvement, we have to take these statements or metaphors seriously, that is to say, to consider the source as being structured in its self-referential character not less than in its outcome. This is why the affinity between spirit, inspiration, and the inspired are inherent in the system. The various attempts to define the notion of spirit are, as a matter of fact, articulations of that structure of the comprehensive actuality and that which is inherent in it.

This has obviously its impact on Hegel's definition or description of reason *(Vernunft)*. *Vernunft* is the certainty to be all reality or actuality (*Phän.* 177). Reason is the highest unification of consciousness and self-consciousness, or of the knowledge of an object and the knowledge of itself. (*Phil. Propädeutik.* 89-90). *Vernunft* is but another expression for the truth or for the idea, which is the essence of the spirit. It is only the spirit as such which knows that its nature is the reason and the truth (*Enz.* § 387). In this context it is not necessary to dwell on KANT's definition of *Vernunft* nor on the major systematic differences between KANT and Hegel which go along with that definition. For KANT — in brief — *Vernunft* in its broad sense is the capacity of a priori knowledge, and as such it is the capacity which brings forth the *principles* of a priori knowledge. Moreover, KANT relates *Vernunft* with the capacity to derive the particular from the general and to present the latter as according to

principles and as necessary;[9] but the particular is not an essential manifestation of the universal in Hegel's sense. For KANT, *Vernunft* connotes a capacity of pure thinking. It is basically related to the duality between principles and data, or between the general and the particular. Whereas for Hegel *Vernunft* is essentially a unity or, to put it dynamically, unification. Thus it cannot rest on the level of purity in KANT's sense. Two further aspects emerge in our analysis, the one related to the notion of end *(Zweck)* and the other to the characteristic qualities of men. These two aspects again are essential for the understanding of the concept of the spirit in Hegel, and shed light on the differences between Hegel and KANT.

11.

The affinity between the broad notion of end or *telos* and the specific — Hegelian — notion of *Geist* becomes paramount when we consider the end as grounded in a notion or in an idea, which as such gives rise to action or to development. This would be an ARISTOTELian version of the notion of the end, since an end is not for the sake of something else. The end is a limit, and as a limit it gives rise to acts for a purpose, and that purpose is a limit (*Metaphysics.* 994b, 10-15). The shape is the end and only that which attains an end is complete. Therefore what is characteristic of the notion of an end is that it precedes the process and gives rise to it, being in turn the completion of the process. Here the German expression *Vollendung* is adequate, because it connotes both fullness, perfection and the end in the chronological and substantive sense of that term. It is not necessary to dwell on the particular interaction, characteristic of the ARISTOTELian view, between the concept of *energeia* as a process or as a way, and that of *entelecheia* as a position of the end. It is essential from the ARISTOTELian point of view that the position of the end in its substantive and chronological sense elicits the process. Thus the end precedes the process and becomes its principle cause, rendered as the final cause. ST. THOMAS related the teleological process to the intelligent being, i.e. to God.

Yet one cannot be oblivious, at least as to one of the philosophical sources of the concept of end, of the fact that the end connotes the projection of our action; it is an end projected for the sake of our action, and as such our action is aimed at it. To be sure, without falling into an overly hasty typology, this is the core of KANT's notion of the end or *Zweck,* when KANT says, for instance, that an end is the concept of an object in so far as it contains at the same time

[9] *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht.* § 43.

the ground of the actuality of this object.[10] Therefore, where the representation of an effect is at the same time the ground determining an intelligent *(verständig)* efficient cause to its attainment, the effect thus represented is termed an end. We have to emphasize here the notion of representation, and consequently the notion of an intelligent efficient cause, whereby "intelligent" does not necessarily connote the conception of an independent ontological intelligent cause. It can be viewed as a human projection or as a regulative conception related to the process of nature. Basically Hegel is closer — and perhaps this is an understatement — to the ARISTOTELian view of the end than to the KANTian one. To be sure, Hegel renders the ARISTOTELian view in his own language when he says, for instance, that ARISTOTLE inquires into the moving factor or principle, and for him that factor is the *logos* qua the end (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 320); or when he says that the ultimate end *(Endzweck)* is the thought itself *(der Gedanke selbst)*. Therefore, according to that conception, the theory, which is, as it were, the philosophical correlate of the teleological structure of the universe, amounting to the view that its end is the *logos* or the thought, is the most perfect attainment, since it corresponds to the structure of the universe. Because of the awareness of the affinity between ARISTOTLE'S conception and the Hegelian rendering of it, Hegel is critical of the KANTIAN conception of finality since, as he says, the concept of finality *(Zweckmäßigkeit)* according to KANT is indeed necessary, but not as the determination of the objects themselves, but as a subjective principle. Thus, it is related to KANT'S *Verstandesphilosophie,* which as such relinquishes *Vernunft* (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 610).

In this sense Hegel attempts to relate te traditional concept of *Zweck* to his interpretation of spirit, by regarding the teleological cause as implying both the moving principle of actuality and its end. He says, for instance, that the end is that which is mediated or its effect, but at the same time it is the immediate, the first, and therefore the ground (*Phil. Propädeutik.* 141). Hence similar to the structure of spirit, the end as a teleological concept connotes both the beginning and the end qua fulfilment of the process. The inner teleological rhythm of the actuality contains in itself its own concept and is therefore concurrently end and means (ibid.). There can be stages in the attainment of the end, for instance, when there is a teleological process, though that process is not accompanied by self-understanding — and this is obviously the case of nature. But the ultimate fulfilment, again, is the convergence between the process and the concept. That fulfilment is grounded in the concept of spirit, since from the activity imbued with finality *(zweck-*

[10] *KdU.* Akad.-Ausg. Bd 5. 180; transl. 19.

mäßiges Tun) nothing comes out which is not already there beforehand (*Phil. d. Rel.* 159). Were it not for the inherence of self-understanding in the process, self-understanding would be outside the teleological *energeia.* Thus the end would not be complete or perfect on the one hand, and on the other the conception would emerge out of the blue. The activity grounded in the end is that of realization. Therefore realization implies both the fulfilment and its self-understanding. As a matter of fact, it could even be said that fulfilment implying that self-understanding would appear to us as a pleonastic or tautological proposition. When Hegel relates the end both to life and to spirit, he actually gives to life a spiritual interpretation. One of the methodical advantages of the employment of the concept of the spirit in the context of a teleological conception or, to put it differently, the attempt to bring together the two notions of *telos* and spirit, is for Hegel the merger which enables him to see different spheres of reality as stages in the one teleological process. These stages can be evaluated as such and they can be lodged accordingly. This is so because of the notion of the spirit which, by definition, amounst to the coalescence of the process with self-understanding. Hence we find this two-way identification from the *telos* to the spirit and from the spirit to the *telos.* Because of this conception, the interpretation of the structure and position of man and the difference prevailing in this context between KANT and Hegel becomes paramount. We turn to that issue.

12.

In our attempt at an understanding of Hegel's conception of the nature of man and his position within the scope of the universe, we start with a summary of KANT's conception of the subject. We do this not only because the juxtaposition of the two conceptions may throw additional light on the nature of the spirit, but also because an exploration of this particular subject brings into prominence some basic systematic differences between Hegel and KANT.

It is probably consistent with KANT's view of the end as grounded in the projection, as we called it, that KANT relates the nature of man to the notion of end. He says that the characteristic feature of humanity *(Menschheit),* in contradistinction to the essence of the animals, is the capacity to set an end, to oneself.[11] As we know from KANT's philosophy of history — and we are about to enlarge on that theme in a subsequent part of our analysis — going out of the present moment is one of the characteristics of reason. Thus it is related to the conjecture about the beginning of history. We may bring things together by assuming that the step transcending the present moment and the positing of ends are interlaced or, to put it differently, the focus on the posit-

[11] *Metaphysik der Sitten.* Zweiter Teil. Akad.-Ausg. Bd 5. 386; transl. 46.

ing of the end gives the step of transcending a moral innuendo, already so in the first place. With his capacity of positing ends, man's position as a person in the strict sense of the term, that is to say, as a subject qua end of moral practical reason, is connected. To be sure, the position of man as a person in the moral sense refers to the position of the *homo noumenon* who, as such, is not just a means of other human beings, but has to be regarded as an end in himself. In this sense the descriptive quality of *Menschheit* is immediately an object for reverence; the descriptive and the prescriptive aspects coincide. Out of this merger KANT derived certain imperatives or commandments, for instance: do not become slaves of human beings, and do not let others encroach on your rights with impunity (cf. note 18, 435; 101).

In this context KANT refers to what he calls *praktische Bestimmung* which can be translated as practical destiny or vocation. KANT is far from contending that nature as such provided man with a faculty needed for his end. The provision is only in a stepmotherly fashion. Man's position and his destiny depend on the moral law in him, that is to say, that law makes demands of us which as such elicit our response, without making definite promises or threats. Here, too, the inner relationship between the moral law, the practical destiny and the supersensuous realm is estalished. KANT says in the context that only when this respect has become active and dominating, it allows us a view into the realm of the super-sensuous, though we can view it only with a glimpse (*mit schwachen Blicken, KdpV* 144 ff; transl. 152). We can sum up by saying that we encounter in KANT's conception of the position of man an explicit tendency towards practical reason, and even more the interconnection between the projection of ends, the position of being and the transcendence of the natural condition, the acceptance of the moral law as the guiding principle, which as such elicits our response qua respect. At this point the transcendence of the natural condition touches upon the noumenal or the super-sensuous.

It strikes us immediately that in Hegel's conception of man the emphasis is placed on the relationship between man and thinking spirit. The characterisic quality of man is his self-elevation above the particularity of sensuous feelings *(Empfindung)* to the level of the universality of thought, i. e. to self-knowledge and to the comprehension of his subjectivity (*Enz.* § 381). In this sense man is spirit for himself. Here again the emphasis is on "for himself", since, according to Hegel's basic view, nature is spirit too, but it lacks self-knowledge or *Fürsichsein.* To be sure, Hegel does not disregard the aspect so strongly brought forward by KANT, viz. *Selbstzweck.* But even here we may question, at least to some extent, whether that position of an end is related to the moral destiny of man or to his cognitive destiny as a comprehending or cognitive being — what Hegel calls *"die Bestimmung zur Ewigkeit"* (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 427). At this point it is obvious that the concept of *Ewigkeit* is related

to that of idea or the spirit. Eternity will not be, nor was it before: it is (*sie ist, Enz.* § 258). If this is so, then even the ethical innuendo attributed to the position of man as an end in itself cannot be detached from the broad view of the spirit and its nature. Hence, for Hegel, man is a finite consciousness, but just the same he is the spirit in the determination of finitude (*Phil. d. Rel.* 41). It can be observed that *"Bestimmung"* is essentially an ambiguous term, since it is both determination and destiny — a characteristic feature and a projected vocation. To be sure, when Hegel says that man is the finite consciousness, and as such he is the spirit within finitude — the term *"Bestimmung"* has in the context propably a descriptive rather than a prescriptive quality. Hence the shift we are analysing by means of a comparison with KANT's conception becomes prominent again: in Hegel the focus is self-consciousness and its manifestations as well as its position within the scope of spirit; it is not man's practical destiny. It is for this reason that Hegel does not refer to the noumenal or to the super sensuous realm, which is open only to man's "glimpse". He speaks explicitly about elevation to infinity. That elevation is brought about by conceiving of nature theoretically in thought and practically through the harmony between the spiritual idea, reason, the good and nature (*Ästh.* Bd 1. 2, 38). The last point can be summed up by saying that for Hegel even the practical aspect of destiny is not practical in the limited sense of the term; it refers to the comprehensive harmony — and there is no need to elaborate on this point, since it is part of Hegel's conception of morality. This brings us back to his disparity with KANT — and our exploration refers to this issue.

A further observation is called for. It is related to the position of self-consciousness in KANT compared with that in Hegel, though KANT's analysis of that concept does not occur within his ethical interpretation of human destiny. In his criticism of DESCARTES, KANT says that for DESCARTES the immediate inner experience is possible only on the assumption of outer experience (*KdrV* 278; 244). Self-consciousness in the CARTESIAN sense is meaningful only in a situation of correlation, and cannot be seen within its own boundaries. Because of this basic position of correlation, KANT says that I am conscious that there are things outside me, which have a relation to my senses with the same certainty as I am conscious that I myself exist as determined in time (36, note; 36 note). Hence for KANT the affirmation of self-consciousness or self-awareness cannot be a secluded sphere. The overcoming of the "monadic" character of self-consciousness, if we may put it in these terms, makes for the relation of that consciousness to the broad context of experience. For Hegel the situation is phenomenologically, and thus also ontologically, different, due to the aspect of positing, which is so essential in his system. In self-consciousness, which is the becoming spirit *(der werdende Geist)*, we discern that double rhythm to which we referred before, namely that the substance

turns out to be self-consciousness; conversely self-consciousness becomes externalized (*Phän.* 574). Therefore, that which is encountered as given in KANT's sense is not just encountered but has to be seen in the dialectical context of self-externalization. Hence KANT, according to Hegel, describes only the empirical, the finite, and the sensuous self-consciousness, that is to say, he does not ascribe any reality to self-consciousness (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 572, 578). Reality or actuality have to be understood here in the strict sense as being total and hence self-enclosed, and not in the KANTian sense as correlated to the broad context of experience or of time. An additional observation about Hegel's interpretation of DESCARTES may enhance the understanding of the disparity between himself and KANT on the issue we are analysing here.

KANT in his criticism of DESCARTES places the emphasis on the latter's excluding experience from the context of self-consciousness; self-consciousness cannot be posited in isolation. Here again Hegel's interpretation, as well as his criticism, of DESCARTES are indicative of his conception of man's essence and likewise of his conception of the spirit. He says, for instance, that in DESCARTES' philosophy existence *(Dasein)* is not understood as the negative aspect of self-consciousness. DESCARTES negates the extension from the essence to God; he does not bring back the extension into thinking, and thus remains within the duality of substances, without realizing that extension is just the negative aspect of substance; in a nutshell, there is no dialectical evolvement in DESCARTES. For him, being is in thinking. Yet being, as such, is "a poor determination", since it is only an abstractum derived from the concretum of thinking (*KdrV* 355; 343). Hence Hegel does not criticize DESCARTES for the absence of the context of experience, as KANT did, but for his direct identification of self-consciousness with being, without realizing the dialectical evolvement from self-consciousness to being or actuality. If we see this criticism within the context of the essence of man and of spirit, we come to the conclusion that in Hegel's eyes DESCARTES' self-consciousness is not the paradigm, from the human point of view, of the duality and the synthesis of thinking and reality. It is, as it were, a unity preceding the explicit synthesis, though the synthesis can be brought about only on the basis of the dialectical evolvement of the aspects at stake.

It is therefore possible to present a resumé of Hegel's conception of the nature of man by pointing to two aspects combined in that conception: (a) From the human point of view, man's self-consciousness is for us a model of the dialectical identity of thinking and being. From the universal point of view — that is to say, from the point of view of the spirit — human self-consciousness in its duality and synthesis is a partial manifestation of the dialectical identity of thinking and being. Human self-consciousness is therefore a *Nachbild* of the nature of the spirit. Here again we have to underscore that

the position of being a *Nachbild* carries with it the relationship to the identity of thinking and being, and not, as in KANT's philosophy, the relationship to will or to legislation. The importance of that aspect will become even more prominent when we analyse the respective interpretations of the nature of philosophy. (b) The second point is that, self-consciousness is at least *pros hemas* a model for the identity and *pros auton* it participates in the total identity of thinking and being. Being a partial manifestation of that identity, it is, by the same token, an emanation of it. The totalistic interpretation characteristic of Hegel's conception or presupposition leads him in the direction of presenting the position of man as indicating the structure of the totality on the one hand and as making that structure manifest on the other. The difference between KANT and Hegel becomes prominent at this juncture: for KANT self-consciousness is an anchor of thinking; for Hegel it is a manifestation of the totality expressed in the spirit.

13.

A further step in this direction calls for an interpretation of the notion of *Volksgeist* — though, as we shall see, from the position of the theory of spirit, the notion is not without some inherent problems. In the first place the very combination of *Volk* and *Geist* may sound as tautological or pleonastic. If nature is a manifestation of spirit or is spirit in its externalization, then *a fortiori* a people in the historical sense, is such a manifestation, since a people is by definition lodged within human boundaries. These could perhaps be understood as an in-between sphere — between nature on the one hand and the *Weltgeist* and its philosophical interpretation on the other. One of the reasons for the very introduction of the term *Volksgeist* lies perhaps in a certain ambiguity of the term *Volk*, which is present in Hegel, and not just aphoristically so, being rather close to the notion of *populus* or a populace and not to people in the historical sense of the term. For instance, when Hegel says that philosophy has to recognize the possibility to raise "*das Volk*" to its level, but it should not demean itself to the level of the people (*Über das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik.* Bd 1. 185; transl. 196) — he understands *Volk* in the context as plebs, as the common masses. But even in the context of the notion of the sovereignty, he makes it clear that it cannot be assumed that *das Volk* necessarily understands best what serves it. This is why Hegel himself describes the term *das Volk* as a particular part of the members of the state, and it is characteristic of this part that it does not know what it wills (*Phil. d. Rechts.* § 391; transl. 196).

In contradistinction to that description, according to Hegel, *Volksgeist* implies in its very definition a historical entity, expressed in mores, laws and

constitution; these are grounded in the inner life of a *Volksgeist* (*Phil. Prop.* 222). In this sense we already find the characteristic structure of spirit in general, namely, its expressions or manifestations; in the inner life it becomes manifest. Hence *Volksgeist* is related to what is described by Hegel as the moral substance or as the actual spirit, which as such pertains to a family and to a people (*Phil. d. Rechts.* § 156; transl. p. 110). People *(Volk)* appears here not in its political connotation nor in the context of the question of aiming at something and being aware of the best, but in the sense of a collective entity, characterized by a specific quality of the spirit. Hegel uses the term to which we referred in its various transmutations: *ein bestimmter Geist* or *der bestimmte Volksgeist* (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 84-85); *bestimmt* related as it is to *Bestimmung* implies here both determination and particularity. In view of the fundamental historical meaning of *Volksgeist,* Hegel refers to stages in the development of a *Volk* or a *Volksgeist,* which eventually reaches the stage which is what he described as the universal *(allgemein)* stage of its spirit. Because of the historical character of *Volksgeist,* the plurality of *Volksgeister* are only moments of one universal spirit. As such they elevate themselves and find their consummation in a totality which conceives of itself *(zu einer sich erfassenden Totalität erhebt und abschließt*; ibid. 97). *Volksgeist* has to be conceived within the context of the objective spirit *(der objektive Geist)*; the characteristic quality of the objective spirit is that it is the absolute idea, but only as given in itself *(an sich seiend*; *Enz.* § 483). As such it differs from the absolute spirit, which is characterized by the identity that reverts to itself, and is thus imbued with self-consciousness. *Volksgeist,* as an in-between manifestation of spirit, whose position is epitomized by its belonging to the sphere of the objective spirit, lacks therefore self-consciousness, which is characteristic of the individual self-consciousness as well as of absolute spirit.

Therefore we can understand the basic trend of Hegel's description of *Volksgeist* as pointing to the creative quality of spirit: it constitutes collective human entities, imbued with the historical component und characterized by a particular and determined direction of that creativity. But Hegel goes farther when he says, for instance, that the individual lives within the scent of his people *(im Dufte seines Volkes).* He goes even farther when he says that the people, the general or universal consciousness, the spirit of a people, is the substance whose accident is the individual consciousness (*Phil. d. Rel.* 218). At this point we have to ask: how is it at all possible to attribute to the people consciousness, and a general or universal consciousness at that, and even turn the individual consciousness into an accident of the former, when the creativity of the collective entity qua *Volksgeist,* because is belongs into the sphere of the objective spirit, is by definition lacking self-awareness? Hegel has perhaps overstated his case somewhat; we are mentioning this be-

cause the relationship between the *Volksgeist* and the *Volk* in the sense of *Volksgeist* and the individual consciousness as defined here runs counter to the paradigmatic position of self-consciousness, which we analysed before in terms of the essence of man, as well as in terms of the broad aspect of the dialectical identity between awareness and being. On the positive side, this aspect will be central when we come to analyse Hegel's understanding of the nature of philosophy — and here too a comparison between KANT's and Hegel's respective positions is called for.

14.

KANT's understanding of the nature and tasks of philosophy is not unrelated to his understanding of *Menschheit* in terms of the capacity of positing ends. Philosophy is described or defined by him as the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason *(Teleologia rationis humanae).* Concurrently, the philosopher is not an artificer in the field of reason, but is himself the lawgiver of human reason (*KdrV* 867; transl. 657-658). To be sure, even when KANT takes exception to the vainglorious pretense of calling oneself a philosopher, since in his description — and this is significant also for our understanding of Hegel — philosophy in this sense is an idea alone, the notion of the lawgiver has to be understood essentially in a very attenuated fashion. As the lawgiver, the philosopher is actually reading the ends or aims of reason. His function as a lawgiver is secondary, because the ends are inherent in reason. The task of the philosopher is to explicate the teleological character of reason. That essence of reason is emphasized in relating the ends with the destiny of man, in the sense analysed before. The ultimate end is but the whole destiny or vocation of man. Philosophy which deals with this aspect is termed moral philosophy, and — this is a consequence drawn by KANT — moral philosophy is superior to all other occupations of reason. It is appropriate to mention in this context that KANT looks back at history by referring to the ancients who, in their use of the term "philosopher", always meant more especialy the moralist. To that historical or ideational line of descendence he gives a topical interpretation speaking about exhibiting self-control under the guidance of reason (*KdrV* 969; transl. 658). It is in this context that he refers to the cosmic concept of philosophy qua *Weltbegriff,* pointing to the concept as one which relates to that in which everyone necessarily has an interest (*KdrV* 868 note; transl. 658 note) — whereby he presupposes that the concept of interest itself points in the teleological direction. The practical or moral end is the supreme interest from the human point of view and concurrently an end from the point of view of the essence of reason. To be sure, a word of attenuation emerges in this context when KANT says that, in regard to the essential ends of human nature,

the highest philosophy cannot advance further than what is possible under the guidance which nature has bestowed even upon the most ordinary understanding (*dem gemeinsten Verstande; KdrV* 859; transl. 652). Hence the explication of the ends of reason carried out by philosophy is not consummated in a new guidance governing human actions or even human motivations qua *Gesinnung*; it is an explication proper of that which is present — at least implicitly — on the level of common understanding.

Cognate to this interpretation of the nature of philosophy is KANT's interpretation of the nature of *Weisheit* (wisdom). KANT derives from the traditional terminology of *Weisheit* or *Weisheitsliteratur*, as it is known from traditional sources including the Bible, that wisdom implies guidance in the affairs of everyday existence. Philosophically he elevates or sublimates that common understanding of wisdom while referring to it as to a practical idea in his own systematic sense, that is to say that he is concerned with the practical employment of reason. In that direction the idea is related to our actual activities, and as such it is indispensably necessary. KANT tries in this sense to bring together in one comprehensive conception the idea of the necessary unity of all possible ends, as he puts it, with the guidance of our actual activities (*KdrV* 384-385; transl. 310). He apparently attempts to present a *Gestalt* which combines the structure of reason on the one hand, being teleological in its essence, and the guidance of human actions and behaviour on the other. Even more pointedly, when KANT says that wisdom is the idea of the lawful, perfect, practical employment of reason (*Anthropologie* § 43) he is referring to the issue of concordance between the will and the highest good as the supreme end. In this sense, for human beings wisdom is but the inner principle of the will to observe the moral laws or imperatives.[12] Summing up, we may say that in wisdom we find on the one hand a reference to moral self-understanding, and on the other a congruence of the will of a being with the final end. Again a *Gestalt* emerges, that of self-awareness in the moral sense with the moral or ethical structure of all activities converging in an *Endzweck* (*Met. d. Sitten.* 384). Philosophy is understood mainly in the practical sense, and wisdom, either terminologically conceived or accepted in its traditional connotation, has mainly a practical or moral connotation. To be sure, it is taken out of the context of sagesse in order to give it the meaning of "practical" in KANT's systematic sense and not that of practical in the sense of prudence. Yet we still remain within the ethical connotation of philosophy and of wisdom.

[12] *Verkündigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Tractats zum ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie.* Akad.-Ausg. Bd 8. 418.

At this juncture Hegel's reference to the traditional notion of *sophos* and *philosophos* is rather telling. Referring to PYTHAGORAS (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 227) Hegel does not accept the interpretation, e. g. by DIOGENES LAERTIUS, that PYTHAGORAS replaced the term *sophos* with the term *philosophos* in order to present a more modest description, emphasizing not the possession of *Weisheit* but the striving for it as an end which as such is unatainable. Hegel interprets *sophos* as a wise man who is also practical. Therefore, for him *philosophos* is meant to bring into prominence the opposition to participation in practical life, that is to say, in public affairs of the state. *Philosophos*, as he says, interpreting PYTHAGORAS, is a person who entertains a relationship to wisdom as an object *(ein Verhältnis zur Weisheit als Gegenstand)*. At this point Hegel adds an interpretation, which is indicative of his own understanding of both wisdom and philosophy, namely: "This state is cogitation *(Nachdenken)* and not more being, but so that one is occupied with it also in thoughts. For sure, one who likes wine *(philoinos)* is to be distinguished from one who is full of wine (a drunk); yet does *philoinos* signify only a vain craving for wine?" (ibid.) It goes without saying that the central point here is *Nachdenken*, which as such is not mere being but an activity of thinking and the position of being and the meeting between the two correlates within thinking. This is but one of the articulations of the concept of the spirit. We shall elaborate now on this theoretical or speculative understanding of wisdom and philosophy, which differs from KANT'S understanding, by a closer analysis of some of Hegel's own presentations.

Since the term *Nachdenken* appears in the context, it is apposite to say a few words about the meaning of that term, even though it would be preposterous to presume that a definition proper can be presented. Hegel himself refers to *Nachdenken* as reflection, *raisonnement*, but he includes under this broad heading philosophy as well (*Enz.* § 22; *Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 243). Thus he removes *Nachdenken* from being only thinking and paying attention to something in the broad sense. He relates the notion to some of the distinct characteristic features of philosophical thinking in the systematic sense of that term. He says, for instance, that *Nachdenken* brings into consciousness the true nature of the object. From this point of view, *Nachdenken* is just an equivalent of *Denken* in its precise sense, that is to say, the free concept which is also free in terms of its content. Hegel attempts again, be the terminology he employs what it may, to point to the equilibrium between thinking and its object. This in turn is a characteristic feature of the spirit, as it emerged already from our analysis so far. It is not surprising that Hegel considers his own characterization of *Denken* as a recapitulation of the ARISTOTELIAN understanding of thinking, namely, that the principal moment in the ARISTOTELIAN philosophy is that thinking and the thought *(das Gedachte)* are one (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 330). He relates thinking in this sense or direction

to speculation — we shall return to that issue later — since to think in a speculative manner amounts to the dissolution of something actual *(ein Wirkliches auflösen)*. This direction is carried out when the differences according to the determinations of thinking are first juxtaposed and thus the object is conceived as a unity of both. It is therefore only consistent to regard these various expressions of the speculative-reflective activity as the task of philosophy, since the principal idea of philosophy is to conceive the unity of thinking and being — (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 535) — as stated by Hegel in his introductory comment on the recent German philosophy.

This exploration of the variations on the theme of *Nachdenken* shows that it is consistent with Hegel's understanding that *Weisheit* and *Weltweisheit* take a speculative meaning as against the practical one which we analysed before in the KANTian system, even though the understanding of *Weisheit* was transformed through the definite conception in KANT's system. It should be observed that Hegel does not refer to the wise *man*, but to the wisdom of the universe, or to what he calls the "real reason" (*die reale Vernunft; Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 159). This can be taken as the motto for the whole system, and that motto can be explicated as rendering reason ontologically. We referred before to the broad conception of the intellegibility of being. That intelligibility appears now not only as reason written large, but as the very essence of being. Hence wisdom refers to the deciphering of that real essence and not to the projection of human ends; the inner standard of that deciphering is the awareness of the identity of thinking and being. It is wisdom about that which reality is in its essence. Hence there is eventually no difference between *Weltweisheit* and philosophy, since to know what is the reasonable *(was das Vernünftige sei)* is the task of both philosophy and *Weltweisheit*. Wisdom is, therefore, a system in which the divine idea is mirrored. (*Phil. d. Rel.* 254). Hence even when we start with the separation between human wisdom and the divine idea, eventually, because of the motivating force which lies in reality and which is by the same token the prompting factor of our thinking in the direction of speculation, the identity between the idea and the awareness of it become the essential quality of wisdom and of philosophy.

Hegel tries to retain the KANTian emphasis of the free essence of thinking. But according to the structure of his system and its inner logic he broadens the understanding of freedom. Freedom is not only a spontaneous decision which is guided by the laws of reason. It is also the fullness of thinking, which as such goes out beyond the limited sphere of thinking and reaches out towards reality. Freedom does not find its consummate manifestation in ends and their projection, but in the identity with being, whereby the essence of being is intelligibility. The achievement of thinking is reaching that identity from the perspective of thinking and within the activity of it. Intelligi-

bility and intelligence meet and are essentially expressions of the basic identity of the two ends. That identity, when it becomes explicit, is identity proper, i. e. identity imbued with self-understanding. The interpretation of the nature of philosophy is only a reiteration of those aspects. Philosophy is understood as the conceptual articulation of the totality, and totality again is just another rendering of the spirit, or another rendering of the identity between thought and thinking. If the spirit is the transformation of the *An sich* into the *Für sich* (*Phän.* 605) and if that transformation is actually the understanding that intelligibility is intelligence, then we have eventually described the locus of philosophy, its essence and its task. The task of philosophy is to comprehend that what is: that what is — is reason. This is a shift from the practical to the theoretical or speculative, since we are no longer concerned with the question of ends, but with the consciousness of the absolute unity overcoming the various separations and distinctions (*Enz.* § 213). Philosophy as the idea of thinking itself (*Enz.* § 514) ceases to be contemplation or even *theoria* in the classical sense. As long as there is a distinction between the contemplating subject and its object, we remain within the realm of observation, be the level of that observation as high as it may. But philosophy — and here again there is no terminological or substantive difference between *Weltweisheit* and philosophy — has as its task the overcoming of the strongest contradiction, which amounts to the contradiction or even distinction between the subject and the object. It is the nature of philosophy that the concept develops the truth out of itself (*Phil. d. Rel.* 202). In this context philosophy is related in its very essence to an understanding of the totality as an immanent one. Philosophy is an understanding of the totality within that totality, and not, for instance, the demarcation of the boundaries of human understanding, or the projection of the totality as a convergence of different aspects of human activities. The principal idea of philosophy is the unity of thinking and being. What philosophy innovates, is that it makes that unity an object of its consideration in order to understand it (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 535). The unity is there, it explicates itself: philosophy is in a way the organ of that explication, or, to put it differently, a deliberate understanding of the unity between being and concept.

Coming back at this point to the previous exploration of KANT's and Hegel's interpretations and evaluations respectively, we could say that being is thinking, without the *"ergo"* bringing the two together. It is the task of philosophy to explicate that primary unity through *Nachdenken,* which is *Nach-denken* proper, since *Denken* follows the structure of reality. The unity between self-awareness and being is transplanted by Hegel from the confines of self-consciousness to the structure of reality at large. Having taken that step in terms of the development of philosophy, philosophy does not start with self-consciousness — it starts with being, even if understood as

material. The emergence of the unity of being and consciousness is part and parcel of the structure of philosophical thinking, which becomes explicit through detours in the history of philosophy, whereby the latest, most recent and newest philosophy is the most developed, the richest and the profoundest one (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 55). In this type of philosophy, where the position in time and the quality coincide, the emergence of the self-understanding of being becomes the principal indicator of the consummation of philosophical thinking. Here we can present as the resumé: Not *Cogito ergo sum*, but *esse = cogitare*. The difference between KANT's and Hegel's respective approaches becomes manifest in their analyses of theory and practice — a topic which will be explored in a subsequent part of the present book.

15.

The difference between KANT and Hegel can be expressed, in terms of the respective concepts of philosophy, as that between viewing philosophy mainly as an activity, and as such as a projective one — in contradistinction to viewing philosophy as a contemplating discernment of that which is essentially spiritual or philosophical. KANT understands speculation as theoretical knowledge, whose object cannot be attained in any experience (*KdrV* 662; transl. 527). Speculation points, therefore, to the activity of philosophical delineation. For Hegel, speculation is the conception of the contradictory in its unity, or, from the other end, the conception of the positive in the negative (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 44). It is the task of speculation to sublate the distinction between subject and object and thus to establish their identity. The speculative element amounts to the positive rational *(das positiv-Vernünftige)*; as such it is a spiritual element, which is authentically philosophic (*Über Phil. Unterricht.* Bd 3. 314). In this sense, speculation as *das positiv-Vernünftige* ceases to be a delineating activity, looking, as it were, from above on the scene of objects. It is an activity, if that expression is permitted at all, imbued with a content, recapturing through articulation the spiritual essence of actuality and thus bringing into prominence that essence which may be hidden or lacking explication. Hegel says in this sense that life can only be grasped speculatively, since it is precisely in life where the speculative exists (*Enz.* § 337). Life stands here as a synonym of actuality. It is probably introduced into the context not in order to stress the organic character of actuality, but the complexities and interrelations characteristic of it. Coming back in this context to a systematic-historic association, we may say that philosophy is an analysis not of the soul coming back to the ideas (PLATO); the ideas or the idea are restablishing themselves through the philosophical speculation. Hence there exists a basic affinity between the spirit and philosophy as a speculative

activity; the spirit, which is essentially endowed with self-awareness, becomes explicitly so through philosophy. That self-awareness passes through detours of the history of the world and of the philosophical systems. These detours are only transitions in the direction of the reformation of the full and explicit affinity between the spirit and philosophy. To be sure, we remain somehow within the duality, because philosophy is, after all, a continuing and consecutive human activity, and is not the world as such. But through philosophy the world as such becomes — to apply that traditional philosophical metaphor — illuminated.

16.

At this point we have to reiterate the philosophical motivation which lies behind Hegel's concept of spirit. We start with a comment on the position of what Hegel calls the universal — *das Allgemeine.* The unification of the universal, which amounts to the being in general, and to the particular, which amounts to the subjective being — this alone is the truth. This is of a speculative nature (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 32). Moreover, the particular is not an addendum to the universal; the universal itself opens itself up to the determinate, to the particular (*entschließt sich zum Bestimmten; Phil. d. Rel.* 255). Because of these considerations, and this is perhaps the pivotal point, thinking amounts to bringing something into the form of universality (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 113). This is so, since the universal is that which is called the rational *(das Vernünftige)* and which can be comprehended only in a speculative manner. Looking into these descriptions, we may identify as Hegel's *Leitmotif* the conception that in our understanding and thinking we are already moved, i. e. inspired, by an element — let us call it substance — which is basically beyond the boundaries of our individuality. While thinking, we are already integrated into a content and a structure which moves us, and thus goes beyond the immanent boundaries of individual self-consciousness. In this sense again Hegel goes beyond the immanent individualism characteristic of Descartes. But he is obviously not satisfied with Kant's projective acts of transceding. These have to be replaced by a transcendence which appears within the boundaries of immanence. It thus ceases to be transcendent, or, from the reverse perspective, the distinction between transcendence and immanence becomes sublated in the totality, which is both substantive and imbued with awareness. For Hegel that totality is the spirit. The spirit thinks in ourselves: when we think we are not only inspired or animated, but the content of what we are thinking is within ourselves. When the content is thought *(das Gedachte),* it cannot be deprived of thinking, or thinking is not an external addendum to what is thought of. The same structure applies from the other end, that is, thinking is not a gratuitous activity,

seeking as it were the thought or content, as thinking it is imbued initially with that which is thought of. The concept of the spirit seems to Hegel to be the explication of that affinity between the object and the subject from both ends. Hegel attempts to safeguard that affinity by placing the object and the subject within the comprehensive sphere of the spirit.

Yet at the same time the problematic character of the concept of spirit comes to the forefront. Hegel took affinity to be idenity; he took the interrelation between object and subject not only as a correlation, but as two dialectical sides of the same structure. The sublation of the difference between subject and object, or between transcendence and immanence, is the vulnerable spot of the whole conception. Because of these steps in the direction of sublation, Hegel comes to a conception of philosophy as an activity which reaches its consummation, that is to say, it is adequate to the structure of the world which, as we have seen, is *vernünftig*. Hegel did not admit the possibility of interpreting thinking as "inspired"; he interpreted thinking as explicating that which inspires it and eventually presenting an adequate report on the subject-matter of philosophical thinking. He gave preponderance to self-awareness, but made it symmetrical with its object qua totality or the spirit. It is one of the critical issues of an analysis of awareness as well as of the structure of philosophical thinking to make the distinction between the dialectic of thinking which is both personal and trans-personal and the inherence of thinking in that which is thought of. Yet the primacy of thinking can be separated from the personal character of thinking without immersing it in the "immanent transcendence" or "transcendent immanence"[13], and this applies both to KANT and Hegel.

17.

The component of process is essential in the structure of spirit. In terms of process, history has to be viewed as inherent in spirit and concurrently as manifesting it. To shed additional light on the position of history within the realm of spirit it might be apposite to present a short analysis of KANT's conception of history and its position. That analysis will aid us in turn in exploring the particular — or paradoxical — conception of Hegel: history *sub specie speculationis* and not *actionis*. Both KANT and Hegel, when dealing with the phenomenon of history, apply concepts such as development or potentiality. KANT conceives of development as *Fortgang*, potentiality in terms of *Naturanlagen* — natural capacities. Hegel employs the broad concept of

[13] The subject has been delt with in the book: *From Substance to Subject*. Studies in Hegel. The Hague 1974.

Entwicklung, referring, for instance, to the development of a plant from its seed. Yet a closer analysis is bound to show that, where the issue of history is concerned, the difference between KANT and Hegel has a systematic significance and throws additional light on the difference between the two systems and their structural logic.

We first look at some comments made in KANT's *Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte*. KANT states that one must start out with something which human reason cannot derive from prior natural causes, namely the existence of man. Confining himself *ab initio* to the human realm, KANT refers to what is called human nature, understood as a given essence of the human species. That essence is characterized by the fact that man is a being whose skills are acquired. If he were born with skills like standing, walking and speaking, he would pass them on through heredity. It is a characteristic of man that he is not guided by instinct alone. Thus the natural infrastructure — if we may use this term — of man opens the vista for man's own activity and for his intervention in the course of nature. Eventually that activity leads him to develop manners and morals in the sense of *das Sittliche*. Reason appears in that structure. It first takes the shape of conscious expectation of the future. KANT does not refer to reason as the spontaneity of knowledge nor to the capacity to think the objects of sensuous intuition. Neither does he refer to reason qua *Vernunft* as the highest faculty of knowledge — though the two meanings of reason may perhaps be regarded as eventually amplifying the basic feature of reason, which — negatively — involves the overstepping in the absorption in the present. The capacity to face the future is, as he puts it, the most decisive mark of the human advantage *(Vorzug)*. It enables man to prepare himself for distant aims, according to his role as a human being. Reason is involved in the factual situation of the human beings, but at the same time it is the step towards man's release from the womb of nature. In this sense we are placing the beginning of history at the border between nature and culture, as a step beyond man's mere animal condition. Put differently, it is as a step from bondage to instinct to rational control, from the tutelage of nature to the state of freedom. This is the first step in the long series of endeavours towards perfection. The rhythm of nature is different from the rhythm of history: nature is the work of God and therefore begins with good, while history, being the work of man, as an active intervention of his and thus a manifestation of freedom, begins with wickedness. Man constantly remains within the duality or conflict between his striving towards the fulfilment of his moral destiny on the one hand and his unalterable subjection to laws governing the uncivilized and animal state on the other *(... Befolgung der für den rohen und tierischen Zustand ... gelegten Gesetze)*. This aspect of man's historical position is relevant for several aspects of KANT's system, including his philosophy of religion.

Culture constantly interferes with the natural functions, but at the same time the natural impulse interferes with culture. It follows from that interaction between nature and culture that man was meant to rise by his own labours above the crudeness of his natural dispositions. In so doing he has to take care lest he contravenes his natural capacities *(wider sie verstößt).* Ultimately, we encounter a phenomenon which comprises two aspects: (a) a gradual development from the worse to the better, and (b) the vocation given by nature to everyone to contribute as much to this progress as may be within his power (*Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte.* Bd 8. 107 ff; transl. 53 ff.

18.

It can be argued that the notion of potentiality, whether or not explicitly stated, appears in KANT's presentation of the dynamic character (dynamic derived from *dynamis*) of nature at large, and not only of human existence and of history as related to the latter. Thus, for instance, KANT says in *Von den verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen* (1775) that in the nature of an organic body like a plant or an animal there are grounds for a pre-determined "evolvement" *(Auswicklung)*; that *Auswicklung* concerns particular parts which are seeds. He refers further to natural predispositions — *natürliche Anlagen.* In *Kritik der Urteilskraft* he speaks metaphorically about attributing to the universal mother an organization suitably constituted for all these forms of life. Without that organization the possibility of the final form of the products of the animal and plant-kingdoms is quite unthinkable. In a footnote he says that as far as experience goes, all generations known to us is *generatio homonyma.* He understands by this term a generation which brings forth a product which in its very organization is of like kind with that which produced it (*KdU* 419-420; transl. 79-80).

Granting this broad evolutionary notion, we have to see the distinctive feature of history as presented in *Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht.* KANT maintains that all natural capacities are destined to evolve completely to their natural end. Subsequently he says that in man, who is the only rational creature on earth, those natural capacities are directed to the use of his reason. It is obvious that reason, by its very definition, even if we take it in its functional sense, cannot be listed with the natural capacities in as much as we understand nature, as KANT himself says, qua natural instincts. Reason itself does not work instinctively; reason requires trial, practice, and instruction in order to progress gradually from one level of insight *(Einsicht)* to a higher one. Nature, KANT says, has willed that man should, out of his own resources and by himself, produce everything that

goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence (*die mechanische Anordnung; Mutmaßlicher Anfang,* 15 ff; transl. 13 ff).

In our attempt at an interpretation of this conception the following emerges: the reference to or the hint at potentialities has a twofold meaning. In terms of nature at large, development of potentialities is viewed as a universal law. In terms of the human position, that universal law becomes more specific because it implies the transcendence of nature at large for the sake of human nature, the latter amounting to the development of the specific human capacities; these are reason as opposed to the instinctive equipment. Broadly, nature has willed this development to take place, namely that, according to the law of nature, there is a going beyond nature in the mechanical sense of that therm. Nature at large opens the possibility for the particular rhythm of the human potentiality or, to put it differently, nature at large by marking room for the human potantiality ceases to be the only determining principle of human existence. The emphasis placed on self-production within the scope of human nature opens again the space for history as the sum-total of consecutive human deeds. This aspect is reinforced by the fact that it is a characteristic feature of human nature that human potentialities can be fully developed only by the human race as a whole and not in and by the individual. This statement leads to the conclusion that, since the human race is the scene of human fulfilment, it is the process of history which is the developmental coordinate of the position of the race within the scope of human nature. Hence we reach the conclusion that history derives its justification from the fact that nature is an open-ended sphere. In addition, the legitimation of history in terms of its status or final cause lies in the fulfilment of the particular human potentialities. The intervention of human deeds in the process of nature — the intervention which in its sum-total amounts to history — is a manifestation of freedom. But freedom on the empirical level is a deliberate human action interposed into the course of nature. Freedom cannot be understood in the context of the transcendental sense as related to the intelligible character of man or in the legislative sense as giving rise to imperatives. KANT was probably concerned with the question of positing an in-between situation of the human condition in general, of finding a sort of anthropological *Sitz im Leben* for transcendental freedom, notwithstanding the dichotomy characteristic of his systematic conception, expressed in the fundamental distinction between the empirical and the intelligible, or between the natural and the transcendental. History has its origin in that in-between position and indeed its rhythm is shaped by that position.

That position is reinforced by the fact that nature keeps coming back to influence the historical process; nature brings about the development of all the human capacities by means of the antagonism prevailing amongst men in society. KANT calls that antagonism, as is well known, *ungesellige Geselligkeit*

der Menschen. He refers specifically to empirical, and therefore sensuous, urges of human beings in their selfish pretensions, such as man's inclination to laziness, to vainglory, man's lust for power, his avarice, his ambition to achieve eminence among his fellow-men whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw, etc. These motivating forces go on to bring about a universal civil society which administers law among men. In this sense the history of mankind can be seen as the realization of nature's covert plan to bring forth a perfectly constituted state. Such a state is the only condition in which the capacities of mankind can be fully developed. That condition also determines the external relations amongst states, which are perfectly adequate to this end. Hence the development of a constitution and a state is on the one hand a goal of the development of human capacities on the level of history, but on the other is the necessary condition for the full development of human capacities. It is warranted to interpret the latter part of that statement as implying that freedom in the transcendental sense can become a feature of the human character only in certain circumstances which are circumstances of culture and not of barbarism. This seems to be also one of the guiding ideas of KANT's *Zum ewigen Frieden.* The impact of the view discussed here on the notion of the state and the social contract will be explored in a subsequent part of the present book.

The position of the constitution and the state has to be understood rather precisely. These are modes of human coexistence in history, and thus ones on the level of man's empirical reality, though empirical in the sense of humanity qua race on the one hand and qua history as a span of time on the other. Within the limits of historical existence as empirical existence we do not refer to morality in the strict systematic sense of that term but to legality, as KANT understood that notion, namely when the moral law is not promoting its observance for its own sake, but is a code to which we adjust ourselves; we behave not for the sake of the law but in accordance with it. The emphasis does not lie on the moral conviction qua *Gesinnung,* but on the moral behaviour qua *Gesetzmäßigkeit.* Here, too, by the shift to the external aspect of human behaviour, KANT emphasizes the position of history both as an empirical domain and as a bridge between nature in general and specifically human nature and morality in the strict and systematic sense of that term. We move beyond laws of nature at large, though we still remain — vaguely — within the sphere of potentiality, without reaching the level of the laws of freedom. This aspect is amplified by the notion of progress — *Fortschritt* — and its position as an end of history and yet not as a trans-historical focus. We shall look into that aspect by referring mainly to *Der Streit der Fakultäten.*

19.

The notion of *Fortschritt* or the process of *Fortschreiten* is understood by KANT as related to a certain interpretation of practical reason and its commandments. It is a hypothesis which points to the fact that the "progressing towards the better" *(Fortschreiten zum Bessern)* can be interrupted but never stopped. When we take a closer look at KANT's notion of progress, we realize that it refers to humanity as a whole, united in the earthly society and divided into national groups. Man's natural endowment consists of a mixture of evil and goodness in unknown proportions. Hence no one can tell what effects man should expect from his own actions. This is one of the restatements of the idea that within the process the direction is not unilinear, because the active factors cannot be related to the *telos* of goodness, despite the progressive character of the process. The full course of the progress cannot escape the influence of the divergent operating forces of the process. The overall direction is — and this is of central significance — towards the evolution of a constitution governed by natural right. This implies that the progress referred to takes place on the level of the society or commonwealth. In this context KANT interprets what may be called a PLATONIC ideal qua *res publica noumenon* — which is not a figment of the imagination — as the eternal norm for all civil constitutions whatsoever, and as a means of ending of all wars. In the first place this interpretation gives a limited meaning to the notion of ideal because, even when it is understood as an eternal norm — and the eternal in this context may refer to the noumenal — it is still a norm for civil constitutions and not for freedom in the noumenal sense. The effect of the realization of that norm and the impact of the former relates to the situation of wars. It is therefore understandable that in this context KANT moves from the *res publica noumenon* to the *res publica phaenomenon*, without maintaining the strict dichotomy between the two. This is so since civil society, organized in conformity with that norm and governed by laws of freedom, is an example representing the ideal in the world of experience. The emphasis is placed on the arduous process of innumerable wars and conflicts, which eventually bring about the realization of the civil society. The benefit which will accrue to the human race as it works its way forward will not be an ever-increasing quantity of *morality* in its attitudes *(Gesinnung)*. Instead, what we find is the increased number of products of legality, i. e. of actions performed in accordance with duty, be the motive behind these actions what it may. This can be taken as a resumé of KANT's notion of progress, since it limits progress to the empirical realm to such an extent that it allows that realm be governed not by morality and freedom in the transcendental sense, but by legality and order in the empirical sense. Henceforth the position of history as a sphere on the borderline between nature and the noumenal realm precludes the viewing of history ontologically as a process of progress toward morality and freedom in

the strict sense of these terms. Such a *telos* of history would remove it from its proper position and place it on the level of the noumenon in its various connotations.[14] This conception is obviously relevant also for the position of the state and the social contract establishing it — as we shall see subsequently. Hence it is clear that for KANT the position of history is by the same token its limitation in terms of the motivating forces operating in it as well as in terms of the end toward which history is progressing. It is at this point that we shall notice that Hegel's lodging of the historical process manifests the basic systematic difference between himself and KANT. We move now to that topic.

20.

We start with the delineation of the process in history versus the process in nature. About nature Hegel says that the revitalization *(die Wiederbelebung)* in nature is only a repetition of the same thing. It is the boring story with the eternally uniform cycle. There is nothing new under the sun. Yet with the sun of the spirit it is otherwise. Its course or motion is not self-repeating and the appearance *(Ansehen)* is changing. The spirit shapes itself continuously in different forms; it is essentially progressing (*wesentlich Fortschreiten*).[15] This is said in spite of Hegel's reservation about the notion of progressing, which is not a satisfactory notion, since it implies the inference that man is endowed with a perfectibility which amounts to the real possibility and even the necessity to become ever more perfect. Such a notion has a quantitative innuendo; yet we are bound to conceive of the spirit as change, implying the qualitative and not the quantitative aspect. We have to note the end which has to be achieved and cannot be satisfied with progressing qua *Fortschreiten.*[16] This reservation vis-à-vis the concept of progressing can be understood in its significance when we see, in the first place, that the history of the world is in itself a step-by-step course *(Stufengang)* of the development of the principle, the content of which is — in accordance to the notion of spirit — the consciousness of freedom (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 70). Already this statement is indicative of the systematic difference between KANT and Hegel. In Hegel we view history as realization of the principle of spirit implied in it, and not as a

[14] *Der Streit der Fakultäten.* Akad.-Ausg. Bd 7. 79 ff. *The Contest of Faculties.* In: *Kant's Political Writings.* Ed. Hans Reiss. Transl. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge 1970. 177 ff.

[15] *G. W. Hegel: Die Vernunft in der Geschichte.* Hrsg. von J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg 1955. p. 70.

[16] Ibid. 150. — Consult: *Werner Marx: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.* Its Point and Purpose — A Commentary on the Preface and Introduction. Transl. Peter Heath. New York/Evanston/San Francisco/London 1975. Also: *Otto Pöggeler: Philosophie und Geschichte.* In: *Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes.* Freiburg/München 1973. 299 ff.

process motivated by different factors which, when coinciding, lead to a certain form of régime qua civil society. Again: it is already implied that the focal point of history is not a régime but the consciousness of freedom — hence the focus is the spirit and not civil society. We do not encounter here the distinction between legality and morality, of freedom in terms of an order vis-à-vis freedom in terms of the primary synthesis between decision and law — in KANT's sense. This view of KANT is related to the fact that freedom on the level of history is not relegated to the sphere of morality. Philosophy, to mention it again, is understood by Hegel as a science of freedom, since philosophy overcomes the strangeness of the objects and along with that the finitude of consciousness. Only in philosophy does reason qua *Vernunft* rest completely in itself. It is because of this consideration that Hegel interprets KANT in the direction that KANT included also the freedom of the spirit in the theoretical part of his philosophy.[17]

For Hegel the principle of freedom is implied in the very process and is not just a projected end, realized — to some extent only — empirically. Hence the development of spirit is concurrently a going out, explicating oneself, and by the same token coming back to oneself (*Herausgehn, Sichauseinanderlegen, und zugleich Zusichkommen; Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 51); development is seen within the sphere of the spirit, and whatever occurs is a manifestation of it. The universal idea is the basis of the process and remains the most comprehensive and unchanging factor (ibid. 56-57). It is from this point of view that we become aware of the fact that the very position of history is not on the border between nature and freedom. It is integrated within the sphere of the spirit and freedom, with that significant additional aspect, namely, that freedom does not connote the spontaneity of the will and its decisions, but the self-reference of the spirit, which amounts to the highest level of reflection.

This is emphasized by the view that history is the becoming which knows itself and which is mediated by itself. In different words, it is the spirit which externalized itself in time. History is the history of the thought which finds itself (*die Geschichte ... ist die Geschichte von dem Sich-selbst-Finden des Gedankens*; ibid. 31). Since freedom is the essence of the spirit, we remain within that essence and refer to its manifestations. To put it differently, keeping KANT's view before us, we may say that freedom is the beginning of history as well as its end. We do not distinguish between the conjecture as to the beginning of the process nor between the origin and the end, since the process of history takes place within the comprehensive sphere of the spirit and

[17] *Enz.* 1817. § 23; Über F. H. Jacobis Werke. Werke. Bd 17. 17.

freedom. The concept of the spirit is the point of departure, and history is a process of the spirit itself. History is the process in which the spirit reveals itself out of its bottomless enveloped consciousness to reach the standing of its own self-consciousness. Eventually the theoretical or philosophical imperative "know thyself", which is the absolute commandment of the spirit, finds its realization in the process of philosophical history (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 103). The disappearing of the distinction between the practical and speculative, between the process and the philosophical self-reflection, is indicative of the systematic position maintained by Hegel. Eventually his tory is not confined to the public realm of the civil society, the régime, the constitution, etc.; it is not a phenomenal expression of the noumenal republic which is realized in the process. It is the philosophical reflection in the speculative sense, which is manifest in history and achieved in it. This conception reinforced by the position of reflection which is the zenith of Hegel's view as well as an aspect epitomizing the major difference between his position and that of KANT.

21.

Reflection is coming-back *(Rückkehr)*; it amplifies the inner structure of thinking in its nature. Hegel makes a distinction between reflection and speculative thinking, since speculative thinking is the unity of opposing determinations of thinking *(gegensätzliche Denkbestimmungen)*. Hence we have to go beyond reflection to speculation proper. Speculation amounts to the identity of the subject and object and as such should be placed in the "theoretical" realm and ultimately in the sphere of the spirit. As such it would at first sight seem strange to relate history and its *telos* to speculation. But if we look at speculation from a broader point of view, being aware that for speculation the finitudes are radii of the infinite focus from which they emanate, then speculation should be regarded as related to the focus of history which as such brings about the very process (*Differenz*-Schrift. 162, 196). Thus it emerges that the factors of history are factors of the end of history. They are not grounded in the point of departure of history, i. e. nature, not in their continuous intervention in the process — as KANT thought. Going beyond the categorial distinction between subject and object, and clinging to the distinction between being and its concept, the speculative element is understood as the logical necessity to be in its being its own concept. History is one of the domains of speculation. Indeed, we encounter in Hegel one of those paradoxical or dialectical positions, whereby history is essentially related to the structure of thinking, and not to that of actions and deeds the latter being eventually subservient to the former. Just as a hint at this point we

could say that MARX' position about theory and practice is, more than it sounds, related to the issue of the locus of speculation or theory[18]. It is an attempt, deliberate or not, to bring back the locus of history to deeds qua praxis and to retract it from its position in speculation. To be sure, Hegel saw some factors intervening in the process of bringing together being and its concept and *die List der Vernunft* is an obvious case in point. Just the same, the teleological character of history amounts to bringing about not just freedom as spontaneity but speculation as a unity of reality and concept. We find a parallel logic in respect of the notion of infinity. Hegel saw the relationship between KANT's concept of freedom and the notion of infinite progress, since in the latter notion ineptness (*Untüchtigkeit*) becomes absolutely valid. The progress towards the infinite is related to the notion of the ought (*Sollen*), since we remain within the infinite is related to the notion of the ought (*Sollen*), since we remain in the dualism of existing and being for itself. In a very strong expression it is said that the notion of infinite progress belongs to the conceptless reflection. Inasmuch as true infinity is a reflection in itself, and the progress toward the infinite is the wrong infinity, then again *Fürsichsein* becomes the focus of history and of processes in general.

We come back to the difference between KANT and Hegel, which can be interpreted as a difference in the conception of freedom, as seen before, namely whether freedom is the origin of acts, and thus has at the outset an ethical connotation, or whether freedom is self-reflection of the highest order and thus has a speculative connotation. Hence for KANT history is lodged between nature and freedom, while for Hegel history is lodged within the encompassing speculative reflection, i. e. in the spirit.

22.

Some criticism of Hegel's concept of the spirit is oposite at this juncture. From here we shall take up some specific topics in KANT's and Hegel's respective systems.

Before presenting some critical comments on Hegel's concept of the spirit, it might be appropriate to juxtapose that concept and KANT's concept of the transcendental apperception. This juxtaposition might explicate the fundamental differences between the two systems in terms of their immanent structure. To state it briefly, we can say that KANT presented the architectonics of his system by way of discerning the anchor of our cognitions which, as

[18] See the present author's *Practice and Theory: Kant, Marx, Lukacs.* In: *Varieties of Marxism.* Ed. by S. Avineri. The Hague 1977. (The Van-Leer Jerusalem Foundation Series). Also: *Practice and Realization.* Studies in Kant. (The Hague 1979).

such, guarantees their unity. The highest point of cognition is by the same token the built-in guarantee that cognitions will not be rhapsodic or scattered but will relate to a unifying principle which provides a basis for the various conceptual or propositional steps taken in the direction of unity. To be sure, KANT employs in this connection the notion of synthesis when he says, for instance, that such an unity is possible only in synthesis according to rules (263; transl. 237). We have to be aware of the meaning of "synthesis" in this context: "Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which on their part represent nothing but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, insofar as the manifold has unity in apperception" (*KdrV* A 401; transl. 365). This statement emphasizes the hierarchical structure of KANT's system explicated before. Apperception, as the highest level of unity, is the ground of the possibilities of the categories which are the propositional manifestation of unity; but at the same time the categories are not just one principle: these are twelve categories. The concept of synthesis here is not that of a total synthesis of all data, processes and ideas, but of the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. Therefore the reference is to the manifold of sense-data which are unified in and through the categories, which in turn are grounded in the unity of apperception. Self-consciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is a condition of all unity and itself is unconditional (ibid.). The *unconditional* unity is not a *comprehensive* unity; it is a point or an anchor and not a circle or a comprehended sphere.

At this juncture Hegel steps in with his concept of the spirit as analysed above. Hegel attempts to replace the notion and the supposition of transcendental unity by that of a total unity. This is in line with the direction of the system which can be described in our context as rendering speculation applicable to the data by assuming the identity of the subject and object and expressing that identity in a determined way. For speculation the finitudes are to be conceived as radiations of the infinite focus which on the one hand emanates them and on the other is itself shaped by them.[19] While KANT understands speculative knowledge as referring to an object which cannot be reached by any experience, Hegel understands speculation as a mode of cognition which apprehends unity in the opposition itself. All objects are objects of pure thinking — and this character of thinking applies to nature and to the spirit. Pointing to the opposition on the one hand and to the overcoming it on the other is but a manifestation of the basic structure of Hegel's system: no contradictions or oppositions are the last word in the process of cognition. One of the expressions of that trend towards unity is the motto of

[19] Krit. Journal. Werke. Bd 1. 34, 68.

turning the substance into the subject[20] — whereas KANT while speaking of the transcendental unity underscores the distinction between the cognitive subject and substance as manifested — in this context — in the concept of the soul.

At this point we observe that the strength of Hegel's argument and structure is at the same time its weakness. We cannot assume a comprehensive unity overcoming limitations and dichotomies unless we presuppose that unity and unless we assume that whatever is present is concurrently a manifestation of the underlying unity as well as a stage towards the explication of it. The idea of unity according to KANT is inseparably bound up with the very nature of our reason (*KdrV* 722; transl. 656). Hegel, however, took the idea not only as a projected unity but as a unity which can be discerned step by step — because it is not the focal point of the approximation of our knowledge but already the point of departure of all manifestations including that of knowledge. Hegel did not accept the basic KANTIAN distinction between matter and form. Hegel held not only that there is no matter without form and no form without matter, but also that matter and form create each other reciprocally (*Phil. Prop.* 125). If the basic unity is not only a matter of fact but also a matter of mutual dependence and creation grounded in that very mutuality, we start with the unity and are concerned with making it explicit or, more precisely, the implicit unity makes itself explicit out of its own resources and momentum. The comprehensive unity made manifest in the concept of the spirit is thus a unity presupposed and not merely discerned *en route*. Unless we presuppose the total rationality of the world, that is to say the identity between reason and the surroundings of it, the ultimate identity can not be identified. KANT started his exploration by pointing to the duality of sensuality and reason; but once he started with the duality he could not overcome it. Hegel starts with the identity and moves to the progressive discernment of its presentations or manifestations, whereby even contradictions are interpreted as exhibiting the basic identiy. Hence Hegel can think that he presents a rounded-up system, that is to say that the initial identity re-occurs through the explication. Once that re-occurrence takes place we are as a matter of fact at the end of the process and at the peak of the system in the strict sense of the term. The two perspectives — that of the point of departure and that of the peak — are re-identified with each other, since the underlying presupposition is that of the identity. Earlier, we criticized KANT's system for not leaving the acts of cognition on the level of the meanings with which they are invested. The consequence of this view is that the acts of cognition themselves lead us beyond their empirical locus. KANT tried to ground the trans-

[20] See the previously referred to book: *From Substance to Subject.* Studies in Hegel (cf. note 13).

empirical character of cognition in the level of unity amplified in the transcendental apperception. This criticism of KANT is *a fortiori* applicable to Hegel, because Hegel is not satisfied — even — with the unifying principle of apperception. He attempts instead to establish a total unity — and not only an organising one as KANT did through his concept of transcendental apperception or his understanding of the notion of synthesis.

23.

There is a specific issue which may explicate the built-in difficulties of Hegel's system and its direction, namely the treatment of thinking on the one hand and acting or doing on the other. We point to that duality and its interpretation in Hegel because it is of major significance for the interpretation of several aspects of his system, including the distinction between theory and practice, to which we shall return shortly. When Hegel says, for instance (*Phil. Prop.* 114), that thinking is in general the apprehension and comprehension of the multitude in a unity — he, as a matter of fact, rephrases not only the traditional characterisation of thinking but KANT's characterisation as well. But since speculative thinking is for Hegel the highest manifestation of thinking, we have to examine the particular character of that mode of thinking. That mode amounts to the dissolution of the real. It places the dissolved real in the orbit of thinking; the distinctions according to the determinations of thinking are placed in the opposition and the object is comprehended as the unity of determinations qua unity of thinking and of the real (*Phil. d. Rel.* 39). It is clear from this statement that speculative thinking cannot take the distinction between thinking and the data as basic, which as such cannot be dissolved and has to be preserved. In Hegel's system the distinction is only a step between the initial and ultimate unity. That step is possible and even necessary since the real is not given but posited by thinking and, as such, is from the very beginning endowed with qualities of thinking. The unifying character of thinking is interpreted in its extreme mode as a unification not of data but of the world. Hence, according to Hegel, the task of philosophy is to comprehend the unity of thinking and being (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 552). At this point the difference between his system and KANT's is that KANT takes thinking as an ultimate datum and not as a component in a comprehensive unity.

Hegel attempts to overcome the fragmentary or piecemeal character of thinking and follows, as it were, the trend of thinking as a unifying activity in the direction of a totalistic interpretation which eventually amounts to a unification of being and thinking. Still, he attempts to preserve the primacy of thinking since the unification is to be comprehended as thought. Just the

same he makes the leap from the relationship between acts of thinking to the comprehensive character of it as an activity of unifying. Hegel attempts to have the best of the two worlds: both the activity of unification inherent in thinking and the total comprehensive unity of thinking and being. One may wonder whether the phenomenological character of thinking as unification from the vantage of meanings and for the sake of acts referring to them can be preserved when thinking takes the shape of an all-comprehensive identity with being.

24.

We wonder whether or not Hegel imposed his interpretation of action on the essence of thinking. But here too we may wonder whether according to this conception the distinction between thinking and acting or doing can still be preserved. In terms of acting and doing, Hegel says that the will posits its own inner determinations in an external existence in order to represent itself as idea (*Phil. Prop.* 215). We have to examine the meaning of that statement. In the first place the will is understood not as an activity or a factor leading towards an activity in its own essence but is, according to Hegel, a concept which as such is determining *(bestimmt)*. Hence Hegel tries to show that the will as such is a concept and not an initiating factor as KANT held. Secondly, although Hegel grants that the will attempts to give to its own internal qualities (or in his terminology: determinations) an external existence, he adds that, teleologically speaking, the attempt is made to present the will as idea (ibid. 215). The will is not concerned with the realisation of its objective, intention, project or plan: the will is concerned with the presentation of the idea. We recall that the idea is the most comprehensive expression of cognition and concepts. Accordingly, the will ceases to be piecemeal or fragmentary and takes the shape of a total attitude bringing about an activity which is directed not towards this or that objective but to the total identity between thinking and being. The will becomes a sort of agent mediating between thinking and being. One could say that since the essence of the spirit is its deed (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 61), the deed performed through the impetus of the will is both a representation or manifestation of the spirit as well as a step towards its actualisation. Hence in the analysis of the deed Hegel tries to show that there is a unity of the accomplished deed as well as of the subject of the activity which brings about the deed. Since the unity is the guiding principle of all these explorations, it is first realised on the level of doing or acting, albeit in a fragmentary way. But the fragment is only a transitional step towards the comprehensive unity.

The extent to which Hegel models activity after the paradigm of thinking is discernible in the following remark of his: "the activity is the middle link of the syllogism. One extreme of that syllogism is the universal which is the idea which as such is present in the internal structure of the spirit. The other extreme is the externality in general which amounts to the objective matter. The acitivity is the middle link which translates or transforms the universal in objectivity" (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 56). It is clear that the very application of the syllogistic structure, which is obviously a manifestation of thinking, warrants the previous suggestion that Hegel introduces into the realm of doing — or perhaps we should say *imposes* on that realm — the structure of thinking. Moreover, the role of acting or doing is that of bringing about that transposition of the idea into objectivity, or what he called before "external existence". Hegel does not view our activity or our deeds as intervening in the world as we encounter it or as means to shape it to our ends. He does not regard our doing or acting as fragmentary intervention whose outcome is absorbed into the reality in which we intervene. He treats doing or acting from a totalistic point of view, that of the materialisation of the idea in the comprehensive sense of the term contributing to, or already exemplifying, the unity of reason and reality. He does not raise the question of the various attitudes implied in the momentum of action, such as our awareness of the distance or chasm between ourselves as doers and the world in which we find ourselves present, if not forlorn; or our limited attempts to shape our environment in order to achieve a goal or re-incorporate the data of the world into the sphere of our own existence. As a matter of fact, again phenomenologically speaking, the sphere of acting or doing is more fragmentary than the sphere of thinking or cognition; being essentially a unification of data it is synthetic. Whereas acting or doing, since it is essentially a movement from subject to object, is not a unification but what we have called an intervention. Intervention shapes the reality in which we intervene even when *post factum* we come to the conclusion that the results of our interventions are eventually part of the reality changed through our acts. But the distinction between that which our acts are initially and that what becomes out of them as a matter of fact cannot be obliterated. Any philosophical analysis of the sphere of practice must allow for these distinctions. Here Hegel's totalistic unification is not concordant with the phenomenological structure of the various practical attitudes.

In a way, Hegel accepts and amplifies KANT's view: "For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot dissolve ... the concept of combination includes, besides the concept of the manifold and its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the manifold". (*KdrV* 130; transl. 152) Yet for Hegel the unification is not a deliberate act of understanding. The unity of the manifold is inherent in the manifold itself. This is one of the meanings of

the concept of the spirit; the spirit penetrates into the data of reality and *ab initio* creates the identity between reason and reality. The process of exhibition of the spiritual essence of reality is in a sense a process of dissolution and analysis but the two are only tentative explications or transitional stages in the direction of the ultimate unity. The dissolution at once presupposes the unity and leads towards it.

We shall analyse now in some detail two major aspects of the respective systems, namely theoretical knowledge and the practical attitude. These topics are significant in themselves but they also reinforce the distinctions put forward in our juxtaposition of transcendental apperception and the concept of spirit.

Chapter Three
COGNITION AND ACTION

1.

The structural difference between the two systems — the system based on the transcendental "I" or on reason as a faculty and the system based on the comprising concept and reality of the spirit — is bound to have its impact on some major aspects of the philosophical horizon. In the first place — on the analysis of knowledge or theory, differently understood in the two systems on the one hand and action or practice, again differently understood, on the other. We can preface the exploration in its details by suggesting that basic philosophical issues like knowledge and action are not only differently interpreted in systems based on structural differences, but their very placement and very description or definition are differently rendered following the immanent logic of the systems. It is not out task here to start with a systemic independent or semi-independent exposition of the two attitudes. By and large we follow the systems themselves, though here and there some aspects of principle beyond the respective systems are echoed.

KANT, and the same would apply to Hegel, to some extent followed the traditional distinctions. Yet one cannot be oblivious of the changes they introduced in the meaning of the two activities in their respective systems. Let us recall that in Greek philosophy theory amounts to the vision of the sublime or the highest: as ARISTOTLE said, theory is the most joyous and the best of the activities. As to practice, the traditional interpretation seems to waver between the emphasis to be placed on will and that on doing or acting.

Yet KANT changed the interpretation of theory because he could not equate theory with the contemplation of the highest sphere of reality and therefore conceive of it as an activity endowed with awareness of the most joyous and best of the human attitudes. Again, in terms of the sphere of action and practice though KANT realizes the relation between will and action, he amplifies the component of will. Only action emerging out of free will, in the sense to be analysed later, is of a moral character and thus belongs to the sphere of practical philosophy proper. The very fact that KANT employs the term 'absolute self-activity' (*KdrV* 446; 392) is an indication of the emphasis placed by him on the origin of the action which in the practical sphere amounts to will or to freedom.

2.

Where do we find KANT's anchor or point of departure for his own version of the distinction between theory and practice (*Prolegomena* § 58; transl. 107). Negatively speaking, it has to be observed that the study of nature, as KANT puts it, out of the sources of reason, does not connote the alleged derivation of the phenomena of nature from the highest reason. This negative statement is meant to emphasize not only that in theory we are concerned with nature as our subject-matter but also that there is no continuity from reason to the objects, i. e. phenomena, with which reason is concerned. The outcome of this proposition is that since reason is concerned with nature and the objects of which it is composed, the sources of pure reason are not the absolute beginning within the sphere of knowledge. We are always confined to conditions, and there can be no absolute origin of the synthesis concerned (*KdrV* 511; 435). Hence pure reason does not entail an immediate relationship to the objects (363; 306). Because of the lack of the direct relationship to the objects, KANT introduces an intermediary sphere, as it were, whereby pure reason refers to understanding and its propositions. Understanding, though it lies within the sphere of reason, is closer to the sphere of possible experience. As a matter of fact, it can never achieve more than to anticipate the form of possible experience in general (*KdrV* 303; 264). We start by looking at the faculty of reason, but, on the same showing, we are aware of its built-in limitation, since reason is a faculty or a capacity lacking as its primary correlate the corresponding object. Hence reason refers to its own limited or restricted manifestation qua understanding. That limitation is compensated, we may say, by the fact that on the level of understanding there is indeed a correlation between the capacity of a cognitive character and the givenness of objects-to-be. This distinction within the sphere of reason points on the one hand to the structure of knowledge or theory, but, on the other, leaves an open space for an additional interpretation and re-orientation of reason.

This reference to the two levels of the cognitive faculty is amplified by an additional interpretation of reason, namely, that reason is a legislating capacity (*KdrV* 868; 658). Legislation seems to be a focused manifestation of the spontaneity of reason: reason is totally independent. It is not derived from any sphere outside itself. As such it is an activity; knowledge is grounded in that active faculty. Legislation is a prescribing aspect of spontaneity; it guides that which spontaneity encounters within the sphere of nature, or it is of a creative character when no limitation is implied in the position of nature. Hence, continuing that characterization of reason, KANT says that the legislation of human reason has only two objects, namely, nature and freedom. The same notion put in terms of laws, or legislation, amounts to the proposition that reason has only two directions for the exercise of law-giving, namely, the law of nature and the law of moral behaviour (ibid.). At this

point KANT already brings into the scope of his interpretation a sphere which lies within the horizon of reason but is not within the horizon of understanding, namely of morality. Thus, both from the viewpoint of reason, and from that of the field of reference, it is outside or above understanding. Hence in the sphere of morality human reason shows what KANT calls true or genuine causality (*KdrV* 374; 314). We have already indicated that freedom is understood as causality or absolute self-activity. It is therefore appropriate to note at this juncture that one of the major distinctions between the cognitive or theoretical attitude and the practical or moral attitude is that the self-activity in the sphere of knowledge is by definition limited; it refers to *data* which are not created out of the sources of reason. That limitation does not apply to the sphere of practice or morality. At this juncture, we also find the concomitant distinction between theoretical knowledge and speculative knowledge. One of the descriptions of that distinction reads that in speculative knowledge there is a reference to an object, or in that knowledge we find such concepts of an object, which we cannot reach in any experience. Hence speculative knowledge is by definition not knowledge of nature, and is even opposite to it (*KdrV* 662; 527). The positive consequence drawn by KANT from that contradistinction is that speculative knowledge relates to fruitful practical employment (*KdrV* 421; 377) — and we could add here that it relates *only* to such employment.

3.

These distinctions are to be linked with an additional pair of distinctions of which the axis is the concept, as is well known, of the thing in itself. There is a correlation between understanding and the objects of nature; these objects are given to the understanding of that which is present before it. The thing in itself amounts to an object independent of sensuality (*KdrV* 252 note; 270, note), sensuality being the medium for the establishment of the contact with the data, or the sphere in which that contact occurs. Hence the architectonic structure of the system may lead not only to the distinction between that which is given and that which is not given, but also to a conjecture in terms of a possible correlation between reason and the thing in itself, once we look into the positional aspects of the two, namely; reason is above understanding — the thing in itself is beyond the data. This correlation is reinforced by KANT's theory of ideas: in the first place, the idea connotes a necessary concept of reason (*KdrV* 383; 318). We can emphasize this description by saying that it is a concept of reason but not of understanding (*KdrV* 383; 318). This position of the ideas is amplified by the KANTian description that ideas are unconditioned or, as he puts it, categories extended to the level of the unconditioned (*KdrV* 436; 386). The idea has an objective but indeterminate

validity; this is so because nowhere can experience be congruent to the idea (*KdrV* 691; 455, 649; 518). Ideas which connote something built-in in reason while lacking the realization which cannot be provided within the realm of reason, nevertheless point to reason's particular destiny, since they amount to a principle of the systematic unity of the employment of understanding (*Prolegomena* § 56; transl. 87).

At this stage an additional aspect of reason, as well as its thematic components, i. e. ideas, comes to the fore: on the level of understanding, the unity is provided by the synthesis of the data which is brought about by the laws imposed by understanding on the data. Since thinking is by definition unification, thinking of the data becomes knowledge. Thus knowledge is a unification of the variety encountered on the level of nature, or a unification multiplicity. KANT had in mind an additional aspect of unity, namely, what he refers to as unity of reason, or a system; that is to say, that the concepts applied on the level of understanding would be unified not only in terms of their functional application to the data but also in terms of what KANT calls — architectonic unity. In terms of the architectonic perspective all cognitions are looked at as belonging to one possible system (*KdrV* 502; 429). The system goes beyond the limits of application or applicability, i. e. beyond the reference to data. It points to the inner structure of the concepts, looked at from their own viewpoint in terms of unity and not from that of their possible reference to the given. To sum up, we may say that the notion of the thing in itself is presented from the point of view of the data being a correlate of the understanding, whereas the notion of idea — which will be analyzed separately — is put forward from the point of view of the concepts of understanding as such, disregarding their correlative position. Yet the common ground of the two notions is that both point negatively but also positively, to that which is not and cannot be included within the sphere of knowledge proper. Anticipating the subsequent part of our exploration we may say that KANT attempts to place morality not as a sphere parallel to that of knowledge but as one that would occupy the position envisaged by the critique of knowledge in terms of reading or interpreting positively that which cannot be experienced but is envisaged in the critique of knowledge of experience.

4.

An additional aspect, prominent in the tradition, is the relationship between practice as morality and the notion or principle of goodness. If we speak in a broad sense about morality we have in mind the shaping of the will leading to actions by a principle of preference. When we look into a term introduced by KANT, which will to be analysed presently, namely, the ideal of pure reason, we find that: KANT describes the notion of the ideal of pure reason as the con-

cept of a particular object which is fully determined by the mere idea (*KdrV* 602; 489). Hence he could understand the ideal as an object placed beyond experience, since it is determined by concepts only and not subjugated to the structure of the synthesis between concepts and data. Since ideas connote concepts of pure reason, not referring to objects, the ideal is an object determined by concepts only. Hence a step has been taken from the notion of the ideal of pure reason to the notion of the ideal of the highest good. The conjunction between the two, i. e. the ideal and the highest good, can possibly be understood in the following way: reason by definition is of a legislative capacity, but only reason proper, that is to say, not understanding, can be conceived of as a full legislative capacity. It follows from this description that only reason proper can overcome the limitations imposed on the legislative capacity of understanding. The manifestation of the highest legislative capacity of reason would be the combination of nature and morality, that is to say, the combination of that which would eventually concur within the world with our merit, in terms of our moral behaviour, to be worthy of the benefits of the real world which will be bestowed on us. This amounts to happiness within the structure of the world. The ideal of the highest goal is therefore an eventual combination of nature and morality; however morality has the priority in the sense of prescribing the course of nature and making it consonant with its own expectations which in turn are grounded in the moral principles. These are principles of reason. Thus the ideal is the highest manifestation of the idea, that is to say, of reason. It is a harmonious manifestation not legislating only in one segregated sphere, that of morality, but legislating in a total realm where nature and morality form an ultimate synthesis or even unity. This would be an ultimate realization within boundaries described by the critique of theoretical reason, thus constituting an attempt to outline not only the essence of ethical behaviour but the essence of the fulfilment of ethical expectations. It is obvious that we find here one of the ground for KANT's notion of the primacy of practical reason.

5.

However, the demarcation between cognition and action does not lead us, according to KANT, only to a kind of a deference of the forthcoming meeting between the two, but also to a more explicit manifestation of two attitudes, one being of an exploratory and one of a prescriptive character. The philosophy of nature, as KANT says, applies to all that is; the philosophy of mores of ethical life *(Sittlichkeit)* applies only to all that should be. The "should be" is related to the full spontaneity, to which we referred before, namely, to the structure according to ideas (*KdrV* 868; 658, 575; 473). The position of that which ought to be grounded in reason is meant to connote

that, since reason goes by definition beyond that what is given. Its only adequate manifestation can be that which ought to be. The "ought" expresses a mode of necessity and conjunction with grounds which do not occur otherwise in the whole of nature, or else the ought points to a possible act or deed whose ground cannot be but a concept alone (*KdrV* 575; 472-473). To try to interpret this statement, which can be described as the topography of the moral sphere, the following could be said:

(a) Reason is, to put it like that, present. It has its own structure and activity.
(b) One could envisage a possibility that the fact that there is a structure does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the structure is realizable, let alone realized.
(c) KANT drew the conclusion that the structure is to be realized, and the concept of the ought *(das Sollen)* is his own interpretation of the position of it, is that which is to be realized. Hence he faced the question: where do ideas as causative factors find their locus of realization, once the very definition of the ought is that it goes beyond experience? Even when we say that the ought prescribes, we still cannot be certain that there is a respondent to the prescription, that is to say, a realm in which prescription can find its proper realization.
(d) To be sure, KANT presupposes a correlation between willing and the ought when he says that the ought may impel me to will. It confronts willing with the limit and an end, and even more, it forbids or authorizes it (*KdrV* 576; 473). But here the concept of the ought refers to an empirical datum, i. e. will or willing, mitigating it or restraining it. But in this capacity it cannot be seen as creating its own sphere of realization. Hence the empirical sphere is presupposed here even from the point of view of the ought. One may wonder whether KANT could stop at this point, and as a matter of fact he did not.

This reflection is reinforced by what KANT says himself, namely, that the principles of pure reason have in their practical, namely, moral, employment, an objective reality (*KdrV* 836; 637). That objective reality is not a reality in terms of shaping the empirical data of willing or will, but is creating its own full spectrum, or its own full sphere. It is therefore necessary to point to an additional aspect in KANT's philosophy of action or morality in terms of its justification, that is to say, to arrive at a positive delineation of it vis-à-vis knowledge. This aspect, which is central to his philosophy of morality, is related to several components of the system which have to be explored.

6.

In a way, within the scope of the philosophy of practice the philosophy of man comes to the fore, even when not the whole spectrum of that philosophy becomes manifest in KANT's philosophy of practice as the philosophy of morality. The first point to be emphasized is that the philosophy of morality is related to the notion of highest ends. The highest ends, or the ultimate ones, are the whole vocation of man; the philosophy treating this is entitled moral philosophy (*KdrV* 868; 658). It can be said that either KANT tried to view the nature and position of man from the point of view of man's whole destiny, i. e. in the first place KANT introduced in the scope of his characterization of man a concept going beyond description, namely destiny *(Bestimmung),* or he tried to distinguish between a kind of anthropology in the empirical sense and philosophy in the proper sense, the latter being concomitant with morality. In any case we could say that the notion of destiny is a kind of a mediator or schema between reason and KANT's concern with the position of man in the universe, if not in terms of his comprehensive understanding of the essence of man.

The second point is the inner relationship pertaining, according to KANT, between the laws of reason and imperatives. Imperatives are objective laws of freedom, and, as such, explicate what ought to occur (*KdrV* 830; 634). In this sense imperatives are but laws within the moral sphere and are related to freedom, being its objective laws. Laws on the level of understanding are related to data and prescribe their unification, whereas the imperatives are laws of freedom. Therefore the correlate of the laws in the moral sphere is freedom, and freedom is in a sense presupposed in the moral sphere. Its presupposition makes it impossible that the moral sphere could be a sphere of reason and hence a vacuous sphere. It is not enough to say with KANT (e. g., *KdrV* XXVIII-XXIX; 28-29), that it is essential for morality that the concept of freedom should not contradict itself, that is to say, that at least it lends itself to being thought of. It is more important to stress that freedom and the awareness of it, is present within the consciousness, and as such it is the correlate of the principles of reason or the moral laws. To be sure, KANT's interpretation of the sphere of practice makes the relationship to freedom essential, since the practical is all that which is made possible by freedom (*KdrV* 828; 632). Still, such a description could be n a way a postulate only; a postulate could not be understood as a given correlate to the moral laws. The same would apply to the description of freedom as an independence — or arbitrariness — from the necessities imposed by the sensuous urges. These would be nominal descriptions of freedom. But in the same context KANT says that as a matter of fact man can determine himself independently from sensuous urges according to the principles of reason (*KdrV* 562; 405). If this is so, then we find freedom present within the human realm not only as a postulate

but also as a kind of trans-empirical fact. Hence the correlative structure characteristic of understanding is in a way preserved also on the level of reason qua practical reason, though the correlation on the latter level amounts to prescription in the direction of that which ought to be and not to the imposition of understanding of that which is. The concept of the ought comes to the foreground here because freedom is understood by definition as pointing to the absolute beginning of action and: the ought amounts here to directing the action stemming from that beginning. This aspect of direction towards something which is not there, i.e. the ought, can be present only within the sphere of morality and thus cannot be understood as applicable to the sphere of knowledge, in the theoretical sense of that term.

We can go beyond a conjecture, and refer to a text of KANT — to which we come back time on again. KANT says at the beginning of the *Critique of Practical Reason* that freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law, whereas the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom. KANT indicates here not the identity between freedom and the moral law but the circularity, or circular interaction, between them. He says the following: "For had not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we would never have been justified in assuming anything like freedom ... But if there were no freedom, the moral law would never have been encountered in us." (*KdrV* 5 note; transl. 4 note) The correlative structure, so characteristic of the KANTian approach — and this is not so in the case of Greek philosophy, and, as we shall see, of Hegel — is present in the moral sphere despite the differences between that sphere and the cognitive one. The aspect of freedom is present in our self-consciousness, and thus is the possible addressee for the prescriptions of the moral law. The presence of freedom in our self-consciousness precludes the vacuous position of reason, and hence of morality, from the very beginning. The moral law as such remains within the limits of guiding freedom but not of creating it; without being guided by the moral law, freedom would remain empty. Hence, unless we can discern within our own self-awareness an essential component of morality, morality would be a kind of an aspiration but would lack the constitutive character attributed to it by KANT. To be sure, one can wonder whether this reliance on the presence of freedom in the self-consciousness justifies KANT's notion of the primacy of practical reason. Leaving this aside, we can say that a common feature both of understanding qua knowledge and of reason as a capacity of principles of a moral character, is a correlation characteristic of the two realms: in terms of knowledge the correlation between understanding and the external data, and in terms of morality the correlation between the internal datum of freedom and the moral law. It goes without saying that in this notion we find the ultimate justification of KANT's concept of the intelligible character of man. That concept refers to that which cannot be a phenomenon but is also not only a logical

postulate as KANT sometimes put it, nor is it only that which underlies the external phenomenon we call matter. To be sure we even find a kind of a continuity from KANT's position which has, to say the least, an implication in terms of actuality, to the position of the ought. Because of freedom the rational being *can be* what according to the necessary laws of morality it *ought to be* (*KdrV* 836, 637).

We can become aware of the affinity between the traditional conception of theory and KANT's rendering of it, once we have established that theory amounts to cognition and knowledge. It does not need special emphasis to show that KANT's innovation in the concept of theory lies in pointing to the constructive aspect of knowledge, i. e. unless *a priori* conditions are applied to the data, knowledge of the data is impossible. To be sure, there is a difference, even a basic one, between theory as vision and theory as construction. Yet the common denominator of cognition keeps the two conceptions within the same frame.

The issue seems to be more complicated when we turn to KANT's understanding of practice as morality. The following is an attempt to interpret KANT's view. Practice is doing; doing is, by definition, an activity directed towards an end. KANT distinguishes between different sorts, modes, or levels of action according to the different ends. He distinguishes, for instance, between a pathological interest, which relates to human sensuality, and practical interest proper, which relates to morality. Morality is an activity towards an end, but towards what might be called an end proper, i. e. an end in itself. It is an end that does not serve as an instrument for, or means to, an end beyond itself. Man in his position, as representing mankind, is an end in himself. Thus the recognition of man as an end in himself, and the respect arising out of that recognition, is the essence of morality. The overcoming of instrumental considerations is, according to KANT, an overcoming of the pathological interest, namely, the considerations grounded in sensuality and serving it. It follows that morality is related to or grounded in reason, thus transcending by definition the boundaries of experience. The recognition of an end in itself is, according to KANT, the major manifestation of reason, which differs as such from the constructive character of cognition, knowledge or theory. It is so because morality has that character that it is grounded in freedom qua total spontaneity on the one hand and in the moral law, qua ultimate principle of reason guiding the spontaneity of freedom on the other. The two poles, as it were, of spontaneity meet in the moral field — freedom as a fact of consciousness and the moral law as a manifestation of reason which by definition is spontaneous, being self-originating.

We may try now to sum up the structure of KANT's argument concerning the nature of theory and practice and their relationship. The common ground of the two fields lies in the aspect of legislation, legislation in the theoretical

field amounting to imposing conditions while in the practical field it amounts to guiding the primary datum of freedom. In conjunction with this are two further elements in KANT's systematic presentation: (a) The distinction, ore even the dichotomy, between theory and practice, a dichotomy which can be epitomized by the very fact that theory refers to understanding while practice refers to reason or intelligibility. (b) The hierarchical structure: reason is placed above understanding and concomitantly principles are placed above rules, or intelligibility is placed above sensuality. We may now move to an analysis of Hegel's view of theory and practice — and we shall start with Hegel's critical approach to KANT.

7.

Hegel describes KANT's critique of reason as a system in which we do not come to know the objects but are concerned with knowledge and the principles of it, or else we are concerned with the boundary and extension of knowledge so that in order that knowledge should not, as Hegel puts it, fly over itself (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 56). To some extent we can say that the various critical observations made by Hegel in relation to KANT are variations on that theme. We shall try to elaborate the major points at issue.

Hegel comments that KANT, in his critique of the metaphysics of his own age, was actually simply following HUME's mode of scepticism (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 265). This is indeed a startling statement, paradoxically reminding us of SALOMON MAIMON's self-characterization, in which SALOMON MAIMON presents his own system as a continuation of HUME's philosophy, Hegel attributes to KANT a version of HUME's scepticism, though, as we know, KANT, according to his own pronouncements, attempted to overcome that scepticism. There are, apparently, several elements in the KANTian exposition which led Hegel to attach such a surprising label to KANT. For instance, Hegel says that KANT's philosophy is the enlightenment presented in its theoretical and methodical version, namely, that nothing true can be known but only the appearance (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 554). Obviously the concept of truth as apparent in many other passages of Hegel's expositions, has to be understood both from the ontological and from the cognitive point of view. That is to say, that the true amounts to reality in its fulfillment as well as to the adequacy of a proposition in relation to its real object. The true in this sense, in Hegel's interpretation, does not appear in KANT's philosophy because the reality in its fulfilment would be, as we have seen before, the congruence between nature and grace, or between experience and the moral merit. Such a congruence has to be deferred beyond experience to the level of ideas, or the ideal. In contrast, the concept of appearance, or phenomenon, as Hegel points to it in the context, has somehow the implication of appearance only. Hence, put in

rather exaggerated terms, such a concept does not lack the element of illusion. We can see again this aspect of Hegel's criticism of KANT in some additional remarks of Hegel, when he says, for instance, that in KANT the highest idea is placed at the end of the philosophy as a postulate (ibid. 24). Broadly speaking that, as Hegel puts it, which is above sensuality cannot be known by reason. To be sure, this is an adequate interpretation of KANT's philosophy, but an interpretation which, when viewed in its systematic context, leads to the abolition of both the hierarchical structure of the system and the various dichotomies present in it. Instead of the dichotomies, there emerges what might be presented, as a gradual transition from and transformation of one level to another. Let us look now more closely into some of Hegel's remarks directed against KANT because KANT rendered the concepts in dichotomies and not in a structure of transitions.

Hegel criticizes KANT's concept of the "I", or the ego, in characterizing it as an empty transcendental subject of our thoughts, and as such known only through its own thoughts; of what the ego or the "I" is in itself we are unable to have the slightest conception (ibid. 577; 8). It is clear that KANT did not pretend to say that the transcendental subject is a reality or an existence and we are bound to emphasize this point taking into account our previous critical exposition of KANT's notion of the "I". But the very fact that Hegel adds the adjective "empty" to his characterization of the subject is meant do denigrate that subject and its position, not only in the system, but what is, of course, more important, in the structure of the universe. This is intended by Hegel when he criticizes both KANT and FICHTE because the two systems remain within the limits of the dualism of existence and being for itself (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 191). To put it differently, even when the subject of the transcendental "I" in KANT's system knows itself, it still is not of an existing character. Because of that feature KANT's philosophy is a subjective idealism, the meaning of which is that the "I" presents the form as well as the material of knowledge. The form is presented by the "I" as thinking, while the material is presented by the "I" as perceptive *(empfindlich; Enz.* § 131). The meaning of that seems to be that at no point is there a relationship, or even a direction, of the "I" to reality. Since there is no relationship of that sort there cannot be, even at the end of the cognitive process, a contact — eventually amounting to an identity — between knowledge and reality, which is, indeed, the meaning of idealism as Hegel understands it. To put it differently, KANT's philosophy remains within the boundaries of absolute finitude and subjectivity. Its content is not the cognition of the absolute but the cognition of that subjectivity or critique of the faculty of knowledge (*Glauben und Wissen.* 296). Hegel refers here to the inner structure of the KANTian system, namely, to the conception that the aspect of presuppositions of knowledge imposed on data gives preference to subjectivity. Thus the KANTian philosophy is, as we have

already observed, not cognition in the strict sense of the term but critique. Certainly it is not cognition of the absolute but the delineation of the character of the faculty of knowledge and its various manifestations. Hegel points to the correlation between the notion of what he describes as absolute subjectivity expressed in concepts and laws — which for him still connotes a total emptiness of subjectivity, or else the purity of the infinite concept — and the true idea that remains an absolute subjective maxim (*Glauben und Wissen.* 326-7). Again, Hegel sees here, and rightly so, the correlation between the limitation of the categorial propositions and the notion of ideas. But he carries the first correlate to its extreme by referring to it as being totally empty. He identifies the purity of the concept with its infinity whereby that infinity in turn is a "bad infinity" because it is nothing but a prolongation of the same structure without reaching the end, or identity, that is, the identity of rationality and reality. At this juncture we could say that when Hegel characterizes KANT as following in the footsteps of HUME, he is saying that KANT is by the same token following in the footsteps of dogmatism. Hegel actually says that KANT put an end to the metaphysics of understanding as objective dogmatism, but, as a matter of fact, he only translated that dogmatism into subjective dogmatism (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 554). One of the ways in which Hegel characterizes dogmatism is that it places the finite as absolute.[21] This characterization cannot, of course, fit the KANTian system, which does not put the finite as absolute. There is a difference between that which cannot be overstepped, or, in the Hegelian metaphor, be flown over, and being absolute. However, all these aspects of Hegel's criticism, sometimes presenting the KANTian view in adequate form and sometimes exaggerating, relate to the positive aspects of the system. They also relate to the issue of theory and practice, and may well serve as a point of departure for our understanding of it. To put it differently, in a positive way, we may say the following: Hegel saw the task of philosophy as the realization of the unity of thinking and being (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 535). The hard core of his criticism of KANT amounts to that issue, namely, that KANT's philosophy falls short of achieving that identity. Perhaps because of his preoccupation with critique in the strict sense of the term, this identity lies beyond the scope of the KANTian system. Here again Hegel intimates his own objective, in which he intends also to place the distinction betwee theory and practice as against the distinction presented in KANTian terms: instead of the view which sees the two spheres or attitudes as supplementing one another we have to see them within the structure of transitions and its implications. It is at this point that we have to mention also Hegel's criticism that KANT is concerned with the deduction of the categories

[21] For instance: *Verhältniß des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie.* Werke. Bd 16. 103.

but not with their principle or spirit (*Differenz*-Schrift. 34). The concept of spirit (explored before) is, of course, an intimation, since it supposedly comprises all the manifestations, unlike the rigid distinction between understanding and reason and their respective manifestations.

Several additional expressions of Hegel's criticism have to be mentioned in the present context because they indicate by the same token the positive direction of the system. There is something ambiguous, Hegel argues, in the victory of KANT's critique over traditional metaphysics. Traditional metaphysics investigated its objects according to the criterion whether these objects are something true or not, or put in the traditional terminology, whether they are substances or phenomena. The victory of KANT's critique over that metaphysical orientation lies in the fact that KANT put aside the objective of the investigation of traditional metaphysics, namely, the truth. We have in a somewhat different form already indicated that line of criticism. We may now emphasize that concern with truth is related in traditional metaphysics to the position of being an objective or an end. What follows is this: as KANT shifted the centre of his interest, according to Hegel, from the traditional notions he shifted also his interest from the basic element of truth. This presentation refers, at least implicitly, to KANT's conception of theory, because that conception does not amount to knowledge of true reality but to what we described before as construction. Hegel conceives of construction as the obverse of subjectivity, and, as is well known, he sometimes presents the over-emphasis on subjectivity as the sickness of our time (*Enz.* § 81). The concomitant of that observation is that, in KANT's critical philsophy, objectivity amounts to the understanding of universality and necessity; these two are determinations of thinking, and by definition not determinations of reality, let alone of the identity of reason and reality. Hence KANT endorses the dichotomy between that which is subjective or objective — and this is a shortcoming (*Enz.* § 125). The outcome of that trend of thought is that both theory and practice are placed within the realm of subjectivity, be it understanding or reason (*Phän.* 327). This is, perhaps, according to Hegel, an innate shortcoming of the system because it falls short of its own systematic programme. To put it positively, the only way to present the legislative, that is to say, the active, character of reason is to view it as spirit. This amounts to the conception of a certainty to be reality and to elevate that reality to the level of truth, or eventually to realize the implication between consciousness and self-consciousness and their objects (*Phil. Prop.* 111-2). Again, if the concept of the spirit is — as we have seen before to be the replacement by way of a full realization — of reason, then the dichotomy between theory and practice, characteristic of KANT's system, will have to be reformulated as well.

It goes without saying that as in the KANTian system there is a correlation between understanding and the thing in itself, so the criticism of KANT's sub-

jectivity by Hegel is reinforced by his criticism of the concept of the thing in itself. The expanded subjectivity, as Hegel calls it, that which comprises the whole of experience, i. e. that nothing remains outside of it, has only as its correlate the thing in itself (*Enz.* § 327), or else the notion of the thing in itself is but an empty abstraction of all the determinateness (*Wiss. d. Logik.* I. 609). Since everything is subjective we do not know what these things in themselves are (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 609). Positively speaking, if the thing in itself is negated, or is introduced into the scope of reason and spirit, practice will have a different connotation from that presented by KANT. Hence one of the basic differences between KANT and Hegel is related to the notion of the thing in itself. We are about to come back to that issue in the last chapter.

8.

As a corollary, we mention a few points that elicited Hegel's admiration for KANT. They are significant because they too anticipate the direction of the positive exposition of the concepts which form the theme of our exploration. The first point is that, according to Hegel, and despite what has been said before, KANT does not deal with reality from the empirical point of view only, i. e. from the point of view of the conception of the empirical subject. He recognizes at the same time a higher reality, namely, as organic system and beautiful nature (*Glauben und Wissen.* 405). This distinction seems to be significant, because, according to Hegel's interpretation, KANT anticipates the appearing reality that makes the idea manifest. Thus in these two areas — of the organic system and of nature viewed from the vantage of beauty — we encounter a kind of anticipation of what has to be fully articulated and explicated in the identity of idea and reality, and in the process of that explication we have to discern the position of both knowledge and practice. We see them not as two parallel manifestations of reason but as stages of a process. To put it differently, what we do find in this evaluation of KANT's presentation by Hegel is that there are some indications in KANT of a possible synthesis, not in a constructive sense of that term but in a present or manifest sense. This is an indication of the position of a given synthesis, which has to be made explicit dialectically. On the other hand, it has to be emphasized, in spite of the very articulated criticism of the concept of the self-consciousness to which we referred before, that KANT also points to another synthesis, namely, to the simple unity of the self-consciousness. Here, in a positive rendering, it is presented as being totally unpenetrable independent freedom and the origin of all universal self-consciousness, of determinations of thinking, i. e. theoretical reason, but also the highest of all practical determinations, i. e. practical reason, which means free and pure will (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 553). Though Hegel does not use the term synthesis in the context, we cannot be

oblivious of the fact that he finds in self-consciousness the overcoming of the juxtaposition of the theoretical and the practical aspects and thus, though the term is not employed, a kind of a primary synthesis.

But surprisingly enough Hegel makes several pronouncements about the faculty of synthesis in KANT, though KANT himself, as is well-known, did not view it in a methodical way. We refer here to the faculty of imagination. Hegel says that KANT placed most prominently within the sphere of the faculty of imagination the *a priori* element of sensuality and the original identity of unity and multiplicity (*Glauben und Wissen.* 361). We have to stress the notion of the original identity, since once that identity is present — in contradistinction to the dichotomous character of the KANTian system — we have to assume that it will be a point of departure in the direction of its articulation and explication as a discursive identity, which is characteristic of the identity of reason and reality comprized in the concept of spirit. In the same tenor Hegel says that this high level inherent in the transcendental power of imagination is one of the most beautiful sides of KANTian philosophy, in which pure sensuality and pure understanding are unified. This is an intuitive understanding, or understanding intuition, though KANT himself does not take it in this way, or conceives of it like that. But, and here Hegel employs a concept so much used by him, that of "in itself" (*an sich*), stressing that this aspect is present in KANT's system (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 570). It is indeed a true speculative idea since it represents the absolute original identity of the self-consciousness. It appears even as the identity of the subjective and the objective within consciousness becoming manifest as proposition. The power of productive imagination represents the synthetic unity. We can therefore say that within the form of that power the idea of the true *a priori* is present, or, that it is anticipated (*Glauben und Wissen.* 309). Hegel's laudatory presentation of KANT's description and positioning of the power of imagination seems to anticipate the approach Hegel will adopt in his own systematic or positive presentation, i. e. the metamorphosis of imagination *(Einbildungskraft)* into synthesis proper, that is to say into idea.

Interestingly enough, this aspect — and we emphasize it again in spite of the unmethodical character of the power of imagination according to KANT — is reinforced by some comments Hegel makes on HAMANN, in spite of the latter's obvious rejection of any philosophical approach, which Hegel characterizes as the philosophy of immediacy. He says of HAMANN's critique of KANT that it is extraordinary to see how HAMANN points to the concrete idea and is opposed to the distinctions of reflection, or, positively, that in contrast to these distinctions he presents the true determination. Hence HAMANN turns against KANT's separation of sensuality and understanding.[22] It is not by

[22] Compare: *Ueber Hamanns Schriften* ... In: *Vermischte Schriften aus der Berl. Zeit.* Werke. Bd 20. 203 ff.

chance that the centre of HAMANN's concern is language, which is a kind of a primary, or perhaps primordial, synthesis. This positive appreciation of HAMANN is expressed by Hegel although he says that HAMANN misunderstood the nature of the KANTian system as well as the nature of enlightenment. Still we venture to comment that Hegel's own attempt to start with the synthesis, and thus his rejection of the various modes of dualities presented by KANT, led him to emphasize at a certain point an affinity even with a philosopher who is unquestionably concerned with intuition and immediacy, and thus cannot be viewed even as furnishing a critical point of departure for the development of Hegel's system.

We can wind up this part of our analysis by saying that Hegel attempted to achieve duscursively, in the context of the KANTian distinctions, a synthesis that the philosophy of immediacy (HAMANN) purported to achieve *ab initio* without a discursive analysis. Indeed, this is significant for our analysis of the conception of theory and practice, and of Hegel's placement of understanding and reason. That topic will be our next concern.

9.

Against the various dichotomies characteristic of KANT's approach and system Hegel presents a conception that can be characterized as that of a process of ongoing perfection i. e. self-perfection. According to Hegel the lowest level is the highest one (*Phän.* 579). Therefore we have to distinguish between the given, as for instance the form of representation *(Vorstellung)*, and self-consciousness, which becomes mature by reaching the level of the concept (*Phän.* 581). It is because of this process of self-perfection that Hegel directs his criticism against the notion and position of understanding (*Verstand*). He does not even grant understanding the validity granted by KANT in terms of scientific or empirical knowledge by way of a construction. For Hegel understanding is related to abstraction; it raises intuition *(Anschauung)* and representation *(Vorstellung)* to the level of the form of universality. If we recall that a primary synthesis is present, then the abstracting character of understanding becomes even more prominent. It runs counter to the original synthesis, and can be justified, if at all, by our looking at it as an interim or preliminary step towards an explicit synthesis, to be achieved on the level of reason which has, obviously, to be viewed differently from KANT's presentation. Understanding refers to opposites; it is therefore the task of reason to overcome that what understanding has established (*Enz.* § 107). Understanding is thinking, and therefore has to be seen as a pure ego in general. It is the activity of separating, and as such is characterized as a charting (*tabellarisch*) activity (*Phän.* 50). Again, KANT points to the interrelationship of reflection and abstraction on the one hand, and se-

paration on the other, whereby the characteristic feature of understanding is not so much that it is engaged in the activity of separating, which is an essential step towards the ultimate synthesis, but that it remains within the scope of those separations.

Nominally, Hegel retains the KANTian notion of understanding but does not attribute a constructive function to it within the structure of the system; in the process of self-perfection it is a necessary step leading to the synthesis. Because of that, the emphasis is shifted towards reason — to which Hegel attributes the highest position. Here again he may be seen as following KANT, but his characterization of reason differs from that of KANT since Hegel attributes to reason not a projection of the highest reality but the achievement of that highest reality. Let us look new at some of the features of reason as presented by Hegel, since his presentaton carries consequences for the conception of the essence of practice as well as of theory.

Hegel conceives of reason as the truth of the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness (*Enz.* § 291). He relates self-consciousness to the idea when he says that reason is a concept inasmuch as it does not exist as a logical idea only, but is an idea that has developed into self-consciousness. Is has to be observed that whereas KANT took self-consciousness as referring to the "I", Hegel, and this is not accidental in the structure of his system, conceives of the self-consciousness as relating to the developed idea. That idea in turn constitutes the identity between reason and reality. Hence self-consciousness is not a separated reflection but a manifestation of the totality. This synthesis characteristic of reason is expressed also as a synthesis of the finite and the infinite (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 185), which amounts to the conception that philosophy is a science of reason insofar as reason is conscious of itself as being all reality (*Enz.* 1817. 22). We notice here again that the highest unification of consciousness and self-consciousness is, by the same argument, the highest unification of the knowing of an object and the knowing of itself (*Phil. Prop.* 111-112). The emphasis placed is not only on the unification of reality but on the certainty of knowing that unification, and, therefore, the centre of gravity is not accidentally placed in reason. Self-consciousness and being are the same. Again we have to see not only consciousness as involved in the structure but self-consciousness as well (*Phän.* 186). Hence we find that Hegel presumes both the identity of knowledge and reality and also what can be called the primacy of cognition, because of his emphasis on awareness and/or consciousness. The terminological and systematic manifestation of these two aspects, i. e. identity and knowledge, of self-knowledge, is, of course, to be seen in the position held by the term and notion of the spirit in Hegel's philosophy when he says that his point of view is the knowing of the idea, and the cognition of the idea as spirit, as absolute spirit (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 691). Here we have to refer to the previous exploration of the notion of spirit.

An additional expression of this systematic position is the introduction of the concept of speculation, which, let us not forget, is the Latin rendering of the Greek *theoria*. KANT employs the concept of speculation, or the description "speculative". He does that within the context of his system, namely, when dealing with theoretical or speculative knowledge, amounting to a situation in which there has been reference to an object that cannot be reached in any experience (*KdrV* 662; 527). When we look now into Hegel's conception of speculation we find, for instance, his criticism that KANT did not realize that the subjective is in itself concrete, that is to say, that the categories themselves are concrete (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 573). KANT, in Hegel's description or expression, renders the speculative in the humane form because he refers to the harmonization of morality and happiness. (*Glauben und Wissen.* 324) But that humane form is not adequate for Hegel, since speculation has not to be seen as being realized in the moral sphere, or as related to the moral postulate. It has to be seen as being realized in the very identity of reason and reality imbued with self-knowledge.

Here we have to re-articulate the systematic difference between KANT and Hegel: KANT starts with dichotomies, whereas speculation has been related by him to the possible overcoming of the dichotomies beyond the experience of nature. Hegel starts with the given synthesis, we may even say — that he starts with the absolute. Thus for Hegel the content of the absolute is to make itself manifest (*Wiss. d. Logik.* I. 671). The identity Hegel establishes of the absolute and the spirit enables him to attribute to the spirit the essence of being infinitely creative. (*Enz.* § 38). Thus the various stages of the manifestation are actually explications of that infinite creativity, a creativity which reaches its height in the identity of reason and reality and is not to be seen as a projected harmony only in the KANTian sense. Once we start with the given synthesis, which is actually the absolute, as a point of departure, we are led to additional consequences. Some of these will have to be mentioned since they throw light on the basic difference between the two systems. For instance, according to Hegel, the particular is the general or the universal (*das Allgemeine; Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 43). We are not engaged in subsuming the particular under the general or the universal but are engaged in discerning the general or the universal in the particular. At the same time the process of discerning is not a reflection imposed on the particular on the one hand or the universal on the other. It is a process that can be described as the self-discernment of the general and universal out of the particular whereby the particular does not get lost on the way. Essentially, the universal itself decides to go to the determined or to the particular (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd. 1. 7). This is so since we start with the synthesis; the separation or particularization takes place within the process of explication of that which is primarily unified. The unity to be achieved on the level of reason is, as a matter of fact, only a restatement of the unity already present at the beginning. The same applies to the finite,

since the finite is exactly that which is destined to have as its truth the infinite. The process or progress of the finite to the infinite is necessary; it is inherent in the concept. (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd. 1. 384) Obviously the infinite is not understood in the KANTian sense as that which is beyond experience and is therefore the regulative principle. In the process, the infinite amounts to the closed system of identity and therefore contains the affirmation of the sublated finitude (ibid. 461). Thus we come back to speculation, or to the identity of knowledge and reality imbued with self-consciousness. The variations on the theme of dichotomies or antitheses are negated by Hegel, and cannot be seen as KANT saw them. Hence the context of knowledge, which for KANT amounts to theory, is changed because of the systematic changes introduced by Hegel.

10.

Before emphasizing the difference between the theoretical and the speculative approach let us mention one detail, namely, that Hegel refers in several places in his writings to *life (Leben)* interpreting it in a speculative sense. He says, for instance, that life can be understood only speculatively; this is so since the speculative element exists in life. How could Hegel conceive of life in this way? We can find some explanation in what he propounds, following that general statement. He says that life is the unification of opposites in general, not only of the opposite of concept and reality. Life is where the internal and the external, the cause and effect, the end and the means, subjectivity and objectivity, etc., are one and the same thing (*Enz.* § 451). The point of comparison, as it were, or even perhaps of identity, of life and the absolute, lies in the structure of life as the unification of opposites, which in turn is the characteristic feature of speculation of of the speculative idea. Actually when we return to the previous proposition, namely, that the point of departure is the absolute, we could say that life itself is the point of departure of the philosophical pursuit, since life is imbued with the opposites, contradistinctions or various modes of antithesis. These become explicit in the philosophical process, but the philosophical process is not of a constructive character. Since it is a characteristic feature of speculation to conceive of the unity within the opposition itself (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 40), whereby one of the major manifestations of the emergence of the opposition is the emergence of the separation of the subject and the object. We may therefore say that life is in a way both the anticipation of the absolute and its primary or given realization. A negative expression of that position is that life is inconceivable for the understanding but not for reason (*Enz.* § 430). Here again we may say that since life is continuously active it cannot be conceived of by a faculty having a static character like understanding or having one

that establishes the data and does not realize them in their continous processuality.

We can sum up so far by saying that speculation replaces or sublates (*aufhebt)* theory. Instead of theory understood as constructive knowledge, speculation is the self-revealing character of the absolute, or reality, however expressed. What Hegel accepted from KANT is the emphasis on self-knowledge, even within the scope of speculation. Thus he changed the focus of speculation from that of the Greek notion of *theoria* and its Latin version *speculatio.* Speculation does not amount to a vision of external objects, but to self-knowledge of the absolute. It does not amount to the knowledge of objects which are distinct, or separated from, appearances, but to a continous self-knowledge reaching the peak in the awareness of the identity of reason and reality, whereby the emphasis has to be laid on both identity and awareness. Hegel's interpretation differs here not only from the KANTian view of knowledge as well as of reason and ideas, but also from the classic presentation of theory and speculation.[23] One point has to be added here in order to realize the distinction between Hegel and KANT, which in turn will have its implications for Hegel's analysis of practice and morality. This is the conception of the subject closely related to the process of self-manifestation analysed before. Hegel says that a subject is the series of his acts (*Phil. d. Rechts.* § 124; transl. 23). To put it negatively first: there is no separated self-enclosed level of truly real objects like ideas or pure form. Identity has here a far-reaching meaning because it points to a comprehensive view of the relationship between the components of knowledge, consciousness and self-consciousness, as well as the component of reality.

We can look at Hegel's position as a kind of realization of what KANT conceived only as occupying the position of the regulative principle. KANT speaks about concepts of reason as though they were not self-contradictory, yet as concepts which would be without an object. They are thought only problematically; they are heuristic fictions. We may base on them regulative principles of the systematic complyment of the understanding in the field of experience. Save in this connection they are merely thought-entities (*KdrV* 799; 613-614). In another context KANT describes these ideas as ideas which never allow of any constitutive employment. When regarded in that mistaken manner they are pseudo-rational; they are merely dialectical (clearly in KANT's sense) concepts. They have a regulative employment only, that is to say, "... that of directing the understanding towards a certain goal upon

[23] About Plato, Hegel says that the concrete self-determining thought is still the abstract idea (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 204). On Hegel's relation to Plato consult: *K. Düsing: Ontologie und Dialektik bei Plato und Hegel.* In: Hegel-Studien. 15 (1980), 95 ff.

which the routes marked out by all its rules (sc. understanding) converge, as upon their point of intersection." This point of intersection is indeed a mere idea, a *focus imaginarius*, from which, since it lies quite outside the bounds of possible experience, the concepts of the understanding do not in reality proceed (*KdrV* 672; 533). We could interpret Hegel's conception of speculation as giving a constitutive meaning to ideas or reason and thus replacing their regulative meaning in KANT's sense. This being so, or is made possible, by his view of experience. The unity referred to by the concept of speculation does not lie outside of experience. Experience, as we see it, for instance, in the concept of life, is akin to the concept of absolute and is from the very beginning imbued with identity. The separation is only an interim step towards an explication of the conceptual manifestation of the primary unity. It is the very essence of experience that the content is the spirit in itself. It is also the substance, and, by the same token, the object of the consciousness (*Phän.* 613). Only the modern philosophers of experience entertain the view that knowing comes entirely from the outside (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 215). At this juncture we could say that Hegel tries to overcome this modern view, or, let us call it, modern prejudice.

11.

We may now make our next step to the concept of practice. In the first place, we have to refer to Hegel's criticism of the notion of the ought *(das Sollen)*, which is but one of the targets of his criticism of any rigid dualistic version of philosophy. Hegel sees the inner relationship between the notion of the ought and the concept of the infinite progress, or, to put it differently, between that notion and the dualism presented by existence *(Dasein)* and being for itself (*Wiss. d. Logik.* I. 191). Hence, in Hegel's eyes, for KANT the absolute good remains an ought without objectivity, and Hegel says in order to reinforce this statement: man ought to be moral and the whole issue remains at the ought (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 593). The elevation of the subjective spirit to God is in KANT's presentation again a postulate and it is downgraded *(herabgesetzt)* to a mere "ought" (*Enz.* § 434). A different expression of that major deficiency, or the characterization of moral philosophy by way of the concept of the ought, is that the finite ought to be sublated but that in the ought an impotency supervenes. To be sure, one can wonder whether Hegel's presentation at this point is adequate. We may question whether KANT's philosophy is concerned with the elevation of the spirit to the level of God as a postulate, unless we interpret Hegel at this juncture as trying to convey the notion that according to KANT the very existence of God is a postulate within the moral sphere, that is to say, a postulate because of the moral concern. Thus, because of the direction towards the ought we can assume or

conjecture that Hegel's notion of the identity between reason and reality also has a connotation of being God, either systematically or symbolically. Hegel attempts to place God within the context of speculation, and removes the concept of God from its position in KANT's system confined to the moral sphere only. In any case we have to be aware of the fact that the progress of the manifestation of the spirit in Hegel's thinking leads him to negate the KANTian notion of relating morality to the ought or to the postulate; the ought refers only to the sublation of the finite (*Enz.* § 223) but it can never reach the position of the absolute, being essentially imbued with subjectivity. Since, according to KANT, there is only an infinite progress of the realization of the good, the good can be seen from the point of view of the ought and not from the point of view of a comprehensive reality. This, indeed, also means that in KANT's view the unity of the particular will and the universal will can only be postulated and cannot be seen as present or realized (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 593). In this sense, the concept of the ought is one of the versions of the abstractions characteristic of KANT (*Wiss. d. Logik.* I. 155). It thus suits those other abstractions we have identified previously, i. e. self-consciousness, the thing in itself, etc. The abstract character of the system can be expressed also as being related to the infinity of reflection. That vantage point is characteristic of the notion of the ought in the philosophies of KANT and FICHTE (*Syst.* I. 224). According to Hegel this character of the ought as a postulate, an abstraction related to an infinite progress, etc., has to be replaced by a different approach, namely, that the real world is what ought to be, namely, that the true good, the universal divine reason, is also the power to realize itself (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 67). This view of self-realization not only attributes to reason the power of realization but also explicates its very presence in the world. Hence it does not allow us to relegate reason to that which is trans-empirical, since such a relegation, as we have seen, amounts to its impotency. If reason is present in the world, this is a reaffirmation of the world, from the moral point of view as well. Put differently, since the absolute exhibits itself in the world in the first place, the affirmation of the world is not only the affirmation of the given, or the affirmation of the present, but also the affirmation of the absolute or of the spirit. We have to see now to what extent this different perspective, compared with that of KANT, has a bearing on some of the more detailed aspects of Hegel's system, namely, of practical reason. This will be the next part of our exposition.

12.

When KANT assumed the primacy of practical reason he was guided by several considerations, the most prominent among them being that if reason is by definition a legislative faculty, practical reason is the manifestation of that

faculty *par excellence*. Hegel takes exception at that view. At this point he presents several arguments, all of them amounting to the abstract character of practical reason, correlated to the notion of the "ought" which we have analysed previously. In practical reason, according to KANT, as Hegel puts it, the "I" in his singularity is immediately essence, universality and objectivity (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 589). These are characteristic features with a negative implication because the emphasis is on immediacy, or, out differently, there is no process in which the "I" becomes identical with universality. KANT starts, according to Hegel, with the identification or conjunction between the "I" and universality instead of looking at that conjunction as a result of the process. Thus practical reason leads us to that character of abstractness which is the most vulnerable spot of the KANTian system in its many manifestations. This shortcoming can be seen also in what can be viewed just as a description of KANT's conception of duty, namely, that it is imbued with the form of identity, of not contradicting itself (ibid. 592). Yet we realize that the outcome of that description of duty in terms of the form of identity only is just a corrolary of the conception of the absolute good, which remains an ought without objectivity (ibid. 596). There is a clear interrelation between the formality in terms of identity and the mere ought which lacks any objectivity. As our first resumé it can be said that the purity which KANT attributed to practical reason is considered by Hegel to be rather a shortcoming, or at least only a step in the direction of full realization in general — a full realization of reason, including practical reason, which is "full" and not "pure".

Another way of seeking what is missing in the KANTian conception is to take practical reason as being totally independent. What is missing in the practical idea is the element of the theoretical idea. To put it differently, the idea of the good can find its supplement only in the idea of the true. (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 324). Hence the very dichotomy, to which we have referred several times, is criticized because it amounts to, as it were, two parallel channels of reason. Eventually, in KANT's system, there remains no channel in which, or trough which, reason comes to its full manifestation, that is to say, its fulfilment proper. As a matter of fact, Hegel criticizes this view and its underlying presuppositions in several ways, some of which are even meant to bring empirical components into the sphere of morality or practice including those of the urges which, as we know, were excluded by KANT from the scope of morality proper. The primary reason for introducting empirical elements is to be found in the broad conception of the practical attitude towards nature, which has to find its incorporation within the moral sphere, at least from the point of view of the process leading from one stage to another.

The second reason is that Hegel applies to the practical attitude his concept of becoming something different from itself. Therefore the antithesis to the practical attitude is essentially a becoming something different on its way to becoming identical (*Enz.* § 20). But once we attempt to ground the practi-

cal attitude in the empirical level, we cannot easily identify practice with freedom, since urges are related to what Hegel describes as animal drives and are by definition directed towards the external circumstances. They eventually have to be incorporated into the sphere of *Sittlichkeit*, of ethical life, as it is called in the English translation (*Phil. d. Rechts.* § 42 and further; transl. 105 ff). One cannot, therefore, remove the practical attitude from the empirical level. Hence the absence of freedom has to be seen as belonging, at least at the initial level, to the position of the practical attitude. Put positively, we can notice here the structure of Hegel's argument by observing that if freedom is taken to be not only identical with decision and the faculty of deciding, but also with the full expression of the potentiality, we come back to what can be understood as the primacy of speculative reason. This is so since that expression of full potentiality amounts to the full identity of reason and reality, and that identity in turn is realized on the level of speculation. When we look at the theoretical spirit and the practical spirit — and here obviously the theoretical has to be distinguished from the speculative — we still remain within the subjective aspects, or manifestations, of spirit (*Syst.* 3. 304). Freedom proper is the progress of spirit in its development. Its objective is fulfillment, and also, by the same token, the bringing about of the freedom of its knowledge (ibid. 300). The shortcoming of the KANTian philosophy lies in the falling apart *(auseinandergefallen)* of the moments of the absolute form (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 610). Here again morality, or practical reason, is one of the major manifestations of that disparity between the various, essentially interrelated, moments.

It is not necessary in this exposition to go into the details of Hegel's distinction between morality in the terminological sense and what is called *Sittlichkeit.* Morality is characterized by subjectivity. This, indeed, is the self-determination of the will (*Phil. d. Rechts.* § 107; transl. 75); according to Hegel freedom is expressed in the reflection of self-consciousness as good. To be sure, Hegel points to the relationship in KANT's view between decision and duty. But even at this point he criticizes KANT's position, both implicitly and explicitly, by arguing that the correlation between decision and duty involves the overcoming not only of the particular will of the various natural incentives, inclinations and passions, but also of the noble feelings and higher drives. This would be again one of the renderings of the abstract character of morality according to KANT (*Ästh.* Bd 2. 80). Concurrently, the perfection of morality is relegated to the infinite. Were it not so, that is to say, if morality is not to be realized in the infinite, the moral consciousness would be abolished (*Phän.* 465). It is because of this consideration that ethical life is placed as a stage above the abstract — or subjective — stage of morality, since ethical life amounts to the concept of freedom developed into the existing world (*vorhandene Welt; Phil. d. Rechts.* § 142; transl. 105) and the nature of self-consciousness. Hence we have to attribute superiority to the realization of

the concept of freedom in the existing world as against freedom amounting to formal self-consciousness only.

A further expression of Hegel's critique of KANT's various distinctions is his argument against what can be described again as a separation of will, including the separation of will from thinking. Will is a particular mode of thinking, that is to say, of thinking that translates itself, or posits itself, into existence *(Dasein)* and becomes an urge to give itself existence *(Dasein*; ibid. § 5; transl. 22). In a more general statement, Hegel says that the will is reasonable *(vernünftig)* only in as much as it thinks (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 2. 148). This can be seen as a very central statement in Hegel's critique, not only because it is directed against one of KANT's dichotomies but also because Hegel must have been aware that the thinking component is present in KANT's theory of ethics as well. The turning of the maxim into a law, or the absorbing of the categorical imperative into one's attitude and behaviour, would be impossible were the decision of freedom not accompanied by reference to, and thus understanding in the sense of *Verstehen* of, the categorical imperative. Hegel goes beyond KANT's correlation between will and the categorical imperative, mediated, as it were, by understanding, (a) by negating the view that thinking and will are two separated faculties, and (b) by postulating that there is no will without, what Hegel calls, intelligence (*Intelligenz; Phil. d. Rechts.* § 4; transl. 21). Thus the synthetic nature, characteristic of the ultimate objective of philosophy, also comes to prominence at this stage, where we distinguish traditionally, and also according to KANT, between the various faculties of the soul or of the mind. The will in general, which wills only itself — and this seems to be Hegel's interpretation of KANT — remains only the abstract concept of the idea of the will. This can be summed op in Hegel's own words in the following way: human beings think that they are free only as will. But precisely here they are exposed to the external world with which they maintain relationships. Only in the rational will, which is a theoretical element, similar to the theoretical process of the senses, is man free (*Syst.* 2. 632). This is a basic or programmatic statement because it points not only to the unity of the theoretical and practical spirit but also to the primacy of the theoretical. That primacy in turn is apparently safeguarded by the fact that in an attitude guided by will, man faces circumstances which are outside his will and surround him, as it were. This aspect of externality is sublated when the synthesis of will or reason occurs. But that synthesis is at this juncture described as theoretical, or of a theoretical character. Indeed, we may question whether "theoretical" is a proper term to be used in this context, since "speculative" would be more appropriate. Just the same, we have to see that, according to Hegel, freedom is realized on the level of pure speculation and not on the level of will or practical attitude.

The same considerations come into prominence in Hegel's critique of the conjunction present in KANTian philosophy between the good and the ought.

If we adhere to the view that the good is related to the infinite progress of realization, then it follows that the good is positive only as an ought (*Syst.* 1. 444). However, philosophy guides us to a different view, namely, that the real world is that what it ought to be, or put differently, that the true good, which is identical with the universal divine reason, is also the potential to realize itself (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 67). It is, therefore, not accidental that Hegel sees the truth of the good as a unity of the theoretical and practical idea (*Enz.* § 235). The postulate of that unity places good in the sphere of practice, but also points to the synonymity of the identity of reason and reality and the realization of the good as that identity, or within that identity.

We may mention only briefly one additional element in Hegel's encounter with KANT, and refer to the concept of duty. Hegel acknowledge the significance of KANT's position stressing the acting according to duty for the sake of duty (*Phil. d. Rechts.* § 135; transl. 89). But even here he criticizes KANT because he provides no further characterization of duty; it is identity lacking any content; it is a positive element of an abstract character, totally lacking a quality of determination appears often. Such a position faces the danger of an empty formalism — and emptiness comes view in this context. A different expression of that line of criticism is to be found in Hegel's view that in spite of the supremacy of KANT's concept of duty lacks any articulation (*Gliederung;* ibid.; transl. 89-90). To be sure, this criticism of KANT is to some extent similar to his well-known criticism of KANT's formalism. Yet it has to be underscored that Hegel does not try to argue that KANT fails to indicate the particular circumstances in which the various acts have to take place. He refers rather to KANT's lack of concreteness, since Hegel's starting point in the primary synthesis favours the aspect of concreteness not because of the emphasis on circumstances but because of the development characteristic of the unfolding primary synthesis.

13.

We have tried to examine the two systems of KANT and Hegel, emphasizing their differing structures and respective logic. Let us state again that these are indeed two differently structured philosophical systems, one based — in the context explored — on the distinction between the theoretical and practical, and the other on a primary synthesis to be explicated and eventually sublated in speculation.[24] A philosophical system that emphasizes the identity of

[24] Trendelenburg's attempt to reduce the ultimate difference of philosophical systems to that of thought and power (*Gedanke und Kraft*) cannot do justice to the difference between the systems of Kant and Hegel. See: Ueber den letzten Unterschied der philosophischen Systeme. In: *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie.* Bd 2. Berlin 1855, 1 ff.

reason and reality, i. e. that of Hegel, is bound by its logic to place morality not as being parallel to cognition but as a stage in the process towards the fulfilment of the full identity. At this juncture a critical question of a secondary order, as it were, emerges with reference to both systems. In terms of architectonics, — and this will be dealt with consequently — we should agree, that Hegel's system seems to be more well-rounded and thus more coherent than the structure outlined by KANT. However, the question we have to ask does not only concern he architectonics of the two systems, but: which of them provides a more adequate presentation of the profiles of cognition and morality respectively? Here we have to return to the obvious issues, namely, that for KANT cognition or theory amounts to the knowledge of nature, and is not of a speculative character. What Hegel considered to be the weakness of the KANTian system is, to say the least, a weakness of which KANT himself was aware because of the built in limitations of his system. But in terms of its moral philosophy, the KANTian presentation seems to be more germane to the phenomenon of morality because of the emphasis it puts on freedom and the interrelationship, or even circularity, pertaining between freedom and the moral imperative. The fact that KANT excludes morality from the cognitive sphere is perhaps an architectonic shortcoming. But, by the same token, it is an attempt to do justice to the continuous transcending of the circumstantial or empirical limitations to which we are exposed, while the moral imperative is meant to lead us in the direction of overcoming them by shaping them. Hegel sees these very significant components of the KANTian system. Yet the systematic considerations, in the strict sense of the term, i. e. the overriding impact of the notion of synthesis, lead him to acknowledge the KANTian elements but at the same time to try to place them in an explicitly articulated higher synthesis based on the notion of the primacy of thinking. Parallelism is replaced by identity, but, as it usually results, parallelism does more justice to the variegation of the phenomena we have examined than the notion or the structure of identity does.

The difference between the systems will become apparent when we shall deal presently with some of their consequences in the areas of religion and politics and eventually shall come back to their basic structure. The first step in that direction is the exploration of the concept of the ideal.

Chapter Four
ON SOME TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF IDEAL

1.

It is an established conclusion that the first application of the concept "ideal" refers to the sphere of art.[25] If we start with a book by MENGS published in 1762, we notice that he refers to beauty in terms of perfection; the emphasis is on the visible concept of perfection. The visibility is taken as a characteristic feature, at least of painting; therefore beauty is dealt with in the context of painting representing the area of art. To be sure, MENGS refers also to the perfection of the matter, according to our concept; he does this apparently in order to emphasize that there is a certain conception according to which the matter is shaped in the direction of reaching its perfection. Moreover, he refers also to a kind of an affinity between beauty as embodying perfection and perfection as a quality of God. In this sense the beauty is a divine entity. This aspect of beauty qua perfection leads MENGS to regard beauty as the soul of the matter: the more beauty there is in a thing, the more spiritual the thing is. The important point to be mentioned is that perfect beauty, according to that view, can be found in man only. We arrive at that conclusion from the fact that almost in every man some parts of his are beautiful. As a matter of fact the beautiful parts correspond to the efficiency or utility of those parts in the whole structure of man. This structure does not apply to this or that man but to man at large; painting picks up the beautiful parts and structures them in — what MENGS calls — the moulded and moral perfection of the matter. It is in this context that the term *"das Ideale"* appears and it is conceived as being higher than what he calls das *Materielle.* The ideal element can convey its perfection to the material one and the material one can accept or receive the ideal one. Terminologically it has to be observed that the term *"das Ideale"* appears in the context and not the term *"Ideal"*. Obiously the term, as it

[25] On the aesthetic background of the concept of Ideal see the instructive article of *Giorgio Tonelli: Ideal in Philosophy from the Renaissance to 1780.* In: *Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas.* Publ. by Philip P. Wiener. Vol. 2. New York 1973, 549-552.

stands, is closer to the adjective *idealis* which connoted first something which exists in an idea or in a conception. This leads us back to the notion that the ideal aspect of perfection can not be detached from a certain impression which is present in our minds. Hence the relationship pertains between the ideal and the power of imagination. In this sense the notion of Ideal refers negatively to the rejection of the aspect of imitation, since imitation implies the reference to what is really present and as such it so brought into the context of art or painting. If there is imitation it is an imitation of the ideal perfection and not of the given fact or facts. In addition we have to emphasize here that the introduction of the concept of perfection is meant to imply a PLATONIC element — but as we shall see later that PLATONIC element underwent a significant transformation.[26]

2.

We move now to the second presentation which entails the concept of ideal, namely, that contained in WINCKELMANN's book on the history of art of the ancient times, which has been published two years after MENGS' book, in 1764. Thus for instance, WINCKELMANN, and he refers specifically to *Laocoon*, speaks about nature lifted up through the ideal. In another context he speaks about ideal heads *(idealische Köpfe)* referring to the eyes of the person which are in art or in painting always deeper than what is generally the situation in nature. We have to mention that WINCKELMANN uses also the term "the height of the ideas" — and one can wonder to what extent the two terms *Ideal* and *Idea* are to be taken here synonimously, or whether they point to a difference which has not been made explicit.[27]

A comment present in the literature on the concept of Ideal with reference to WINCKELMANN does not seem to be very helpful for our understanding of the notion at stake. [28] That comment distinguishes between two elements since the emergence of that concept and goes back even to SOCRATES. The first element underlined is the selection of components out of nature — a judicious selection at that. That selection amounts to a name for the cultivation of the sense of beauty enhanced through rich experience. The second element emphasized is the representation of the idea as a kind of an inner vision and as such it can occur only in the brain of man. This comment is not satisfactory because it does not refer specifically to "idea" in the PLATONIC

[26] *Raphael Mengs: Gedanken über die Schönheit und über den Geschmack in der Malerei.* Mit einem Vorwort hrsg. von H. Seller. Leipzig (n. d.) 11, 12, 15, 18, 20. Consult: *Monika Sutter: Die Kunsttheoretischen Begriffe des Malerphilosophen.* Dissertation 1968. 30 ff.

[27] *Johann Joachim Winckelmann's Geschichte der Kunst des Althertums nebst Auswahl seiner kleinen Schriften.* Hrsg. von Dr. J. Lessing. Berlin 1970. 114, 123, 154.

[28] *Carl Justi: Winckelmann und seine Zeitgenossen:* Vol. 3 Leipzig 1898. 161 ff.

sense or to its new version inherent in the term "Ideal". At the same time it retains the traditional aspect of the relationship between the ideal and the human fantasy or imagination expressed here through the reference to the brain of man. Further still, the same comment refers to the ideal or to the ideal formation as being in contradiction to the individual datum. Here too we do not find an analysis of the level of the perfection qua ideal and the distinction between the individual and the general of the universal. It is for that reason that LESSING's *Laocoon* (published in 1766) and some of the writings related to it shed more light on the notion of the ideal and its relation to beauty and art than the previous writings which introduced that term.

3.

In the first place we have to mention that LESSING helped us to identify the origin or the employment of the term ideal. He observes in one of his writings that the Italian father DE LANA (TERRI FRANCESCO 1631—1687) seems to be the person who invented the word "ideal", though he adds — in the article at stake LESSING collected quotations from DE LANA — that DE LANA did not want that the painter should paint by following the ideal but by following nature. LESSING observes also that DE LANA does not want that all the parts of the body of a man or of a person should be taken by the artist from nature in the sense that they should refer to all the parts of one and the same man. They should be parts taken up from different persons in the sense that the artist should present the most beautiful parts collected by him from different persons. At this point LESSING adds that nothing else is understood now by the notion of ideal.[29] Again we have to see here the relationship established or pointed to between what LESSING calls elsewhere the higher corporal beauty which exists only in man. Even this is due to the idea. Put differently[30] we find here again this exclusive relationship between beauty conceived in terms of what is ideal and the position of man, which as an object of art occupies a unique status. To be sure we do not find the explanation for that employment of the notion of "ideal". Perhaps we can enlarge presently on a warranted conjecture about that very significant aspect of the notion of ideal and its employment in the area of art or painting.

[29] Lessing quotes de Lana *verbatim*. See his *Sämmtliche Schriften*. Hrsg. von K. Lachmann. Bd 11. Part 1. Leipzig 1857. 440.

[30] *Ibid.* 165; Paul Oskar Kristeller points to the fact that de Lana uses the term "ideal" only as an adjective. Hence the concept of ideal as a noun or a substantive has to be referred to the authors discussed in the text. See: *Philosophie und Gelehrsamkeit*. In: Heidelberger Jahrbücher. 24 (1980), 38 note. — Tonelli in the above mentioned article (note 25, 549); says that the Dutch critic Kate (1728) seems to have been the first to use Ideal (*Idealité*) as a substantive.

At this point let us refer to LESSING's *Laocoon* (published in 1766) where he himself applies specifically the term "ideal". In the second chapter of the *Laocoon* he speaks about the ideal of one particular man and not of man in general.[31] But there are additional references in LESSING's *Laocoon* which have to be mentioned in the present context. He speaks about the perfection of an object; when he refers to the poet and not to the painter, he speaks about the idea of the corporal pain, or about the idea of benevolent patience which in turn is tied up with pain. LESSING speaks also about the slightest deviation from the ideal which leads us to a misperception of the picture.[32] We could sum up by saying that though the concept of ideal is made prominent by LESSING, it is not the only concept that he uses in his analysis. Both "ideal" and "idea" are present in *Laocoon*. Yet when he refers to the difference between painting and poetry, which is the running theme of *Laocoon*, he says that the ideal of beauty in the painting had possibly occasioned the ideal of moral perfection in poetry. We could see in the context the difference in the hierarchy between painting and poetry and the concomitant difference in hierarchy between beauty and morality, namely, that the first is inherent in painting and the latter in poetry. But the common denominator of the artistic expressions is here the notion of the ideal, which as such, becomes perhaps a replacement of the idea, though the wavering in the employment of the two terms is scattered in the various presentations of the *Laocoon*.

At this point we can ask the question to which only a very tentative answer can be given, namely, why has been the notion of the ideal introduced at all in the context of art. The first point to be stressed in this conjecture of our answer to the question is that the notion of the ideal has been understood — as idea was — as connoting something of a model, something which is paradigmatic. As paradigmatic it is not real and has only its existence in our representations, perceptions, or even in our intellect. Since art has been viewed as not following the data of nature but as embodying a paradigmatic position, it has been taken as being tantamount with expressing in an exemplary way that paradigmatic object conceived by us but not present in any given structure. The fact still remains that the invention of the concept and its application to art can not be detached from the notion of the "idea". Thus the PLATONIC element or the echo of PLATO's concept of idea is present here.

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[31] *Laokoon oder über die Grenzen der Mahlerey und Poesie.* In: *Lessing: Sämmtl. Schriften.* Bd 6. Hrsg. von K. Lachmann. Leipzig 1854, 370. The English translation: *Laocoon.* Transl. with an introduction and notes by Edward Allen McCormick. New York 1962. 14; to the following sentences cf. 380; transl. 25 and 400; transl. 41.

[32] *Ibid.* 412; transl. 53. Consult: *Erwin Panofsky: Idea.* A Concept in Art Theory. Transl. by J. S. Peaks. New York, Evanston, San Francisco 1968. mainly 65 ff. "Le beau ideal" is analysed there.

This may sound as a paradoxical transformation of PLATO's concept of idea since in PLATO we have to distinguish between the idea of beauty and, for instance, the painting or generally speaking the work of art. After all the work of art, invented or created by the human beings, can not be as such an embodiment or a representation of an idea. It belongs to the sphere of shades in PLATO's view and, as such, is by definition exposed to errors. When PLATO speaks about the beauty of a painting he stresses that it is not due to the pleasure of the sensuous excitement but to the adequate geometrical proportions e. g. straight lines and circles.[33] The very shift towards the concept of ideal, even when it has its roots in the PLATONIC "idea", implies a new understanding of art. Art is a legitimate embodiment of a paradigm or an archetype. The work of art is an individual work conceived and invented by the human beings. As such, it is an embodiment of an ideal level and not something to be placed within the shadowy sphere of artificial creations of man. PLATO started with the assumption that the encountered reality is akin to the idea or ideas; the introduction of the concept of ideal brings in a new approach in the sense that even invented creations are, or can be, embodiments, of the level of ideas qua ideal.

In this context we have to come back to the fact that the introduction of the concept of ideal has, as its concomitant element, the centrality of man in the paintings — if we may put it like that. How can we explain that centrality? Perhaps one of the explanations would be that man is conceived as a distinct being in the universe of data or beings and as such, through his excellence, occupies a position which already initially contains an element of perfection. Art following the ideal reinforces the given — innate — perfection. To put it differently there would be a kind of affinity between the initial stage of man and the perfection implied in the ideal, finding in turn its embodiment in the work of art. The embodiment lies, as it were, between two poles — the ideal perfection conceived by the artist and the given perfection present in the reality of man. If this conjecture is — at least to some extent — warranted, we find that art cannot be placed outside the realm of a given affinity between the reality of man and the archetype. Thus art does not bestow the ideal on what is outside the realm of perfection altogether. Here one notices more of an echo of the PLATONIC view than in the description of the position of art in general. In terms of the sphere of art, the concept of ideal has an anti-

[33] *Philebos* 51c; *Dialogues of Plato.* Transl. into English by B. Jowett, introd. by Raphael Demos. Vol 2. New York 1937, 386–387. The superiority of poetry as a dynamic presentation against the static character of painting — the major topic of Lessing's — differs from Plato's evaluation of poetry. Consult Hans-Georg Gadamer in his Plato and the poets included in his book: *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato.* Transl. with an introd. by P. Christopher Smith. New Haven 1980. 39 ff.

PLATONIC connotation whereas in the terms of the theme, that is to say, the position of man, the PLATONIC motif comes back — at least partially so. This has to be said in general, disregarding at this point LESSING'S distinction between painting and poetry, according to which poetry incorporates in its own way and through its own means the notion of the moral perfection. That notion has again a PLATONIC resonance, but at the same time it leads us to the relationship established by KANT in terms of the ideal beauty and the moral destiny of man.[34]

4.

It is because of that background that we start with *Kritik der Urteilskraft.* KANT defines an ideal as the representation of an individual existence as adequate to an idea, whereas an idea signifies a concept of reason. In the context of taste, KANT says, that some products of taste are looked at as exemplary. There is no imitation involved, for taste must be an original faculty "hence it follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea" (*KdU* § 17; transl. 73). When KANT speaks about the master's teaching his pupil the evaluation of the work of art, stressing that there is no method of teaching in this area, he says that regard must be paid to a certain idea which art must teach in view, even though complete success ever eludes its happiest efforts (*KdU* § 60; transl. 226). This element can be understood as pointing to the notion of idea or ideas "to which no commensurate object can be given in experience, and in which thus could only serve as regulative principles in the pursuit of experience" (*KdU* § 77; transl. part II. 60). The regulative is understood as being ideal only or related to it and the word "ideal" is rendered again in an adjective. The paradigmatic position is an ideal because it guides the efforts to embody it, for instance, in the work of art.

In the area of art where KANT stresses the guiding aspect of the ideal, the ideal is rendered as an aim or an objective. What is called by KANT "free beauty" does not presuppose a concept of what the object should be. The second mode of beauty described as beauty which is near to immediacy presupposes such a concept of what the object should be and also the responding perfection of the object. — Here we encounter in KANT'S analysis an interesting turn. He speaks, for instance, about flowers as free beauties of nature. No attention is paid in term of the flowers to their natural aims. No

[34] Cassirer in his analysis of Winckelmann's position overstressed the Platonic element allegedly present in Winckelmann. It seems to be more plausible to refer to Plotinus — Cassirer puts the Platonic and Neo Platonic view together, because the element of vision is indeed significant in Plotinus' theory. See: *Ernst Cassirer: Freiheit und Form.* Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte. Berlin 1916. 200 ff.

perfection of any kind underlies this judgment, and the same applies to other natural beings which are called self-subsisting beauties. They please freely on their own account. In the same class we may rank also in the area of music what is called sensations — and KANT adds that music moves from sensations to ideas.

The situation changes when we speak about the beauty of man but also about the beauty of a horse or of a building. The change occurs because a concept of the end is presupposed. That concept defines what the thing has to be and consequently it defines a concept of the perfection of the thing. Once we introduce the notion of perfection, we introduce something which differs from the notion of beauty. Therefore KANT says that perfection neither gains by beauty nor beauty by perfection.

An additional distinction is brought forward, namely, that between the idea of the beautiful and what KANT calls "moral ideal". Ideal proper can be placed only as the expression of the moral. To be sure, the visible expression of moral ideals which govern man inwardly can be drawn from experience only "... but their combination with all that our reason connects with the morally good in the idea of the highest finality — benevolence, purity, strength, or equanimity, etc. — may be made, as it were, visible in bodily manifestation ... and this embodiment involves a union of pure ideas of reason and great imaginative power ... The correctness of such an ideal of beauty is made evident by its not permitting any sensuous charm to mingle with the delight in its object, in which it still allows us to take a great interest. This fact in turn shows that an estimate formed according to such a standard can never be purely aesthetic ..." (*KdU* § 17; transl. 80).

It is clear that at this juncture KANT's analysis is related to the previously explored concept of the ideal and its embodiment in art. Moreover KANT's exposition places the emphasis on the moral perfection. He sees this partially embodied in a possible work of art, but it is essentially connected with morality and the ethical destiny of man. Whereas LESSING has seen the ethical perfection as being present in artistic expression and poetry as being different from painting, KANT sees the moral perfection as going beyond any artistic representation, though he grants the possibility of a connection between such a representation and the moral code. The difference between the views related to art and KANT's view is due to the fact that KANT does not allow for the possibility that beauty as such could be evaluated in terms of any finality. Beauty is self-sufficient and evokes our taste by finality, but by definition it is not self-sufficient. It can serve a purpose as a building does, or it serves an end in the inherent sense of that term as morality does. Yet KANT uses the term ideal in the context of art because it points to a paradigm or archtetype embodied in the work of art. KANT uses the term also in the context of morality because morality goes beyond the empirical data: the moral deed has to follow the example of the moral law or the moral destiny. With all the

differences between the aesthetic expression and the moral position, the common feature of the ideal in both spheres lies in their transcending the given. From the point of view of experience the guiding principle is the ideal, embodied in the work of art and present in and regulating our experience in so far as we are concerned with morality. In any case, KANT did not detach himself from the preceeding explorations of the notion of the ideal though he incorporates those explorations into the structure of his own system. This indeed will lead us to the most prominent exploration present in KANT's analysis of the concept of ideal i. e. in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.*

5.

Remaining within the realm of art we have to observe that KANT's position is not detached from the discussions related to the presence of the intelligible component within the work of art, in spite of the primacy of the ethical consideration which we analysed before. In KANT's words: the beautiful is a symbol of the morally good (*KdU* § 59; transl. 223). Yet, in KANT's view the aspect of the presentness of the work of art is obviously a fact and as such it cannot be seen outside the context of the response or reaction of sensuality. Hence KANT refers to sensation as to something which is merely subjective, intended to be accompanied with pleasure. The feeling of the senses is here an essential component of art or of the encounter with it, though it does not exhaust the essence of art. (*KdU* § 45; transl. 167). Yet, KANT did not follow at this point the view which became, to some extent, prevailing, namely, that each level of our encounter with the world entails its own respective perfection and the perfection of the sensuous cognition is the beauty — as has been exposed e. g. by BAUMGARTEN; the emphasis has been placed on the appearing harmony. KANT has neutralised that view by pointing to the aspect of an end, characteristic of the aesthetic field, what he calls formal finality estimated by the agent. Here he stresses explicitly the subjective aspect of that estimation and therefore relates it to feeling of pleasure or displeasure (*KdU* § 8; transl. 34). We could suggest in this context that the teleological aspect inherent in the work of art is the equivalent of the component of intelligibility which has been stressed in the various expositions of the nature of art. What has been considered as a kind of a synthesis between the intelligible and the sensuous elements, appears in KANT as the synthesis between perception and the presence of the teleological aspect, which in turn implies a kind of a harmony both of the faculties of the human agent as well as the profile of the work of art. But as long as we remain within the scope of art and do not pass to the ethical aspect, there is no identification between the presence of the intelligible aspect and the ideal in the terminological sense of that term.[35]

[35] Consult on this: *Gerhard Funke: Erscheinungswelt.* Zur phänomenologischen Ästhetik. II. In: *Perspektiven der Philosophie.* 146 ff.

6.

The situation changes once we look at the dialectic in the first Critique. Here we find a detailed elaboration of the relationship pertaining between ideas in the terminological sense of that term and the ideal. To put it like that: the addition of the consonant "L" to "idea" transforms the idea into an entity, self-rounded and self-sufficient, thus having a character of reality in the proper sense of that term. It is therefore essential to see first — and at this point we have to come back to the realm of art — the texture of the relations which are to be considered in this context.

In the first place let us look at the definition or description of the concept of idea. An idea is defined as a concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience. It is a concept of reason (*KdrV* 377; transl. 314). As such an idea is grounded in reason and concerns itself exclusively with the absolute totality. Since that totality transcends experience, reason as the origin of ideas occupies itself solely with the prescription to understanding in its direction towards a certain unity (*KdrV* 383; transl. 318). Thus ideas are placed on a borderline between the two spheres — of experience and of absolute totality; since it guides experience towards a total systematization and is not a system self-subsistent and rounded in itself, ideas amounting to the ultimate and necessary unity of all empirical realities are — only — regulative principles of reason (*KdrV* 703; transl. 553). We find here a transformation of the notion of ideal, though the term as such is not used as yet, to indicate the continuous striving towards perfection, which amounts to the ultimate systematic unity of knowledge. As long as the idea remains the regulative rule, and understanding follows that rule, the notion of the idea is, at least to some extent, KANT's version of what we call projection: we project the unity or the unity is projected in the idea or through it. There is a basic difference between a projected unity and, as it were, the achieved one. Now, in this context we can say that the "ideal", terminologically speaking, amounts to the achieved unity. It is therefore not by chance that in KANT's own presentation, the ideal is related to God in the various interpretations of that concept. To be sure, critically speaking, KANT himself never attributes to the ideal the quality of reality as a traditional view of God had it. The regulative validity is present here, just the same. The concept of a highest intelligence is a mere idea; its objective reality is not to be taken as consisting in its referring directly to an object. KANT calls that position of the content of the highest intelligence a new idea. He speaks about what is only a schema constructed in accordance with the tradition of the greatest possible unity of reason (*KdrV* 698; transl. 550). The notion of perfection appears in this context as pointing to the completion of all conditions of thought as being too surpassingly great for the human understanding. One of the ways of proving the difference between the regulative position of the idea and its constitutive

one, or even as we shall see, transcendent position, is to refer to the analogy namely, that we attribute to the unknown being by analogy an intelligence, the latter being an empirical concept (*KdrV* 726; transl. 458). This is so since intelligence as a capacity and as an activity is known to us from introspection or from the empirical world in which we are involved.

Speaking about the idea as an ideal KANT uses the expression: "Thus, while for the merely speculative employment of reason, the supreme being remains a mere *ideal,* it is yet *an ideal without a flaw (fehlerfreies Ideal),* a concept which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge" (*KdrV* 669; transl. 531). The very fact that KANT introduces here the qualification "without a flaw", is to be explained by the fact that he refers not only to what is implied in the other ideas, but to the self-sufficient reality which as such is to be viewed not only as pointing to the end of perfection but is understood as the perfection in itself. It is perhaps not by accident that when KANT attempts to characterize the qualities of the ideal he refers to what he calls transcendental concepts or transcendental theology and the following qualities are mentioned: *ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium (KdrV* 659; transl. 525). What we encounter here, as a matter of fact, is that KANT, deliberately or not, returns to the concept of *transcendentalia* in the traditional sense of that term, which differs from the sense which he himself gave to the term. Since he refers to God in his infinite plantitude, he refers by the same token to the highest reality or as the traditional notion of transcendentals had it, to the highest unity, to the truth, *par excellence,* to goodness, etc. Hence we could say that vis-à-vis the ideal somehow the line of demarcation between the transcendental aspect viewed as the grounding of the idea in reason and in its striving towards a systematic unity, and the transcendent aspect is, at least to some extent, blurred. To be sure, KANT himself observed in spite of the fact that transcendent and transcendental are not the same or are not interchangeable terms (*KdrV* 352; transl. 999) ... "that the speculative employment of reason hypotheses ... have no validity in themselves, but only relatively to the transcendent pretensions of the opposite party. For to make principles of possible experience conditions of the possibility of things in general is just as transcendent a procedure as to assert the objective reality of (transcendent) concepts" (*KdrV* 809; transl. 620). In attributing reality to the ideal we transcend reason and by the same token refer to a transcendent reality. It can be understood that it is precisely in this context that KANT referred to the hypostasis of the ideas which amounts to turning a guiding principle into a reality. Transcendence is to be understood as a projected unity turned into a hypostatic reality. To the aspect of hypostasis we shall come back.[36]

[36] Hinrich Knittermeyer sums up the traditional understanding of the term transcendental by saying: transcendental philosophy goes equally beyond the dogmatics of the being as beyond

7.

Again we find that aspect of turning the focus of the striving into a reality explaining the very introduction of the term or notion idea. To put it differently: we find the explanation of the fact that KANT did not limit himself to the employment of the term "ultimate unity" but introduced the term "ideal" which is to connote the idea not merely *in concreto* but is an individual thing, a particular one, determinable or even determined by the idea alone.

This quality of concreteness, of individuality, of particularity, enables an establishment of the relationship between the idea of the ultimate unity, the notion of ideal and the notion of God — at least God as the concept has been understood in the traditional religions. One could conjecture that there exists a relationship between the personality of God and the individual character of God understood in terms of the ideal. Just the same we could say that the qualitites which KANT mentions in the context could lead him beyond the traditional religion. This could enable us to listen here to a kind of an echo of SPINOZA's characterization of God as substance being totally determined — in what KANT refers to as being determinable or determined by the idea alone (*KdrV* 594; transl. 485). When KANT speaks about an ideal that is quite unique (*KdrV* 639; transl. 512) he could still be understood as referring either to the personal God or the total reality. Yet when he speaks about this being as containing in its concept all that is required for absolute necessity and consequently enables to infer this absolute necessity *a priori* (*KdrV* 639; transl. 512) he, obviously, refers to the ontological proof of the existence of God. Just the same, he seems to refer — directly or not — to the ways SPINOZA described the identity of the total substance with God. This trend is reinforced by the reference to the ultimate unity and to the particular objects, for instance, when the latter are understood merely as limitations and therefore they presuppose the ultimate reality. "All manifoldness of things is only a correspondingly varied mode of limiting the concept of the highest reality which forms their common substratum, just as all figures are only possible as so many different modes of limiting infinite space" (*KdrV* 578; transl. 492). It seems to be obvious that the very analogy to space, to which the notion of limitation refers, is echoing again SPINOZA's position.

Summing up this aspect we could say that the notion of the ideal is intelligibility *par excellence,* viewed as reality with all the predicates which go along with that concept. In the ideal the transcendental structure of reason becomes transcendent or is rendered so — and obviously this turning into transcendence is a dialectical mistake. At this point it is appropriate to add KANT's

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the formality of the logical and guarantees the unity of the being out of the unity of the transcendental method. See: *Hinrich Knittermeyer: Der Terminus Transcendental.* Marburg 1920. 213.

own observation: "for it is not the idea in itself, but its use only that can be either transcendent or immanent..." (*KdrV* 671; transl. 532). It is because of that term, explainable as it is, that KANT introduces in the concept the well-known reference to *"as if"* pointing to our viewing all objects *as if* they drew their origin from such a self-subsistent and original reality — what KANT calls here archetype. An additional comment has to be made here, namely, that KANT uses not only the substantive term "ideal", but also the adjective *"idealische"*, that is to say ideal beings (*KdrV* 702; transl. 552). We have noticed before that aspect of the employment of an adjective in the process of introducing the notion of "ideal" into the philosophical or aesthetic terminology.

8.

The identification of the idea with God or, as KANT puts it, the supposition of a being that is the sole and sufficient cause of all cosmological theories (*KdrV* 714; transl. 559) leads KANT to conceive of the ideal not only as an all-comprehensive reality with all the determinations which go with it, but also as what he calls: Prototypon transcendentale (*KdrV* 599; transl. 487). "The ideal is ... the archetype *(Urbild) (prototypon)* of all things, which one and all, as imperfect copies *(ectypa)* derive from it the material of their possibility, and while approximating to it in varying degrees, yet always fall very far short of actually attaining it", (*KdrV* 578; transl. 492). The archetypical or prototypical status of the ideal can be understood in two ways. In the first place, it pertains to the fact that within the empirical realm there is no complete unity. The complete unity is present only on the level of the ideal and thus becomes a model of or the unity aimed at and which is not achievable on the level of our categorial knowledge which is the level of experience. But just the same the concept has a moral implication or connotation: our attempts to realize the unity are meant to follow a model, both from the point of view of cognition as well as the point of view of our ethical aspirations. The comprehensive unity becomes our ethical objective while the empirical things are imitations or copies of the ultimate unity, being both an ontological sphere as well as a sphere of the ethical code in its full realization. Here the plentitude characteristic of the idea can be interpreted both in the cognitive sense as well as in the moral sense. In addition, historically speaking, a third component of the concept of ideal becomes prominent, a component which we can coin the PLATONIC one, to which the very employment of the notion of prototype or archetype would hint. Indeed, KANT says, and he expresses the obvious, that for PLATO ideas are archetypes of the things themselves. They

are not as the categories are merely keys to possible experiences (*KdrV* 370; transl. 310). This aspect of PLATO's system makes PLATO the representative of the view that objects should be purely intelligible. PLATO is therefore the outstanding intellectualist philosopher (*KdrV* 881-882; transl. 667).

We can try to sum up now the aspects of the notion of ideal, as that notion is presented in *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* Structurally speaking, an ideal is an idea, that is to say, a focus of our continuous attempts to systematize our knowledge, whereby the system would be coterminous with the ultimate unity. Since human reason is by nature architectonic, it regards all other knowledge as belonging to a possible system (*KdrV* 502; transl. 429). The *ideas* represent the system to be achieved and thus are the consummation of the architectonic character of reason. The *ideal* adds to that generic characteristic feature of reason and system the realization or, let us call it, the embodiment of the system in a reality which by becoming real becomes transcendent. To put it differently: ideas are related to the achieved intelligibility. The ideal is intelligibility viewed as embodied or realized, though there is no justification for this step taken from our mere aspiration to the to be achieved realization. This aspect of realization, as we have seen, turns the ideal into a term which can be viewed as synonymous with the different interpretations of the concept of God. The attribution of reality is reinforced by that association with the concept of God. And lastly — ideal has a moral connotation because it is viewed as an archetype of things and not only as a goal to which things aspire. Hence in a way KANT integrated or attempted, deliberately or not, to integrate into this presentation, as well as into his terminology, some of the aspects of the notion of ideal which he inherited but by the same token gave a momentum to the variegated employment of that notion. The ideal in the aesthetic sphere related to the intelligible aspect is present in the sensuous one. From here KANT, in a way, elevated the notion of the ideal from sensuality to the level of systematic unity. The realization does not take place any more in the work of art sensuously perceived. It takes place on the level of the unity of reason regarded as completed, self-rounded and self-subsistent. If from the point of view of beauty in terms of the human beings there exists a primacy of the ethical aspect, that ethical aspect comes back to the ideal on the level of systematic unity as being the prototype or a model imitated by things. And lastly, the justification for the notion of ideal as well as for the notion of ideas, is their regulative position. Hence we could say that the regulative position in KANT becomes the version of the aspiring characteristic of human beings who aim at something beyond their experience and has to be realized step by step in their enlarging of the scope of experience. Thus, KANT both inherited some of the aspects of the notion of the ideal as well as gave momentum to the formulation of some aspects of that notion in his attempt to incorporate the notion in his own architectonics. There is an additional

version in the notion of ideal related to KANT's ethical philosophy. It is our task now to look into that aspect of the system.[37]

9.

The concept of ideal is present also in the orbit of KANT's ethical philosophy. We could assume that because of the primacy of practical reason and because of the general notion that the regulative principles become in the field of morality constitutive ones, the ideal would be turned in the sphere of morality into a constitutive notion. Yet this is not the case. There are several reasons for that, including the very position of God (a topic to be discussed in the context of religion) and concurrently the presence of the notion of postulates in the sphere of morality. In the first place, we have to mention that we should not look upon actions because they are commandments of God. We should regard them as divine commands because we have an inward obligation to them. To put it differently: we should believe ourselves to be acting in conformity with the divine will only insofar as we hold sacred the moral law. This position of being sacred is grounded in reason which teaches us from the character of the actions themselves (*KdrV* 847; transl. 644). We can mention here parenthetically — and we shall come back to that issue — that because of this conception the relationship between religion and morality can be explained, that is to say, that religion does not connote the obedience to divine commandments. On the contrary, religion consists in the assertion that the moral imperatives are divine commandments because they are moral imperatives, that is to say because they are grounded in practical reason. To be sure, we cannot be oblivious of the fact that KANT introduced into the context the notion of "being sacred", which is obviously a notion with a religious field of association. It is for that reason that KANT says: "That law of all laws, like every moral prescription of the Gospel, thus presents the moral disposition in its complete perfection, and though as an ideal of holiness it is unattainable by any creature, it is yet an archetype which we should strive to approach and to imitate in an uninterrupted infinite progress." (*KdrV* 89; transl. 86). In the exploration of the concept of ideas, within the context of the systematic unity aimed at from the point of view of knowledge or theory, the notion of holiness, let alone the reference to the Gospel, did not appear. When KANT moves to the area of practical reason, holiness becomes one of the synonyms for the position of the archetype and is implying imitation or, as the German text has it, to become similar. We can

[37] The previous interpretation by the present author's of the notion of ideal in Kant's is contained in his *Experience and its Systematization.* Studies in Kant. Second and enlarged edition. The Hague 1972. 154 ff.

even assume that within theoretical reason the aspect of similarity or imitation would be meaningless, because what is meant by systematic unity is the enhancement and the enlargement of our cognitions and not the absorption of an archetype and its qualities into our own behaviour or character. Still, even within the context of practical philosophy the ideal of the highest good as a holy being or will is an ideal proper, that is to say, an archetype, and is not made into a constitutive principle of morality. To refer to the previous observation we could say that to turn the archetype into a constitutive principle would blur the distinction between morality and religion — and this is precisely what Kant did not want to maintain.

From the point of view of the ideal, an additional aspect has to be mentioned which is indeed an aspect added by KANT and can not be seen simply as an exposition or an elaboration as an idea of God as the supreme good. KANT says that what he entitles the ideal of the supreme good is the idea of such an intelligence in which the most perfect moral will is united with supreme blessedness. Such an idea is the cause of all happiness in the world, so far as happiness stands in exact relation with morality. Yet morality is viewed here not from the point of view of the imperatives guiding or shaping it but as worthiness to be happy. The ideal of the supreme good as a harmonious intelligence in which the perfect moral will and supreme blessedness are united is called also, in terms of the intelligible world, a wise Author and Ruler (*KdrV* 839; transl. 639). There are probably two aspects which have to be distinguished here: One is that God already a perfect being represents an archetype unifying the aspect of morality and the aspect of blessedness, the latter being, at least to some extent, the archtetype of happiness insofar as happiness can be seen as imitating blessedness within the human context. But in addition to that, God represents the status of an Author or Ruler, who can be viewed both as a Creator or Organiser of the world or as Guarantor for the ultimate convergence between the moral worthiness of the human beings and their achievement in terms of happiness. The conjunction between morality and happiness would be a realization of a harmony from a human point of view, as the already given conjunction between the holy will and the blessedness it embodies. Yet here again the ideal remains an ideal only, that is to say, a focus for our imitation or aspiration and does not turn to be a constitutive principle, like for instance, freedom is. KANT says that the maxims of virtue and those of one's own happiness are wholly heterogeneous. They are far removed from being at one in respect to their supreme practical principle. It follows from this that the question how is the highest good practically possible remains an unsolved problem (*KdrV* 112; transl. 117). It is not impossible that morality of intention should have a necessary relation as close to happiness as in effect in the sensuous world. Yet this relation is only indirect and therefore mediated by the intelligible Author of nature (*KdrV* 115; transl. 119). Hence we notice again that the ideal appears

in the context of ethics as of a regulative validity. It does not become a constitutive being — to repeat this — both as the object of our aspirations to reach the level of similarity as well as the Ruler and he is the guarantor providing the ground for that the aspiration is not in vain: the world will continue to exist as well as the soul and the merger between merit and achievement will ultimately be a fact. It turns out, and this is perhaps paradoxical, that the concept of the ideal even within ethical philosophy does not cease to be a projected entity. It does not become constitutive or present in the context. Therefore what we identify as the quality of the ideal in terms of projection is indeed a constant feature of KANT's interpretation or transformation of that notion. As we have seen, the moral perfection occupies a primary position even in the context of KANT's exposition of the notion of beauty. We realize therefore that the moral connotation of the notion of idea, as distinct from the theoretical connotation, prevails in KANT's view. Thus from the human vantage, aspiration is the centre viewed from the divine position, from within, as we find in KANT's exposition the reference to the original unity or synthesis between holiness and blessedness. This emphasizes the distance between man and the archetype as well as the position of the archetype as the focus of human aspirations. Hence there is no shift from the transcendental considerations to the transcendent position, even in the context of moral philosophy.

10.

At this point it is appropriate to look into Hegel's version of the notion of ideal, the version which will shed light on some basic systematic difference between Hegel and KANT.

We start with the observation on the position of beauty, since the change which occurred in this context is significant for the understanding of the variations represented by Hegel in the context of the notion explored. Structurally, the major change is already indicated by the systematic position of the idea or concept of beauty, since beauty is placed by Hegel on the level of the absolute spirit. As such it belongs to the level to which, in addition to art, religion and philosophy belong. Hence the presence of the intelligible element in beauty or in works of art is not something sporadic, but becomes part of the whole systematic structure. Indeed, the unity of the concept with the individual appearance is, according to Hegel, the essence of the beautiful. The production of that unity takes place in art (*Ästh.* Bd 1. 148). Hence to speak about the beautiful is, by the same token, to speak about the ideal of the beautiful. The beautiful itself has to be conceived as an idea, that is to say, an idea in a definite form qua ideal (ibid. 153). The idea itself, including the idea in the context of beauty, has to be viewed as the concrete unity of

the concept of objectivity (ibid. 156). The sensuous appearance *(Scheinen)* of the idea (ibid. 160) is again one of the manifestations of the idea or of that realization of the idea in the area of sensuality which amounts to beauty (ibid. 382). If we compare the position of the beautiful with the position of morality we are bound to come to the conclusion that morality in Hegel does not occupy that position within the level of the absolute spirit, and thus cannot occupy a position of primacy vis-à-vis beauty. This indeed is a first major change which occured in Hegel's system in terms of the concept of ideal, compared with that concept in KANT's system. Summing up this point we can say that according to Hegel, art is the mediating link between what is only external, sensuous and ephemeral and the pure thought — or put differently, between nature and finite reality and the infinite freedom of the conceiving thinking (ibid. 28). The content of art is the idea; the form of art is the sensuous shaping appearing as a picture (ibid. 107). Art is one of the manifestations of the spirit in its totality though it has to be distinguished from the manifestation as truth. This is so since the destiny of art is to bring about the conciliation with objectivity and sensuality. This is done because of the sensuous representation which is essential for the essence of art (*Ästh.* Bd 2. 255), as the representation in symbols is essential for religion and the manifestation in concepts is the characteristic feature of philosophy. According to Hegel art in itself entails the component of the idea; that component does not need to be relegated to the sphere of ethics or to the sphere of the architectonic of reason. Yet an additional aspect is essential for the understanding of Hegel's conception, namely, that the intelligible component is not of a particular, let alone sporadic, character. That component as an idea is due to the everpresence of the spirit in reality as such as well as in human creativity, including the creativity of art.

As we have seen already, there exists this very close relationship between the concept of the spirit and the concept of idea. Since the notion of ideal in the theory of art — as well as in KANT's variations — is a derivate from the notion of idea, we have to look now into Hegel's understanding of that notion and move from that analysis of his understanding of the idea to that of the notion of ideal. Critically, Hegel takes exception from KANT's version of the concept of the highest idea and points to the correlation between what he describes as the purity of the infinite concept and the full emptiness of subjectivity. He points to the relationship pertaining between KANT's understanding of the ideas as an absolute subjective maxim in its manifestations, for instance in our activity of reflecting or what he calls faith. In any case, KANT's concept of idea does not become the middle point of knowledge and of reason (ibid. 27). The idea in KANT's sense is of a speculative character. Since KANT looks at speculation, reason and ideas from the point of view of understanding (*Verstand*), the speculative idea becomes for him an idea from which any potency has been taken away (ibid. 10).

Concurrently a significant shift occurs in Hegel's position which probably enabled him to try to interpret the concept of the idea as that which could be termed in the KANTian terminology as constitutive — and perhaps even a stronger expression is called for in this context. This is so because the term "constitutive" in KANT cannot be detached from the constructive character of knowledge, that is to say, from the component of the conditions of our knowledge which are *a priori.* Once the view is taken, and this is a view expressed by Hegel, that everything clear is an idea (*Phil. Prop.* 116) we cannot speak any more about constitutive versus regulative. The whole connotation of guiding the validity of our assertion disappears and is replaced with the trend towards identity. Hegel does not speak about knowledge as conditioned by concepts, but about reality being determined by the concepts. It is in this sense that the idea connotes the unification of the subjective and the objective. As we have seen, for KANT the idea, let alone the ideal, connotes a level which though grounded in transcendental reason carries with it, to say the least, a transcendent element. Again that element disappears once the identity of concept and reality becomes prominent. Therefore absolute knowledge is that level of knowledge in which the concept has itself as its object and content; in this sense absolute knowledge is its own reality (ibid. 166). This is a self-rounded knowledge being identical with reality. Hence, we cannot refer any more or, let us put it like that, we do not have to refer any more to a self-rounded reality which is determined in an idea which lies only within the scope of our developing or progressing knowledge. The fact that real things are not congruent with the idea is but the other side of the coin, that they are finite things and, as such, lack truth (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 239). Once we refer to the identity between knowledge and reality we have to refer also to the identity of the theoretical and the practical aspect, each one of them being a synthesis of aspiration or striving (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 321).

There is an interesting metaphor, or parable, in Hegel which sheds light on his concept of the absolute ideal as against KANT's version of that concept. Hegel, as we have seen, starts with the presumption or the presupposition of the ever-presence of the spirit or the idea. Hence the idea cannot be seen as lying beyond the scope of our knowledge, being the focus of our aspirations in the various interpretations of the latter concept both in the theoretical and the practical field. Hegel compares — and here the metaphor comes in — the position of the absolute ideal with the position of the old man who expresses the same religious propositions as a child. But for the old man these propositions have the significance of his whole life (*Enz.* § 20). It would be a warranted interpretation of that comparison to say that the absolute idea is only a mature formulation of the present notions, present in every stage of our knowledge or existence. The mature stage becomes explicitly full, carrying with it the previous explications which have been made prominent in course of the process. The idea in itself is essentially concrete, that is to say, it

is the unity of different determinations (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 53). Hence the concreteness qua sensuous appearance in the sphere of art is grounded in the very character of the idea. To be sure, that concreteness is re-shaped within the process of maturation until it reaches the level of the conceptual manifestation which is the manifestation in which the adequacy between the manifestation and the essential core becomes apparent. Thus the summit of the potential character of the idea becomes actualized. Hence unlike the theories of art which refer to the intelligible as being present in the sensuous appearance because of the mediation by the artist, the presence of the idea is for Hegel the point of departure of his whole philosophy. To be sure, the artist appears in the context — and is — the mediator. But that mediation is not just an inspiration but is the bringing together of the sensuous and the ideal or making the ideal manifest, and thus sensuous. The artist reads, as it were, the essence of the idea in its drive towards concreteness which takes shape in the sensuous appearance. It has to be added that when Hegel speaks about the work of art he points to what he calls the two theoretical senses, that is to say, vision and hearing. These two are elicited by the work of art whereas smell, taste and feeling *(Gefühl)* are eliminated from the enjoyment with art (*Ästh.* Bd 1. 66—68). In this sense Hegel looks perhaps here more closely at a certain affinity between the senses elicited by the work of art or embodied in it and the spirit and idea, in order to emphasize the primary affinity between — at least — a segment of sensuality and ideas.

Within the context of that view the question arises as to the difference between the notion of idea and that of ideal. It seems that Hegel maintained Kant's distinction in spite of the major change in the context and the respective points of departure. This becomes clear when Hegel says that the ideal is the idea looked at from the vantage point of existence. The adequacy between reality and the concept indicated by Kant comes back. But within the structure of that adequacy the centre of gravity moves in the direction of reality namely, that the essence of the ideal lies in that the idea is real. At this point Hegel adds a significant clause namely that to that reality man as subject belongs and through it he is a strong unity *(festes Eins)* in itself (*Ästh.* Bd 1. 329). Since the component of reality becomes central, namely, the self-rounded reality, Hegel is aware of the difference between the position of the idea and that of the ideal in the sphere of art and that position in the sphere of logic and the absolute. In the sphere of art, in spite of the presence of the ideal, the ideal is not present in its adequate version. The idea in the sphere of art is only immediately unified with reality but not through the mediation, what we called before the process of maturation (*Ästh.* Bd 1. 112). What philosophy brings in, as against the ideal as present in art, is that the real world is so as it ought to be, or put differently, that the true good or the universal divine reason is also the might *(Macht)* to realize itself (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 67). Here again the Kantian direction is discernable: Hegel identifies the position

of the ideal in its substantiality or in its concreteness with the essence of God — to be sure employing here the adjective "concrete". He speaks about the concrete essence of God (*Enz.* § 451). Again, what KANT has seen as a projection of a reality becomes here — on the level of speculation — reality proper. The self-rounded character of reality is due to the identity of the concept and not due to the attributes of God, the former looked at, as it were, from within.[38] Again we can say that Hegel accepted the KANTian distinction between idea and ideal. But the ideal is not transcendent and cannot be so since Hegel does not accept KANT's conception which emphasizes the identical and infinite in itself as self-consciousness. Self-consciousness according to KANT, as viewed by Hegel, is only subjective and cannot be seen in relation to and cannot be attributed to the objects as they are in themselves. The transcendent according to KANT, as Hegel sees it, is that which goes beyond the determination (*Bestimmtheit*) of understanding (*Enz.* § 60). Since according to Hegel reason as such goes beyond understanding or above it and reason contains ideas which are identical with reality, the concept of the ideal only reinforces that position of reason or that meaning of the ideal. It is the task of speculation to sublate the separation in the identity of the subject and object (*Krit. Journal.* 148). It is the character of the speculative element to be the logical necessity, its concept and its being. Again, in this sense the attribution of reality to the idea qua ideal is only a reformulation of the difference between KANT's concept of the idea and what goes along with it — ideal and speculation — in Hegel's view of these concepts.

11.

Looking back at some of the aspects of the transformations of the concept of ideal the following can be remarked in terms of the structure or the configuration of these transformations. We started with the aesthetic aspect of the concept. That aspect brings into prominence two elements — (a) the meeting between the sensuous and the intelligible ingredient which is grounded in the very position and nature of the work of art, and (b) the particular or singular character of the work of art which by definition is of an individual character being self-rounded. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that the sensuous aspect it present in KANT's exposition (*Anthropologie.* § 61, 239 ff.) From that character of the ideal and its limit within the aesthetic field the step made by KANT is one from particularity to the total sphere: either to the sphere of systematic unity of reason or to the sphere of the convergence between moral worthiness and happiness. We shall come back to this issue after pointing to the third step in the direction of extension and intensification of the concept

[38] For the critique of Kant's notion see: Gesch. d. Phil. Bd 3. 602.

of ideal which we encounter in Hegel where the concept of ideal is coterminous with the systematic unity; that systematic unity in turn is the full identity between reason and reality. Such an identity cannot lack reflection or self-consciousness because lacking reflection would amount to absence of reason. Summing up we can say, that the direction of the transformation of the concept of idea is one of *crescendo*, that is to say, of starting with a fragmentary realization of the idea and going upwards to a self-rounded system.

Yet we have to come back to KANT's version of the concept of ideal because we find in KANT an ambiguity of sorts between ideal as connoting the systematic unity and the position of it as a regulative — only — principle of reason. Different interpretations are given to that unity in terms of the spheres which respectively are presented as spheres of reference to the ideal or, the other way round, as spheres in which the ideal becomes relevant for their direction and problematic situation. We may start with a comment which would distinguish between the ideal of highest reason and the ideal of the highest good. KANT says: "Reason, in its ideal, aims ... at complete determination in accordance with a priori rules ... it thinks for itself an object which it regards as being completely determinable in accordance with principles" (*KdrV* 599; transl. 487). The context of posing the notion of reason is that of determination and the question raised explicitly or implicitly is whether or not there are full *a priori* rules which guarantee such a complete determination. Since the condition of such a determination cannot be found in experience and since we are concerned with the full determination, the concept of an ideal is in KANT's own words transcendent. Systematization amounts to a total coherence of our determinations, positions or statements. As we have explored before, one of the ways of rendering that position of the ideal is to look at it or to interpret it as God.

KANT takes advantage of the fact that the ideal is described as God and gives it a moral rendering: "The idea of such an intelligence in which the most perfect moral will, united with the supreme blessedness ... as entitled *the idea of the supreme good* ... Morality, by itself, constitues a system, Happiness, however, does not do so, save in so far as it is distributed in exact proportion to morality. But this is possible only in the intelligible world, under a wise Author and Ruler." (*KdrV* 839; transl. 639).

In the first place we notice that KANT brought in here, into the concept of ideal as the total unity, the notion of the Author or the Ruler. He does this because of the perspective of morality, the hope and the expectation that worthiness will be rewarded. Happiness is understood here as a reward for the moral will and the moral action, a reward which cannot be expected, let alone safeguarded, in the empirical world and thus is referred to the intelligible world beyond experience where merit and reward could meet. That convergence in turn is an idea but just the same a postulate, a postulate from the point of view of morality. Why does KANT introduce into the context the

aspect of happiness at all? He does probably this because he acknowledges the empirical urges and drives of human beings, acknowledging by the same token that urges and drives cannot be satisfied within the empirical world. He accepts the empirical aspiration or expectation and projects it onto the intelligible world. At the same time he presents God as a primary synthesis of the holy will and blessedness. Blessedness is probably in this context an idealized or elevated version of happiness; because KANT presents God as such a unity he turns God's position and essence into an archetype for the human behaviour in spite of the fact that the distance between the empirical quality of happiness and the ideal quality of blessedness remains. Moreover, not only the drive towards happiness is of an empirical character but also the very concept of happiness itself is of the very same character, namely, that the concept of happiness is so indeterminate that although every man wants to attain happiness, he still can never say definitely what really is it that he wants and wills. The reason for this situation lies in the fact that all the elements of which the concept of happiness is composed must be borrowed from experience (*Groundwork.* 85). It might be understood as not totally consistent to look at the projection of empirical expectation as belonging to the concept of ideal, as hinted at before. KANT tried to mitigate that lack of coherence between moral worthiness, the empirical urges and the concept of happiness by relating to it the ideal aim in the systematic sense of bringing into it the integration of morality and blessedness.

Indeed, we find here the change introduced into the structure and into the meaning of the concept of ideal by Hegel. Hegel agrees with KANT that the aspiration to reach happiness is an interpretation of the moral situation in which the accidental and the particular are turned into the principle of the will. In this sense KANT placed practical reason as against all these attempts which are arbitrary and open the door to capricious expectations. To put it differently, KANT presented the demand of the universal will which is binding for all human beings (*Enz.* § 153-4). But Hegel went a step further, that is to say, that the very aspiration to achieve happiness amounts to a satisfaction of objectives of finitude (*Phil. d. Rechts,* § 123; transl. 83). As such it is related to that which only ought to be and thus is a universality the content of which is only represented as abstract (*Enz.* § 479). Even in terms of KANT's position happiness is related to the individual and is of an empirical character; *a fortiori* it cannot be removed from that sphere, according to Hegel. To be sure happiness would be an aspect of realization but only an aspect of a particular being (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 56). Hence the ideal in Hegel's sense cannot be viewed as containing in itself the element of happiness. Hegel took the notion of the full identity between reason and reality, that is to say, the systematic notion of KANT's concept of the ideal. Yet he did not want, let alone did not try, to introduce into it the aspect of human expectations. We find in Hegel an elevation of the empirical and not a projection of it.

This is related to the notion of philosophy and its meaning. KANT says about philosophy: "... the definition in all its precision and clarity ought, in philosophy, to come rather at the end than at the beginning of our enquiries" (*KdrV* 759; transl. 588). We could say that Hegel accepted this description of the nature of philosophy but argued that philosophy reaches, or already reached, its end because it came back via the process of exposition to the beginning. When the end and the beginning converge we find a criterion for the achievement of the objective of philosophy, that is to say, for the realization of the ideal. Yet Hegel did not accept KANT's comment on his own description, namely that philosophy is full of faulty definitions. He was rather inclined to take another element in KANT's description, namely, that these definitions contain some of the elements required though they are not complete. Since philosophy is a process, it contains incomplete definitions. But these are again elevated or sublated until they reach their summit in the concept of philosophy proper which is tantamount to the system or to the ideal.

A further point has to be made related to the KANTian distinction between the regulative and the constitutive principles as principles of systematic unity of the manifold of empirical knowledge in general (*KdrV* 699; transl. 550); they are only a rule for the continuation and magnitude of possible experience (*KdrV* 544; transl. 454). There is no need to enlarge on the relationship between the notion of the ideal related to the systematic unity and the notion of regulative principles. Constitutive principles are principles in respect of experience since they render the concept without which there can be no experience (*KdrV* 692; transl. 546). One could assume that what is only regulative in terms of knowledge or experience becomes constitutive in terms of morality — if we would take the notion of the primacy of morality in its strict sense; but this is not the case. Regulative principles come back in the sphere of morality, as is the case with the convergence of morality and happiness or with the notion of the immortality of the soul and even the notion of the God. Perhaps there is only one exception, namely, that freedom in morality ceases to be of a regulative position and becomes an intelligible fact which is presupposed by the moral imperative as well as guided by it.[39] The principles which were regulative in the first Critique remain so in the second Critique. Thus the ideal as — only — the focus of expectations or aspirations is present in both Critiques. This is just the other side of the coin of the conception that the system in its variations either as a unity of all determinations or as a unity of morality and happiness is not factually realized.

Hegel's notions go by definition beyond the distinction between the constitutive and regulative principles since the aspect of being constitutive is in

[39] Consult Part I of *History as the Moral Totality*. In: *Yirmiahu Yovel: Kant and the Philosophy of History*. Princeton 1980. 29 ff.

KANT related to the nature of empirical knowledge as construction. Knowledge for Hegel is not a construction but an exposition. When the philosopher goes after reason and not after understanding (*Krit. Journal.* 60) he goes beyond knowledge as a construction. It is in this sense that Hegel criticizes mathematical knowledge or cognition and mathematic is explicitly the model of construction for KANT. There is something contradictory in the very position of mathematics which abstracts from things though the results of mathematics are meant to be applied to things (*De orbitis.* 24). Mathematics is for Hegel a science of understanding and not of reason (*Enz.* § 84). The two aspects — of the rejection of construction knowledge *par excellence* and the criticism of mathematics — are obviously interrelated. Hence we can say that though Hegel employs the notion of ideal there is basically no difference between ideal and idea.

The notion of ideal as it became prevailing in the vocabulary of generations is directly or indirectly more shaped by KANT than by Hegel, since by and large the term "ideal" as it is used by us connotes the focus of our projections or aspirations, and not the core of realization or making ideas concrete.

12.

Looking at the development of the concept of "ideal" from an additional end the following comment might be appropriate: "ideal" connoted in the first place the presence of the intelligible element within the scope of a visual appearance. KANT, to put it like this, isolated the intelligible element from its involvement in its antithesis and posited it as being totally independent, and thus as being beyond any experience and as such beyond the possible reach of any empirical cognition. It became a focus, pointing to the unreachable yet guiding objective of knowledge. By the same token the ideal connoted the prototype in general, the prototype of the objective of knowledge as well as the prototype of the ultimate and full realization of morality.

The coordinates of Hegel's system changed that position of the idea as well as of the ideal. Once the identity of the idea and reality is within reach of speculative knowledge; or once speculative knowledge proper is within reach, there is no place for the connotation of "ideal" as pointing to that which is beyond reach. Hence "ideal" may connote at most that which we empirically, until the present moment, did not reach. But that hindrance does not connote a hindrance which as such is of an ultimate character. The exposition of knowledge leads to its immanent fulfilment within the process of knowledge which is both a historical process and a process of "spirit" in the philosophical sense.[40]

The criticism raised against Hegel — and obviously MARX's philosophical approach is the most prominent illustration of that criticism — amounted to the conception that the supposed identity between idea and reality has not

been reached precisely because the historical and social existence exhibits clashes and contradictions. According to Hegel himself the full identity is achievable on the level of the absolute spirit, while the situation on the level of objective spirit with its clashes remains as it is, since the focus of identity is shifted to the level of absolute spirit. MARX attempted to arrive at the identity of the idea and reality on the level of historical and social existence. He did not follow Hegel's view that the identity might be relegated to the level of speculative reason. This attempt to place the identity on the level of the historical and social existence is the actual meaning of the aspired and aimed at transposition from theory to practice. The identity has to be realized where practice is the dominating factor and impetus.

Historical reality became the predominant horizon and within that horizon the identity has not been realized for many reasons. One of them, which is perhaps the most significant one, is that history never reaches its end either chronologically or thematically. Once we actualize something we create by the very act or fact of actualization a new problematic situation. That situation is imbued with rifts and hence — if we use these concepts — with the lack of identity between idea and reality. Hence the aspect of ideal as a goal, as a focus, as something beyond our reality, came back in the attempt expressed by MARX to move from speculation to history. In this sense the concept of ideal comes back within the Hegelian framework as a kind of a manifestation of the "poetic justice" of history. The transformations of historical and social criticism until the present day era illustrate this point. Knowledge did not reach its end in terms of the full identity between itself and reality, neither did the historical sphere reach its end. We come back by way of a detour to the variations of gaps between ideas and reality. Thus we come back also to the notion of ideal once we point to a structure beyond the description of that which is present. Via a detour (*Umweg*) we encounter the impact of KANT'S notion, though obviously not of his system.

[40] On the paradigmatic position of the work of art — to be sure in terms of the idea and not ideal — in the development of Hegel's system consult: *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung.* Hrsg. von J. Hoffmeister. Stuttgart 1936. 219. Also: George Armstrong Kelly in his paper: *Social Therapy in Schiller and Hegel* (a mimeographed text in my possession. 30).

Chapter Five
ETHICS INSTEAD "OF THE DOGMATIC DRESS"[41]

One of the major differences between the systems explored here is their respective conception of religion. KANT understands religion essentially as a version of ethics; Hegel understands religion as one of the manifestations of the absolute spirit and as such as a step leading towards speculation. The difference pertaining to the sphere of religion sheds in turn additional light on the inner structure of the two systems.

Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the two conceptions let us start with exploring some attitudes or components of attitudes which are relevant for what can be called the "spheric conception" of religion. The first step to be made in this context is the analysis of faith and belief. We shall preface that part of the exploration by a few comments on that attitude as it emerged in the history of the concept and turn to KANT's interpretation of faith or belief.

Faith as it has been understood — and the medieval sources are here very relevant — is a human attitude based on trust or confidence evoked by the object i. e. God in the souls of human beings. The object of faith is by the same token the inspiring cause of it. *Pistis,* if we take that expression as connoting faith or belief, is also what we call faithfulness; here the attitude of faith qua confidence and devotion coincide, or at least go along together. While faith and belief contain the nuance of reliance, devotion which is apparently related to the root *vow,* entails the nuance of a commitment and loyalty. The conjunction of the two nuances is essential for the presence of these terms as describing or expressing the attitude inherent in religion. In these — and cognate — elements we find the human being transcending himself, turning his mind to the entity beyond and above him, relying on that entity but also clinging to it by being motivated by both the trust in it as well as by its very presence.

[41] The heading alludes to what Kant says in his letter to Mendelssohn of April 8. 1766: *das dogmatische Kleid abgezogen.*

2.

In what sense does KANT use the terms faith and belief? We shall consider some of his basic statements in order to try to understand the direction of his system. We start — and this is only natural — by the well known saying that KANT found it necessary to deny *knowledge* in order to make room for *faith* (*KdrV* XXX; transl. 29). In what sense is knowledge put aside in the context? It is clear that the knowledge referred to is empirical knowledge, that is to say, the only knowledge available to us — which is constructive knowledge as explored before. Systematically, dogmatic or metaphysical knowledge is denied in order to make room for an extension of cognition which is not knowledge in the strict sense of the term. Faith referred to amounts to the moral position which enables the assertion of objects or an object, a position or cause and a situation — God, freedom and immortality. What is clear in this context is that the assertion contained in faith is not confined to God, since it relates to two aspects of the human situation — one connoting the beginning as it were of the ethical decision, i. e. freedom and the other connoting the expectation grounded in the ethical position, behaviour and merit i. e. the immortality of the soul. If faith entails the element of reliance then we may say, that we rely for reasons grounded in the moral sphere on the fact that God exists. We rely also on the fulfilment of the human moral expectation, namely that the soul will not disappear with the disappearance of the human person from his terrestial existence. One may question at this point: to what extent can we say that we rely on the reality of freedom by trusting — whom? — that freedom exists, since KANT himself, as we have seen, conceives of freedom as an intelligible fact grounded in practical reason as well as presupposed by it. It might be more than problematic to turn the intelligible fact of freedom into an object of faith qua expectation.

In a different context, related to the same issue, KANT speaks about intellectual *presuppositions* and *faith* on behalf of our practical interest. These could never be permitted to assume the title and dignity of science once we understand science in the strict sense of that term, like mathematics, physics etc. which rest upon a secure foundation, (*KdrV* 498; transl. 427; A, xii; 9 note). The two sciences have to determine their objects *a priori* (A, xi, 8). Hence it can be said that the difference between knowledge proper embodied in science and faith lies in the difference between determination and expectation. We can even include the fact of freedom within the scope of that which is beyond knowledge, since the identification of the presence of freedom in the subject does not connote the determination of the datum. It is only a cognition which identifies that the fact is there; freedom in this sense is an ultimate fact. To put it differently, once that identification is an identification of the noumenon, which indeed lies beyond experience but is still discerned, it cannot be listed as belonging to the sphere of knowledge. Therefore we have to distinguish between knowledge as an *a priori* construction and

identification of freedom which is not a construction. Further still, we have to distinguish between the two i. e. the expectation as well as reliance namely, that the expectation will be fulfilled either in the presence of God or in the realization of the expectation centered round man himself, namely his immortal soul.[42]

2.

Two additional comments have to be made in the present context. The relationship pertaining between faith and the moral sphere is coterminous with the parallel aspect, namely, that data are not relevant for the latter sphere. What is called the doctrine of the virtues can never furnish a true and demonstrated science because it depends on empirical and psychological principles (*KdrV* 79; transl. 95). Hence pure ethics, which relates only to free will in general, goes beyond empirical science by the very position of the object referred to, namely, pure will. KANT suggests here an analogy between pure logic and applied logic. To be sure, KANT does not suggest a symmetry between the position of the expectation of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. He confines, and not by accident, the symmetry to that between pure logic and freedom since purity is the common quality of the two. To put it differently — as reason has a structure manifest in the rules of logic, so the intelligible subject is endowed by definition with freedom. The immortality of the soul and the existence of God cannot be viewed as being grounded in reason as such — as logic and freedom are. Hence they are relegated to the scope of faith which again amounts here to an assertion of reality which cannot be grounded neither in reason in its essential structure nor in reason as a causative factor (freedom) the discernment of which could be a kind of a "super-introspection."

An additional observation will reinforce the position of science on the one hand and faith on the other. The knowledge of our ignorance which is possible only through ciriticism of reason itself is science (*KdrV* 786; transl. 606). This is so since that kind of introspection of reason is grounded in the *a priori* understanding of reason and it limits. Once we look at the Critique in this sense as at a preparation and not as a doctrine (*KdrV* 26; transl. 59), we may say that faith is an attempt to supplement the critical aspect by a doctrinal one. Yet paradoxically, the doctrinal aspect can never reach an assertion in the sense of science, since it is by definition related to expectations. The dif-

[42] Kroner's resumé of the dilemmas in Kant's system is relevant: that system wants to make the moral law the highest stage within the scope of the human consciousness, but it wants just the same to posit God above that highest stage. This dilemma amounts to what Kroner calls the split *(der Riss)* in Kant's *Weltanschauung.* See: *Richard Kroner: Kants Weltanschauung.* Tübingen 1914. 39.

ference between certainty grounded in foundation and that grounded in expectation can never be blurred and that difference provides the sphere for the attitude of faith, as KANT understood it. To be sure, the fact that the concept of the existence of God is included in that sphere gave KANT some additional motivation to refer here to faith and not only to assertions, in the hypothetical or expectational sense of the terms.

4.

The analysis of faith (the English translation refers here to "belief" and not to "faith" rendering the original *Glaube;* probably in order to introduce a broader expression and in order to include in the scope that what KANT calls the pragmatic *Glaube* pointing to the attitude of the physician who does not really know what the illness is like but still prescribes a certain treatment based on *Glaube; KdrV* 852; transl. 647) adds to the previously explored presentation of the nature of faith only a kind of an epistemological or phenomenological placement of faith or belief within a hierarchical structure — believing being an attitude between opinion and knowing. The common feature of the three grades is what is called *Fürwahrhalten. Glaube* or believing is characterized by holding a proposition as being true only when that attitude is subjectively sufficient but objectively insufficient. It is an attitude of conviction for myself but not an attitude of knowledge which is characterized as certainty grounded in argument which holds good for everybody. (*KdrV* 850; transl. 646). The expression of belief *(der Ausdruck des Glaubens)* is an expression of modesty from the objective point of view though; from the subjective point of view it is an expression of firmness and confidence *(Zutrauen; KdrV* 855; transl. 649). Firmness refers to the inner conviction, while confidence or trust refer to the reliance which, in turn, is a mode of intentionality towards the object or is the focus of the attitude.

The paradigmatic case of that mode of belief is faith proper: it is called moral belief. From the point of view of the essential features of morality and, by the same token, of religion, it amounts to an attitude which takes it as absolutely *(schlechterdings)* necessary that something must happen. Yet KANT does not refer here to something which must happen in the future and indeed he will present that point within the context of the moral faith. He speaks about an attitude made explicit by him as one in which I must in all points conform to the moral laws. Yet somehow he points also to the relationsip between the categorical position of the moral law and imperative and the position of God and immortality, when he says that the end *(Zweck)* is here irrefragably *(unumgänglich)* established. As such it is possibly an end in terms of the human destiny. Yet KANT moves from the end looked at from the point of view of the relation pertaining between the human beings and the moral law to ends which connote the convergence of moral destiny, with

ends in terms of the broad human situation or expectation: there is only one possible condition under which this end can be tied up with all other ends and thereby have practical validity. That condition, or we could even go beyond the text and speak about conditions, is the existence of God and the existence of a future world (*KdrV* 856; transl. 650). Looking at this statement from the vantage of that which is missing in it, we notice that freedom is not included in these "conditions", since freedom is the presupposition of the moral attitude and thus cannot belong to the scope of the moral faith. The conditions listed go beyond the presupposition since faith refers to the fulfillment of a kind of a harmony between the inner momentum of morality and the structure of the trans-empirical world. God and the future world belong to the trans-empirical sphere. A person is certain, in the sense of faith — that is to say subjectively only, namely that his faith in the existence of God and a future life is not to be shaken. This unshakable position of the moral faith is explained by two arguments (a) the person's moral principles would thereby themselves be overthrown, and (b) the person cannot disclaim the moral principles without becoming abhorrent *(verabscheuungswürdig),* that is to say, deserving to be rejected in his own eyes (ibid.). One can wonder whether KANT does justice to his own presentation of the moral attitude of principles once he views the moral attitude as belonging to the magnificent equipment of human nature (*KdrV* 855; transl. 647). This characterization would rather indicate that freedom and its interrelation with the categorical imperative are manifestations of that "magnificent nature", while the expectation of fulfillment and reward for acting in accordance with the moral law, motivated by the law and responding to it through freedom — belong to the scope of faith proper. This is possibly the reason for the fact, emphasized before, that freedom is not listed among the themes of which the moral faith consists. From the negative point of view, again only in terms of the existence of God and existence of future life, nothing more is required than at least this: It cannot be pretended that there is any certainty (and certainty is a quality of knowledge) that there is no such being and no such life (*KdrV* 858; transl. 651).

As a matter of fact KANT himself points to the difference between the systematic position of freedom on the one hand and God and immortality of the soul on the other insofar as faith is concerned: "... the faith that has reference to particular objects is entirely a matter of morality ... It is a free assurance *(freies Fürwahrhalten)* ... which we assume in the interest of a purpose which we set before ourselves in accordance with laws of freedom" (*KdU* § 91; transl. II. 146). Freedom does not belong to the scope of particular objects of morality being its presupposition; whatever is the object of faith, has as its condition the laws of freedom. This is an essential point not only in terms of the line of demarcation between freedom and the objects of faith but obviously also in terms of the position of religion within the system. Once

religion presupposes morality, it is bound to presuppose freedom as well. The term used in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* is the *Vernunfglaube* — and it only reinforces that point.

5.

The notion of rational faith or rather of reason *(Vernunftglaube)* reinforces the previous characterization of the essence of faith. It is meant to emphasize the attitude of faith as one grounded in reason yet as one for which reason cannot provide the full proof as it is necessary for a rational — that is to say, cognitive — attitude in the full sense of that term. KANT distinguishes between the theoretical aspect of the rational faith, namely the assumption as such which is a quasi theoretical cognitive attitude. As such, it belongs to reason in its theoretical connotation though there emerges here the connection of that assumption with the concept of duty which as such belongs to practical reason. The connection to duty appears here not as the grounding factor of duty which is of an autonomous character but with the expectation for the reward for the duty (*KdpV* 144-5; transl. 133). Hence it is essential to ask the question whether duty as such leads in the ethical realm to the attitude of faith and its thematic components, that is to say, God and the immortality of the soul. Or perhaps we are prompted by considerations which are transformed from our empirical expectations to the realm of ethics proper. In this case faith would be an attempt to present some kind of validation or vindication for those expectations, once they are transferred from our day-to-day expectations or those we accepted or received from historically tainted commitment to the level of ethics. We attempt now to find their eqiuivalent in the ethics of pure practical reason.

The position is not changed by the introduction of the notion of need of reason, though KANT relates that notion to the objective ground of the will i. e. the moral law, which is necessarily binding on every rational being. KANT goes a step further by saying that there is a justification *a priori* to assume or to presuppose the suitable conditions in nature and make them inseparable from the complete practical use of reason (*KdpV* 165; transl. 149 note). Indeed, we may ask the question: what is the complete practical use of reason except that which relates to the categorical imperative and which is possible only when freedom is present as an intelligible fact or is presupposed in its interaction with the legislative capacity of reason. The reference to nature goes beyond the boundaries of practical reason proper. It refers to a kind of harmony between the realization of the imperative and the conditions in which the empirical human beings exist and in which there is no convergence between the realization of the moral law and the conditions, including the expectations of the human beings. Hence faith is related to a kind of an extension of reason, not in terms of the inner motivation of reason as such

but in terms of giving attention to the empirical conditions of man including the expected harmony pertaining to nature. Once that attention is given, KANT tries to find a position for it within the limits of reason relegating them to faith on the one hand and to the expectation and hope which go along with it on the other. Hence the component of hope becomes an essential aspect of faith both as an attitude as well as in its thematic shape.

The notion of the postulates come into the context — yet we have to be aware of the fact that this notion is far from being unambiguous. Even when the very definition of the postulate places it in the practical realm as a proposition or a principle which is immediately certain we may wonder whether the postulates related to the practical, qua ethical, realm can be viewed as being endowed with an immediate certainty. The preceding exploration of the essence of faith makes that connection with immediate certainty doubtful. This is reinforced by the additional characterization of the postulate, that it determines a possible action. In this context the term "immediate" appears again, since in that kind of action it is presupposed that the mode to perform it is immediately certain. It goes without saying that the performance of the ethical action is not related, let alone dependent, on the postulates — be their epistemic position as it may — since the postulates in the strict sense of the term relate to what is beyond the action. The postulates refer to the constant structure of the universe either in terms of a wise Ruler or in terms of the permanent subject or the self, implied in the notion of the immortality of the soul. The fact that KANT adds in his Logic to the characterization of the postulates the feature of being theoretical for the sake of the practical reason can not change that situation (*Logik.* § 38, 123). This reservation is re-inforced by KANT's own distinction between theological ethics which contains moral laws presupposing the existence of a supreme Ruler of the world and moral theology which consists in a conviction of the existence of a supreme being, a conviction which bases itself on moral laws (*KdrV* 662; transl. 526, note). This statement is most relevant for KANT's conception of religion but, in a more limited sense, it is relevant for his understanding of the notion of postulates since they obviously can not intend to lay the foundation of the morality. They refer only to what can be viewed as rounding up morality in its strict sense i. e. as manifestating the legislation of reason.

The introduction of the concept of hope into the context is an additional vindication of the fact that KANT refers to the vindication of the expectation of that which will occur since it is desired. The only present attitude is the anticipation of the desired occurence or our looking forward to it, once we assume that the expected occurence or reality is for us of a positive character, that is to say that it is beneficient for us. This aspect has to be stressed since hope has been interpreted differently once it has been taken as an attitude anticipating the future, but the future is not of the benevolent character. For

the sake of illustration we mention SPINOZA's description of hope. Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do not yet known the issue.[43] For KANT hope cannot be inconstant since it is related to the problematic situation of the empirical human beings brought about by the kind of one-sidedness of the ethical acts as motivated by the imperative and thus neglecting the anticipation of those empirical human beings. To put it in stronger terms: in the ethical realm proper there is no anticipation at all since the ethical realm consists in the response to the imperative, whereby the imperative itself becomes the incentive for or towards the act. The anticipated pleasure — for KANT happiness — is known in the sense that we know what to expect and want or wish to expect, but do not have the objective arguments or proofs for asserting these expectations. KANT's interpretation of hope seems to be closer at this point to some tradionally religious interpretations of it once, in general terms, hope is defined as an *"Affect"* which is elicited by an unexpected openness of the prospect to achieve happiness *(Glück; Anthropologie* § 74, 252). Two points have to be made at the present juncture; the first and the positive point — is that hope refers to happiness and is indeed also the situation within the moral realm because of the expectations grounded in it or inspired by it. The negative point is that happiness in the moral sphere is expected and we may say expected *only.* Again we are bound to refer to some traditional interpretation of hope and look into KANT's attempt to see the inter-connection between hope as expecting and the immortality of the soul as well as happiness. Happiness will be achieved and will call for the continuous presence of the soul qua immortal to-be-involved in the enjoyment of that happiness.

In the *New Testament* hope *(spes)* is close to faith *(fides).* The two terms appear sometimes in an immediate sequence; hope amounts to a positive expectation of redemption and salvation. Hence the concept of "God of hope"; to that description or attribute of God the situation of man abound in hope may be seen as corresponding (*Rom.* 15, 13). The situation of man is in turn a situational response to the delivery from so great a death and the trust in God is accompanied by the trust in that delivery (*2. Kor.* 1, 10). The significance of these statements for KANT's version of hope is obvious since we notice that the verses refer to the relationship between hope and the delivery from death — to immortality in KANT's sense. To be sure the delivery in the *New Testament* is in turn correlated to a total situation of redemption or salvation. Indeed we have to ask the question whether KANT attempted to find a kind of

[43] *Ethics.* Part III. Prop. xviii, note 11. In: *The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza.* Transl. with an introduction by R. M. Elwes. Vol. 2 New York 1951, 144. Plato refers here and there to the attitude of hope *(elpis).* His descriptions depend on their contexts. In *Timaios* he speaks about hope as easily leading astray. *Timaios.* 69.

an equivalent of the concept of salvation in his notion of immortality, of happiness as related to it and in several other nuances as they are formulated in his system.

In addition we have to mention here the presentation of the position of hope in KANT's pre-critical writings e. g. in his *Lectures on Ethics.* There he speaks about hope that God in His wisdom and goodness will make up our shortcomings. He will supply our deficiency in things beyond our power, provided we have done all within our own power. KANT uses there the notion of practical belief but probably the qualification "practical" is related to the sphere of action and lacks the terminological connotation grounded in the concept of practical reason.[44] What is significant for the pre-critical interpretation of the notion of hope is that it does not relate to the extension of the soul beyond the terrestial existence, but to the response of God to man's actions once man exhausts the scope of his actions within the limits of his human possibilities. Negatively speaking we could say that the aspect of postulates is missing in that presentation of the attitude of hope.

6.

In the first place, the notion of immortality appears in the context of the complete conformity of the will with the moral law. Such conformity is beyond the reach of human beings, once they cannot be endowed with the holy will but only with the good will. Yet such a total conformity is required, being practically necessary. Thus it can be found only in an endless progress. A progress of this kind in turn is possible only under the presupposition of an infinitely enduring existence and personality of the same rational being — and is called the immortality of the soul. Hence the highest good as the full realization of the moral law by the human agents is possible only once the immortality of the soul is presupposed. "All that can be granted to a creature with respect to hope for this share is consciousness of his tried character" — and this statement is not totally different from what KANT said in his *Lectures* about the hope which presupposes human action achieving the maximum of his effort within the human limitations. Moreover, KANT presupposes the continuous progress on the level of the actual human beings or, to put it differently, the continuous perfection on that level. Once this perfection takes place, man as the moral agent can hope for a further uninterrupted continuance of this progress, even beyond this life (*KdpV* 124 ff; transl. 128). Once the continuous existence of the agent, i. e. of the soul, refers to the progress in terms of the moral perfectibility it becomes again clear that both the

[44] *Lectures on Ethics.* Transl. by L. Infeld, Foreword by L. White Beck. New York Evanston 1963. 95, 96.

ideas of God and immortality do not belong to the foundations of morality — as freedom does — since they do not form the conditions of the moral law. They belong to the sphere of the practical function or of applying the morally determined will to the object which is given to it *a priori* — and that object amounts to the highest good (ibid. 4; 5).

How does the aspect of happiness come into the context of immortality and the highest good?[45] In the first place we may observe that KANT applies to the concept or to the position of the highest good the notion of realm of God *(Reich Gottes)* which is obviously a vestige of the traditional religious formulation. The highest good is not exhausted in the projected conformity between the human will and the holy will. We cannot hope to effect the highest possible good in our actions as they are brought about by our obedience to the moral law. The highest good is the object of my intentions but is not their motivating cause. The intentionality towards the highest good refers to my own happiness, since that happiness is included in the concept of the highest good — and one may wonder whether or not that statement is in this context a kind of *deus ex machina.* KANT justifies — as well as mitigates — that inclusion of the aspect of my happiness when he says that it is thought of as connected in exact proportion to the greatest degree of moral perfection. In addition, once the greatest happiness appears in the context, KANT seems to be aware of the possibility of blurring the basic distinction between motivation and expectation. Therefore he reiterates that the moral will and not the expectation of happiness is the ground determining the will to further the highest good (*KdpV* 130; transl. 134).

KANT felt apparently the need to emphasize the distinction between the object of expectation to be approached by the moral progress and the foundation of morality, since he described happiness as being the other side of the coin of self-love (*KdpV* 22; transl. 21). It is related to the faculty of desire and not to pure will or freedom. It is a necessary desire of every rational but finite being. As contentment with our existence is one of the renderings of the essence of happiness it is a problem imposed on us by our own finite nature, whereby finitude is understood as referring to a being characterized by needs

[45] Since Kant places the notion of immortality of the soul in the moral sphere he may speak about the continuous existence of the soul after the death of the person or the moral agent. He does not refer to the pre-existence of the soul in the Platonic sense, since for Plato that pre-existence served as a point of departure for the cognitive essence of the soul and for knowledge as *anamnesis.* Otto observes rightly, analysing Fries' notion, that one has to distinguish between the eternity of our essence and the immortality of the soul, though to be eternal and permanent in time do not exclude each other. The question is one of emphasis, that is to say that the religious interpretation tends to emphasize the element of eternity. See: *Rudolf Otto: Kantisch-Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie und ihre Anwendung auf die Theologie.* Zur Einleitung in die Glaubenslehre für Studenten der Theologie. Tübingen 1909. 66-67, note.

(*KdpV* 25; transl. 24). Happiness — as a rational being's consciousness of the agreeableness of life accompanies without interruption his whole existence[46] — cannot apparently be left in a void. It has to find its fulfilment in and through the immortality of the soul as the precondition of the conformity to be reached between will and the holy will. The object of the progress is, as we have seen, the highest good which becomes now, to put it like that, the locus in which happiness is achieved. Happiness is thus transformed from its primary position as the incentive or object of empirical human desire to the level of a component of the highest good. The presupposition seems to be that the highest good amounts not only to that aspired conformity but also to the harmony between different components and objectives of human action. Probably the notion of the kingdom of God is meant to emphasize that harmonious aspect — as is brought to the forefront, for instance, in the fact that KANT himself refers to LEIBNIZ's distinction between the realm of nature and the realm of grace. To be sure, happiness appears not only as an aspect of the highest good but also as a necessary idea of reason: "to view ourselves... as in the world of grace, where all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our share in it through being unworthy of happiness is, from the practical standpoint, a necessary idea of reason" (*KdrV* 813; transl. 640).

The way KANT describes happiness is an additional factor which moves the objective of desire to achieve happiness beyond the sphere of experience: "happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires, *extensively* in respect of their manifoldness, *intensively,* in respect of their degree, and *protensively,* in respect of their duration" (*KdrV* 834; transl. 636). This three-dimensional character of happiness in itself calls our attention to the fact that such a "loaden" happiness is bound to be placed beyond the boundaries of experience. Yet from the point of view of the relation between happiness and immortality of the soul the most significant element seems to be that of protensity, since that element amounts to the permanent duration of the situation of happiness, taking into account that *protendo* connotes the stretching out or extension. Unless the soul is immortal the permanent duration and the happiness as activity or reality would lack the subject engaged in happiness or immersed in it. It is not enough, as KANT does, to distinguish between happiness as a motivation grounded in prudence and happiness as a situation which presupposes the worthiness to be happy which, in turn, can be justified only by the obedience of the moral imperative. There exists a basic difference between enjoyment and happiness, once happiness is understood in its three dimensional-essence.

[46] *KdpV* 22; transl. 20. Consult on the highest good *Yirmiahu Yovel: Kant and Philosophy of History.* Princeton 1980. 29 ff.

7.

Yet one question cannot be escaped here, though a close reading of KANT's text may lead to the conclusion that he himself did not give attention to it. Happiness is guided by self-love and the expectation to achieve happiness does not erase that element which is part of the definition of happiness. The very expectation is centered round the expecting person. Hence the satisfaction deferred beyond experience is by definition bound to bring about that satisfaction. Can self-love and its satisfaction be concomitant with the worthiness to be happy, once that worthiness is conditioned by the moral law which, by definition, is universalistic and thus goes beyond the limits of the individual and his self-centered urges or desires? "... and where there is something which, without regard to such relations [i. e. external relations, N. R.], constitutes by itself the absolute worth of man, it is by this that man must be judged by eyeryone whatever — even by the Supreme" (*Groundwork.* 107). To put it differently: even the relation of man to God does not remove man's basic moral position as an end in himself. Hence the question is to be raised: how is it possible that the desire to achieve happiness which is egocentric, if not egoistic, is concomitant with the position of every man as an end in himself, once there is always the possibility that man's egocentric desire will clash with the position of his fellowman, or in a different formulation how parallel desires of an egocentric character will not clash? The very postponement of the hoped for situation is a way not to deal with the problem. But it implies also, as it seems to be the case, that the fulfillment of the desire in the kingdom of harmony is to bring about a harmony between the various lines of desire, that is to say that self-love will not contradict the position of man as an end in himself. The fulfillment in the kingdom of God will not erase the basic moral situation of man as mandated by the categorical imperative but will supplement it by one's self-centered desire and its realization. We find here that happiness is grounded in and presupposes the immortality of the soul and expects the situation inherent in the divine kingdom, which in its goodness amounts to a harmony between man's basic desire and his worthiness. KANT says elsewhere, that the furthering of the final end of all rational beings, namely happiness, is nevertheless imposed upon us by the law of duty (*KdU* § 90, 471 note; transl. II. 145). This cannot be seen as being consistent with the position of happiness in its systematic context. Yet we cannot be oblivious of the fact the question of: what can I hope — appears as an independent question from: what shall I do. It is the basic question but still not implied in the question of "what shall I do", which is of course related to the imperative of duty.

The only thing which we may say in this context is that we have to distinguish between the motivation of actions and their end, the motivation being the categorical imperative while the end being happiness whereby the merit or "do that through which thou becomest worthy to be happy" (*KdrV*

836; transl. 638) is a kind of a mediating link between the two ends of action; while doing what I have to do I am entitled to orient myself to the end of happiness.

The conclusion we eventually come to, the conclusion which is essential for KANT's understanding of the essence of God and for his interpretation of religion, is the following: We move in the first place within the domain of morality. In that domain we have to distinguish between the position of freedom, which is the presupposition of the domain and an intelligible fact, and the postulates of immortality and God. Within the context of those postulates the expectation of happiness comes in. It is in turn a translation of an empirical urge which as such is excluded from the realm of morality to an expectation which, as such, is legitimate in that realm once we see that expectation as being presupposed by the duration of the soul and by the harmonious order of reality grounded in God. God is the guarantee, among other aspects of harmony, also of the harmony between morality and happiness. The harmony of the universe is inherent in the physico-theological proof of the existence of God, related as it is to immeasurable stages of variety, order, purposiveness and beauty (*KdrV* 650; transl. 519). The mistake or the impossibility of that alleged proof for the existence of God does not lie in the lack of those qualities in the universe, but in the mistaken assertion that we can draw a conclusion about the creator of the universe from the qualities pointed to. Hence the next step in our attempt to understand KANT's conception of religion is to explore his notion of God.[47]

8.

The concept of God is one of the versions of the concept of the ideal which we explored before in some of its aspects. The ideal connotes the projected unity which is beyond experience — stated negatively, or of a speculative character — stated positively. From the point of view of morality and of religion, and the identification of the features of religion is the objective of this part of our investigation, we are concerned with the ideal within the scope of moral theology which leads to the concept of a sole, all-perfect and rational premordial being (*KdrV* 842; transl. 641).

To be sure there are significant or unique aspects of the idea of God, like that of being the cause of the universe as its creator. Yet the whole orientation of the relationship between morality and God as a postulate of the former leads in the direction of the centrality of goodness as an attribute of God. Goodness amounts here to the adequate convergence between moral merit and achievement in terms of the person's happiness. We have to be aware of

[47] Consult: *Julius Guttman: Kants Gottesbegriff in seiner positiven Entwicklung.* Berlin 1906.

the shift in emphasis which occurred in Kant in terms of the interpretation of the essence of goodness. "And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose" (*Romans,* VIII, 28). If good is understood as benevolence, care, or distribution of that which men expect, there is traditionally a kind of correlation between man's orientation towards God and his essence as goodness conceived as a manifest response to man. KANT, differing from the tradition, does not put in the center of his consideration man's intentionality towards God but man's intentionality to his own happiness, which can be achieved because God and his goodness or within the realm related to God. In a sense, one could say that KANT presents an egocentric — and not only an anthropocentric — version of that what has been traditionally called *providentia specialis* = providence concerned with the individuals, and in KANT's sense even with self-love which amounts to the individual's concern and expectation to achieve his own satisfaction or his own position within the reality which will eventually respond to his desires. The individual is the beneficient while God is the benefactor. Though these expressions or terms are not present in KANT's text the meaning attributed to God within the context of the moral theology is warranting the assertion of this interaction. Moreover, happiness does not connote the contemplation of God — perhaps since God as object of contemplation is beyond cognition — or the very reliance on God. The reliance inherent in the expectation to achieve happiness has a character of a teleological order amounting to harmony. "If I say that we are compelled to consider the world *as if* it were the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will, I really say nothing more than that a watch, a ship, a regiment, bears the same relation to the watchmaker, the shipbuilder, the commanding officer as the world of a sense ... does to the unknown, which I do not hereby know as it is in itself but as it is for me, that is in the relation to the world of which I am a part." (*Prolegomena.* § 57, 357; transl. 106) The emphasis "for me" cannot be seen in the context as referring only to the realm of appearances as data. Precisely within the context of moral theology it carries with itself the connotation of referring to me pragmatically, i. e. in terms of my actions and expectations. Hence the meaning of religion, once the relationship of it to morality and moral theology is that central, is a question we are bound to ask and realize its problematic position, in KANT's system, as he himself presents it.

Some of the scattered reflections in *Opus Postumum* have to be mentioned at this point because they are relevant for the interpretation of religion. In the first place it has to be observed that the personal character of God is stated there in the context of the notion of the highest ideal: the highest ideal is person and God combines in his essence the element of the ideal with the element of person (*Opus Postumum.* 30). There is one nuance in the notion of person which is explicated as the active principle; active is probably tied up with the essence and position of being a person or perhaps *the* person.

That active character is expressed in the reflection that God is the only highest active principle of all purposes *(das alleinige oberste tätige Prinzip aller Zwecke)* (ibid. 150). The activity related to ends may be seen in the context of the end as the highest good, that is to say, that the activity of God helps in bringing about the convergence between duty and the reward for the merit implied in the acts guided by it. To put it differently, God as the principle of ends, is not only the end of our aspiration — and this aspect is implied in the notion of the postulate of practical reason. He is also intervening in the realization of the ends viewed from the human point of view. There is in the text an additional statement namely that God embodies an essence of rights only and these are without duties (ibid. 11). This description goes beyond the concept of the holy will, since the holy will connotes a situation where there exists a primary identity between reality and the moral imperative, whereas the introduction of the distinction between duties and rights into the divine realm and the exclusiveness of rights in this realm along with the position of ends may point to the focus of aspiration in the sense that what is aspired is the position of rights only. The aspiration to reach happiness can be interpreted as a situation of rights which — from the human point of view — is an ideal only. But the reference to God makes that focus both unachievable within the human scope and yet indicating its ultimate end. If this is so then duties are both a manifestation of practical reason and an expression of the limits of the finite human being motivated, or to-be-motivated, by them. Happiness, from this point of view, would be a total situation not only correlated with merit but going beyond it.

One additional reflection should be referred to at this juncture. God is not a thing existing outside myself. God is my own thought. It is improper to ask whether God exists (*Es ist ungereimt zu fragen ob ein Gott sei*; ibid. 153). One can wonder whether this call of warning about the impropriety is meant to convey the conclusion that it is obvious that God exists or perhaps, on the contrary, since God is my own thought there is no room ro ascribe existence to God. It is obvious, to say the least, that the second interpretation makes the position of God in religion, and religion is essentially tied up with the position of God, more than problematic. It seems to be a warranted conclusion that Kant left us here in a darkness, at least in so far as the *Opus Postumum* goes.

9.

In our attempt to explore the meaning of religion in KANT's system it might be appropriate to start with two negative statements or contradistinctions. The first refers to what KANT calls *Schwärmerei* (translated in English as fanaticism, though we may wonder whether the translation renders the concept in an adequate way. Perhaps: ghostly vision might be more adequate). *Schwär-*

merei is a deliberate overstepping of the limits of pure human reason. Moral *Schwärmerei* is an overstepping of the limits in practical reason. The concrete manifestation of such an overstepping in the practical field would be to place the determining ground of dutiful actions anywhere else than in the law itself (*KdpV* 85; transl. 88). *Schwärmerei* would mean that the incentive for the obedience of the moral law would lie in the aspiration to achieve happiness — and this would be a type of *Schwärmerei* within human or perhaps utalitarian confines. Another manifestation of the *Schwärmerei* would be — and this is a type relevant for the formulation of the essence of religion — to ground the motivation of the moral attitude and behaviour in the divine commandment, removing the foundation of morality from freedom and the moral imperative and placing it in the will, decision and imposition of God. This would be *Schwärmerei* in two senses — in moving from the scope of morality, as such, and reaching in a projected way to God from the inner logic, as it were, of that realm. Secondly we would base the moral behaviour on the will of God which, as such, is not exposed to the evalutation inherent in the structure of morality and might be viewed in an extreme sense as amounting to an arbitrary decision. Only moral theology in the strict sense of the term can be relevant here and is the contradiction to — as well as the defense — against *Schwärmerei.* In his evaluation of Judaism KANT does not use the term *Schwärmerei.* Yet we can say that the reliance on prescribed commandments, being external laws or statutory prescriptions, as KANT terms them, is basically a kind of *Schwärmerei* too, though obviously KANT's distinction between legality and morality comes here to front: a conception based on obedience to external laws or to a divine legislation is eventually a legal system and not a moral one, since intentions or motivations are not to be prescribed. What is prescribed in terms of legality, which paradoxically coincides here with *Schwärmerei,* is the external behaviour of human beings. It is clear at this point that KANT did not distinguish between a heteronomeous morality and what we might call a theonomeous (TILLICH) one. The common link between the two systems or attitudes lies in their dependence upon an external source dictating the behaviour. — The second relevant point at this juncture is the distinction between faith and religion.[48]

[48] On Kant's evaluation of Judaism see *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft.* Akad. Ausg. Bd 6. 124 ff. *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.* Transl. by Th. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson, with a new essay, *The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion* by John R. Silber. New York and Evanston 1960. 115 ff. A close examination of Kant's interpretation of Judaism is contained in the present author's book *The Recurring Pattern.* Studies in Anti-Judaism in Modern Thought. London 1963. 23 ff.

10.

Attempting now to explore KANT's positive conception of religion we cannot be oblivious of the fact that there is a trend, or taint, in that conception which relates religion to sublimity. "In religion, as a rule, prostration, adoration with bowed head, coupled with contrite, timorous posture and voice, seems to be the only becoming demeanour in presence of the Godhead, and accordingly most nations have assumed and still observe it ... Only when he [sc. man] becomes conscious of having a disposition that is upright and acceptable to God, to do those operations might serve to stir within him the idea of the sublimity of this Being ... not reverance for the sublime, but dread and apprehension of the all-powerful Being ... From this nothing can arise but grace-begging and vain adulation, instead of religion consisting in a good life" (the original reads here: *Religion des guten Lebenswandels*; *KdU* § 28, 263-4; transl. 113-4). The aspect of sublimity is placed here in two contexts — the one is that of the mode of behaviour of nations and the other is the relation to the good mode of life *(Lebenswandel)*. From the point of view of nation, and we can describe that frame of reference as the historical aspect of religion, the emphasis is laid on dread as the human response the sublimity. From the point of view of the good code of life the emphasis is laid on the correlation between the sublimity of morality and the sublimity of God. From the historical point of view it appears as the one-sided dependence on and submission of man to God. From the moral point of view, there is a kind of a parallelism between the sublimity of the moral order within the human scope and the attribute, or to put it like that, atmosphere of sublimity of God. KANT had before his eyes the traditional interpretations of religion, either in the sense of obligation or of dependence. Probably dependence has been taken more in the sense of historical religions while the awareness of duty as obligation *(Verpflichtung)* points more to religion within the limits of reason. The historical religions incorporating in themselves a popular understanding of God acknowledge the total sovereignty *(pantocrator)* of God, while religion within the limits of reason is related to the notion of God as complete goodness, be the interpretation of that attribute rendered in terms of rights or in terms of ends — as the *Opus Postumum* has it. To the aspect of sublimity in its context we shall come back analysing that aspect in some of its details.

But precisely since KANT conceives of religion within the limits of reason as religion within the boundaries of morality, we are bound to ask to question whether or not we can discern a particular quality ascribed to religion which is not to be identified witin morality and practical reason in the systematic sense of that term. Here we can suggest as an opening of our present analysis a sort of a pun: there are two interpretations of the etymological roots of the term *religio* — either *religare* i. e. to bind or *relegere* i. e. to read over again. In KANT's interpretation of religion the aspect of *relegere* is perhaps more

prominent than that of *religare,* since the element of binding is present already in the nature of morality which centers round the notion of duty. Religion, to some extent, is a "reading over" of that which already is present in morality.

11.

We can ask at this point the question whether the fact that only freedom and immortality of the soul are mentioned (*KdrV* 773; transl. 597) as the two pillars of religion, is just accidental or indicates perhaps the broad meaning of God and his position in the system. Therefore that meaning is not included as the third — or rather the first — pillar of religion. Be this as it may, metaphysics cannot be the foundation of religion but it must be and continue to be so, in spite of the critique or because of it, a bulward *(Schutzwehr)* of religion (*KdrV* 877; transl. 664). This aspect has to be stressed since the age of critique or criticism cannot skip over the critical approach to religion, though religion through its sanctity and majesty, may seek to exempt itself from the critical analysis and evaluation (A, xii, note; 9). The positive outcome of that critical approach, along with taking metaphysics as the bulwark of religion, is a greater — or exclusive — preoccupation with moral ideas; this in turn is justified or perhaps even grounded, in the extraordinarily pure moral law of religion (*KdrV* 845; transl. 643).

The positive outcome of these combined approaches is this: what in the infant stage of philosophy has been taken as the beginning should be placed now as the end, namely the knowledge of God (*KdrV* 880; transl. 666). It seems to be a warranted interpretation that the notion of end does not connote only the aspect of the postulate but also a certain interpretation of the moral imperative which has first to be established and grounded in pure reason and then re-stated in terms of its relation to God — and we come back to the root of *relegere,* to be read again, from the point of view of the relation to God. God is considered not only in terms of his ontological status but also in terms of his authority or legislative status. "In this manner, through the concept of the highest good as the object and final end of pure reason, the moral law leads to religion. Religion is the recognition of all duties as divine commandments, not as sanctions, i. e. arbitrary and contingent ordinances of a foreign will, but as essential laws of any free will as such. Even as such, they must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being because we can hope for the highest good ... only from a morally perfect (holy and beneficient) and omnipotent will" (*KdpV* 129; transl. 134). The relation to God characteristic of religion is here mediated by the notion of the highest good and the relation of that notion to God. Kant is perhaps not totally consistent in this statement, since he does not distinguish sufficiently between the duties as such and the achievement of one's share in the highest good. He could say

that since the highest good is related to God, one's share in it as the end *(als Zweck)* of morality has to be viewed as connected with the position of God placed at the end of our speculation including the moral theology. (End would obviously mean here the ultimate point). Since the achievement or the realization of the aspiration goes beyond reason as such in its legislative position, it has to be seen as referring to God who is beyond the boundaries of reason in terms of his ontological status as well as in terms of his essence as the highest good or as guaranteeing it. Be this as it may, that would be one interpretation of the statement about placing God not at the beginning of reason but at the end of it.

The distinction has to be maintained between morality from the point of view of the concept of duty, which as such is a primary synthesis of freedom and the imperative, and morality in terms of its legitimate expectation, whereby the *conditio sine qua non* of it is the obedience to the moral imperative. Religion is relegated to the expectation and is not related to the point of departure of morality amounting to freedom or its very nature i. e. the moral law. The relation to God and not only the concept of God and his status appear at the end of the moral line or direction. "Morality ... leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends itself to the idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, for Whose will that is the final end (of creation) which at the same time can and ought to be man's final end" (*Religion,* 5-6; transl. 5-6). The concept of God cannot be analytically evolved out of morality; hence religion is an extension of morality but not its integral part. Yet morality leads inevitably to religion since the human capacity does not suffice for bringing about happiness in the world proportionate to worthiness to be happy. Under the care of an omnipotent moral being, i. e. of God, this balance between merit and achievement of happiness will occur or perhaps does occur (ibid. 8; transl. 7, note). To underscore the difference between morality in its inner structure and the expectation to which morality gives rise, the opening statement of the book on "Religion" is significant: "So far as morality is based upon the conception of man as a free agent who, just because he is free, binds himself through his reason to unconditioned laws, it stands in need neither of the idea of another Being over him, ... Hence for its own sake morality does not and need religion at all ... by virtue of pure practical reason it is self-sufficient ... On the contrary, when it is a question of duty, morality is perfectly able to ignore all ends, and it ought to do so" (ibid. 3-4; transl. 3). Therefore we may say that aspect of reliance inherent in religion is present in KANT's system in terms of the reliance for the sake of the fulfilment of the human end in so far as that end connotes the harmony between worthiness and happiness. Whereas in terms of obedience, religion does not appear in the horizon of morality since obedience is an immanent element — or even essence — of morality as such.

12.

A question is to be raised at this point as to KANT's motives which brought him to state again the basic position of freedom at the opening of his work on religion. The following suggestion may serve as a partial answer to that question. Precisely within the context of a philosophical exploration of religion KANT assumed that it is necessary to restate the independent position of freedom and ethics, since historically, be the concrete historical religious phenomena as they may, religion is associated with commandments and more generally with the awareness of dependence. That awareness is expressed in the very notion of "creature" which has an obvious connotation of being created; that connotation entails the aspect of dependence more than that of attachment. If this suggestion is plausible, then KANT had to come to grips with religions as they have been shaped within the process of history in order to draw a line of distinction between them and religion within the limits of *reason alone.* This line of demarcation is applied even vis-à-vis Christianity, as we shall notice presently.

Yet the description of religion is not confined to the previously analysed relationship between the aspect of grounding and that of expectation. "Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of all duties as divine command" (*Religion.* 153; transl. 142). In the footnote KANT adds: "There are no special duties to God in a universal religion, for God can receive nothing from us; we cannot act for Him, nor yet upon Him ... whether something which is indeed permissible in itself, but cognizable by us only through divine revelation, is really commanded by God — that is (at least for the most part) highly uncertain." Again: we cannot escape the question as to the meaning of the subjective aspect introduced into the context, since the aspect of subjective certainty is characteristic of faith as such. In the context quoted that aspect appears not in terms of faith but in terms of the attitude or acceptance of duties. These are based in reason, at least in practical reason, and as such are categorical in their essence and validity. What can be the argument for turning established duties into commandments out of a subjective conviction? What can be the argument for turning objectively grounded duties into subjectively grounded ones — taking into consideration the fact that the subjective aspect of certainty appears as related to the existence of God and not to the obligation inherent in the concept and position of duty. Does emerge here a subjective motivation in the direction of a hypostasis — an element which we shall explore in a later part of our analysis. But even so, that aspect of the hypostasis refers to the existence of God and the very relation between God and commandments — the central issue in KANT's criticism of Judaism. Judaism is exposed to the criticism precisely because it turns the autonomous character of morality into a theonomeous sphere. What makes us to be prompted, granted that this has a subjective validity, to perform that step?

A further step taken by KANT can not serve here as an adequate answer. "Godliness *(Gottseligkeit)* comprises two determinations of the moral disposition in relation to God: *fear* of God is this disposition in obedience to His commands from *bounden (schuldiger)* duty (the duty of a subject — *Untertan*), i. e. from respect for the law; *love* of God ... is the disposition to obedience from one's own *free choice* and from approval of the law (the duty of a son; ibid. 182; trans. 170). It goes without saying that the metaphor of "the duty of a son" is a parallel to the duty of a subject — and there is no need to go further into the analysis of these metaphors except to observe that here KANT uses expressions present in the tradition, in the historical sense of that term. Yet we have to be aware of the very distinction between obedience and respect on the one hand and the love and free choice on the other, since the respect for the moral law is an inherent aspect in the relationship of the agent or person to the imperative. Turning the respect into the incentive of behaviour is the central aspect in KANT's analysis of the penetration of the imperative into one's "soul". Respect and free choice are in KANT's ethics not two aspects or elements but two sides of the same coin. While in the text mentioned before there is a distinction, though the distinguished elements are comprised in *Gottseligkeit*, between respect on the one hand and fear and love correlated with respect and free choice on the other. The aspect of love in this sense does not appear in the systematic presentation of morality. Probably KANT transferred these two descriptions of the attitudes from the treasures of traditional religions. It seems plausible to assume that his own bias or predelection led him in the direction of love, because of the possible affinity of that attitude with free choice. But in his attempt to come to grips with the broader spectrum of religious attitudes he introduces also the element of fear, giving it a kind of a systematic foundation in the element of respect, present in the ethical sphere in any case. Respect is transformed into a religious attitude because of the interpretation which now renders the attitude as fear.

Metaphysik der Sitten comes back to that issue and the statements there are perhaps most instructive for the understanding of KANT's reasoning. "... admitting that the *doctrine of religion* is an integral part of the general *doctrine of duties*, the problem now is to determine the boundaries of the *science* to which it belongs. Is it to be considered a part of ethics (it is not the right of men in relation to one another that is in question here), or must it be regarded lying entirely beyond the bounds of pure philosophical morality."[49] A few comments are to be made here: the point of departure is the concept of duties

[49] *Metaphysik der Sitten.* Akad. Ausg. Bd XX. 486. The English translation referred to is: *The Doctrine of Virtue.* Part II of *The Metaphysic of Morals.* Transl. with an introduction and notes by M. J. Gregor, Foreword by H. J. Patin. New York, Evanston and London 1964. 162.

— and KANT seems to isolate or underscore that element in the ethical theory as against the correlation between rights and duties, once we look at the ethical theory within its immanent structure. This is so since the recognition of man as an end and not only as a means can have the connotation of duty i. e. it is my duty to approach man according to the imperative rendered in this way, or it is the right of every man to demand that attitude from me. The second comment is related to the emphasis laid on the interrelation between men in terms of rights, apparently hinting at the aspect of duty which is preponderant in the exploration of religion as it is implied here and stressed explicitly in the work on *Religion.* And thirdly — KANT speaks about philosophical morality (*Moral* — in the original text), as if a different kind of morality would be possible at all. He probably introduces that characterization since he is concerned with outlining the nature of religion i. e. the character of morality from the point of view of religion, and religion is taken here not as a historical phenomenon but as a manifestation of reason. From these preliminary comments we may proceed to KANT's further observations with regard to the essence of religion.

13.

A distinction is introduced between the formal aspect of religion and the material one. From the point of view of the formal aspect, religion is defined as the sum-total of all duties *as if* (instar) they were divine commands (*Met.* 346; transl. 162), the original does not read here *als ob* but: *als*). The next sentence is rather significant for the fuller understanding of the formal element. "That aspect belongs to philosophical morality, since here the definition expresses only the relation of reason to the *Idea of God* which reason itself makes." KANT goes here beyond his description or analysis in the *Critiques,* since he places even the duties within the context of the relation to the idea of God. Concurrently he does not limit that relation to the aspect of expectation or the highest good. There is also a cautiousness expressed, since even such a relation does not erase the basic systematic position, namely that we still abstract from the existence of God. Because of that abstractness the duty inherent in religion is not turned into a duty to *(erga)* God. Yet even that relation to God — with its qualifications — changes the position of reason as being legislative in its essence and makes reason only the spokesman (*Sprecher*) of God and his will. The duty remains a duty of man to himself — what the terminology of the time called incomplete duties. Yet we face here a paradoxical situation: the relation to the idea of God is supposed to go along with the awareness that reason itself makes that idea.[50] Yet reason with all its capacity turns out in the religious interpretation — formal as it is — into a spokesman of that what it itself created. Again the reference made to the sub-

jective aspect of the duty involves the goal to strengthen the moral motive in our own legislative reason (*Met.* 346; transl. 162). We may ask at this juncture the question as to the meaning of subjectivity in the context: does KANT assume that the acceptance of the common notion of religion is transferred into the context of the philosophical morality in the sense that we accept the duty, but our adherence to it is reinforced once the duty is understood as a divine command? How do the two perspectives — that of being of a legislative capacity and that of being a spokeskan — meet — this issue is not explored. The duties *(erga)* to God are placed within the scope of the material aspect of religion. The duties in this sense amount to the service rendered to God *(at praestandum)*. These duties would not proceed merely from reason, which is giving the universal law. Therefore they would be known to us only empirically and not *a priori*. The consequence of this is that these duties can be prescribed only by a revealed religion, that is to say by historical religions or religion. The historical religions are revealed ones, since they presuppose not merely the idea of God but also the existence of God. The religion in this sense lies entirely beyond the bounds of pure philosophical ethics. Such a religion ceases to be viewed within the bounds of pure reason and is based on teachings of history and revelation — and there is no room for it within the domain of ethics as pure practical philosophy. Actually we can sum up the distinction suggested, problematic as it may be, between the formal and material elements of religion, by saying that the first is within reason while the second amounts to KANT's attempt to come to grips with religion as a historical phenomenon. But as such, religion is read as it conceived of itself and cannot be placed within the scope of philosophy.[51]

An additional comment is called for the sake of a closer interpretation of the formal versus the material aspect. As to the formal *(das Formale)*, KANT considered as the occupation of philosophy to deal with that aspect. The form is the essence of the thing *(forma dat esse rei)* in so far as it is known by reason. We notice a correlation between reason and form. That correlation applies in the sphere of ethics to the correlation between pure will and its

[50] In terms of the position of the moral law which cannot be changed even by God Kant seems to take a view which is even more extreme than that taken by Leibniz vis-à-vis eternal truths. "We must not, however, imagine, as some do, that eternal truths, being dependent on God, are arbitrary and depend on His will, as Descartes, and afterwards M. Poiret, appear to have held. That is true only of contingent truths, of which the principle is *fitness (convenance)* or choice of the *best*, whereas necessary truth depend solely on His understanding and are its inner object." (*The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings*. Transl. with introduction and notes by R. Latta. London 1948, 242-243.

[51] Metaphysik der Sitten. 486 ff; transl. 162-163. The various elements of the human expectation — what we called before *providentia singularis* — are reiterated here 487 ff; transl. 163 ff.

universality and the form of pure will. In terms of the understanding of the notion, the material within theoretical philosophy amounts to perception related to sensuality as the medium of its awareness, it is given *a posteriori*, it is *substantia phenomenon* etc. Within the scope of ethics the material element or the practical-material rules presuppose that our will is determined by the low capacity of desire. Among the practical rules of an inner character, KANT mentions that of the moral feeling as presented by HUTCHESON, perfection and the will of God according to CRUSIUS and other theological moralists. The latter interpretation is listed as being of an external character in terms of the material practical grounds of determining (*KdpV* 40; transl. 41). Perhaps the conjunction between the external aspect and the material moment guided KANT in his employment of the term "material" in the scope of the interpretation of the essence of religion. It is possible that an additional consideration was relevant too, namely the conjunction between the material aspect and the historical one, since religion materially viewed, being a historical phenomenon, is bound to be encountered *a posteriori*. Once encountered it can be interpreted in its structure as comprising duties to God. In any case, the affinity between the formal essence of ethics and the formal aspect of religion leads to the dichotomy of the formal element in religion and the material one, the latter amounting to the acceptance of the external authority of revelation. Reason in this sense is even not a spokesman but only a receiver. In any case it can be suggested that the notion of material is closer to the meaning of the term in the first Critique than to that in the second, since it refers directly or indirectly to the empirical element and more specifically to historical religions. This is already an indication of the problem pertaining to KANT's conception of historical religions including Christianity — and we shall be concerned with that issue in course of our exploration. Within the scope of the material aspect of religion we notice also that the relation which holds between God and man surpasses completely the boundaries of ethics and is altogether inconceivable to us (*Met.* 490; transl. 167). Again we notice the correlation between the material, historical or revelational aspect of religion, and our agnosticism within the bounds of religion of reason. That agnostic attitude does not lead to the projection or to postulates but to an acknowledgement of a dimension which is fundamentally beyond the boundaries of reason, even when we include within those boundaries the various components of the end of reason, the goal of man, the highest good, etc. Religion within the bounds of reason does not intend to "save the phenomenon of religion", at least in its entirety, but substitute itself for a certain aspect of it. Unlike the *Critique of Pure Reason* which is concerned with the presuppositions of knowledge and the *Critique of Practical Reason* which makes explicit the legislative capacity of reason rendered as the moral imperative, the formal interpretation of religion, or let us say *even* the formal interpretation, brings into the context the relationship to God. To

be sure that relationship does not turn God into an "addressee" of religion in terms of man's attitude to God. The notion of the existence of God remains within the scope of legitimization or authorization of our duties.

14.

Attempting now to explore KANT's interpretation and evaluation of Christianity, we may start with some comments he makes about the Gospel. The Gospel presents the moral disposition in its complete perfection — and here KANT introduces some of his own systematic vocabulary: "... though as an ideal of holiness it is unattainable by any creature, it is yet an archetype which we should strive to approach in and to imitate in an interrupted infinite progress" (*KdpV* 83; transl. 86). This aspect is re-emphasized when KANT says that the moral teaching of the Gospel is characterized by the purity of their moral principle and at the same time through the suitability of the principles to the limitations of finite being (*KdpV* 86; transl. 89). An additional statement is not totally consistent with that just quoted, when Kant says about Christian ethics that it is formulated in a way presenting its precepts as pure and uncompromising — and that character of Christian ethics befits the essence of moral precepts. Yet the other side of that essence is that it destroyed man's confidence of being wholly adequate to it, at least in this life, but at the same time introduced into the scope the hope that "... if we act as well as lies in our power, what is not in our power will come to our aid from another source, whether we know in what way or not" (*KdpV* 127; transl. 132, note). The expectation or hope are not rendered here in terms of the hope for the life to come and the harmony which will be the very essence of it — that between merit and happiness. Hope connotes here the help extended to man — a situation which KANT calls eselwhere *Beistand.* The question whether a help of the kind, which is a version of grace, is congruent with the ethics of autonomy is not raised in the context. Indeed, grace is understood as a superior decree conferring a good for which the subordinate possesses nothing but the moral receptivity (*Religion,* 75, note; transl. 70, note). To be sure, the human being described here as a subordinate possesses more than receptivity; he is called to do whatever is in his capacity to do. In addition KANT uses the notion of decree which obviously carries with itself an element of imposition, even when that imposition is of a benevolent or redeeming nature. Yet grace is also interpreted as being the contradiction of nature. In this sense it amounts to our moral disposition which, as such, can not be comprehended and is essentially the principle of morality in the sense of morality of autonomy. In this context the Son of God represents the hope of the development or evolvement of that good, since the Son of God is the model of humanity pleasing God (*das Beispiel der Gott wohlgefälligen Menschheit; Der Streit der Fakultäten.* Werke VII. 43). The position of

morality is rendered now in religious, i. e. historically religious, terms. KANT refers therefore to the ideal of humanity pleasing God. That ideal we can represent to ourselves only as the ideal of a person "who would be willing not merely to discharge all human duties himself... but even, though tempted by the greatest allurements, to take upon himself every affliction, up to the most ignominous death, for the good of the world and even his enemies." Pleasing God seems to be identical with being acceptable to God. The practical faith in the Son of God comes here into prominence. Perhaps, emphasizing the human nature of Christ (in a milder version: having taken upon Himself man's nature) KANT wanted to underscore the basic systematic aspect, namely that the concern of the moral philosophy, even religiously rendered, remains within the human scope. Hence, Christ is a man who can be a model for human beings caring for the good of the world and of every human person (*Religion,* 63; transl. 55). As a perfect example of a man he can perform that function precisely if he is a man himself "... even then we should have no cause for supposing him other than a man naturally begotten ... the naturally begotten man feels himself under obligation to furnish such an example in himself. This is not, to be sure, absolutely to deny that he might be a man supernaturally begotten. But to suppose the latter can in no way benefit us practically, in as much as the archetype which we find embodied in this manifestation must, after all, be sought in ourselves (even though we are but natural men.)" (*Religion,* 65; transl. 57). The pedagogical, to put it in these terms, position and function of the Son of God is served better once we realize the affinity between the example and men as natural beings. This is strengthened by an additional consideration namely that the notion of archetype is applied by KANT to God even in the interaction or identity between blessing and will. Once that notion is transferred to the status of the Son of God, KANT feels apparently the need to bring the status of the Son of God closer to mankind. The traditional discussions and controversies about the natural element of the Son of God served KANT here for the purpose of his own interpretation of the relation between religion and ethics, and more specifically the relation between Christianity and ethics. KANT himself distinguishes between the position of the archetype being the ideal of pure reason and that of an ectypon which is a copy of the former. It does not seem warranted to assume that the fact that KANT employs the term "archetype" both to God and to the Son of God would connote that the Son of God is an ectypon of God as the archetype. We should rather see the connection and the distinction in the following way: in terms of moral theology God is the archetype but in terms of Christianity as a historical religion and, as such, concerned with the human condition, the Son of God as an example and as carrying in himself the feature of the natural condition of man is conceived of as the archetype.

Parts of KANT's correspondence shed an additional light on his attitude to the Gospels and *a fortiori* to Christianity as a historical phenomenon. In a letter to LAVATER KANT says that he seeks to separate out the moral teachings of the Gospel and the remainder which can only serve as an auxiliary to them. The term "remainder" implies apparently the Dogmas, since they tell us what God has done to help us to see our frailty in seeking justification before Him. The moral law tells us what we must do to make ourselves worthy of justification. To be sure, KANT does not refer here to worthiness in terms of achieving happiness but in terms of being justified before God; hence God appears in the context not as an end but as an authority. Yet the Dogmas refer to our frailty — and we may add, not to our intentions and deeds. Hence we may assume that frailty is here a hint in the direction of the radical evil, the concept which will be explored presently. In any case the Gospel contain a mixture of facts and revelations and KANT approaches them from his own systematic position, which is that of the moral faith. The Gospel is the scuffolding for that faith historically conditioned, grounded in the situation which preceeded or preceeds the doctrine of purity of conscience in faith and of the good transformation or our lives. For the relation to God nothing is needed of my union with the divine force except my own using of my natural God-given powers in such a way as not to be unworthy of His aid. To be sure, KANT adds here a significant proviso namely that the human capacity or reason are God-given powers. Thus in a way he introduced into the scope of his presentation a certain feature which cannot be looked at as being totally autonomous. Yet once reason is there in its self-sufficient position, the dogmas, confessions and ceremonies are brought to us through historical reports and these are categorially distinguished from the sources of reason. The historical aspect becomes prominent also in the relationship to the time of the writing of the Gospel and not for our own age — with a significant addendum, namely that the writing, being conditioned by an age, did not concern itself for later ages. Hence the historical aspect has two correlated elements — the source of reliance being that of reports and the determination by a certain age and its climate of opinion e. g. Jewish dogmas had to be opposed by Christian dogmas and old miracles had to be opposed by new miracles. The Gospel is after all a book and no book can be a substitute for the religion of conscience, the latter connoting here one's own conviction in terms of morality or reason. That distinction is rendered differently as the distinction between obligation and the manner in which the message is to be introduced into the world and disseminated in it. The moral faith contains in itself a critical aspect in the sense of delineating that which is legitimate in the scope of reason and that which goes beyond its boundaries. More specifically for the sake of formulating the essence of religion we are forbidden to engage in the presumptuous curiosity about the manner God will supplement our efforts and forbids "the arrogance of so supposing that one can know what means

would be most in conformity with His wisdom". That description of the status of the Gospel is mitigated in another letter of KANT where he says that the book is an everlasting guide to true wisdom "one that not only agrees with the speculation of a perfected reason but sheds new light on the whole field surveyed by that reason, illuminating what still remains opaque to it." We do not find here the distinction between historical documents and their relationship to the age of their composition and reason which is not a historical datum. The harmony between the book and reason is presented as being complete.[52]

15.

The difference between the visible and invisible church is not unrelated to the difference between the Gospel and the religion within the limits of reason, though the organizational structure of the visible church along with the hierarchy inherent in it lead KANT, to put it mildly, to a stringer reservation vis-à-vis the church than his historical placement of the Gospel is determining the meaning of the distinction referring to them. Obviously, KANT follows some distinction present in the tradition like e. g. the distinction between *Kirche* and *Gemeinde* suggested by LUTHER. The terms (visible—invisible church) themselves appear e. g. in HOOKER. KANT incorporates the traditional distinction into the structure of his systematic presentation designing a kind of progressing development from the empirical level to that of reason; "... in the end religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and from all statutes which rest on history and which through the agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the requirements of the good; and thus at last the pure religion of reason will rule over so that God may be all in all." The quotation refers to *I Corinthians.* XV, 28 but is implicitly or explicitly interpreted in the direction which is congruous with KANT's own position. Again, the ecclesiastical faith and its humiliating distinction between laity and clergy will disappear and the religion of reason, which by the same token is a universal religion, will prevail (*Religion,* 121-2; transl. 112-3). The visible religion looked at from the vantage of religion of reason is a representation of the religion of reason which is symbolically rendered as the invisible kingdom of God on earth. In order to stress that relationship between essence and representation, KANT uses the term "vehicle" and also a term with a strong systematic connotation

[52] See *Briefwechsel.* Auswahl und Anmerkungen von O. Schönderfer. Mit einer Einleitung von R. Malter und J. Koppe und einem Nachtrag. Hamburg 1972, 134 ff (two letters to Johann Casper Lavater, dated 28 April 1775) as well as 367 ff (a letter to Heinrich Jung Stilling, dated 1 March 1789). *Kant's Philosophical Correspondence 1759—99.* Ed. and transl. by A. Zweig. Chicago 1967, 79 ff, 131 ff.

namely "schema": the schema of the visible church serving as the vehicle of the invisible church and its ultimate victory. To be sure we encounter here an extension of the notion of the schema, since no schema of sensibility corresponding to the principles of pure reason can ever be given (*KdrV* 692; transl. 546). Yet, as we see, the visible church as a historical-empirical reality is placed in the position of the schema of reason, connoting religion manifested in history and *pari passu* representing the religion of reason. Moreover, KANT even transfers concepts or descriptions from the realm of the visible church to the realm of reason; the very employment of the term "the invisible church" gives to the religion of reason a particular innuendo, as is the case when KANT refers to it as public religious faith, though it permits only the bare idea of a church. Service under the sovereignty of the good principle in the invisible church cannot be regarded as ecclesiastical service (*Religion*, 152; transl. 140). It seems to be warranted to conclude that the visible church is for KANT *praeperatio evangelica*, and the invisible church is a symbolic expression for the presentation of the religion of reason within the context of distinctions present in the tradition. Hence Christianity in the historical sense is only a preparation for the religion of reason. The religion of reason is not an interpretation of Christianity from within rendered in philosophical concepts nur a continuation of it. This is so since the distinction between dogmas and principles of reason, let alone the distinction between a structure and the principles, cannot be erased. Yet at one point related to the notion of the radical evil KANT seems to try to interpret traditional Christian notion within the context of the religion of reason. We shall deal now with the notion of radical evil.

16.

The concept of evil takes a new shape in the context of the philosophy of religion compared with KANT's statements about evil within his ethical philosophy, in the strict sense of the term, and also the presentation in *Anthropology*. The distinction within the scope of ethical philosophy is that between *Übel* (translated as *harm*) being a physical harm e. g. punishment even if not bound as a natural consequence to the morally bad (*KdpV* 38; transl. 39). The difference between *Übel* and *Böse* appears here in a terminological fashion — but that difference is not analysed conceptually. A step further is taken when the object of pure practical reason is explored, an object which fundamentally means an effect possible through freedom. Hence: "The sole objects of practical reason are ... those of the good and evil. By the former, one understands a necessary object of the faculty of desire, and by the latter, a necessary object of aversion, both according to a principle of reason" (*KdpV* 58; transl. 60). The two aspects are relevant for the understanding of the framework in which the exploration takes place: (a) KANT refers to facul-

ties and they may have an empirical or psychological connotation. Yet the fact that he adds on both ends the adjective "necessary" places the faculties on a new, i. e. categorial level, since empirical faculties might refer to objects but it would be difficult to describe the position of the object as necessary, once we deal with faculties as confined to the empirical scope. (b) That aspect of the elevation of the objects to the level of necessity is obviously reinforced by describing both desire and aversion as occurring according to a principle of reason. This statement amounts eventually to placing the evil — and not only the good — on the level of practical reason. How does this happen is not explained in the context, perhaps since the next objective of the exploration is to point to the difference between the pleasant and the good on the one hand and the unpleasant and the evil on the other. "Whoever submits to a surgical operation feels it without doubt as an ill *(Übel),* but by reason he and everyone else will describe it as a good" (*KdpV* 61; transl. 63). Again: the concept of "unsocial sociability"[53] is probably related to that ambiguity in terms of man's character as an individual and the character of the human species i. e. the propensity of men to enter into society which is bound together with a mutual opposition of men, whereby that opposition constantly threatens to break up the society. The natural inclination towards the evil takes, in the inter-individual context, the shape of being unsocial, while the potentiality to go forward in the direction towards improvement takes the shape of sociability. This distinction gives priority to the species over the individuals, since the rational capacities of man, which are his natural capacities, are to be fully developed only in the race and not in the individual (*Idee,* 18; transl. 13). KANT relies here on nature which brings about as one of its results that the capacities are destined to evolve completely at their natural end (*Religion,* 100-1; transl. 92). We could perhaps suggest that the natural course of events serves here as a kind of an anchor or sub-structure for the evolvement of practical reason qua reason. The well-known metaphor characterizing human beings as "crooked wood" has to be seen in the same context of the essence of human beings or of the doublefaced character of them.

We have to observe here that the employment of the term "reason" in the context and along with it the term "good" is not fully clear, since the outcome of the mentioned surgedy operation can be understood as good in the pragmatic sense of the term; this would render the meaning of reason as prudence. Yet since the distinction with reference to which the example is brought forward, relates to the parallel distinction between pleasure and displeasure, the possible distinction between reason in its two levels or directions as well as that between good in its two meanings seems to be irrelevant or even is neglected. To sum up this point we can say that KANT, by introduc-

[53] *Idee zu einer allg. Gesch.* Akad. Ausg. Bd 8. 20; the transl. *On history.* 15.

ing into the scope of the analysis the concept of evil along with that of good and through pointing to evil as related to pure reason, does not go into a more detailed analysis of the concept of evil. *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* of 1788 and *Anthropologie* of 1798, represent from that point of view a step backwards, since they present the inclination towards the evil as an active desire in the direction of that which is not permitted. Hence man has to be evaluated from the vantage of his sensuous character *(seinem sensiblen Character nach)* as being evil — and this amounts to the fact that man is evil by nature. This position or the character of man is part of the character of the individual man and therefore the progress towards the better should not be excluded as being part of the character of the human species (*Anthropologie* 329).

The dichotomy of sensuality and reason, which is the prevailing feature in KANT'S system, is to some extent attenuated when KANT tries to show that there is still a ground in human nature which leads beyond the empirical level of nature as such. "The power to set an end — and any end whatsoever — is the characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from animality)" (*Met. d. Sitten.* 391; transl. 51). To set an end may mean the anticipation of something to happen, by my own effort, in the future. But it may also mean, in the ethical sense, the setting of something as having its justification in itself including the position of being an end and not a means only in the ethical sense, as the categorical imperative makes it mandatory. In any case we find here — at least — a hint in the direction of transcending the reality as the sensuous level of human existence in the direction of something which will eventually be rendered as the level of reason in the ethical sense of that term. Hence we could say that KANT attempts to find a sort of a mediator between sensuality and reason in the very essence of the human condition, even on its empirical level.

These elements have been mentioned before. Looking now into the notion of the radidal evil we notice that the notion is introduced in order to stress that evil is not identical with the sensuous aspect of human essence. The radical evil is grounded in freedom and only from the position of freedom and the direction of its decision can evil be part of the ethical spectrum and can be evaluated morally.[54]

KANT'S own presentation of freedom usually amounts to the stress laid on the independence of the will of everything except the moral law (*KdpV* 93;

[54] In *Opus Postumum* Kant quotes a verse from Lessing: *O Mensch, wo bist du her, zu schlecht für einen Gott, zu gut für Ungefähr* (roughly translated: Man, where are you from? too bad for God, too good for random). (Akad. Ausg. Bd 22, 288). Landmann righly mentions the fact that Kant by quoting that verse turns it into an indication of Kant's anthropological position. See: *De Homine.* Der Mensch im Spiegel seines Gedankens. Von Michael Landmann unter Mitarbeit von Dilm u. a. Freiburg/München 1962, 281.

transl. 97). In this sense there is a primary correlation of freedom and the moral law, a correlation explored before. What is obvious in that correlation is that the aspect of decision is not a made a primary element of freedom. From this point of view, the philosophy of religion changes the outlook by introducing, paradoxically or not, within the scope of decision or choice the decision between good and evil as grounded in freedom. Freedom is a realm in which one can control events only as far as one can rule hearts and minds (*Religion* 84; transl. 78). We have to direct our attention to the actual evil of a given action with respect to its inner possibilities. Hence we have to go back to the will, if evil is to be performed (ibid. 41; 35). This amounts to an *original* use of man's will disregarding the natural causes which may influence man. Be the causes as they may, no cause in the world erases the position of man as a freely acting being. Thus we cannot inquire into the temporal origins of man's deeds but only into the rational origin of them. A perversion of our will takes place here, but the act is still performed by will; the situation is not that we are just swept by our sensuality or by nature. There is a rational origin of this perversion of our will — and it is obvious that the adjective "rational" refers to reason: reason is the level at which the evil accurs or where the decision carried out by will in the direction of evil originates (ibid. 41 ff; 35 ff). Evil is possible only as a determination of the free will. Yet the free will, as it has been presented, is correlated with law, imperative and maxim. Once the free choice is brought into the context of evil it has to be correlated to a maxim. Hence the propensity to evil must consist in the subjective ground of the deviation from the maxims of the moral law (ibid. 20; 24). As long as we remain on the empirical level of sensuality, without the relation to the moral law, evil can have a connotation of being grounded in an urge or desire. These in turn are manifestations of sensuality. Only the relation to the moral law, even when it takes the actual shape of deviation from that law, brings into prominence the moral i. e. anti-moral, character of evil. That relationship, though it is actually a deviation, still takes place within the relation to the moral law, though concretely that relation is one of negation or non-obedience. A kind of determination which is a negaton is implied here. To be sure the implication is not an ontological one but contextual and moral.

To put it in the nutshell we can say: the concept of sin as present in the Christian teachings, with all the varieties of the interpretation of it, served for KANT as a kind of a reminder of his own formulation of the essence of evil. In traditional terms we may say that the doctrines served not as *praeambula fidei* but as a *praeambula philosophiae* or as *preparatio evengelica* not for the sake of *preparatio dogmatica* but as a preparation for a philosophical concept which renders the sin as evil. We could use here WILLIAM JAMES' well known saying, applying it to the issue before us: the evil is the "moral, moral-theological equivalent" of the concept of sin. Traditionally the concept of sin

connotes the reversed attitude of man to God, an attitude which contradicts that what should prevail i. e. that which has been prescribed by God's command. In this ense the sin amounts to a transgression which in turn is manifest in disobedience. In broader terms: sin is grounded in — or leads to — the lack of faith or lack of love. The well known distinction occurs in that context namely that between the sin committed here and now related to the actual act performed *(peccatum actuale)* and the sin which looms large on the human race and is an original or inherited condition carrying in itself the potential drive of human beings to commit acts of transgression as actual sins (*peccatum originale*). The evil intention, from this point of view, preceeds not only chronologically the deed but does this basically so. KANT describes sin as transgressing the moral law as a *divine command* (ibid. 37; 68 and 42; 72). The fact that he uses the formulation "fall into sin"[55] indicates that he refers somehow to the notion of fall *(Sündenfall)* hinting again to a traditional Christian interpretation of the sin as a fall into a condition. The importance of that term may lies in the possibility offered by it to point to the human act which brought about a fall, that is to say a change in terms of the original human situation.

17.

The change which KANT introduced in the traditional religious understanding of the notion of sin lies in the fact that he relates sin to the animality of man, i. e. to a part of the human essence in general and not to an act of transgression as such. "The predisposition to *animality* in mankind under the title of physical and purely mechanical *self-love*, wherein reason is demanded". The identity between the evil and self-love is grounded in the natural or animal infrastructure of human essence. Once we are swept by animality we do not follow the imperative of reason which can be the only agency for overcoming self-love in the direction of universality. The evil lies in accepting the urge grounded in animality by reason — as we have seen before. There are vices of coarseness *(Rohigkeit)* of nature and they find eventually their expression in beastly vices of gluttony and drunkenness *(Völlerei)*, lasciviousness and wild lawlessness in relation to other men (*Religion*, 27; transl. 22). What is characteristic of KANT's transformation of the traditional notion of

[55] On the whole issue consult: *Albert Schweitzer: Die Religionsphilosophie Kant's von der Kritik der reinen Vernunft bis zur Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. 1899. — Werner Marx in a Hebrew paper of his deals with the essence of evil in Schelling's system pointing out the affinity of Schelling's view with of Kant: The Essence of Evil-On Schelling's Essay "Of Human Freedom"*. In: Iyyun. Hebrew Philosophical Quarterly. April 1981, 92. Consult also his: *Die Aufgabe der Freiheitsschrift Schelling's*. In: *Schelling: Geschichte, System, Freiheit.* Freiburg/München 1977, 151 ff.

sin into the notion of evil is what we may call immanentization of the sin rendering it as evil. The evil is factually grounded in the very presence of the component of nature in the human essence. In order to accentuate that element of nature, KANT calls it animality.

The second aspect of the direction towards immanence lies in the fact that reason which is a component of the human essence as well has to adopt the animal drive out of its own resources; only that adoption is an evil act or an expression of the evil component which lies in human nature. Hence the identification between human nature and the evil character in the human nature (*Streit der Fakultäten.* 60). We can observe here that KANT explores religion *within* the *bounds* of reason but does not transform religion into one of reason — as HERMANN COHEN has done. KANT's more restricted interpretation of the relation between reason and religion is due to the trend prevailing in his system, i. e. not to find a full synonymous translation of religion into a system of reason, but to suggest some transformed interpretation which presupposes religion as a historical fact and attempts to find an equivalent of religion within the bounds of reason. But the position of an equivalent has its limits when compared with the position of a systematic synonym.

The same applies to the corresponding element to reason, that is to say to grace. "For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ" (*The Romans.* 3, 23-24). Grace is a position or an act of benevolence of favour. It is an act or a response of God; an intervention in the human condition of a benevolent character. It is not a permission to do what one is inclined to do, but is an act of taking man out of his condition or at least to regard him not in terms of his condition but in terms of the mercy granted to him. It is an act of blessing or a possibility to be bestowed with blessing. When KANT mentions grace he refers to the predisposition towards morality which lies in us and which as such is unintelligible. To put it differently: the very fact that human nature consists not only of animality but also of freedom and reason cannot be explained and thus can be viewed as an outcome of grace. Animality and the aspiration to achieve happiness are interrelated — and this is so because the goal of happiness is eventually a manifestation to fulfill the drive of self-love; happiness contradicts pure morality *(Sittlichkeit).* Yet when we understand grace as related to our own capacity to set out of our own power certain goals, grace is nothing different from human nature (ibid.). It becomes clear from this statement that only the aspect of autonomy comes into the scope of human nature, being at least a component parallel to the component of animality. The integration of grace into human nature in the direction of turning to grace, which originally connotes intervention of God's mercy from the outside — and this is so by definition of the position of God — somehow reaches its peak. We may wonder about KANT's reasoning behind

the very introduction of the notion of grace into the texture of his presentation. But it seems plausible to assume that here too KANT attempts to find an equivalent of ecclesiastical terms in his system though that equivalent leads him to see the immanent element of human nature as replacing the transcendence of grace, as grounded in transcendence *par excellence*. The *tertium quid* of the two understandings of the notion of grace would be that in both versions, if we may put it like that, grace is supra-natural in the total sense, coming from above human nature as such; in KANT's version it is supra-animal, since human nature has a broader meaning than that of animality, comprising morality too.

The traditional concept of original sin *(Erbsünde)* understood as *naturae corruptio* does not suit the direction of KANT's system, since KANT transfers the center of the concept of evil from heritage or inheritance to the act of will and choice. The most inept explanation of the moral evil is that which describes it as descending to us as inheritance from our first fathers. KANT finds here in the verse of OVID referring to the good about the species and the ancestors as something we have not made ourselves (Genus at proavos, et quae non fecimus ipse;) an indication in the direction of the evil: the evil has not to be related to ancestors or to the human species at large but, only to the act of the actual choice which by definition can be an act of the individual who is therefore responsible for the act he performed (*Religion*, 40; transl. 35). We have to mention here that KANT presents the notion of the original sin as *Erbsünde* with reference to the traditional elaborations of it. But he says also that each of the faculties of the university would interpret that concept according to the logic of the discipline the faculty is respectively in charge of. It is rather difficult to assess that hint in the direction of various partial interpretations of *Erbsünde* unless we assume that KANT somehow, perhaps ironically, attempts to show what the so-called higher faculties do whereas the lower faculty i. e. the philosophical one, is in the only position to present a view which is a legitimate interpretation i. e. replacement, of the notion. In any case the faculty of medicine would represent the original sin as a hereditary evil in terms of the genealogical descendence, as that faculty represents the tapeworm. The hereditary evil is to be met only within the range of human beings and thus must have existed in our first parents. The faculty of law would regard the evil in legal terms, that is to say as the legitimate consequence to the patrimony bequested to us by our first fathers. We have obviously observed here that the legal context leads to the conception of legitimation of the sin — and the punishment is the legitimate end — adding: How just is legal justice. The theological faculty would regard the evil as the personal participation by our first fathers in the fall of the condemned rebel — probably since the fall is the other side of the rebellion against the divine commandments. KANT adds at this juncture a comment related to the actual human beings namely, that even now we do not have enough faith to free

ourselves. He is hinting at the possibility of an emancipation from the doom of the original sin as *"Erbsünde"*. But that possibility is not actualized since we lack the faith; a relation between faith and will apparently implied in that description (ibid. 40; 35-36 note). It seems that we may read that description — which somehow has an ironic innuendo — by pointing to the fact that the concept of the original sin is the closest one in terms of the philosophical representation of the evil, since it carries with it the element of rebellion which can be understood as a manifestation of will. Concurrently it implies the possibility not to carry on as *force majeure* the condition brought about by our fathers in case we would exercise our own faith and will and give preference to the choice of the good over the choice of the evil. If this implicit or explicit affinity between the theological interpretation of the sin and the philosophic one is warranted, then we come back to the more general view namely that the theological interpretation is indeed — only — a preparation of the philosophic one. The concept of *praeparatic evangelica* has been applied by Eusebius to the *Old Testament* which has been looked at as the preparation of the *New Testament* and of Christianity *(Demonstratis evangelica)* in general. According to Kant, Christianity does not represent a continuation of Judaism since it is grounded upon a wholly new principle, being a pure moral religion. "Thus Christianity arose suddenly, though not unprepared, from Judaism" (ibid. 125, 118). The notion of preparation moves from the relationship between Judaism and Christianity to that of the relationship between Christianity as the moral religion to philosophy, to ethical philosophy or ethical theology grounded in reason.

Two correlated elements in Kant's philosophy, that of will and that of evil, are Kant's contribution to the philosophy of religion, once we take into account the fact that the concepts of God and faith have been already dealt with and placed in their context in the *Critiques*. Kant himself considered the introduction of the two concepts, and mainly the concept of evil, as concepts shaped or anticipated by traditional religion i. e. by Christianity though he interpreted them within the framework of his conceptual structure. It has been suggested that to some extent Kant is here close to St. Augustine. Heinrich Scholz sums up by saying that the struggle between the evil principle with the good one has a great deal of similarity described by St. Augustine in *De civitate Dei*. It can be questioned whether the analysis presented by Scholz himself substantiated that general statement.[56] To be sure, one can

[56] See *Heinrich Scholz: Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte.* Ein Kommentar zu Augustins De Civitate Dei. Mit einem Exkurs: Fruitio Dei. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Mystik. Leipzig 1911. 6. In the Exkurs Scholz refers to the *Kritik der Urteilskraft,* (54) where as he states it Kant rejects any attempt to attribute to will a mystical quality. Scholz — and he is not the only one — describes Kant as the philosopher of Protestantism (cf. 232-233).

point to the element of will or man's own deed in the explanation given by St. Augustine to the very occurrence of the sin, since man has broken the precept and after he has done this he was first forsaken of God's grace. After this occurrence, which amounts to God's negative response to man's deed, man continued to go according to his impulse of his disobedient flesh; the soul was now delighted with perverse liberty. All these acts amount to the situation in which man willingly has forsaken God as his superior.[57] Yet the difference between that view and Kant's one is obvious, not only in the fact that St. Augustine starts with man's deed as disobedience of the precept of God but mainly because St. Augustine related the disobedience to the flesh. The concept of will as such, which can decide out of its own resources either in the direction of the good and in that of evil is obviously absent in St. Augustine's conception. Along with that there is, according to the structure of St. Augustine's thought and can not be, the element that will which out of its own resources can opt fot the good and thus overcome its own openness both in the directions of the evil and the good. Here too the grace of God is a religious reminder for philosophy to proceed in a certain direction within the bounds of the autonomy of the will or freedom. By and large Kant remained faithful to the general structure of his system, even when he addressed himself to religion. — The outlook and the philosophical interpretation of religion changes in Hegel's system. Hegel takes of course a comprehensive view and integrates the religion or religions leading to the religion *par excellence* i. e. Christianity within the structure of his system. Yet by doing that he presents at several points a more adequate analysis of religion and the various components of which it consists.

[57] *Saint Augustine: The City of God. (De Civitate Dei). Vol. 2. London, New York 1945. 10, Chapter XIII, XIV.*

Chapter Six
FROM RELIGION TO SPECULATION

1.

As we have seen, KANT is attempting to discern in religion its ethical essence and thus to discern also the element of reason present in ethics and religion.[58] Hegel attempts to place religion within the scope of the absolute spirit, looking at religion as one of the stages in the process of the manifestation of spirit. There is indeed a parallelism between the two systems in terms of structure, namely, that each of the systems is directed towards establishing the relationship between religion and the highest manifestation of reason — ethics in KANT, speculation in Hegel. Yet within the parallelism we find significant differences. We shall begin by analysing some of the basic concepts bearing on religion, as they appear in Hegel's system.

2.

We start with the description of faith. Hegel presents faith as the relation of the limited to the absolute. What is inherent in that relation is only the antithesis; in consciousness, there is only the antithesis, whereas the aspect of identity is totally absent from it (*Differenz*-Schrift. 57). It is obvious that the identity is hinted at but that it lies beyond the boundaries of faith. The characteristic feature of faith is that it is a relationship within the limits of finitude. Man as a finite being relates to God; but his relationship is accompanied by the consciousness of the basic distinction between the finite and the infinite. To be sure, there is a kind of longing for a rapprochement between the finite and the infinite, but this is only a longing and not an awareness of realization. It should be observed that, within this context, Hegel recognizes that the longing needs justification through a theory of happiness (*Glauben und Wissen.* 284). It is only a conjecture as to whether Hegel is alluding to KANT's view that the achievement of happiness lies beyond the range of man's

[58] Reinhold observes that Kant is bound to start off from *morality* (Moral), as Christ started off from *Religion. Carl Leonhard Reinhold: Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie.* Hrsg. von R. Schmidt. Leipzig (n. d.). 130.

empirical existence and thus calls for the postulate of immortality and the guarantee offered by God.

It is possible to assume that since faith is not faith in an entity which is absent, implying almost by definition relationship to the absolute, the awareness of the distance between man and God implies the presence of God in human awareness, though that presence does not lead in the direction of identity between the two (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 522ff). Again, perhaps taking for granted KANT's description of faith, Hegel speaks about posing faith against knowledge. But Hegel introduces a significant nuance by saying that when I believe I do know because the content of my belief is in my consciousness. Hence faith is knowledge, knowledge understood as immediate knowledge and not as an immediate form of certainty (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 129). There is an interesting parallel to which Hegel points to, namely, that this certainty is related to the ego in a way resembling the relationship of freedom to the will (*Enz.* § 412). Underlying this statement is the assumption that the certainty itself is a way of apprehending the ego. This might imply that since certainty is of a self-reflective character, it cannot be a final characteristic of man's relation to God. It implies a step beyond or above itself, what Hegel describes as certainty expressed intensively, as when I say that I know something as certainly as I know that I myself exist. Just the same, certainty as it is immediately given is not knowledge of the necessity of the content to which it refers (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 130). In this sense faith anticipates the overcoming of subjective certainty and what is called religous feeling, in the direction of the awareness of the absolute identity of the content and myself — but obviously, faith as such does not reach the awareness of that absolute identity. Yet, since faith contains that element, it has to be seen as essentially grounded in the spirit and thus as a manifestation of the spirit, though not the ultimate one (ibid. 299). It is clear that Hegel attempts to place faith in a comprehensive sphere, that of the spirit, in order to overcome KANT's approach to faith — what we called before the in-between position of faith relating to the attitude of taking something as being true *(Fürwahrhalten).*

Because faith is posited within the boundaries of the difference between the absolute and empirical reality, the absolute as conceived from the point of view of faith as implicated in the chasm between the infinite and the finite, is a concept only, and thus exhibits the emptiness of reason. This emptiness in turn leads to the assumption that the object of faith is totally inconceivable; faith turns out to be the relation to the inconceivable. KANT is listed among the anti-eudemonistic philosophers since he tried to overcome the limitations of the empirical realm and also its desires and inclinations. Just the same KANT — Hegel points out — remains within the sphere of the empirical precisely because he accepts the duality between the empirical and the ideal as an ultimate fact, at least from the point of view of man and thus of his faith. In strong terms, Hegel renders this view as saying that the task is not to

know God but to know man. Even here, however, the reference is not to the idea of man but to that abstract entity which is called mankind, which as such is an empirical datum involved in limitations. What occurs is a kind of sanctification of finitude — and it is the task of philosophy not only to point towards the relationship with the infinite, but to place this relationship in a totally different context (*Glauben und Wissen.* 288ff).

3.

It is clear already that, unlike KANT, who relates faith to one kind of subjective certainty, Hegel moves toward placing faith within the structural contours of his system, that is, between the finite and the infinite. When Hegel speaks about faith in terms of confidence, he points out that this relationship belongs to what he describes as the beginning reflection, which makes faith and confidence related to representation *(Vorstellung)* and distinction and even presuppose the two (*Phil. d. Rechts* § 147; transl. 106). To be sure, he speaks about subjective certainty. But even here he describes it as one of the eternal truths, which exists in and for itself, that is to say, a truth about God (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 523). Again, unlike KANT's conception, intentionality toward God or truth is present within the horizon of subjective certainty, though that intentionality does not overcome the basic distance between man and the absolute or God.

Hence there exists a basic affinity between faith as subjective spirit which apprehends God, and the spirit of the absolute which is one with the divine spirit. The difference between the subjective and the absolute is retained. But the fact that both are comprehended within the total sphere of the spirit points not only to the affinity between the poles but also to the possibility of bringing about by philosophical understanding of faith — as well as by the dialectical development of faith itself — the identity between the two (ibid. 105). This is emphasized when Hegel describes faith, even from the point of view of certainty only, as a most inner aspect of certainty, a most profound, most concentrated one. Faith in this sense cannot be listed together with opinion, representation, conviction or willing (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 2. 362). We can point to what faith is essentially, namely the consciousness of the absolute truth which means where and what God is, of and in himself (ibid. 296). Hence, even when we see faith as lacking the consciousness — which is thinking (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 546) — we still see this as just a one-sided presentation of the nature of faith and not of what faith is essentially or potentially.

An additional element has to be mentioned here, namely the historical manifestations of faith in traditional religions. We shall return to this in more detail. We mention now that since faith is grounded in the spirit, and history is one of the manifestations of the spirit, faith too manifests itself in

historical forms. Thus, Hegel will not present historical religions, as did KANT, only as preparations for a philosophical interpretation or sublation of religion, but as stages in the development of the spirit. Both the historical religions and philosophy have to be conceived in the same framework and level i. e. of the absolute spirit.

4.

When Hegel characterizes KANT's conception of practical faith in God, he sees it as consistent with KANT's general trend, which is to turn the speculative aspect of the idea into a humane form *(humane Form)*, related to the harmonization between morality and happiness (*Glauben und Wissen.* 324). To be sure, KANT attempts to give to absolute subjectivity an objective form by re-phrasing it as concept and law. But this does not remove the true idea from its position as a subjective maxim (ibid. 326-7). This is Hegel's characterization not only of KANT's ethical view but also of KANT's attempt to interpret religion in ethical terms. KANT's theory of postulates is part of that general direction of his system (*Ästh.* Bd 1. 91). In KANT there is no way to prove that God is not only a thought but a reality as well, since in KANT there is no transition from concept to being; from the concept we cannot derive the being (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 582-3). Hence the outcome is bound to be that the subjectivity, or, *only* the subjectivity of faith, is related to the self-enclosed character of subjectivity. Thus faith does not lead beyond itself to a more developed or higher degree of philosophical understanding. The ethical interpretation of religion reinforces this, since the absolute good remains an ought without objectivity (ibid. 596). To sum up this point we may say that Hegel's presentation of faith contains two elements: he incorporates into his presentation some of the features of faith according to KANT. But at the same time he integrates the subjective character of faith into the realm of spirit, which enables him to go beyond the stage of faith, a step obviously lacking in the KANTian system.

5.

We may turn not to analysis of an additional aspect, that of happiness. The postulate to reach happiness against the background of moral worthiness is part of the KANTian theory, having its bearing on the trans-empirical aspects of morality and eventually upon the position of God. Again, Hegel in a sense accepts KANT's description of the component of happiness though here and there the nuances change. For instance, Hegel says that happiness is a mixed-up *(verworren)* representation of the satisfaction of all urges (*Heidelberger Enz.* § 396). In happiness, there is a congruence *(Übereinstimmung)* of the

eternal aspect of reality with the inner determination of man which amounts to pleasure and happiness (*Phil. Prop.* 77).

Yet at the same time we find in Hegel a kind of reservation vis-à-vis the element of happiness, related to the distinction between happiness and well-being *(Wohl).* Hegel says that happiness is to be distinguished from well-being in the sense that the former is immediate existence but the latter is represented as justified in relation to morality, (*Enz.* § 505; transl. 303). This aspect is reinforced when Hegel speaks about happiness as the satisfaction of the goals of finitude (*Phil. d. Rechts.* § 122; transl. 82ff). We could look, perhaps, at the distinction between happiness and well-being as a terminological distinction only, not unrelated to KANT's placement of happiness beyond the boundaries of the empirical achievement of man. KANT, as we have seen, points to the relation between happiness and human desires. Hegel, apparently recognizing that relationship, suggests the term "well-being" in order to point beyond finitude and thus indirectly beyond the urges; this new term is called for in order to place satisfaction in the legitimizing context of morality. Indeed, a person can only be described as happy from the point of view of his individual existence according to his individual character and will. Hegel too introduces here the aspect of history, which is beyond the boundaries of the individual and his satisfactions and thus not the proper soil for happiness. History can present happiness as occurring only on empty pages in those periods characterized by lack of opposition and contradiction (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 56). In a sense, the emphasis on world-history can be seen as an emphasis on the empirical world in which human beings live. Obviously it is not by accident that Hegel mentions the extra-individual aspect of history regarding happiness, since historical reality has also to be brought into the context of human expectations and their relationship to human urges. The distinction between the individual boundaries of man and the collective boundaries of history can perhaps be seen as a concession made by Hegel for the sake of individual happiness. However, in so doing, he turns the accidental aspect of the particular into the principle of will and its activity. At this point Hegel mentions KANT's theory of practical reason in opposition to the eudemonistic principle. KANT places over against eudemonism, which would open the door to every arbitrariness, practical reason and the demand for a universal principle which as such would easily be binding for all human beings (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 153-54). On this issue Hegel seems to agree with KANT, yet we could say that his interpretation of what is universal and universally binding differs from that of KANT. Again we would find a reiteration of the difference between legislative reason and the spirit, pointing to history or to world-history as lying outside and beyond the sphere of the individual. By the same token, happiness too lies beyond the individual sphere.

6.

A reinforcement of this element is found in Hegel's conception of the individual as incomplete spirit; the individual has to go through the stages of formation of the universal spirit (*Phän.* 30-31). Hegel is not satisfied with the KANTian thesis that human goals are achieved on the level of species and not of the individual, because he sees it as leading from the subjectivity of the individual to that of the species; the species is not only the locus of realization, but also the negation of the individual. That negation takes the shape of the disappearance of the individual, i. e., going over into the existence of the universal is the death of the individual (*Enz.* § 367). To be sure, the ideal is to bring about the conformity of a particular individuality and substance (*Ästh.* Bd 1. 248). But just the same, since Hegel relates happiness to the individual we may wonder whether happiness can become also and at the same time the goal of human beings, trans-empirically speaking. There are two ways to look at this: one is from the point of view of the historical process which as such points to the situation beyond happiness; the other would be from the point of view of the cognitive or speculative element embodied in philosophy which as such would go beyond satisfaction taken in the sense of coalescence of human expectations and their fulfilment. The point of view of the speculative element is obviously not the satisfaction or our wants and urges but rather the PLATONIC, ARISTOTELian or SPINOZIST interpretation of happiness in terms of intellectual awareness and cognition in its highest form.

7.

Some comments are called for now regarding Hegel's interpretation of human urges or passions. Animals possess urges but not rational will (*Phil. Prop.* 39, 26). Looking at urges from the human point of view, they are — what Hegel calls — natural self-determination. They involve limited feelings and have a limited goal. They depend on the one hand on the inner activity of the agent but, on the other, on external circumstances which, as such, are accidental. Yet since reflection accompanies every stage of human action, reflection goes beyond the urges and their limitations. Hence Hegel speaks about the certainty inherent in the urge: the subjective is only one-sided and thus lacks truth. In this sense there is a parallelism between that which is objective only and that which is subjective only. But inherent in the urge — and this is clearly in accordance with the basic trend of the system — is the overcoming of the opposition both from the subjective and from the objective end. We find already in the passions and the activity prompted by them a step beyond the position of the subject, or, in subjectivity we identify the content of objectivity (*Enz.* § 475). This may put into question KANT's position as to the essence of happiness, which is meant to elevate the passions

to the level of universality when happiness itself is legitimized by its grounding in morality. We encounter here two aspects: a) the urges along with other manifestations of subjectivity are of a particular or individual character. Against this, universality comes to the fore, b) the urges along with other manifestations of subjectivity have inherent in themselves the direction towards universality, though they themselves can never be translated into universal dimensions. But if this is so then the question of the possible harmonization of the expectations regarding the particular and the universal is brought into question, once universality is understood as spirit and not as containing in itself aspects of satisfaction — the meaning of satisfaction be what it may. In any case, universality is not linked to subjective aspirations but to the realization of the inherent structure of the spirit or of the rhythm of the history of the world. Coming back to comparison with KANT, we may say that the aspired harmony of passions and universality which would defer happiness to the trans-empirical existence of the soul cannot be maintained in Hegel's system.

8.

Hegel, as KANT, points to the relationship between the immortality of the soul and God. Yet the reasons for this relationship are quite different in the two systems. Hegel sees the relationship between man's awareness of his particularity and the notion of immortality. In the assumption — or expectation — of immortality man goes beyond his particularity and his singular characteristic features. In this context we are able to understand Hegel's view that when man knows God truly he also knows himself truly — and immortality is related to that self-knowledge of man (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 95). What would this reference to the knowledge of God mean in the context? It probably means that God is the absolute spirit, or one of its manifestations as it is sometimes expressed in religion. Therefore immortality has to be seen within the context of the absolute spirit and not only within that of man's particular existence. Immortality is related to continuity and time, but also to the self-consciousness of the spirit which is characterized as the eternal and absolute movement inherent in eternal life (ibid. 89). Here again the immortality of man is related to the absolute framework of human existence which, as such, goes beyond the boundaries of human existence, i. e., towards the absolute spirit. Immortality cannot be seen just in the context of human aspirations and their fulfilment as KANT had it, but in the objective context to which human beings do belong. One of the manifestations of their belonging to this objective sphere is immortality as everlasting presence within the absolute structure. Thus, KANT attempts to maintain immortality within the individual scope while Hegel goes beyond individuality. It is obvious that all these aspects are bound to be relevant for the interpretations of religion in both

systems. Before going into this, let us mention that the notion of holiness in Hegel is related to the whole direction of his system: the holy can be only the spirit in its truth, the same applying also to the eternal. Hence, as holy we can name only that which is rational *(vernünftig)* and which knows of rationality (*Enz.* § 441). Holiness is related to reason and not to will, a distinction which is central for both systems — the distinction which we have followed in its various transformations. At one point Hegel quotes GOETHE who said that the holy is that which binds many souls. This is indeed a telling reference. It does not relate holiness to an exclusive entity above finite existence, or to an entity where there is no chasm between existence and will. It identifies holiness with that which binds together *(zusammenhält; Ästh.* Bd 2. 276) a view which points to the trend of the system and to Hegel's own attempt to integrate traditional religious notions into the transformations brought about by and present in his system.

9.

At this juncture we have to consider Hegel's interpretation of the essence of evil, an issue which is, as we have seen, of central significance in KANT's exposition of the nature of religion. In the first place, we may wonder whether Hegel means to maintain KANT's distinction between the ill *(das Übel)* and the evil *(das Böse)*, when he says that the ill is nothing else but the lack of congruence of being to the ought (*Enz.* § 472; transl. 370). This sounds like a formal definition of the ill, rendered in KANTian terms and employing even two familiar concepts: being and the ought. To use an example of KANT's, we can say that one ought to be free from pain, but that ought does not bear a moral connotation. Hence we shall concentrate on the notion of evil proper and point out some fundamental differences between Hegel and KANT.

KANT, as we have seen, presents evil as the evil choice, whereby a person opts for his natural desires. This view presupposes the distinction between that which is natural and that which is grounded in free will. Evil amounts to a choice which instead of turning the will toward the rational imperative, turns it towards the natural urges and does it by a motivation grounded in the person's spontaneity. In KANT, the desires and urges thus favoured are natural, sensuous ones; in Hegel, however, the emphasis is on their particularity. Hence Hegel sees them as co-terminous with one's self-being (*Phil. Prop.* § 27, 108). He says that in the satisfaction of desire the stage of self-feeling is reached, which amounts to the being for itself of the subject. Thus we could say that the desires have, as their inherent quality, the isolation of the particular, which is in this case the particular individual. The urging or desiring self-consciousness is the first stage in the development of self-consciousness, which, in Hegel's philosophy, is undergoing a development in order to reach the peak of total self-consciousness. From the terminological point of

view it is important to stress that Hegel does not use the term "naturalness" or "sensuality" but immediacy (*Enz.* § 427; transl. 276). Though thematically one could assume that the "immediate" and the "natural" coalesce, from the systematic point of view it is significant that the urges are placed on the level of immediacy and thus exposed to the process of mediation which leads self-consciousness beyond itself. Thus, instead of the KANTian dichotomy between the sensuous and the rational, the process itself becomes central and as such leads from immediacy to mediation. This lack of dichotomy, to put it negatively, is bound to find its manifestation in the analysis of the essence of evil, as KANT's dichotomy finds its manifestation in the interpretation of evil as an option for the sensuous element of human nature as fundamentally distinct from the duties and imperatives of reason.

Indeed, Hegel locates evil within the inter-relationship between one's particularity versus that of another individual and concurrently of one's particularity versus the universal. Within that inter-relation we find that particularity relates to universality as a direction of and out of its own motion. But it does happen that this particularity is isolated from the comprising universality, in which case the detached particularity is evil, the overt expression of which is hypocrisy (*Heuchelei; Phän.* 506). Here again, the step towards the resolution of the difference between the particular and the universal amounts to the integration of the particular into the universal without erasing the former, and placing it, as it were, outside itself. In religious terms the characteristic feature of evil is the alienation from God insofar as the particular, according to its own freedom, separates itself from the universal (*Phil. Prop.* § 78, 98). It is the nature of evil that it rests in itself and is thereby opposed to the good. In dialectical terms, Hegel describes evil as the positive negativity (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 543). Positive negativity has to be understood as the self-assertion of the moment of negating the universal and comprising essence which is reality. It is not enough to say in SPINOZA's terms that evil amounts to that which is nothing (*das Nichtige; Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 112), since what is inherent in evil is the affirmation of what is of a negative character, which as such is not tantamount to nothingness.

In a way, we find a parallelism between KANT's and Hegel's presentation of evil. One can easily find correspondence between sensuality and particularity on the one hand, and reason and universality on the other. Still, the difference is not merely terminological, because of the structure of involvement which is central to Hegel's system. The immediate element involves and is sublated in the universal. Thus, the overcoming of evil as an isolated particularity is not to be seen as dependent on the option; it is to be seen as dependent on the exposition of that which is already potentially present in the evil. Hence, Hegel's interpretation of evil softens, as it were, the essence and supposition of it. As such it has to be seen not in terms of will but in terms of what we encounter on the level of particularity — before being immersed in

the process of evolvement which is the process characteristic both of reality and consciousness. KANT, in his emphasis on the relationship between evil and the decision of choice, internalized the evil, as it were, by placing it within the option of the will. Hegel does not follow that line since he starts with the particular, which means that he starts with the evil in so far as the particular remains enclosed within its own boundaries.

This interpretation of evil has its bearing on Hegel's interpretation of sin and original sin. For instance, when Hegel deals with the interpretation of sin in the Jewish religion, he points to the essence of sin as amounting to the position of the individual who maintains himself in his finitude vis-à-vis God. He adds an important point, that the maintenance of this finitude is grounded in will and intention. Moreover he says in this context that evil and sin are to be attributed to the natural aspect of the individual man (*Ästh.* Bd 1. 500). We notice that Hegel uses here the term "natural". But in spite of this he does not bring his description of sin beyond the context of man's finitude vis-à-vis God; finitude can be seen here as co-terminous with the moment of immediacy. Parallel to the position of sin is the concept of conciliation *(Versöhnung)* which is the unification of the infinite opposition between finitude and God (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 2. 336). Hegel hints at what he considers to be the essence of Christianity, where all sins can be forgiven except the sin against the spirit. This seems to be significant because sin itself is opposition to the spirit; once a particular person deliberately remains in this opposition he defies the effort to step over the boundaries of his particularity. This is again expressed in terms not entirely different from the KANTian terminology: the human being ought not to be natural. According to true theology — which probably refers here to Christianity — the human being is by nature evil. The evil consists in remaining in that naturality out of which man has to step freely with his own will (ibid. 76). Yet this interpretation of original sin or the fall differs from KANT's because the latter did not suggest the identification of natural existence and sin. He took the concept — the religious one — of sin as anticipating the concept of evil in the strict ethical sense of the term, because he related sin or evil to will. Hegel identifies natural existence with sin and emphasizes the significance of will in terms of one's emancipation from natural existence, and not in terms of one's free adoption of the natural level of existence. The difference between these two interpretations if grounded in the bases of the two systems, the one which accepts duality as an ultimate datum, and the other which, by introducing the notion of process, tries to overcome the *prima facie* duality.

10.

Moving now to the interpretation of religion in the full sense, we realize that the difference between the KANTian and Hegelian systems which we have observed is indeed prominent.

The characteristic quality of religion is the relation to the absolute in the form of feeling, representation *(Vorstellung)*, or faith (*Phil. d. Rechts.* § 270; transl. 166). We can look at religion from two angles, the first being what can be called the manifestation of content and the second being the content itself. From the point of view of content, religion is the stage of the spirit in which the speculative content in general is the object of consciousness (ibid. § 66; transl. 50). Two aspects have to be emphasized in this context: a) religion relates to the speculative content. The speculative content is perhaps an interpretation only, an object or an object only; religion does not reach as yet the awareness of the identity between consciousness and the content (ibid.). This leads to the placement of religion within the system of speculation because we start with the concept of religion (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 77 ff), and not with speculation in the proper — philosophical — sense of the term. The distance between consciousness and its content is a more immediate stage in the evolvement of speculation than the full identity between the two. b) The second aspect is that of the manifestation, namely that the consciousness of the absolute content or spirit is manifest in feeling, representation and faith — the three modes of manifestation to which we referred earlier.

Sometimes, for the sake of underscoring its singular mode of manifestation, Hegel says that religion is bound to be *felt.* Unless it appears in the feelings it is not religion at all (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 2. 385). When Hegel brings to the fore the moral aspect of religion by saying that the principle of religious or moral consciousness is the same (*Enz.* § 552) he attempts to integrate ethical life into religion. He does this not only in order to come to grips with different moments of human existence but also in order to emphasize what seems to him a very significant aspect of religion, namely, its public character. This aspect has several significant expressions which we will now consider.

In the first place, religion is the locus of a people's definition of what it holds as truth (*Phil. d. Gesch.* § 4). This points to the relationship of people and religion. Hegel probably assumed that religion is the manifestation of the spirit having the greatest affinity to what we would call the popular understanding. Religion is a truth for all people, as he says (*Enz.* § 573) and this may be so because of the fact that religion is grounded in what Hegel calls the testimony of the spirit. We can assume that this testimony is the spirit being for something which is different from itself; revelation is immediate knowledge *(Wissen; Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 544); it is a manifestation in terms of testimony pointing to the presence of the spirit in human consciousness, but by the same token different from it. Thus this mode of manifestation

makes religion more accessible to the people than other modes of the exposition of the spirit.

The aspect of presence and manifestation in the people is re-emphasized in the relation pertaining between the state and religion. As the state is a manifestation of the spirit, so is religion; and as the state is an open or public manifestation of the spirit so is religion a manifestation of the spirit for the public (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 84-85). Hegel adds to this characterization the aspect of obedience — on the one hand obedience vis-à-vis the duke *(Fürst)* and the law and on the other hand obedience to God expressed in the fear of God. Within the state with its constitution, religion is the treasury of the moral law (ibid. 86) and from this point of view it adds to the structure of the state as public. This cannot make us oblivious to the fact, however, that there can be a difference between the state and religion, a difference which finds expression in the fact that the demand of religion refers to holiness while that of the state refers to law and ethical life.

In terms of the broad understanding of religion as viewed in the context of the relationship of consciousness to absolute content, religion is precisely that in which man searches for the ground of his lack of independence (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 330). We can add, interpreting Hegel, that the very notions of creation and the creature-feeling of man point to that lack of independence: creation as bringing about the existence of the world amounts to the position that the eternal but abstract spirit becomes something different from itself and thus appears in immediate existence (*Phän.* 387). In the representation *(Vorstellung)* of the creation, God remains for himself and the world is placed at the other end. The contact between the two ends is not to be seen as a form of necessity. In this sense, creation as such has to remain unintelligible *(unbegreiflich; Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 159). Hence it can be said that the notion of creation points to the distance between the world and God as creator — man as belonging to the world remains within the boundaries of that distance. Hence, again, religion referring to man's lack of independence leads man by the same token to tranquility *(Beruhigung)* since man has before himself the infinite (ibid. 330). We can sum up this, shall we say, phenomenological description of religion by saying that religion represents a two-faceted manifestation of the spirit: the fundamental affinity between man and God and the distance between them. The distance in turn can be thematic as for instance in Judaism,[59] the religion of sublimity, which maintains the chasm between man and God; or it can be representational, since religion does not express its substance in an adequate form, that is in concepts or ideas, but in representations *(Vorstellungen)* which are not the highest — that is to say adequate — level of consciousness from the subjective point of view.

[59] The author's book *The Recurring Pattern.* 48 ff. deals with that aspect of Hegel's system.

This characterization of religion opens paths in two directions, one of which can be called the immanent one, that is the development of religions themselves, and the other which can be called the transcending direction, namely the transition from religion to philosophy. Unlike KANT, Hegel takes the history of religion "seriously"; since every type of religious consciousness represents a stage in the development of the self-consciousness of the spirit, the stages cannot be swept away. They have to be integrated and sublated in the ultimate stage, either within the scope of religion itself, or beyond it up to the highest manifestation of absolute spirit, i. e. philosophy. This acknowledgement of the philosophical significance of the process of history is due to the fact that what we are makes us at the same time historical. The self-conscious rationality characteristic of the contemporary world, as Hegel says, did not emerge immediately. It is a heritage, and the result of the work done by all previous generations of mankind (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 28).

This processive or historical dimension of Hegel's position has been rightly summed up as saying that perfection is only perfectability, that is to say, it is only possible as a process of perfection.[60] Precisely that aspect of Hegel's system changes the KANTian view as to the stages of religion including the distinction between the visible and the invisible church; it changes also the relationship between reason and religion in so far as reason is already present in the historical religions. On the level of philosophy proper reason becomes explicit, while on the level of religion there is a kind of built-in discrepancy between substance qua reason and its manifestation qua faith in its various forms. Because of the inherent presence of reason and its manifestations, from which it differs, Hegel integrates into his philosophical interpretation of religion another aspect present also in KANT. We shall now be concerned with this aspect.

11.

The evaluation of cult in religion in general and in specific religions in particular is one of the major differences between the systems of KANT and Hegel. We could say that for KANT cult is part of the visible church and, as such, cannot be integrated into the invisible church, let alone into religion within the bounds of reason. Hegel's position is fundamentally different, probably from two considerations: a) cult is viewed in the context of external expression or manifestation which is, for Hegel, essential to the very nature of the spirit, b) history is one of those manifestations and at the same time a bridge towards the self-establishment of the absolute spirit. Cult is a historical phenomenon and as such has to be integrated into the scope of the essence of religion

[60] *Manfred Riedel: Fortschritt und Dialektik in Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie.* Neue Rundschau 1969. 476 ff.

though, at the same time, has to be sublated along with the elevation of religion to the level of philosophy.

To reiterate: Hegel's description of faith starts with the emphasis on feeling. Feeling is by definition an inner element of the consciousness. Once the cogitation *(Nachdenken)* of feeling emerges, the step is taken towards external manifestation in general and of feeling in particular. Indeed, Hegel says that cult is an externalization of the cogitation *(Nachdenken; Phil. d. Gesch.* 83). Concurrently we find in the essence of cult a mode of a meeting between man and God. The empirical consciousness uplifts man who gives to his consciousness and feeling the awareness of the presence of the divine element in himself as well as of his unity with it (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 2. 126). In other words, we discern in cult that the consciousness achieves awareness of the descent of the divine essence from its "outworldliness". Thus, what has been understood as being unreal and objective only, gains through the act of cult a reality which is proper for self-consciousness (*Phän.* 545). That which was involved in a duality becomes formed and becomes a living process by means of cult (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 85). In this sense, cult is the process of the subject positing himself as identical with his own essence. In one sense we can view that process as a self-identification of the subject; at the same time, this self-identification is a process leading to the integration of the subject in the spirit, or to the full manifestation of — together with the integration of the subject into the spirit. It is significant that Hegel mentions in this context both evil and the immortality of the soul. The subject, who through cult enters into relationship with the absolute spirit, cannot be viewed as totally evil. The same applies, with all the differences, to the representation of the immortality of the soul, since in and through cult the subject is already involved in a relationship with the spirit. Hence the eternal and absolute moment takes on the new meaning of eternal life (ibid. 89). This is reinforced by the statement that cult is the movement of God to man and of man to God (ibid. 256). This aspect of the essence of cult makes it implausible — and impossible — to assume that cult is only an external presentation of a sort of sum-total of external rites and ceremonies — the position KANT took. To be sure, cult traditionally entails adoration. But, since KANT rendered adoration in terms of respect for the moral law, workship as such has been neutralized — something wich we could present as a kind of play on words: KANT points to culture and not to cult, while the two words refer to the same Latin root *"colo"*.

Along with the significance of cult for Hegel, it must be emphasized that the historical development of cult is concomitant with the development of the representation of God. Cults differ when God is understood either as a unity of the natural and spiritual moments or as an absolute unity of a spiritual character (ibid. 240-1). The historical character of cult emphasizes, of course, the historical character of religion. It also makes it impossible

to degrade cult as a phenomenon which runs counter to the very rational essence of religion, as KANT understood it. In Hegel's eyes religions have to be understood both in their basic essence as well as in their historical manifestation. That is to say that if the spirit is a dialectical sublation of dualities, there is a sublation of duality already in the sphere of cult, though to be sure not the ultimate sublation.

12.

As a correlate to his evaluation of cult, we find in Hegel an evaluation of the church that differs from that of KANT. To be sure, the church is listed among mundane existences *(Dasein)* and as such it is an external existence which cannot but be placed vis-à-vis other external existences qua religions (*Phil. d. Gesch.* 425). But again, an external existence is an essential step towards the full manifestation of the spirit and thus cannot be negated. It is the preparation of the individual for eternity as future, since individual subjects are always implicated in their particularity. But the church, at the same time, has the spirit of God present in itself, whereby Hegel adds at this point that the church forgives the sinner and is the present *(gegenwärtig)* kingdom of Heaven (ibid. 438). There are no jumps from the individual to the absolute spirit, but only processes of mediation. Hegel finds one of the characteristic features of Christianity in the principle of mediation and Christ as its manifestation (ibid. 479). Hence we can say that both cult and church are characterized as mediators, and this is also the justification of their presence. That mode of presence is eventually sublated in the self-conscious essence of the spirit but, just the same, as embodying a stage in the process the cult and the church cannot be taken to be of secondary significance. Their transitional elements do not turn them into secondary or just external aspects of the essence of religion.

There is a difference between the historical manifestations of religion and the absolute religion which in turn becomes a step towards the philosophical understanding of the absolute spirit. Hegel plays, as it were, with two meanings of manifestation or revelation: manifest *(offenbar)* where the meaning of manifest is a religion having itself the meaning as its content or fulfilment; the revealed *(offenbare)* which is religion in the traditional sense of the term, namely that God gave himself to the knowledge of man. The latter is a positive religion, so called since it comes to man from outside of him (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 2. 193). The first sense *(offenbar)* refers to manifestation within religion itself because of its spiritual character. The second sense *(offenbare)* refers to revelation as a divine word which is a special occurrence. In terms of the immanent structure of Hegel's system, the first meaning is the more congenial. Yet the recognition of the historical dimension leads Hegel to the acceptance of revealed religion, as tradition has interpreted it. Hegel is

aware of the fact that the Bible has been interpreted in different ways according to the mode of thinking of each historical period; the first interpretation differs totally from those prevailing now (ibid. 198). Here too the recognition of these variations does not make the various interpretations secondary. We have to distinguish again the historical as traditional from the historical as obsolescent. To be sure, the absolute religion is the religion of truth and freedom (ibid. 207). Speaking now from the philosophical point of view, the understanding of the idea as divine self-revelation (ibid. 221) is probably already pointing to the presence of truth and freedom within the absolute spirit, though its essence in terms of truth and freedom is not manifested as yet in philosophical exposition, in the proper sense of the term.

Religion is placed, along with art on the one hand and philosophy on the other, on the level of the absolute spirit. Both art and philosophy have historical dimensions. Historicity or processuality cannot be viewed as exclusive characteristic features of either of these manifestations of the absolute spirit. The characteristic feature is the way substance or content is becoming manifest in terms of the stages of mind. Religion is characterized by its manifestation in representation *(Vorstellung)*. We have to observe here that KANT understood representation as a generic concept which as such comprises all the modifications of the soul *(Gemüt)*. He then distinguished between different rungs of representation, for instance the modification of the condition of a subject, and also the objective perception which is knowledge and as such, either intuition *(Anschauung)* or concept. In a sense, Hegel confines the meaning of representation to the first form of the spirit knowing itself. As such the spirit is related to the revealed religion — and in the essential sense of the term, not the historical one. Hegel also relates the spirit becoming conscious of itself to a form of representing to a society or congregation. It is only an in-between stage leading to self-consciousness whose characteristic feature is that representing is not conceiving *(begreiffend)* — where conceiving is obviously related to the concept (*Phän.* 581). The distinction between representation and thinking must be maintained even though in everyday life the two are intermingled. In representation we have the thing before us according to its external and inessential existence, whereas in thinking we separate from the external and inessential (*Phil. Prop.* 35-36). Yet it has been noted that representation is that stage of the spirit in which the presence of the object becomes apparent; the relationship between that stage and religion is perhaps that representation lifts up the feelings to that which is felt *(das Gefühlte;* ibid. 201) making it germane to faith which is grounded in feeling. The presence on the horizon of that which is felt makes representation again germane to religion in as much as religion refers in the first place to the difference and distance of the subjectivity from that which is above it. To be sure, representations of objects appear prior to the thinking spirit. But the latter goes through representations in order to reach the level of thinking which is knowledge and con-

ception in the strict sense. Here Hegel introduces the additional aspect that representations can be looked upon as metaphors of thoughts and concepts (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II, 44). Metaphors appear also, or mainly, within the orbit of art. It is only a mode of comparison and is commonly present in linguistic expression (*Ästh.* Bd 1. 533). We could say, enlarging upon Hegel's description, that even the representative manifestation of the spirit in cult and rite has some affinity with metaphor. Hegel describes representation as a recalled intuition *(erinnerte Anschauung; Enz.* § 451). He probably would emphasize both elements: the recollection points, negatively speaking, to the lack of an immediate impression; the intuition would point to the lack of concept, and thus again representations are the in-between position in relation to intuitions on the one hand and concepts or ideas on the other. This is emphasized by the additional feature of representation whereby it already carries in itself the determination or the universal (*des Allgemeinen; Enz.* § 408); though again that determination does not take the shape of concept or ideas. Because of the nature of representation, the object is within the consciousness; it is in me or is mine (*der Meinige ist; Phil. d. Rechts.* § 210; transl. 166). This makes representation again a germane manifestation from the point of view of religion, because in religion we are aware of the position of the object in our consciousness even before the total synthesis has been brought about.

There exists an affinity between representation and the image *(Bild)* of God (ibid. 154). But precisely this leads to the conclusion that the absolute true idea, i. e. the idea of God, cannot be conceived as an image. Religions waver between adherence to the proper concept and its inadequate presentation, which in turn emphasizes the in-between position of religion. This is so because representation cannot be taken as totally free from sensuous aspects, which become explicit in religious representations like the anguish of God, atonement, vengeance, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, also in the Christian concept of the son, and his role in creation (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 1. 151). Hegel describes representation as a permanent state of lack of tranquility *(beständige Unruhe)* placed between immediate sensuous intuition and thought in the proper sense (ibid. 156). Perhaps this metaphoric description of "lack of tranquility" makes representation akin to historical development, that is to say, that different religions use different representations — though in an ascending order leading to the absolute religion, which is still not identical with philosophy. What is characteristic of philosophy as opposed to religion is that truth takes the form of truth (ibid. 166). Thus there is an adequacy between the essence and its manifestation and that adequacy turns the circle, as it were, around itself. In this sense manifestation in representation refers to God as content under the form of simplicity (ibid. 168) and obviously as such, is to be overcome or sublated. In thought, exemplified by philosophy, the various elements, for instance man as free and dependent, good and evil, are put into a context of inter-relation

or inter-action (ibid. 169). To be sure, representation is more concrete than the abstraction of understanding. The task before philosophy is to find an ideational manifestation which will exhibit the concreteness, in order to obviate the dichotomy between concreteness and abstractness. Thus philosophy is carried forward not by understanding *(Verstand)* but by reason *(Vernunft),* and finds its expression in speculation which is the positive aspect of reason and as such of the spiritual essence (*Werke.* Bd 3. 313). The affinity between speculation and religion is preserved: what is true is only the mysterious element of religion, and the mysteries of religion are its speculative aspects (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 111-2). The nature of the speculative is to face the opposition and to dissolve it (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 656).

13.

At this juncture we might make a few observations about the differences between KANT and Hegel and their systematic validity. KANT reduces religion to ethics; Hegel sublates religion into speculation but by so doing, in accordance with the direction of his system, he attempts to present what might be described as a phenomenology of religion or religions. By the same token he presents a mode of justification of religion or religions. The most significant feature of Hegel's presentation of religion is his emphasis on the duality of finitude and infinite which is eventually sublated in the infinite and, as expressed in the spirit, becomes a superior manifestation of itself carried out in philosophy. It cannot be disregarded that Hegel tries to describe and define the various historical religions as different interpretations of the opposition between the finite and the infinite. Judaism, for instance, maintains that duality and is thus the religion of sublimity. Christianity attempts to overcome that duality and thus is close to the notion or identity, which in turn makes Christianity the absolute religion. Just the same, the contours of the finite and the infinite are explicitly or implicitly present in the various historical religions. In this sense, though every system is a sort of construction, Hegel seems to be closer than KANT to religion both phenomenologically and historically. The same applies to the societal aspect which as such is related to the cultic aspect. Since Hegel took the systematic position that an inner essence is bound to find its external manifestation, he was able to identify an external element characteristic of religions, that is to say, cult. While KANT took what can be called — we shall refer to it later — fetishism as a kind of typological aspect of historical religions, namely the observance of statutory laws inherent in devotion to God, Hegel looks at fetishism as a historical phenomenon present in what he calls the stage of immediate religion present in the Negro peoples.

The main difference between KANT and Hegel lies in KANT's attempt to see religion, so to speak, one-dimensionally, in its ethical component which becomes explicit in religion within the bounds of reason. Hegel attempts to see

religion in its variety. He does that in spite of, or perhaps because, he recognizes the historical aspects of religions as well as their ultimate goal within philosophy and speculation. It is the difference in their respective interpretations of philosophy which brings about the difference in KANT's and Hegel's evaluations of religion. The distinction made by KANT between philosophy of nature on the one hand and the philosophy of ethical life on the other, without synthesizing the two, prompted him to place religion in either one or the other sphere. It is evident that the only way he saw open was to place it within the orbit of the philosophy of the ethical life which prescribed that which ought to be. This is to be amplified by the notion that philosophy is a science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential objectives of human reason; since those objectives are of a moral character religion is to be placed within the moral sphere.

Hegel takes a different attitude from the very beginning, namely the attitude of synthesis. Therefore he could not place religion in one or another sphere. Since the synthesis is both point of departure and ultimate objective, religion is placed within the context of synthesis, thus comprising more than one element, i. e. that of morality. To express it differently: KANT understood human reason as being in its nature architectonic, that is to say, that all cognitions are understood as belonging to a possible (*KdrV* 502; transl. 429). We should emphasize here the *possible* and not the *actual* system. Philosophy as a cosmic concept (*KdrV* 866; transl. 657) distinct from the systematic unity appropriate to science is related to the teleology of human reason. KANT thought that this description of philosophy is an idea only; it would vainglorious to entitle oneself philosopher and to pretend to have equalled the pattern which exists in the idea alone (*KdrV* 867; transl. 658). Hegel overcame this hesitation, and by the same token enabled himself to come to grips with the variety of the phenomena and see them in a more integrated mode than did KANT.

We can summarize by noting that there is a paradoxical situation in a comparison of the two systems: in terms of the delineation of cognition versus ethics, KANT has an overhand compared with Hegel because he is closer in his interpretation to the inner structure of the two respective spheres. Yet Hegel has the overhand in terms of interpretation of religion or religions precisely because his system enables him to provide room, at least, for different phenomena, including the phenomenon of religion as such and that of historical religions as well. Hegel makes a step towards a kind of immanent interpretation of what we call religious consciousness. This enables him to deal with religion as a phenomenon *sui generis* and not as one immersed in the ethical sphere.[61]

[61] Consult: *Emil L. Fackenheim: The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought.* Bloomington, London 1967.

Chapter Seven
RELIGION AND ITS MISPLACEMENT

1.

Having dealt with KANT's and Hegel's conceptions of religion it is justified to make a further step in analysing the variations on the notion of fetish and prejudice. This analysis is part of the exploration of religion and religious manifestations. But, at least in KANT, it is also related to the difference between morality and legality; religion proper is for KANT mainly a moral phenomenon. Hence the confusion between religion and legality has tc be viewed, if at all, as an inferior manifestation of historical religions. Thus a connection between legality and the historical stage of religions is pointed to as the stage which precedes religion of reason. Since for Hegel religions are by definition historical and religion of reason ceases to be religion and becomes philosophy — the historical dimension e. g. of fetishism, is bound to be integrated differently from the interpretation put forward by KANT. We move now to an exploration of that — negative — aspect of historical religions in KANT. We shall try to present a comparative exposition of Hegel's view versus that of KANT. The introduction of MARX into the scope of the exploration is dictated by the surprising affinity — phenomenological though not thematic — between him and KANT.

2.

It is an established fact that the terms "fetish" and "fetishism" are etymologically related to the Portuguese term *"fetico"* which, in turn, is derived from the Latin root *"facere"*. The term was introduced in order to articulate the basic notion that some objects of worship were artificially contrived and are essentially tools which became objects of adoration or religious reverence. In this sense the notion of fetish and fetishism is traced to the book of C. DE BROSSES, *Du Culte des Dieux Fétiches,* of 1760. To be sure, in terms of historical, comparative or systematic interpretation of the phenomenon of fetish it is not entirely clear whether the reference is only to tools as artifacts or also to natural objects, as e. g. trees, turned into idols, or even some basic elements of

nature, as AUGUSTE COMTE presumed when he interpreted the sun, the moon and the earth in a certain stage of religious development as *"grand fétiches"*. We mention these questions, leaving them aside in order to delineate the context of our study which refers to a minor issue in KANT's terminology; but, as it is assumed here, the exploration of the issue will show that it is more significant than its fragmentary appearance in KANT could suggest. Let us recall that KANT's *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* appeared first in 1792, that is to say, rather shortly after the term was introduced into the vocabulary of comparative study of religion. KANT incorporated the term, and gave it a systematic interpretation which calls for an analysis.

3.

We shall first mention the broader terminological and systematic context present in KANT's exposition, namely the notion of *Aberglaube* (superstition). According to KANT, the passivity of reason and consequently the heteronomy of reason, is the genus of prejudice. Superstitition appears within that genus and is described by KANT as the greatest of all prejudices. It lies in "fancying nature not to be subject to rules which understanding by virtue of its essential law lays as its basis" (... *sich die Natur Regeln, welche der Verstand ihr durch sein eigenes wesentliches Gesetz zum Grunde legt, als nicht unterworfen vorzustellen...; KdU* § 40, 294; transl. 152). If we analyse this definition or description of superstition, we notice to what extent it is related to the basic premises of KANT's system. Superstitition is a failure to understand that nature is subject to the rule of *Verstand* and thus does not occupy an independent position. The fact that nature is, as it were, wrongly interpreted turns the interpretation into a superstition. It is because of that relationship pertaining between the autonomy of reason and superstition that KANT classifies superstition as a kind of prejudice, while prejudice in turn presupposes the notion or attitude of the passivity of reason or its heteronomy. When reason is subjugated to a domain outside itself it engenders prejudice and eventually becomes implicated in superstition. Superstition, as KANT says, deserves to be called pre-eminently, *in sensu eminenti*, a prejudice. Hence the process of establishing understanding or reason in its proper position, namely in its autonomy as opposed to the heteronomy, is for KANT enlightenment, defined in turn as emancipation from superstition. KANT's broad view of enlightenment as *sapere aude*, as emancipation from self-tutelage, etc. is focused in a sense on the dichotomy between superstition implying heteronomy of reason and enlightenment implying its autonomy. Hence he amplifies the dichotomy between reason being passive and reason being self-legislative — and legislation of reason is the *Leitmotiv* of our exploration.

Fetishism too is, as we shall now see, placed by KANT in the context of dichotomy between heteronomy and autonomy of reason. The adoration of that which has been made by man and thus is estranged from him is for KANT the phenomenon of fetishism. Precisely at this point KANT gives to the phenomenon the specific innuendo which is grounded in his system.

4.

Since we place the exploration of KANT's version of fetishism in the context of superstition, it is apposite to insert a comment on superstition as it appears in HUME's writings. HUME says that superstition is founded on fear, sorrow and a depression of spirits.

Superstition is a considerable ingredient in almost all religions and is favourable to priestly power: the stronger the mixture of superstition, the higher the authority of priesthood.[62] Elsewhere HUME says that superstition arises naturally and easily from the popular opinions of mankind.[63] In his attempt to analyse the historical origins of religion, placing them, as is well known, in polytheism as the primary religion of man, HUME comes back to the issue of superstition by way of his interpretation of the primitive religion being in his own words "the religion of uninstructed mankind".[64] According to HUME, the first ideas of religion arose not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with the events of life. These in turn are understood by HUME as incessant hopes and fears which, in his own words, "actuate the human mind". Because of the relation between different events of life and their changing character, the human response qua superstition is related to ages and periods of the lives of the individuals and the sexes, women being more exposed or addicted to superstition. Trying to interpret the nature of the polytheistic attitude of what HUME describes as vulgar polytheism, he says that polytheism conceives all the conspicuous products of nature to be themselves so many real divinities. Polytheism wavers, to put it differently, between two propensities of man: to believe in the invisible or intelligent power in nature; and concurrently an equally strong propensity to focus the attention of men on visible objects. *Pari passu* there is, as it were, a third propensity which amounts to an attempt to reconcile the two opposite inclinations, namely that men are prone to unite the invisible power with some visible object, which probably means that men invest the visible object with an invisible power.

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[62] *David Hume: Of Superstition and Enthusiasm.* In: *Of the Standard Taste and Other Essays.* Ed. with an Introduction by J. W. Lenz. Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City 1965, 147-148.

[63] *David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature.* Ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford 1964, 271-272.

[64] *David Hume: The Natural History of Religion.* Ed. with an Introduction by H. E. Root. Stanford, California 1967, 26; cf. 27, 32, 38.

Trying to sum up the basic attitude to idolatry, polytheism or superstition made manifest by HUME, we can say that HUME takes an historical view, or what we would today call a cultural-anthropological view: he relates the phenomena to historical stages in the development of mankind, though HUME himself points of fluxes and refluxes — as he calls them — in that history. Idolatry and superstition are for HUME thematic appearances, that is to say, they relate to certain interpretations of the phenomena encountered either in nature or in the context of human experience and events. The impact of these phenomena on human life is powerful. Therefore the power exerted becomes the kernel of what he calls deification. From this point of view, it has to be said, that KANT suggests in his analysis of superstition — and of fetishism which goes along with that — a systematically different approach: he interprets those phenomena structurally and not thematically; he places them in relation to reason and not to experience in its mutations and fluctuations. He places them in the context of a misinterpretation of the position of reason, which instead of being what it essentially is, i. e. a law-giving faculty, turns itself into a subjugated faculty or adopts an attitude of subjection to a strange law. One could suggest that the difference between HUME and KANT finds its expression not only in terms knowledge e. g. causality or of morality e. g. desire versus pure will. It finds its expression also in the respective interpretation of a cultural phenomenon like superstition — whether it is eventually grounded in experience and is of a historical character, or though being a prejudice it has its roots in reason, or rather in a misinterpretation of it.

5.

We have to explore now some of the presuppositions of KANT's general attitude, against which the phenomenon of fetishism has to be understood as a misplacement of reason or its malfunction. We have to point to one aspect of KANT's system or his dialectic, namely the presence of the notion of hypostasis in KANT's own exploration. KANT uses the concept "hypostasis" or the verb to "hypostasise" as the operation of taking what exists merely in thought as being a real existing object, that is to say, outside the thinking subject. In this context he employs the notion of hypostasis or hypostasizing qua project, projection and projecting — as we are sometimes inclined to use that root in present-day parlance. To project means basically to have a mental conception as e. g. SHAKESPEARE uses that phrase in "project of power". But we also use the root as indicating something thrown out of our mental conception and turned into as a rounded-off reality, thus extending the mental aspect of the domain of reality. KANT speaks specifically of hypostasis as being related to God: it is meant to hypostasize the systematic unity of nature and it is understood to be a cause, thought the basic meaning of the concept is an idea: "Such

a thing is a mere fiction in which we combine and realize the manifold of our idea in an ideal, as an individual being. But we have no right to do this, nor even to assume the possibility of such an hypostasis". Actually what is attempted here is to hypostasize the idea of the sum-total of all reality. This, according to KANT, is a transcendental subreption which he interprets as "substituting for it the concept of a thing which stands as a source of the possibility of all things, and supplies the real conditions for their complete determination". At this point KANT adds the following footnote which is rather significant in the context of our analysis: "This ideal is the *ens realissimum,* although it is indeed a mere representation, is first *realized,* that is, made into an object, then *hypostasized,* and finally, by the natural progress of reason, towards the completion of unity, is... personified" (*KdrV* 800-1, 721-722, 611 note; transl. 614, 615, 563-4 note). KANT is aware of the fact that we are concerned here with imaginary extensions, but just the same he does not totally reject the validity of realization, hypostasation and personification. He speaks, as we have seen, about the natural progress of reason, which moves reason towards the completion of unity. Hence we have to ask here what led KANT to this descriptive attitude towards hypostasis, and even to his qualified justification of the step taken. Obviously this aspect is related to the concepts of idea and ideal explored previously.

In the first place we have to reiterate the fact, to which we referred before by way of a preliminary juxtaposition with HUME, that KANT deals with reason and is not concerned with historical phenomena. Reason as a faculty of principles according to KANT, is basically a faculty of unifying or uniting. *Ens realissimum* is a projected entity in the literal sense of the term, an entity placed in reality, though conceived in reason; it is an entity which leads to the universe and reason, and is not a deification of an external power which reason has to accept as given or superimposed on it. There is a nuance of legitimacy implied in KANT's description of the process of hypostasis, in spite of the fact that he emphasizes the aspect of projection in it. To put it differently or negatively, we would say that a primordial entity outside reason, which would not be a hypostasis but a self-sufficient entity, would mean for KANT a limitation of the systematic quality of reason in its thrust towards the comprehensive totality. The fact that this comprehensive unity is a hypostasis is on the one hand a reflection on the ontological position of that unity, but on the other hand a reinforcement of the continuous progress of reason. This structure of reason has its manifestation in the ethical meaning of the *ens realissimum.*

6.

One cannot fail to discern a critical accent in the very employment of the notion of hypostasis. This has to be emphasized since on the one hand there is the Christological tradition which has used that concept in the context of the Trinity, but on the other hand, there is the nominalistic tradition which emphasized the nominal position of ideas and thoughts, depriving them explicitly of a position in terms of reality. We find in KANT more than one echo of that nominalistic criticism when he speaks of hypostasizing of what exists merely in thought and taking it as a real object existing outside the thinking subject (*KdrV* A 395; transl. 361). The same concept appears in the statement referring to hypostasizing representations and projecting them outside oneself as real things (*KdrV* A 395; transl. 361). Treating our thoughts as things amounts to hypostasizing them (ibid.), which is essentially an act of subreption of a hypostasized consciousness — and has to be understood as regarding the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a unity in the subject of these thoughts (*KdrV* A 402; transl. 365). To amplify the last statement one could suggest the conclusion that the very shift from the unity of thought to a subject representing the substance of those thoughts is an act of hypostasis and thus an act of subreption.

Parenthetically we can mention that to some extent the critical aspect or, to be more precise in the KANTian context, the negative aspect, cannot escape us, even in the notion of ideal. The ideal, as we noticed, amounts to the highest perfection like, e. g. ideal beauty. But the notion of the highest perfection in turn does not necessarily amount to the notion that a real entity exists, which would amount to the ontological realization of that perfection. The ideal can be understood in the first sense as the focus of approximation or as the guiding principle of a progress. It can even be understood in KANT's sense as the sum-total of all possibilities (*KdrV* B 601; transl. 489) or as an object completely determined by the mere idea (*KdrV* B 612; transl. 495) without assuming that ontologically that idea is to be seen or conceived as a real being. Hence, the shift of the notion of ideal to the sphere of ethics is in KANT a step taken to attenuate the negative connotation of the hypostatic descriptions in their various synonyms. The shift to the realm of ethics was conceived by KANT as preserving the notion of the ideal as an ultimate synthesis, bringing together all determinations, but also, and not less, conceiving of the ideal as the focus of aspirations and hopes. We can notice the manifestation of this shift of the hypostasis to its ethical connotation, which paradoxically is meant to take away from the hypostasis its essence as subreption, at least in two concepts related to KANT's ethics, and one of them being in turn a sort of link between the theoretical and practical philosophies. Metaphorically one could say that the shift towards ethics, in as much as it refers to hypostatic conceptions and entities, is KANT's attempt, to use a Hebrew saying, "to conquer the Queen in her house". Thus KANT does not refer to a fetishistic inter-

pretation in terms of those notions, neither does he reserve the fetishistic description and evaluation to entities, but mainly to legal systems competing, as it were, with the legislation of reason and by it with what is essential for his ethical outlook.[65]

7.

The first concept which is on the threshold of KANT's moral philosophy but derives from his theoretical philosophy is the very concept of God, what KANT calls *Urbild* (archetype). We view all objects *as if* they drew their original from such an archetype, which in turn is the idea of a creating reason. Because of the relationship to that creating reason which is self-subsistent and original, we so guide the empirical employment of *our* reason as to secure its greatest possible extension (*KdrV* 700-701; transl. 551). As we see here, the emphasis is not placed on the moral meaning of the original reason as archetype but on its total independence or spontaneity, which — from the opposite end — points to the ultimate borders of the employment of our reason. Furthermore, KANT says that we ought not to derive the order and systematic unity of the world from a supreme intelligence. We ought to obtain from the idea of a supremely wise cause the rule according to which reason, in connecting empirical causes and effects in the world, may be employed to best advantage. In this context the *Urbild* is instrumental for the *Nachbild,* and indeed presents the ideal perfection of reason to be followed and applied in the sphere of the activity of reason vis-à-vis the empirical data. KANT says this explicitly when he speaks of the idea which gives the rule, so that the ideal serves as the *archetype* for the complete determination of the copy (*Nachbild; KdrV* 597; transl. 486).

The ethical variation or interpretation of the notion of *Urbild* (translated by LEWIS WHITE BECK as "model") is the idea of the holiness of will. This idea is a practical one which must necessarily serve as an archetype or model *(Urbild)* towards which all finite beings must strive, even though they cannot reach it (*KdpV* 32-33; transl. 33). One could perhaps use the expression that the *Urbild* in the ethical context is a supra-practical ideal: pure reason is practical in so far as it gives to man a universal law which we call the moral law, while the *Urbild* is considered as a being completely identical with morality, and thus beyond or above the moral law. It is, to put it like that, morality written large, separated from the empirical subject whose sensuous

[65] The line which leads in this context from Kant to Feurbach is analysed in the present author's article *Anthropology and Sensibility.* In: Revue Internationale de Philosophie. 26 (1972), 336 ff. The German version *Anthropologie und Sinnlichkeit.* In: *Ludwig Feurbach.* Hrsg. von E. Thies. Darmstadt 1976, 384 ff.

urges it is meant to guide and shape. Self-sufficient morality is *Urbild*; thus in a sense KANT could think — and this of course is an interpretation — that the problem of the ontological status of an *Urbild* conceived as holiness does not arise at all. It is pure also in the sense that it is beyond reality and not only beyond nature or empirical data. To be sure, the fact that KANT confers on the notion of *Urbild* in its ethical meaning the quality of holiness, with all the ranges of association that go along with this concept, transposes the notion of *Urbild* into the religious context. This is so though in a different context KANT says that nothing is so sacred or holy that it may be exempted from the searching examination of reason and criticism (*KdrV* 766; transl. 593). KANT applies the notion of being sacred or holy to the moral law, which reason teaches us from the nature of the actions themselves (*KdrV* 847; transl. 644). Thus the moral law is holy or sacred, but KANT probably uses the description only in the sense of its being pure or grounded in autonomous reason. When he emphasizes that aspect of the moral law he removes holiness from the notion of law and grounds it in the supreme being as *Urbild*, where the aspect of law becomes superfluous; the identity, the primordial one, between reason and morality becomes central. The *Urbild* is not a fetish since it lies beyond the sum-total of data of reality, and it serves the *Nachbild*, thus being — if we may put it in these terms — posited for pedagogical reasons or, to come back to traditional Christological associations — for the sake of imitation.

8.

We can turn now to the exploration of the second concept present in KANT, which on the one hand has a hypostatic quality, but on the other, in spite of its projective character, is still not understood by KANT as a fetish. We refer here to the central position of the notion of postulates, or the postulate of the existence of God, and its in-between position between a hypostasis and a focus of aspiration and striving. It should be emphasized that the notion of God is a regulative one not only in the scope of pure reason; in the scope of practical reason it remains a regulative notion being a postulate of that reason, as we explored before.

Before proceeding, we have to make a comment within the context of the notion of hypostasis and one of its extensions, i. e. postulates. The concept of *Urbild* is not mentioned by KANT among the postulates, though God and his existence, along with freedom and immortality of the soul, are listed among the postulates and indeed exhaust the list. God appears as a postulate, but not as an *Urbild* or the *Urbild*. How can we explain, if at all, this double appearance and the different systematic positions attributed to the notion of God? Are these two ideas completely separated from one another?

The following is perhaps a warranted conjecture related to that perplexing feature of KANT's system: God conceived as *Urbild* is not a postulate, at least

not according to the definition of a postulate, or rather of a theoretical postulate, as a necessary hypothesis for the accord between theoretical and practical knowledge. God as *Urbild* appears only within the sphere of practical knowledge and is not a hypostasis related to the harmony between the sphere of knowledge and that of ethics or, to put it from a different angle, the sphere of reality and the sphere of the imperative. God as *Urbild* is a moral concept in its totality or, put differently, in its self-enclosedness. It is the moral subject brought to its full exemplification. As against this the notion of a hypostasis we discern a propensity to objectify concepts; objectivization and the holy will are mutually exclusive, since the holy will is the subject proper. One can even say that to be a subject, to the extent that this implies the aspect of being a moral agent, is consonant with the structure of the ethical sphere, but being an object is not. The application of the term or concept of postulate appears in a different context in relation to God, and there the aspect of hypostasis implicitly or explicitly is rather significant. Let us look into that aspect — and we shall follow, perhaps, a minor piece of KANT's exposition *Verkündigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Traktats zum ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie* (Akad. Ausg. Bd 8. 418-9) which seems to be probably more telling on the issue at stake than any of KANT's major presentations.

KANT defines there a postulate as a practical imperative which is *a priori* given and which does not lend itself to an explanation of its possibility. He says further, that we do not postulate states of affairs *(Sachen)* or in general the existence of an object. We postulate only a maxim or a rule for the activity of a subject. This is a very significant qualification in the context of our analysis, since KANT emphasizes here that postulates do not refer to things, but to deeds. After all, KANT cannot be quite consistent in applying that statement, since he postulates the existence of God or the existence of the soul and its immorality — let us leave aside the issue of freedom, which, for KANT, is both a fact and a postulate. He wanted (already explained here in different contexts) to emphasize the postulate of the existence of God from the point of view of the deeds or activities of a subject; but it is still a postulate of existence, though the term of reference is not one of cognition but one of morality.

When we look into the matter against the background of the concept and the pitfall of hypostasis, we may suggest the conclusion that KANT wanted to escape that pitfall and therefore emphasized, or perhaps even overemphasized, that the axis of a postulate is a maxim and a rule, and not existence. He relates the postulate to the question of whether or not there are conditions under which the performance of one's duty is possible — and the existence of God appears to be one of those conditions. He relates God to the principle of wisdom, which entails the conditions under which satisfaction can be given to the human expectations, namely, the highest happiness

which will be consonant with morality. At this point he says that God is the entity who alone is capable of performing that proportionale distribution *(diese proportionierte Austeilung)*. The difference between the notion of *Urbild* and the notion of the guarantor of the proportionate distribution and its fulfiller is the following: *Urbild* belongs to the moral sphere, and thus the category of reality or existence is not applicable to it. God in his function vis-à-vis duty and happiness is posed between the spheres of morality and nature and above them, referring to both of them. The concept of *postulatum theoreticum* is applicable because of the position which God occupies between the spheres. He has a function not only as the amplification of the moral imperative which in the true idea of *Urbild* ceases to be an imperative and becomes identical with God's very essence. The situation is different in terms of God as a postulate because here he fulfills a function of harmonization; KANT was probably aware that here the pifall of hypostasis becomes prominent. Therefore we suggest to look at the notion of postulates, and primarily at the postulate of the existence of God, as a continuation of hypostasis in a mitigated form, not seeing it as a projected reality but as a projected expectation or aspiration. Still, one cannot help seeing that KANT struggles here with the problem of hypostasis: even when he defers the realization of the expectation and aspiration, the very function which God fulfils is bound to entail the aspect of existence or reality, as if KANT thought that only a real being can bring about the harmony between nature qua reality and the satisfaction which will be achieved against its background and the moral duty proper, whose concept lies beyond the category of reality. Looking at this notion again from the point of view of the concept of hypostasis, it can be said that KANT attempted to present a hypostasis proper. ERNST TROELTSCH, in his well-known study of KANT's philosophy of religion, observes cryptically that KANT makes the most extensive use of DE BROSSES' theory of fetish — but TROELTSCH does not explain that use.[66] We shall revert to the issue in a later part of our analysis but at this point we may suggest that KANT was perhaps aware of the affinity between hypostasis and fetish and therefore tried to escape as much as possible an identification between the two. Therefore he introduced the notion of postulates which as such are beyond the possibility of being realized; it points only to a projection which remains in the air, as it were, and cannot become a fetish.

At this point a summing-up comment is apposite. We may ask the question as to the rationality underlying KANT's concept of religion, which in turn is grounded in his concept of ethics. There is one way to look at rationality by referring to certain doctrines of reason. The theology of the Enlightenment

[66] *E. Troeltsch: Das Historische in Kant's Religionsphilosophie. Zugleich ein Beitrag zu den Untersuchungen über Kant's Philosophie der Geschichte.* In: Kant-Studien. (1904), 90.

and the philosophy of religion grounded in it followed that path to some extent. To be sure, KANT does not evade some of the teachings of Enlightenment, and the notion of God and of the immortality of the soul reappears in the framework of his system.[67] But he does not look at these notions as being isolated teachings, but as related to the very systematic structure of reason. God is the fulfilment of the legislative character of reason, or God is the guarantor of the harmony between nature and grace; that harmony in turn is the realization of the systematic propensity with which reason is imbued. God is the amplification of reason, and in this sense the idea of God, according to KANT, cannot encroach upon the autonomy of reason. Thus is does not lead, according to him, to a fetishistic attitude. We see the importance of that conclusion in KANT's very strict observance of the autonomy of reason, even within the context of his analysis of religion. Against this strict line we shall attempt to understand KANT's presentation and criticism of fetishism.

9.

Let us return to the demarcation line somehow hinted at by KANT, but not clearly elaborated, between hypostasis and fetishes. Three points which may shed some light on the issue have to be made in the context:

The first point relates to the position of God; we have to reiterate here the meaning of postulates and perhaps emphasize one of the elements implied in that notion. Essentially, the moral agent postulates the existence of God but he cannot posit that existence, neither can he prove it. A postulate connotes the focus of the expectation; its position is established from the point of view of the expectant who approaches the focus but cannot reach it. The ever-approximate steps taken by the agent and their correlate, the permanent distance to the expected divine guarantor of the fulfilment of expectations, carry on the one hand a perpetual tension within the ethical sphere but also, on the other, a sense of confidence which cannot be overlooked. We have to remind ourselves that confidence is one of the ingredients of what might be broadly described as a religious attitude.

Here we come to the second point, namely, to KANT's very emphatic insistence that there is no theological ethics. A theological ethics in his eyes contains moral laws, which *presuppose* the existence of a supreme ruler of the world. In his moral philosophy KANT attempts to present what he calls a moral theology which carries within itself a conviction of the existence of a supreme being, but that conviction bases itself on moral laws (*KdrV* 660 note; transl. 526 note). The main argumentation in the *Religion innerhalb der*

[67] *Paul Menzer: Kants Lehre von der Entwicklung in Natur und Geschichte.* Berlin 1911, 307 ff.

Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft centers around that issue, which, as we have seen, is an attempt not only to present the concept of God within morality but even the concept of *religion* within the boundaries of morality as well. Let us only mention some of the statements made, for instance, in the Preface to the first edition of the *Religion.* KANT says there that morality is based upon the conception of man as a free agent. Because man is free he binds himself through his reason to unconditional laws and — what is significant for the direction of our argument here — man does not stand in need of the idea of another being *(ein anderes Wesen)* over him (*Religion,* 8 note; transl. 10). We come to the notion of the ruler of the world not as the initial stage, i. e. in the autonomous conviction of morality, but as the winding-up or, let us say rounding-up stage, of the moral sphere. Therefore, KANT says — and this indeed is only a re-statement of the notion of postulates — that, since human capacity does not suffice to bring about happiness for each individual to the degree he deserves to be happy, an omnipotent moral being has to be postulated as the ruler of the world under whose care *(Vorsorge)* this balance is achieved. Due to that expectation of a coalescence between meritoriousness and happiness, or activity and its reward, morality leads inevitably to religion *(führt unausbleiblich zur Religion; Religion,* 5; transl. 3).

Here we face the third point, namely the meaning of religion in the context, if religion refers to the consummation and not to be initiation of morality. We should not be led astray by the fact that KANT deals with these issues in a book explicitly dedicated to the topic of religion and its possble justification. It can be said that KANT tries to purify religion from all its habitual modes of behaviour and expression, including prayer and rituals. A brief resumé of some of the comments made by KANT on the subject of praying is appropriate here. The only praying which KANT can recommend is what he describes as the spirit of prayer. Man seeks, in KANT's description, to influence himself *(auf sich selbst zu wirken)* while praying in its usual sense is expressed in words which, because of their utterance, remain external *(äußerlich)*; man tries to influence God and not himself. The adequate expression of this valid or shaky conjunction of religion and morality remains proper, that is to say, one's mode of behaviour or style of life, what KANT calls *Lebenswandel,* and one's inner convictions, what KANT calls *Gesinnungen* (ibid. 195 note; transl. 183 note). Even when KANT introduces the concept of God-pleasing perfection (*gottgefällige Vollkommenheit,* ibid. 196; transl. 184) he attempts to remain within the boudaries of morality: we refer here to the idea of the preponderant importance of man's moral character (*die überwiegende Wichtigkeit der moralischen Beschaffenheit des Menschen).* The emphasis on ethical behaviour, which is the adequate manifestation of convictions as well as of the religious attitude, is meant to stress that, even from the religious point of view, the only adequate manifestation remains the immanent morality.

From this point of view it can be said that KANT's reasoning is clearer than his achievement. This is so because we may still wonder whether the religious dimension adds anything at all to the system of morality, including the position of God as a postulate or as an *Urbild* within the boundaries of morality. After all, we know well that there are systems of thought asserting in their argument the existence of God, but this positional aspect of God — if that expression can be used — does not make them into religious systems. We can sum up therefore by saying that KANT attempted to present God within the bounds of reason and therefore of its autonomy. He proceeded from there to his attempt to present religion within the autonomy of reason along with the dilemma whether or not a synthesis between autonomy and a divine ruler is at all possible.

Leaving that point aside, we can take a further step towards understanding KANT's explicit reference to fetishists and fetishism. Though, as already observed, the term has been in use before, KANT incorporated it into his system or into his presentation. It seems to be a warranted conclusion that KANT gives to that notion of fetishism a particular meaning: according to the direction of KANT's argument, a fetish is not an entity invested with divine power. It is structure of a system based on a hierarchy which is not grounded in reason or is a legal system which is not based on self-legislation. — We refer now to some of KANT's statements and descriptions in his presentation so that we may watch more clearly the meaning of fetishism, as he uses that term.

10.

The analysis of KANT's concept of fetishism leads to the conclusion that KANT uses that term explicitly with two meanings. There might be an affinity between them, but still they are different in their respective context, and even in their direction.

The first meaning brings into prominence the kinship of idolatry or, in KANT's own words, sorcery *(Zaubern)* and fetishism. KANT says, for instance, that when man has recourse to actions which in themselves contain nothing pleasing to God, namely nothing that is moral in its essence, in order to earn by these means God's immediate divine approval and thereby the fulfilment of his desires — he attempts to influence the divine realm. Thus he is engaged in sorcery. KANT observes at this point that he replaces that term by the word fetishmaking, familiar in other connections *(das sonst bekannte Wort des Fetischmachens; Religion,* 177; transl. 165). He emphasizes that this mode of religion or worship amounts to using worship in its different expressions as a means to attain grace and describes it as *heidnischer Aberglaube* (heathenish superstition; *Religion,* 199; transl. 187). He defines idolatry as being the superstitious delusion that one can make oneself acceptable to the supreme being other than by having the moral law at heart (*KdU* § 89; transl.

130). It is clear that the description of idolatry and idols differs here from that to be found e. g. in *Isaiah,* Ch. 3, Verse 8: "Their land also is full of idols; they worship the work of their own hands, that which their own fingers have made." KANT, as we see, does not interpret the cognate terms of sorcery, idolatry and fetish-making as referring to the man-made character of gods or deities, but rather to the improper attempt to evoke grace — and thus benevolent response — on the part of the divine being by means which are not inherent in the moral conduct of man. Once religion became identical with moral conduct and expressions of worship were held to be either redundant or interfering with the religious mode qua ethical mode, an attempt to influence God — whose existence is a postulate or *Urbild* — is interpreted by KANT as fetish-making. This, compared with the original meaning of fetish-making qua investing entities with divine power, is certainly an innovation or at least a free interpretation suggested by KANT of the concept. Not the response of human beings to deities is fetishism, once those deities are not transcendent entities and each one a *causa sui,* but the human intervention, the human attempt to influence God by extra-ethical observances — is understood by KANT as fetish-making.

There is a second meaning to fetish-making in KANT, related in the first place to what KANT calls *Pfaffentum* — the rule of the clergy. That rule implies a constitution of a church *(Verfassung)* which provides for the dominance of the clergy. This is described by KANT not as fetish-making but as fetish-worship *(Fetischdienst).* KANT sees a relation between this meaning of fetishism and the previous one when he says that this condition or structure of the church is always to be found where not principles of morality are guiding but statutory commands *(statutarische Gebote),* rules of faith and diverse observances (*Religion,* 179-80; transl. 167-8). He immediately comes back to the term fetish-making by saying that there exist various types of church in which the fetish-making is so manifold and so mechanical that it appears to suppress *(verdrängen)* nearly all morality. Again he says that such fetish-making borders very closely on paganism (*Religion,* 180; transl. 168). The emphasis lies here not only on observances with their inherent motivation to influence God, but on the very organization of the church; *Pfaffentum* embodies or epitomizes the organization as such. Again, we have to see the significance of the notion of statutory commands in the context, since KANT implies that fetish-making is artificially creating a structure that is not an extension of the legislative essence of reason. It is only an artificially invented constitution or condition meant to further human expectations: this is the purpose or the cause of the structure which is not identical with the moral conduct in its basic nature and propensity. The structure may have an instrumental position, and is thus close to the fetish-making in the first sense. But as a structure it creates an environment for human behaviour. Thus, it is an artificial commonwealth or, coming back to the expression KANT so often

uses, a visible church. We can say that the very presence of the visible church is a manifestation of fetish-making and is therefore a fetish.

We come back to the concept we referred to at the beginning of our exploration, i. e. the concept of superstition which amounts to the greatest of all prejudices, that of fancying nature not to be subject to rules based on understanding, by virtue of its own essential law. A structure created by human prudence or endeavour, making human beings subservient to it, is a superstition or a manifestation of superstition. A visible church as a fetish presupposes a superstition which turns human reason from its position of autonomy to a position of subservience. Therefore, emancipation from superstition is called *Enlightenment* (*KdU* § 40; transl. 152). We can enlarge this comment by saying that Enlightenment concurrently amounts to man's emancipation from fetishes and fetish-making, since it amounts to man's creating a culture which makes the autonomy of reason manifest. At this point we can reiterate the statement referred to by TROELTSCH *"das Historische dient nur zur Illustration, nicht zur Demonstration"* (141, note) as leading to the maximum possible concession by KANT, namely that the visible church is at most an illustration and not a demonstration of truth. Again, TROELTSCH observes rightly that the visible manifestations are at most a vehicle for the autonomous reason. The separation of the visible structure from autonomous reason and making the structure resting on its own, amounts to fetish-making. This interpretation goes beyond the interpretation dealt with before according to which the visible church is a historical stage in the direction of the invisible church. Fetish-making is a distortion and not a preparatory step taken. Having said this, we can re-emphasizie the major point in KANT's presentation of fetishism, namely that fetishism does not amount, as it was regarded before KANT, to a deification of terrestrial entities. Its essence lies in the establishment of structures empowered with a legal dimension, structures imposed on man which are not manifestations of his reason and freedom. We shall consider now the transformations of KANT's concept of fetishism, namely whether Hegel and MARX understood fetishes according to the KANTian model or according to the model which preceeded KANT.[68]

[68] There is no need to elaborate in the present context the fact that the conjunction between fetish-making and statutory laws has its repercussion on Kant's interpretation of Judaism and his criticism voiced against it. Compare the present author's: *The Recurring Pattern.* Studies in Anti Judaism in Modern Thought. London 1963, 23 ff. Consult: *Rudolf Malter: Zeitgenössische Reaktionen auf Kants Religionsphilosophie.* Eine Skizze zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Kantischen und des reformatorischen Denkens. In: *bewusst sein.* Gerhard Funke zu eigen. Hrsg. von A. J. Bucher, H. Drüe, Th. M. Scebohm. Bonn 1975, 145 ff.

11.

We may sum up KANT's interpretation of the concept of fetish and fetish-making in the following way. According to KANT there are two directions of fetishism: One, when man in his expectations for rewards places himself in the center of his conduct and turns, for instance, praying into a means to attract the grace of God and to establish his own position. This "homocentric" aspect of behaviour where *homo* is taken not as *homo noumenon* but as *sensuous homo,* is an improper behaviour or attitude because that attitude does not express respect for the moral law but for man in his empirical position. Man is not elevated nor is he following his destiny *(Bestimmung)*; he is turning God into an agent for the fulfilment of his desires. The second aspect of fetishism amounts to the establishment of structures which are imposing by their legislation but do not maintain the proper correlation between the subject, who is the law-giver, and the subjected subject — if that combination is permitted — who follows the law he himself gives to himself. This is a heteronomous behaviour and as such it is a perverted behaviour expressing fetish-making. Only autonomous behaviour is a proper behaviour: it maintains the equilibrium between the subject and the rule binding him. A heteronomous behaviour is by definition one expressed in statutory laws and thus shifts the centre from reason to impositions.

Hegel interprets fetishism within the context of the development of religion as one of the stages of the religion of nature — *die Naturreligion,* that is to say that Hegel approaches the topic historically and not typologically. He refers to the infinite mass of means of sorcery *(die unendliche Menge von Zaubermitteln).* He does not deny — on the contrary, he admits — that in the expression of sorcery, understanding *(der Verstand)* is aware of the fact that there are contexts encountered by it. But the more definite determination of the contexts is not reached as yet and is unknown to understanding. The access to means of sorcery is thus a stage in the development of understanding and is indeed one of the modes of objectivization *(Weisen der Objektivierung).* Since understanding is unable to grasp the encountered reality, fantasy replaces that which is lacking on the level of understanding. Various means are applied to achieve power over nature *(die Naturmacht).* They are meant to bring about what the subject desires to achieve. Hence we find in the adoration of objects of nature a two-fold direction: one, let us call it, of adoration proper, where man believes in the supremacy of objects, like rivers or the sun; in the other direction man introduces sorcery into his attitude, that is to say, he takes advantage of the power of the objects and turns them into his desired direction. The content is always that of an entity of nature *(Naturwesen)* and human self-consciousness can thus conceive of itself as controlling it. Thus sorcery or the ingredient of sorcery expresses itself in the consequences drawn for the benefit of man from his acknowledgment of the objective status of these entities of nature. The influence exercised is that of

deriving consequences for man's own sake. It can already be observed in this context that this description of sorcery is not entirely alien to one of the aspects of fetishism brought into prominence by KANT, though Hegel does not mention KANT in his description and analysis. Hegel points out the various stages of what he calls *Objektivierung:* man does not only accept the entities of nature like the sun or the river, but invests, e. g. a living animal, with an independent power which is placed above man. Man, who invests the power, eventually becomes subjugated to it — and this indeed is in the eyes of Hegel the very nature of the fetish. (To objectivize power and to adore the objectified as something objective. — *Das Objektivierte als ein Objektives zu verehren.*) Hegel asks the question: why does man objectivize at all? He explains this by a basic urge to pose an independent power. Moreover, just as children are endowed with the urge to play and groups to adore themselves, so there exists an urge to have something objective *(etwas gegenständlich zu haben).* The adoration is accidental and it refers to one object or to another. Practically, every unfulfilled wish provokes a change to another object of adoration. Since we are concerned with processes or stages of objectivization, what is really being adored here is the self-consciousness of man, though that consciousness is taken in its rather primitive stage, namely in the realm of desires or expectations. The fetish is the object of adoration, and at the same time it is a means in the hands of the sorcerer. The reveration shown to the fetish is measured according to the standard of what happens to the subject.[69]

One cannot be oblivious of one aspect of affinity pertaining between Hegel's exploration of fetishism and that of KANT, namely, the emphasis on the homocentric orientation. The independent position of the fetish is not left constant because through the intervention of sorcery the fetish is turned into of a means for the satisfaction of human desires. There is, on the one hand, an objectivization — a term which does not appear in KANT: but on the other hand the objective realm does not persist in its self-sufficiency or alienation and becomes an instrument in terms of the subject who, by way of alienation, creates the quasi-objective realm. One can ask both KANT and Hegel why this realm is created at all, and the answer of both would probably

[69] *Phil. d. Gesch.* Bd 1. 138; *Phil. d. Rel.* 316 ff. — It is apposite to observe that Erdmann stresses less the historical-anthropological aspect of fetishism. In accordance with the line of his presentation the central issue is the mode of consciousness which is manifest in different forms of religious consciousness. Hence he says that it is false to attribute to the servant of the fetish-cult the attitude of revering God. It is like speaking about the foetus as if his gum were not split or the parts of his heart *(Herzkammern)* were closed one towards the other. This is an attempt to present a primitive mode of religious consciousness with an emphasis both on "primitive" as well as on "consciousness". *Johann Eduard Erdmann: Vorlesungen über Glauben und Wissen als Einleitung in die Dogmatik und Religionsphilosophie.* Berlin 1837. 195.

be the same: the desire and the expectation are so strong that if they are not fulfilled on the level of given objects and data, they project objects in order to obtain from them the guaranteed satisfaction. For KANT, this projection is essentially inexplicable because it relates only to expectations; Hegel grounds the projection in the self-evolving character of the subject who becomes a subject proper only via the detour of objectivizations. Thus for KANT there is no legitimization for fetish-making at all, because it is a perverted fulfilment: fulfilment proper is related to postulates, and these refer to a trans-sensuous reality, one in which nature and grace coincide. For Hegel the very positing of the phenomenon of fetish is a stage in the process of objectivization. Though fetishism is viewed as a hypostazation of man's inner life, it is — relatively — legitimized precisely because it is a stage in a process. The second aspect in KANT's exploration of fetishism — the creation of a structure of legal impositions, does not appear in Hegel.

That aspect with all its essential mutations appears in MARX — and is related to his well-known view of the fetishist character of the commodities. MARX's heading reads: *Der Fetischcharakter der Ware und sein Geheimnis*; it has to be observed before embarking on our analysis, that MARX uses concepts, terms and metaphors derived from the religious world and, as a matter of fact, they are present also in KANT: for instance, *die Fronarbeit* — a concept which very often appears in Kant, and last but not least the notion of *der Pfaffe*.[70] It is because of that affinity between MARX and KANT that we are overstepping the boundaries of the comparison between KANT and Hegel in the direction of commenting on MARX's conception of fetishism. Because of that affinity an additional light will be shed on KANT's conception and hence also on that of Hegel.

12.

It goes without saying that the use of the term "fetishism" is related to the overall concept of alienation, for instance when MARX says that the capitalist mode of production gives an independent and thus alienated form to conditions of work. The machinery appears here as epitomizing the process of independence and alienation, and thus appears as standing in full contrast to the worker. The alien or estranged capital becomes a dominating and exploiting power. Having in mind this broad concept of alienation and the trend towards independence or isolation of the product, we return to the aspect of fetishism and define it more closely within the context of both our

[70] *Karl Marx: Das Kapital.* Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. I. Band. Buch I. Der Productions-Prozess des Kapitals. In: *Karl Marx — Friedrich Engel's Werke.* Bd 23. Berlin 1972; references are to pages 86-87, 89, 94, 96, 455, 596.

historical and structural analysis. Fetishism is described as intrinsically bound to the products of work. MARX, in his tendency to use a very figurative description as well as to employ different characterizations, stemming from the same field of association, speaks about the enigma of the form of commodity *(das Geheimnisvolle der Warenform)*; because of that secret character MARX adds terms like the mysticism of the world of commodities, sorcery and spook. What explains the use by MARX of all these terms is the fact that the products of the human beings are endowed with a life of their own, despite the fact that they are products of human activity, whether of the brain or of the human hand. This "objective" character of the products of labour is essentially a fancy; it is created by the human beings in their activity as workers and it becomes involved in the social process of exchange.

It is immaterial for the direction of our analysis to go into the essence of MARX's theory of commodities and economic existence in general, as this theory was presented in *Das Kapital* and in the preceding writings and their bearing on the issue before us. We have to emphasize, pursuing the line drawn by KANT, that fetishism — in the present context the fetishism of commodities — amounts, on the one hand, to the perversion of the human order and on the other to the creation of an order which, by its very alienation, becomes a fetish. By the same token it brings about a subjugation of its creator to the order centering now around commodities and their exchangeability. KANT, too, referred to an order, but that order was a legal or a statutory order or a hierarchical structure, i. e., that within the visible church. Both for KANT and MARX the creation of a misplaced order undermines the social structure of human reality or, more poignantly, the autonomous person involved in the structure, and within it — or through it, as MARX saw it — becomes a being who has lost his autonomy. This has to be emphasized precisely in MARX's context since he says that by nature man is not, as ARISTOTLE thought, a political animal, but rather a social animal. What happens, therefore, in terms of fetishism is that man who is intrinsically social, loses in his concrete social existence, his independence and dignity by becoming subjected to a created order with a logic of its own. Precisely the aspect of the immanent logic of the created order amounts to fetishism or fetish-making. It is beyond question that MARX, shifted the emphasis from the statutory rules to the context of commodities. But just the same we notice that his description of the fetishist character of an order is akin to the description by KANT in terms of statutory order.

We may conclude by saying that no suggestion has been implied here of a straight line of continuity from KANT's broad theory which includes the aspects of hypostasis, postulates, autonomy and eventually fetish-making, neither to Hegel's analysis of the phenomenon of fetishism, nor to MARX's application of the description of the metaphor of fetishism to the context analysed by him. Still we have seen that the two aspects of fetish-making

present in KANT, namely the imposition of the human will on deeds and the establishment of an order which is ethically or ontologically out of place – the two aspects recur separately in Hegel from one pole and in MARX from another. The employment of the notion of fetishism carries with itself the reference to hypostatic entities. But in Hegel and MARX it has lost the frame of reference of the postulates and their position in terms of knowledge and action – the feature which is central in KANT's system. Hence KANT's distinction between postulates, which are legitimate ideas in their contexts, and hypostasis and fetishes which overstep the legitimate boundaries of ideas. KANT did not concern himself mainly – as it is cognate to his system – with historical phenomena of religion but with the structural essence of it. In Hegel and MARX the shift to history and its process becomes prominent.[71]

The exploration of the position of the social contract and state in the two systems will be concerned with an additional dimension of them.

[71] On the relation to Vico in terms of the relation of man as creator to his creations see the present author's *Convertibility and Alienation.* In: *Substance and Form in History.* A collection of essays in Philosophy of History. Ed. by L. Pompaart and W. H. Dray. Edinburgh 1981, 77 ff.

Chapter Eight
WILL AND SOCIAL CONTRACT

1.

Basically, KANT's ethical system might be conceived as enabling us to take the step from ethics to the political realm, that is to say to society and to the state. The emphasis led on will in its various levels or manifestations can be seen as providing the point of departure for looking at will as a guiding factor in establishing the social domain. To be sure, we have to add a reservation to that statement because KANT wavers between two views as to the sociability of man. He uses the expression "unsocial sociability" emphasising in a way the two aspects or elements in the human nature. Men have the propensity to enter into society but at the same time they are prompted by a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society (*Ideen*, 21; transl. 15). But even when we disregard the aspect of the unsocial character of man, sociability as such can be viewed only as a pre-disposition. It is not sufficient for the very establishment of the social realm which is after all a structure and not only a manifestation of an innate tendency or propensity of the human beings.

This transition from the propensity to the structure calls for an additional prompting factor, that is to say mutual agreement. Such agreement in turn leads KANT to emphasise the element of will, the element which is central in his ethical system. KANT is aware, of course, that the notion of the contract is in the first place a notion related to the arrangement made by two persons or is an expression of the will which unifies two persons in a contract once all is transferred to another person (*Met. d. Sitten* § 50; transl. 108). Hence the social contract can be understood as an amplification of the notion of contract in its primary meaning, since a social contract does not refer to the relation between two persons only but establishes an organized structure comprising many persons. If we follow the traditional distinction between the pact which brings about unity and the pact which brings about subordination, it is clear that KANT looks at the central element of the contract in the pact of unity whereby the subordination is an outcome of the unity conceived as a basis for the social and political realm. Here too KANT could not take subordination in the constitutional and political meaning as a basic element, since this would

— from the ethical vantage — amount to the disregard of the mutuality pertaining to human beings and finding its expression in the respect for the person as an end not as a means only.

2.

As a matter of fact, KANT sharpens even the primary character of the unsocial sociability of man when he refers to the steps from barbarism to culture, identifying culture with the social world of man (*Ideen*, 21; transl. 15). In this sense, he speaks about the relationship between sociability and humanity; the impulse to society is natural to mankind; humanity signifies on the one hand the universal feeling of sympathy and on the other the faculty of being able to communicate universally one's inmost self. These properties constitute in conjunction the befitting social spirit of mankind (*KdU* § 41; transl. 155). To put it in typological terms, we could say that somehow KANT wavers between HOBBES' understanding of human nature and ROUSSEAU'S understanding of it. Yet we could discern a proximity with HOBBES because of the double-faceted character of man being both unsocial and sociable. Thus the social contract seems to be essential in order to remove the human beings from their ambiguous position and place them in the situation of sociability. In addition, in spite of the established influence of ROUSSEAU on KANT, KANT could not subscribe to the view central in ROUSSEAU'S theory whereby obedience to a law prescribes to ourselves a situation which amounts to liberty.

The conjunction of the law and liberty is more germane to KANT'S theory of ethics in the sense of autonomy than to his theory of statehood. A state, as KANT has it, is a system (*Met. d. Sitten* § 52; transl. 113). It relates to the public law which is a system of laws of relation, that is to say it pertains to a multitude of men or for a multitude of nations. The concept of a constitution is introduced, in order to be able to participate in the actual law of the land; man and nations require a juridical condition of society. A constitution is a condition of society under a will that unites them. The difference between the society and the state is the difference between a structure in which individuals within a nation are related to one another and the whole in relation to its own members. The former is the civil society while the latter is the state. Again KANT emphasises in this context the interest of all, that is to say the common interest, in having a juridical condition of society. Hence he uses the term "commonwealth" *(res publica)* in order to point out the common interest which is present in the very employment of the term — "common" referring to the element of communality, and "wealth" pointing to the element of the interest (*Met. d. Sitten* § 43; transl. 75). It is obvious that lawful coercion is necessary in the structure of a state though that necessity does not rest on a fact but on an *a priori* idea of reason.

There are certain considerations brought into the picture which lead to that conclusion. In the first place, experience teaches us that men live in violence and they are prone to fight one another before the advent of compulsive legislation. In a more mitigated form it is said that individual men, nations and states, can never be certain that they are secure against violence from one another. Consequently, the first decision has to be made, that is to say to accept the principle that one must quit the state of nature characterised by the situation that everyone follows his own judgment. The entering into the civil society is therefore the precondition for bringing into the scope of human co-existence the aspect of law which is meant to secure against violence (ibid; transl. 76). The state as such is not a realisation of justice, since justice is the idea which provides an internal guide and standard for every actual union of men in a commonwealth (ibid.; transl. 77).

3.

Here again we cannot assume the identification of the ethical standard and the situation of the state, since the ethical standard is a norm or in KANT's sense an idea. A distinction has to be maintained between the idea and the commonwealth which is in a sense an in-between realm mediating between the natural state and the ethical situation which responds to the ethical norm. Here we find KANT's position — historically or typologically — as amounting to an in-between position between HOBBES's view and ROUSSEAU's. This has to be emphasised since KANT distinguished between the rule of the state and its origin, namely the social contract is the rule but not the origin of the constitution of the state (*Reflexion* 7734).[72] At the same time, KANT has seen the two goals through the structure of the state, namely justice and security (*Reflexion* 7731). We could say at this juncture that the notion of justice brings him closer to ROUSSEAU while the notion of security brings him closer to HOBBES.

As a matter of fact, KANT's references to HOBBES are rather frequent. Hence it would be proper to explore KANT's view of the social contract by attempting to see it in the context of his relation to HOBBES. This will be done presently.

4.

We begin this part of our analysis with a reference to HOBBES, which given its context and direction can be described as metaphoric in character. In the context of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, KANT says the following: "In the absence of ... critique reason is, as it were, in the state of nature, and can establish and secure its assertions and claims only through war. The critique

[72] *Handschriftlicher Nachlaß*. Akad. Ausg. Bd 6. 503, cf. 502.

... arriving at all its decisions in the light of fundamental principles of its own institution ... secures to us the piece of a legal order, in which our disputes have to be conducted solely by the recognized methods of legal action ... The endless disputes of a merely dogmatic reason thus finally constrain us to seek relief in some critique of reason itself, and in a legislation based upon such criticism. As HOBBES maintains, the state of nature is a state of injustice and violence, and we have no option save to abandon it and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which limits our freedom solely in order that it may be consistent with the freedom of others and with the common good of all." (*KdrV* 799-80; transl. 601-2).

What we called before the metaphoric application of HOBBES' description seems to be justified by the very fact that KANT uses the model of war versus legal action in the context of theoretical reason. The natural state of war is presented as one of endless disputes. These seem to be for KANT a necessary outcome of dogmatic reason, since dogmatic reason lacks self-constraint and self-criticism according to principles. Such a dogmatic use — or misuse — of reason finds its concomitant in the abuse of one's freedom, without taking into account two aspects: (a) the freedom of others and (b) the common good. Hence KANT mentions HOBBES specifically and even describes that dogmatic use or misuse of reason as "violence", reaching the far-fetched conclusion that such dogmatic employment of reason is a state of nature. One can assume that KANT did not suggest that the shift from the dogmatic application of reason to the critical one is to be regarded as an act of a contract, let along of a social contract, since he attempted to see the very nature of reason in its manifestations as critical reason implying self-legislation. Still applying the same metaphor, KANT refers here to the mutual adjustment of the exercise of freedom and of the common good, the latter aspect having, to say the least, a political or ethical innuendo. At any rate, the metaphor or the model are rather telling, since they represent a conception which sees the different avenues of systematic philosophy, namely practical and theoretical philosophy, as embraced in one conception. Moreover, here the practical model in terms of the state of nature guides the theoretical interpretation of reason and its eventual consummation in the attitude of *Kritik*.

Let us look now into a different statement of KANT's, contained in *Religion in den Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* (89 footnote; transl. 91 footnote) where KANT refers specifically to HOBBES' political philosophy and comments theoron. In the first place KANT says that HOBBES' statement about *bellum omnium in omnes* is correct. He observes that this should read ... *est status belli* etc. He suggests this correction, since even if one does not concede that actual hostilities are continually in progress between men who do not stand under external and public laws, the state as *status juridicus* is the same. This is so, since we point to a situation in which each man wants to be the judge of what shall be his rights against others. No person is secure from others, and

no person gives others security. This is a state in which each one has to rely only on his own personal strength. Such a situation is a state of war, as distinct from actual ongoing hostilities: in it everyone must be perpetually armed against everybody else. At this point KANT adds that HOBBES' second statement about the exitus from the natural state follows from the first. This is so, since the natural state is a continual infringement upon the rights of all others. KANT adds a derogatory remark saying that this is a situation in which man's arrogant insistence on being the judge in his own affairs and not giving security to other men in their affairs is as it is since he is guided by his own arbitrary will. The amendment which KANT suggests in paraphrasing HOBBES' first statement is, as a matter of fact, of a minor significance, since it emphasizes the difference between the state of war and actual hostilities, in order to bring into prominence the situation as such, which lacks mutual adjustment between human beings and concurrently their reliance on what is called private strength. To be sure, in one of the *Reflections* (476) KANT gives a slightly different characterization of the natural state of affairs, describing it as *laesus per statum,* to emphasize that the very state of war contains an element of *laesus* qua impairment of human existence, adding to it two aspects: that of security and that of property. These two are always in danger. He adds to that description, what is a clear reference to HOBBES — though HOBBES is not mentioned by name — that human beings are pervaded with fear and one is not obliged to remain in that fear *(ich bin nicht verbunden, in dieser Furcht zu bleiben).* The meaning of the notion of being obliged is certainly not clear nor precise, since it may have a connotation of an immediate motivation when facing a threat, or a more elaborate connotation of obligation in the legal or even moral sense.

We mentioned the *Reflections* where KANT refers to HOBBES, summing up HOBBES' view that the latter had seen all laws, even the moral ones, as despotic, that is to say, as laws for which at least our rational agreement *(vernünftige Einwilligung)* or consent *(Beistimmung)* are not demanded at all. This is so, since HOBBES believed that violence or might *(die Gewalt)* constitutes the law *(das Recht;* 483). KANT probably alludes here to his own distinction between moral laws proper and others grounded in power. Hence he speaks in this context — and this is not the only one in which that expression appears — about *Usurpator,* which would amount to the political or state authority. Since he hints at this distinction, let us recall that in several contexts KANT suggests the distinction between state prudence *(Staatsklugheit),* which is based only on empirical principles, and state law proper *(Staatsrecht)* which is based on rational concepts (180). In these brief points we find a kind of anticipation of the major issue at stake, namely that of the two aspects of the social contract — the one based on prudence and the other based on the moral or rational idea. This issue is obviously related to the distinction between will in its various levels or connotations.

Before moving to this major point, let us look into that part of KANT's analysis of the *Theory and Practice* which in its second part relates to HOBBES. Though HOBBES is specifically mentioned in the heading of that part, one may question whether the direction of that polemic gives an exhaustive picture of KANT's argument in the context of the right of the state or of political right.[73]

5.

There are two points in KANT's systematic position which have to be mentioned before we proceed to the issue of the nature of the social contract. The first is related to a topic which is significant, but probably not central, in KANT's view, namely, that of the right of rebellion or revolt in civil society or within the structure of an established state. KANT's position on this issue is not fully unequivocal. KANT asserts, for instance, that the only conceivable form of government for men who are capable of possessing rights (and we could add that men, by definition, are capable of possessing rights), even if the ruler is benevolent, is not a paternalistic government but what he calls a "patriotic" one. He describes the patriotic attitude as one where every citizen, not excepting the head of state, regards the commonwealth as the maternal womb, or regards the land as the paternal ground from which he himself sprang and which he must leave to his descendants as a treasured pledge. He adds in this context: "This right of freedom belongs to each member of the commonwealth as a human being". This statement would amount to the position that within the commonwealth the basic or innate right is not abolished. This is due to the three principles guiding KANT in his exploration namely, the principles of freedom, equality and independence. Yet, when we look, for instance, into what KANT says in his essay *Was ist Aufklärung?* we find that he expresses some scepticism about the outcome of what he calls a revolution — by saying: "Perhaps a fall of personal despotism or of avaricious or tyrannical oppression may be accomplished by revolution, but never a true reform in ways of thinking. Rather, new prejudices will serve as well as old ones to harness the great unthinking masses" (*Werke.* Bd 7. 36). This indeed is not an expression of scepticism against revolt or rebellion as such. It is

[73] Kant's article on *The Common Saying: "This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice"* is quoted from *Kant's Political Writings.* Ed. with an introduction and notes by H. Reiss, transl. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge 1970, 74. We refer also to the article by *H. S. Reiss: Kant and the Right of Rebellion.* In: Journal of the History of Ideas. 17 (1956), 179 ff. There is a vast literature on the various aspects of Kant's system: one can only recomment the very instructive volume: *Materialien zu Kant's Rechtsphilosophie.* Hrsg. von Zwi Batscha. Frankfurt a. M. 1976. We shall refer to some of the articles contained in that volume. We mention also the selection from Kant's texts contained in it in pages 36 ff, which are very helpful for understanding Kant's position.

rather an expression of or doubt whether a revolt has lasting consequences, since KANT places his emphasis on the inner convictions or on the ways of thinking; the latter are not changed by an act of toppling a regime. Concurrently, KANT says elsewhere "whatever a people cannot impose upon itself, cannot be imposed upon it by the legislator either" (*Über den Gemeinspruch*, 304; cf. above edition 85). This amounts to a situation in which the lawgiver or governor is involved in the process of legislation over the people and thus cannot be separated from it. Still, it does not follow from this statement that the integration of the lawgiver into the process has the consequence that, once a separation occurs, the people can rebel against the government or the lawgiver.

There are probably two reasons for KANT's ambivalence, or let us call it reservations, as to the right to rebel. The first reason lies in what can be understood as the last refuge or asylum of freedom according to KANT — what KANT calls the "freedom of the pen" *(die Freiheit der Feder)*. This expression is used in the following context: "The non-resisting subject[74] must be able to assume that his ruler has no *wish* to do him injustice ... But if he assumes that the ruler's attitude is one of goodwill, any injustice ... can only have resulted through error, or through ignorance ... Thus the citizen must, with the approval of the ruler[75] be entitled to make public his opinion... For to assume that the head of state can neither make mistakes nor be ignorant ... would be to imply that he receives divine inspiration and is more than a human being" (*Über den Gemeinspruch*, 304; ed. 84). It is in this context that KANT speaks about "freedom of the pen"; he refers to HOBBES, saying that, according to HOBBES, the head of state has no contractual obligation towards the people, and this, according to KANT, is quite terrifying as a general proposition (ibid.). In general terms, what KANT refers to is independent thought on public affairs. Again, we have to make a distinction between the expression of views, which goes by the name of freedom of the pen, on the one hand, and rebellion, on the other. We could say that for KANT the last resort of freedom under oppression is the verbal expression. Therefore he makes the well-known dichotomy in the duties of a person such as a clergyman who has to conduct himself passively within the community, but at the same time through his writings has to argue freely, without hurting the affairs for which he is partly responsible as a passive member. Again, an officer has the duty to obey, but at the same time he has the right to point out errors in military matters. He also has the right to lay the errors before the public for judgment, and

[74] One has to be meticulous in reading the proposition: Kant refers not to the resisting but to the non-resisting subject.

[75] Again we have to emphasize that Kant does not speak here about a situation of revolt but about the consent on the part of the ruler.

in general terms, that right "cannot equitably be refused him as a scholar"[76]. A distinction is made between the duty of a citizen and the right of the scholar and here we can take the expression "scholar" as epitomizing the freedom of the pen. Summing up this point, we may say that as long as that freedom is preserved, the last vestige of man's basic freedom is preserved. Two consequences may follow, namely, that a revolt is neither justified nor necessary.[77]

A second point, which may mitigate KANT's position, is related to his evaluation of order as such and to his preference for order as against chaos or disorder. There is a kind of proximity or conformity between reason and order which eventually in the practical or political context finds its expression in what KANT calls *Publizität.*[78] Thus, for instance, there is the right of every person to give himself whatever civil constitution he sees fit. The corollary of a constitution is to avoid wars of aggression, and aggression in general; this is one of the theses of KANT's in the *Streit der Fakultäten* as well as in *Zum ewigen Frieden.* KANT sees an affinity between the universality of the moral law and the status of the law qua principle of order when he says that all actions relating to the rights of other men are unjust, if their maxim is not consistent with *Publizität.* Hence, publicity is to be understood in a sense as an empirical embodiment of the universality of the moral law. A ban on publicity hinders a nation's progress, even where its claim for natural rights is concerned. With all the distinctions between the situation of a good citizen and that of a good man, the order imbued with publicity is preferable to the disorder which is characteristic, by definition, of every rebellion. Hence we may sum up by saying that this semi-ethical position of *Publizität* and order prevents KANT from taking an unequivocal view on the citizen's right to disobey the governmental structure and eventually to rebel. The freedom is the major principle, but probably here, according to what is said in the introduction to the essay *On Theory and Practice,* we have to exercise an act of the faculty of judgment *(Ein Actus der Urteilskraft),* according to which the man of practice decides whether instances to which the rule applies are or are not there.

There is no need to dwell in this context on HOBBES' conception, because it is well known; we can only say that because HOBBES' system is somewhat single-minded in terms of the objective of the contract or the com-

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[76] On Kant's position on the issue of "Widerstandsrecht" we refer to *Kants Lehre vom Widerstandsrecht — Ein Beitrag zur Systematik der Kantischen Rechtsphilosophie* von Werner Haensel. Berlin 1926.

[77] On the aspect of publicity, consult the article by *Jürgen Habermas: Publizität als Prinzip der Vermittlung von Politik und Moral* (Kant) in the previously mentioned volume *Materialien u Kant's Rechtsphilosophie,* 175 ff. Consult the present author's *Practice and Realization.* Studies in Kant's Moral Philosophy. 54 ff.

[78] This thesis is propounded both in *Zum ewigen Frieden* as well as in *Der Streit der Fakultäten.*

monwealth, his position on the right to resist or to rebel is, if we may put it like that, basically utilitarian. "The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them... The end of obedience is protection".[79] Obedience is correlated to the *raison d'être* of the social contract; other concerns which we have discerned in KANT's reasoning do not appear in the context and are perhaps not signigicant. The same applies to the description of the rights of sovereignty; HOBBES mentions among the rights, that the sovereign is the judge of doctrines, the sole legislator, and the supreme judge of controversies (ibid. 130; cf. Anm. 9). Hence there is no way to retreat from the all-embracing right or authority of the sovereignty and to point to the "niches" which KANT mentions in his various distinctions, to which we referred before.

6.

To make a further step we may conjecture that on the issues of resistance the difference between KANT and HOBBES is not unrelated to a different interpretation of what goes by the name of human nature. In *De Cive,* HOBBES says the following: "... man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education. Furthermore, although man were born to such a condition as to desire it, it follows not, that he therefore were born fit to enter into it; for it is one thing to desire, another to be in capacity fit for what we desire; for even they, who through their pride, will not stoop to equal conditions, without which there can be no society, do yet desire".[80] We can interpret this passage by saying that, despite the significance of education, the desires are stronger and therefore predominant, compared to education and its impact.

Considering now KANT's position, we shall mention some relevant considerations related to the analysis of human nature. We do this because on several issues KANT seems to agree with the descriptions presented by HOBBES. According to KANT, man has to be educated toward the good. By nature man is not endowed with modes of behaviour which are related to culture, to civilization and to moral codes, including the civil society. Having said this, KANT somehow wavers between two views, one stressing the evil of human nature epitomized in the well-known saying about the crooked piece of wood, the aspect explored before in the analysis of KANT's philosophy of religion. At the same time KANT makes several distinctions, all of which are related to man as an animal, but he introduces the concept of *animal rationa-*

[79] References to *Leviathan* are from *Leviathan or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil.* Oxford 1946, 144.

[80] *De Cive or The Citizen* by Thomas Hobbes. Ed. with an Introduction by St. P. Lamprecht. New York 1949. 22 Footnote.

bile, that is to say, an animal endowed with the capacity to reason. As an animal of this kind he makes out of himself a reasonable animal *(animal rationale; Anthropologie.* 321). Inherent in this double-faceted position and character of man lies the human capacity to set for himself a purpose (*Met. d. Sitten.* 392). Included in that capacity is the human possibility to relate to the idea of the most perfect of his kind. (*KdrV* B 371 ff; transl. 310 ff).

We can conclude this comparison: the very duality of KANT's system, the distinction between the empirical and the noumenal and the presence of the noumenal within the context of human behaviour, enable KANT to read the starting-point of the human condition as well as the shift towards the civil society in a way which differs from what could be described as the one-dimensional presentation characteristic of HOBBES. Hence the comparison betwen KANT and HOBBES related to the impact of education, is a qualified comparison only, since at least one aspect of KANT's concept of education leads him to ground education not only in the given communication between human beings but also in the moral maxim. It is for this reason that KANT refers even to a sort of a hybrid concept such as reasonable natural being, *vernünftiges Naturwesen.* In the part of his section on HOBBES related to theory and practice KANT speaks of a natural vocation of man to communicate with his fellows, especially in matters affecting mankind as a whole *(Über den Gemeinspruch.* 305; transl. 85-86).

The second aspect in KANT's analysis, which has to be mentioned here is that, even on the empirical level of desires — that is to say, disregarding the motivation by reason — KANT notices a kind of dialectic between the motivation and its outcome. This is well known from his analysis of the state of war between human beings, which leads to peaceful coexistence. It also applies to other aspects of the human situation, where KANT is driven somehow to acknowledge good results which do not originate in good intentions. This aspect of his theory does not fit the empirical description of the human character, let alone the noumenal one. But it is significant for the understanding of the major issue which will now occupy our attention, i. e. the structure of the social contract.

At this juncture it is appropriate to refer parenthetically to a statement made by LEO STRAUSS, which reads as follows: "The antithesis of nature and human will is hidden by the monist (materialist-deterministic) metaphysic, which HOBBES *teaches*, which he found himself forced to adopt simply because he saw no other possibility of escaping the "substantialist" conception of mind ... This dilemma, which was not swept aside until KANT and his successors..."[81] One may wonder whether this interpretation is warranted, be-

[81] *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Its Basis and Its Genesis.* by Leo Strauss. Transl. from the German Manuscript by E. M. Sinclair. Chicago 1952, 168. Consult also: *Michael Oakeshott: Hobbes on Civil Association.* Berkeley and Los Angeles 1975.

cause it is explicitly or implicitly related to — to say the least — a double-meaning of the concept of reason. Reason may be understood as belonging to man's natural equipment for devising the various means beneficent to his behaviour and even to his survival. Thus KANT admits that man does not arbitrarily exit the state of nature. Because of that understanding, KANT says that HOBBES viewed all laws, including the moral ones, as despotic (ibid. 483; cf. note 12). As long as we remain on this level, there can exist a conjunction between a deterministic conditioning and the reason leading to the establishment of the commonwealth. Yet at this point KANT takes a different view, distinguishing between imposed laws and laws of practical reason proper. This distinction eventually finds its expression in the structure of the commonwealth and the social contract establishing it.

7.

The difference between HOBBES' and KANT's views on the essence of the social contract becomes now clear: in HOBBES the motivation for the contract is prudential or utilitarian, whereas KANT somehow merges the prudential consideration, which leads to the exit from the natural state, with the moral consideration proper, which is based on the notion of duty. We find in HOBBES the statement: "By a good law, I mean not a just law: for no law can be unjust ... A good law is that, which is *needful*, for the *good of the people*, and withal perspicuous" (*Leviathan*. 227). KANT did not share that view. Even when preference is given to order over chaos and over the state of war between human beings, any primary identification of law with goodness is precluded. Before moving to explore some nuances in KANT's position, it has to be mentioned that the difference between HOBBES and KANT also lies in their different understanding of reason. For HOBBES, reason is, as he puts it, a kind of reckoning, that is to say, adding and substrating, marking and signifying. For KANT, reason in its proper sense is the sum-total of principles and the adherence to the principles stems from the spontaneity of reason itself.

We shall consider now some of the descriptions of the nature of the contract and its grounding, as we find them in KANT. In the first place it is proper to observe that for KANT the concept of duty as such leads to application. Therefore, as he says, any worries about the empty ideality of the concept disappear completely (*Über den Gemeinspruch*. 286 ff; transl. 62). In this sense, duty appears as an independent and self-sufficient motive for action and can be separated from desires and from the empirical motivations which play a role in the factual coexistence and even cooperation of human beings, but is not the fundamental basis of that coexistence and cooperation. In the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, KANT says: "The formal condition under which nature can alone attain ... its real end is the existence of a constitution so regulating the

mutual relations of men that the abuse of freedom by individuals striving one against another is opposed by a lawful authority centered in a whole, called a civil *community*" (*KdU* § 83; transl. II. 96).

There are three levels to be distinguished in KANT's consideration: the desires, the civil community regulating the mutual relations of men, and then what he calls an original contract which amounts for him to establishing a completely lawful constitution and commonwealth. At this point he says explicitly that he does not assume that this contract exists as a fact, for it cannot possibly be so. A contract of this kind is based on a coalition of the wills of all private individuals in a notion to form a common public will. It is, in fact, only an idea of reason which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality (*Über den Gemeinspruch.* 297; transl. 76). This idea of the will, to use somehow the well known concept of "cunning" — this time cunning of moral reason — takes advantage of the empirical motivation of human beings. But the idea is looming central and establishes a public will which probably is KANT's echo to ROUSSEAU's *volonté générale.* To use here ROUSSEAU's vocabulary, we would say that one facet of the social contract, based on desires and the overriding desire for self-protection, leads, at most, to the *volonté de tous,* whereas the duty, the idea, the acknowledgement of humanity and humaneness etc., lead to the *volonté générale.* In this sense we may sum up by saying — applying again a typology — that KANT's description or analysis of the social contract acknowledges the stratum put forward by HOBBES but adds to it the stratum put forward by ROUSSEAU. By doing so, KANT reinterprets HOBBES' position in terms of the empirical motivation of human beings, and ROUSSEAU's position by interpreting it in terms of his notion of Practical Reason in the strict sense of the term. What is characteristic of KANT's position is that the two typological interpretations of the social contract are brought together, if not merged: the ideational social contract is implanted on the factual motivation and the factual coexistence between human beings. The two approaches to the social contract and the motivation behind it meet, even when they do not coalesce.

8.

The difference between HOBBES and KANT goes beyond these detailed issues — important as they may be. The central issue is the very model of the contract in the two systems. HOBBES says: "... the art whereby God hath made and governs the world is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal" (*Leviathan.* 5). Implied here is a similarity between man and God and imitation of God by man. God governs the world of nature which is the manifestation of his creation, while man, by creating an artificial animal, qua statehood, governs that artificial

creature by what is called government, in terms of a commonwealth or state. One can assume that Hobbes speaks of an artificial animal because of the subsequent reference to the *Leviathan* in its connotations. He says this explicitly: "For by art is created the great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, in Latin CIVITAS, which is but an artificial man" (ibid.). To be sure, we find here two metaphoric expressions, one referring to an artifical animal and the other to an artificial man. Perhaps we could understand this duality by suggesting that the metaphor of the animal is meant as a hint at the monstrous character of statehood, while the metaphor of man alludes to ruling and decisions related to the protection of man, which, as we said before, is the very *raison d'être* of the commonwealth or state. The last point is significant, since the decision to create the state is taken by looking at the paradigm of the covenant (and this again points to the imitation of God by man). That decision is a result of understanding, namely, that dominion over men is necessary to the conservation of man; in this sense it ought to be allowed to him (ibid. 81). The manifestation of human activity in an artifact re-emphasizes the basic consideration of the instrumental position of the commonwealth. In the very covenant we already find a suppression of the innate human inclinations; from the angle of those inclinations whatever happens including the of the social contract is bound to be of an artificial character. The motivation is innate, that is to say, the urge or drive to survive is inherent in human nature, but the way it is realized is artificially constructed. To be sure, we revert here to one aspect of the concept of reason namely, that by nature man, even if the state of nature is motivated not only by his inclinations, is *pari passu* capable of weighing alternatives and giving preference to be best of them in terms of their suitability to preserve human existence or to overcome the constant fear of violent death. Having emphasized the artificiality as a focus of Hobbes' notion of the social contract, we move now to Kant's position and look at it anew from the vantage of human creativity, that is to say, whether or not it is exhausted in the dichotomy of nature versus artificiality. The issue at stake is obviously related to the issue of urges versus duty or intelligibility in general.

The position of the commonwealth as an artificial device is not accidental and probably does not only represent the turning point of the shift from considering human beings as social beings replacing the consideration of them as egoistic individuals. It is mainly based upon the point of departure of Hobbes' political theory which is that the desire for survival and self-preservation is the predominant desire of human beings, and as such is central to their behaviour. Hence the institutions established can be only artificial or instrumental, subservient to that basic desire. The centrality of the desire and its preponderance turn it into a given end of human behaviour, whereby modes of behaviour empirically encountered have that motivation and end. One could say that in Hobbes' view the commonwealth and all that

goes with it have a common denominator: they are of instrumental value.[82] The same end is implemented through different means.

Not so with KANT. We can start with the general proposition that for KANT the civil society and its order, including the state order, are to be listed under the heading of *praxis* or practical reality, and do not belong to the sphere of *poiesis*. In the first place, in this context, it is not without significance to make the empirical observation that according to KANT even in the natural state we find some legal arrangements, like marriage or households. To be sure, these arrangements are not grounded — at least not deliberately so — in the *a priori* law and its validity. But these arrangements mitigate the overly egoistic interpretation of human nature which is taken as the empirical point of departure of the structure of human-social existence.

The second aspect, which has to be brought forward in this context, is that KANT's idea of universal history leads him to the position that the purpose of human existence can be achieved only in a society, and more specifically in the society granting the greatest freedom (on this: *Ideen* 22; transl. 16). Hence society occupies a teleological position and thus cannot be viewed simply as an order, as an invented and thus artificial device, for the preservation of human existence. Probably from this consideration KANT is driven to the distinction between what he calls wild or lawless freedom as against freedom proper, which is to be achieved concretely in what he calls the juridical state of society (*Zum ewigen Frieden,* 348-350; transl. 92-93). If this distinction between the two concepts or levels of freedom is brought in, then it would be difficult to arrive at the conclusion that for the sake of the preservation of existence men are willing to give up freedom. They are giving up *wild* freedom, but not freedom in the sense elaborated by KANT, in terms of the structural correlation between objective laws and self-legislation. By definition, that sort of freedom cannot be lodged in the sphere of experience, and thus cannot be encountered in the area of the natural state, which conceptually and historically precedes the moral order. This is the reason for KANT's variations on the theme that the freedom of the will is the supersensuous element dwelling in ourselves and representing as such the independence from determination by sensuous urges. The wild freedom belongs to nature; but freedom in the moral sense cannot belong there and has to be listed with *praxis* as related to the shaping action of the agent and not to the construction of devices of an external character, like the artificiality of the commonwealth.

An additional element has to be mentioned in this context which refers to the evil character of human essence, to the crooked piece of wood in KANT's

[82] On the position of self-preservation consult: *Hans Blumenberg: Selbsterhaltung und Beharrung — Zur Konstitution der neuzeitlichen Rationalität.* In: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz. 1969, Nr. 11.

metaphoric expression, and to the notion of evil in general, which as we have seen is central from the perspective of philosophy of religion. We recall that the radicality of evil is not attributed to urges, not even to the hyper-egoistic ones, but to the decision to defy the moral imperative. Hence, evil proper is dealt with not on the level of nature in terms of the given desires and urges of human beings, but in terms of the inner structure of the moral or practical realm in the sense that human beings who know the imperative do not follow it automatically and even defy it deliberately. What is central for KANT's view of the political order, though he says so with some hesitation, is that the political order established as it is, — and the notion of the contract points to that mode of establishment — has its place in the area of *praxis* in his sense, and not in the area of *poiesis* or artificiality. He says, for instance, that the end of the establishment of the *status civilis* is not the public happiness, but *ius publicum (Ges. Schriften.* Bd 19, 565). What he calls the well-being *(Heil)* of the state does not lie in the welfare of the citizens of the state nor in their happiness, but in the situation of the greatest conformity of the constitution with the principles of the law, that is to say, it is related to the categorical imperative (*Met. d. Sitten.* 319). It is because of this consideration that KANT stresses repeatedly that the shift from the natural state to the political one is a shift from the singularity of human beings to a kind of universality: people cease to be *omnes et singuli* and become *omnes et universi.*[83]

These aspects of KANT's position lead us to the conclusion that states cease to be instruments only. By being integrated in the moral sphere proper, they gain what we would call in contemporary philosophical language, an inherent and not only an instrumental value. But one could add that the morally inherent status of the political order does not erase its instrumental value and position. KANT probably thought that, if the moral law prescribes respect for human beings or for the human species, the preservation of the existence of human beings — that is to say, HOBBES' major consideration — will be taken care of within the structure of the moral realm. In this sense the intrinsic consideration merges with the instrumental one or, from the other angle, the empirical desires and urges become supportive of the moral order. Thus KANT, by absorbing many elements of HOBBES' theory, takes a view which can be regarded as an attempted merger of the practical and the poietical considerations or, from a critical stand, moves in the direction of a coexistence of these two considerations and even waver between them. Since moral laws belong to the self-legislation of reason, we could say: whereas for

[83] The point is throughly analysed in *Richard Saage: Naturzustand und Eigentum,* included in the above-mentioned volume *Materialien zu Kant's Rechtsphilosophie,* 206 ff. See also in that volume: *Dieter Henrich: Kant über die Revolution,* 359 ff. Consult here: *Metaphysik der Sitten,* 315; On Kant's theory of politics consult: *Kant als Politiker, zur Staats- und Gesellschaftslehre des Kriticismus* von Kurt Borries. Leipzig 1928.

HOBBES self-legislation amounts to artificiality, or creativity and artificiality are for him synonymous, for KANT creativity transcends artificiality. Thus the social contract ceases to be only a device and becomes an embodiment of human reason and a step taken for the realization of freedom proper. In this sense we notice in KANT's political philosophy a mitigated attempt to overcome the sharp dichotomy characteristic of his own practical philosophy.

9.

We may step now to an evaluation of KANT's position and emphasize again that the significance of his conception of the civil society and the state lies in his view that the two are links between the natural state and the ethical situation. As links they serve two ends: the end of the security which is permanently endangered in the natural state, and the end of the mutual respect and reverence of human beings, which is mandated by the ethical imperative. This double faceted character of the civil society and the state is again grounded in two aspects of will: the will as the factor in the decision aims at serving the deciding agent — this would be the will rather akin to inclinations and urges; and the will deciding in the direction prescribed by the moral law — and this would be the will in the strict ethical sense grounded in freedom and not in inclinations and absorbing in itself the norm of the imperative.

KANT conceived the civil society and the state as a link in an additional sense: that between the scattered individuals and individuals co-existing one next to another but still not identical in their co-existence with the status of mankind — mankind both as a human race and as humanity in the ethical sense of the latter term. Because of this in-between position of the civil society and the state, te external law and coercion can be viewed as legitimate, since we have to keep in mind the violence threatening the human beings and at the same time see the difference between the position of the state as serving as a hindrance to violence and embodying the moral law. These aspects in KANT's theory of the civil society and the state are the strong point of that theory which, to some extent, deliberately or not, overcomes on the empirical level the dichotomy between the empirical and the intelligible, a dichotomy to which we referred several times in our analysis of KANT's various systematic exceptions their critical evaluation. The civil society and the state are empirical structures though not in the tangible sense of that term. Just the same, though being empirical they do not permit the adherence to the duality in the usual sense present in KANT's system. Thus one finds here an overcoming of the chasm between the two factors of the duality for the sake of a closer kinship or co-operation between these aspects.

There exists a specific aspect of politics in respect to morality — the former is concerned with the conditional duty while the latter is guided by an unconditional and absolute mandatory duty. Politics finds it advisable not to have

any dealings with morality. It rather denies its reality preferring to reduce all duties to mere benevolence (*Zum ewigen Frieden.* 385; ed. 134). But the very fact that KANT introduced into the scope of the analysis the concept of duty, though in the conditional sense, cannot be disregarded in our attempt to see the various links between the commonwealth and the ethical sphere, visualising again the state as an in-between structure. Thus KANT brings into the context of his analysis not just stages of the development of morality but also structures, each one of them having its own immanent justification. Precisely because the natural state is one of war and a state of peace must be established (ibid. 349; ed. 92) the element of will is put forward. Again the commonwealth being grounded in an act of will may serve as a step towards will in the sense essential for the ethical considerations. Eventually, the inter-relation between the structure of the state and the demand of the moral imperative is summed up in the following way: "A good constitution is not to be expected from morality, but, conversely, a good moral condition of a people is to be expected only under a good constitution" (ibid 366-7; ed. 112-3).

We may ask at this point why can we not expect a good constitution to emerge directly from morality, taking into account the basic fact that KANT attributed to morality the power to guide human behaviour out of its own resources? The answer seems to be that morality appeals either to the individual or to humanity at large and does not address itself directly to the co-existence of a plurality of individuals. That co-existence, having a structure of its own, needs a guiding principle. The constitution serves as that principle (related to it in the first place), while the civil society serves as a given background of the co-existence.

KANT makes a further step, that is to say that the good constitution is the link towards morality and there is no immediate jump from the state of nature to the moral situation. Therefore KANT adds the following: "Instead of genuine morality, the mechanism of nature brings it to pass through selfish inclinations, which naturally conflict outwardly but which can be used by reason as a means for its own end, the sovereignty of law, and as concerns the state, for promoting and securing internal and external peace" (ibid. 366-7; transl. 113).

Reason looms central, taking advantage of the in-between status of the commonwealth or of the constitution, because eventually reason is the aim and it takes advantage of the needs. Just the same there is more of a proximity between the commonwealth and the constitution on the one hand and reason and the moral sphere on the other. Men are already somehow moulded, at least externally, within the structure of the commonwealth. Thus again at least in terms of their behaviour, they are closer to the behaviour prescribed by reason and the moral imperative than they are when placed in the natural state. Here too, the will, which leads to the establishing of the

structure of the commonwealth and the constitution, is a means for the reference to the moral imperative and to the adequate response to it. It is from this aspect that we shall now explore some details of the respective positions and see the difference between KANT and Hegel as centered, to a large extent, on Hegel's denial of the applicability of the notion of contract to the inter-human situation, including the structure of the state.

10.

First: some additional aspects of the juxtaposition will be explored when we look at KANT's version of the social contract within his practical philosophy, which can be understood as a version of the ARISTOTELian distinction between natural and legal justice and the variations on that distinction present in ARISTOTLE. The social contract, referring to the organised society and statehood, can be conceived as a manifestation of legal justice. The very consent or agreement which is inherent in the notion of the contract points to the fact that we are concerned here with an arrangement, that is to say with a positive structure and not with a binding which can be listed as being natural — once we understand natural us identical with rational. The rational is inherent in the ethical system grounded in the law of reason while the contract, by definition, is an organised arrangement and presupposes the consent or the decision of the will, be the motivation of that decision as it may.

It is evident that the whole profile changes once we look at Hegel's view both of the contract being negated in his system as well at his view on the position of the state and its structure. It is not essential to go at this juncture into Hegel's comments on the freedom of the will which was extracted from the various feelings and phenomena of the ordinary consciousness such as remorse, guilt, etc. (*Phil. d. Rechts* § 4; transl. 21). The essential point is that, according to Hegel, a contract arises from the arbitrary will. Hence the identical will which is brought into existence according to the social contract theory by the contract is only posited by the parties. It is a will shared in common and is not an absolutely universal will (ibid. § 75; transl. 58). To use the traditional distinction, we can say that the contract is an outcome of a legal arrangement of a positive character and cannot be seen as grounded in the rational will or in rationality in general. As a matter of fact, Hegel considers the very idea of the contract transposed to the realm of the state as the greatest confusion in both constitutional law and public existence. What is characteristic of that notion is the transfer of features of the private property into a sphere of a quite different and higher nature (ibid. § 75; transl. 59).

It is significant to emphasize that, according to Hegel, the transfer is not only a misplacement in terms of blurring the distinction between the private and the public sphere; it is also impairing the higher status of the social

sphere. The state is not a contract at all nor is its fundamental essence the unconditional protection and guarantee of the life and property of members of the public as individuals (ibid. § 100; transl. 71). Hence Hegel is attempting to remove from he realm of statehood the instrumental character which is inherent in the notion of the social contract and which KANT too retained, though obviously KANT did not identify the position of interhuman relations with the instrumental concern. He could evade that by distinguishing between various levels of the human situation. To be sure, even the instrumental position of the state cannot be listed as being of an arbitrary character or as being motivated by arbitrary wills, their opinion, and their capriciously given express consent (ibid. § 258; transl. 157). The state is, according to Hegel, mind objectified (ibid. § 258; transl. 156). Once the position of the state is referred to the mind or to the spirit it cannot rely on the agreement or on the will because, according to Hegel, once whims and caprices of the many are involved, the encountered situation is opposed to the idea of ethical life.

Obviously, the whole systematic position is related to the question of the connection between will and thought and mind which is in principle thinking. Again, we cannot make the position of the will as being central, neither of pure will in the KANTian sense, nor a portion of will as related to arbitrariness and human urges on the empirical level. Even the practical attitude begins in thinking and the dialectical process related to that, that is to say, when I determine myself I posit the difference and in this sense what I have done or made bears a trace of my mind. The theoretical attitude is essentially contained in the practical (ibid. § 258; transl. 155 ff). Once the will contains the theoretical attitude in itself it cannot provide room for establishing an alleged independent domain of practice; this systematic concept prohibits the possibility of establishing the relationship between the state and the component of decision, that relationship which is the underlying idea of the social contract. The same applies to the notion of the law which is the abstract expression of the universal will as it is in itself and for itself (*Phil. Prop.* 71).

All these considerations lead us to the conclusion that Hegel is not taking exception to this or to that particular feature of the idea of social contract, be its particular version as it may. He negates the whole idea of the contract since that idea leads to the conclusion that a common will is only relatively universal. In this position it is still opposed to the particular will and does not sublate *(aufhebt)* that will into its own structure. In contracts the parties still retain their particular wills and the consequence is that the contract is not yet beyond the stage of arbitrariness with the result being that it remains at the mercy of wrong (*Phil. d. Rechts.* § 81 Zus.; transl. 243).

From this fundamental rejection of the idea of the social contract it does not follow that Hegel rejects, for instance, HOBBES' description of the state of nature. On the contrary, he says that that description is correct (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 2. 271). Yet he observes (ibid. 364) that HOBBES did not completely

develop the essence of the spiritual element. This becomes evident in the fact that HOBBES wrote only *De Cive* and thus has put forward only a limited conception of the essence of man. HOBBES discussed human existence only at the level of man as a civil being without realising that the status of man has to be conceived as integrated in the context of the spirit and its transformations, thereby including the spirit within the state as a whole and as a mode of human existence. To put it metaphorically, we could say that HOBBES and those who follow him, including KANT, have looked at the state from below, while Hegel looks at the state from above, that is to say, from the spiritual essence which finds its partial representation in the state.

11.

Though Hegel accepted HOBBES' presentation of the state of nature, he still has some reservations about that since he observes that the strife for mutual recognition characteristic of the state of nature and of the shift to the society organised in a state refers only to the strife on the level of life and death. We cannot understand that mode of strife as being the overriding human motivation, since the human being is from the very beginning involved in the spiritual essence. Thus is cannot be seen as being motivated by elementary factors only or, to put it differently, those factors are already implicitly present in the comprising realm of the spirit.

We come back at this juncture to the question of whether the whole dichotomy differentiating between man's empirical character and his rational one does justice to the primary synthesis characteristic of human essence, though that synthesis may manifest itself step by step only. Here it has to be observed that when Hegel criticises the idea of the contract he does not refer to HOBBES but to KANT's philosophy of law, criticising the subsumption of marriage *(Ehe)* under the concept of contract and adding to the characterisation that such a subsumption is shameful (*Schändlichkeit; Phil. d. Rechts* § 75; transl. 58).

Eventually what we find in Hegel is that he attempts to remove the structure of statehood and of the social realm in general from the dependence on will to the dependence on reason. He does this in the first place in order to emphasise the correlation between reason and universality. One of the expressions of that universality is that the substantial welfare of the state has claims to recognition totally different from those of the welfare of the individuals. KANT has seen, for instance, in the problem of war or peace a possibility of two standards and even a clash of them — the standard of the moral consideration and the standard of the interest of the state. Hegel says: "When politics is alleged to clash with morals and so to be always wrong, the doctrine propounded rests on superficial *(Seichtigkeit)* ideas about morality, the

nature of the state, and the state's relation to the moral point of view." (ibid. § 337; transl. 215).

Again, we can say that the notion of sublation opens the door for that possibility of elevating the position of the state to the position of morality including the code of behaviour of the state, whereas the dichotomy inherent in KANT's system does not allow for such an elevation or sublation; there is no systematic room for them in KANT's system. Since, according to Hegel, thinking itself translates itself into existence, he can refer to the immanent reason which is present in the system of human needs and their dynamics. These human needs are a restless system and on that level we find particular resources of human beings. One's share in those resources is conditioned partly by one's unearned capital and partly by the skill of the individual. Here accidental circumstances play a role and eventually we encounter, on this level, as an inevitable consequence the disparities between individual resources and abilities. Men are made unequal by nature and in civil society the right of particularity is far from annulling this natural inequality. Hence universality cannot be found on that level at all and we have to look to the inner evolvement of particularity in universality (ibid. § 200; transl. 130), which is characteristic in the notion of sublation as such. We could say at this point that the distinction between particularity and universality echoes KANT's distinction between urges and inclinations and the moral law, which is universal by definition. But again — the difference between KANT and Hegel comes to the foreground in the fact that for Hegel there is an immanent evolvement from particularity to universality, while for KANT the difference between the two levels and motivating factors remains a chasm which cannot be immanently bridged over.

We can sum up by saying that the universality is a *tertium quid* between will and thinking or reason. Will is the sole determining factor of universality and, as such, is essentially freedom. From this point of view there would be no difference between thinking which is the self-activity and the essence of will as freedom. The ultimate conclusion is that the basis of the state is the power of reason actualising itself in will (ibid. § 258 Zus.; transl. 279). Hence it follows that the state cannot be grounded in a contract, since a contract implies will and its decision and can be motivated by prudence only. Social existence and statehood are only stages in the progress towards speculation since speculation is the most adequate manifestation of the spirit — as we analysed before. Since for Hegel the state is a manifestation of reason and thus is one of the embodiments of the spirit and in this sense is closer to theory or speculation than to practice and its variations. Here, we can only hint at the position of MARX's theory, namely that MARX attempted to bring back society from the level of speculation to the level of practice. He tried to find the way to look at society as a universal sphere on the level of practice without assuming that a society has to be viewed essentially as grounded in spirit and thus in

speculation. This conception can be understood as an attempt to reach a synthesis between Hegel's view of society and the position of society as presented by KANT.

12.

At this point we can try to make some critical comments — and indeed they are in line with the critical comments reiterated time and again when the two systems have been juxtaposed. What has been said before about the relationship between practical and theoretical philosophy holds good when we approach the particular sphere, namely that of society and state. Architectonically speaking, as has been said before, Hegel has an advantage over KANT because he comprised the various spheres in one comprehensive realm of the spirit. But that direction of the system leads to a conclusion that the particular features of each one of the spheres gets lost or at least blurred *en route*.

This becomes also evident in the analysis of the relationship between will on the one hand and society and state on the other. Hegel is prompted to identify the aspect of will with the aspect of arbitrariness since he does not visualise an in-between position, for instance the prudential considerations of human beings which may lead them in the direction of an organised structure qua society and state, without necessarily leading them to the universality as embodied in state and eventually inherent in the comprehensive sphere of spirit. The notion of sublation leads Hegel to look at different structures as stages only. Thus, as we observe in terms of the relationship between morals and politics, this conception leads him eventually to look at the various spheres as stages subordinated to one, and to one only, criterion of evaluation. But when we take the society and the state as grounded in a decision and that decision is not necessarily arbitrary — though it is not necessarily identical with universality in the sense of reason — we point to a sphere which may have its own structure. Thus its own position can be evaluated according to that structure, without assuming that as such there can be no clash, for instance, between the moral consideration and the political one or the political interest. The assumption of a basic synthesis between the various components seems to be far fetched. Thus the architectonic advantage may make us myopic in realising the differences between the various spheres including the possible or actual clashes between them.

This applies to the component of consent and agreement in the existence of a society, let alone in the existence of a state. Whereas society can be looked at — and Hegel analysed this aspect — as based upon an exchange between human beings, an exchange of services and of labour, and thus implying mutuality, the state is based on an order. As such, it has a hierarchical or a horizontal structure. It can be an outcome of the mutuality but it is still an

order different from mutuality — and in a sense this is a Hegel's view. But as the matter of fact the order of statehood is not a physical entity and is not subjected to the laws of nature. It is a created order established by human will, agreement and consent. Moreover, and obviously we move here beyond the idea of the notion of the original contract, the state as an order is perpetually created: unless human beings give their consent to the order, explicitly or not, the order cannot exist. If a separation occurs between the will and agreement of human beings and the order — the order creases to exist and becomes a relic of the past, that is to say a foregone entity which has been related to actual human beings in the past and is not related to the present.

We cannot belittle the aspect of consent and agreement by relegating it to the identification of will and arbitrariness. Obviously, one of the manifestations of the consent is that a consent may pertain to the order as such but not to particular actions performed on behalf of it, for instance by governments or by political organisations within the order. Being in that position does not make them essentially identical with the order as such. The presence of the action of will and agreement in the social-political sphere opens the possibility for varieties within that sphere. Thus it opens the way for looking at the political sphere as a semi-comprehensive sphere on the one hand and as a variegated sphere on the other.

He we come to the conclusion that the element of will is not only an initiating factor; it is not only a factor maintaining the social-political order but is also a factor which gives to that order a structure of plurality or variations which may have also an ethical connotation. Once we see the possibility that the law of reason can be differently interpreted, we probably go beyond KANT's system, as we have done before in terms of the concept of intelligibility. Nevertheless, somehow we remain within KANT's outlines though we are trying to look at them from a more empirical point of view.

Chapter Nine
ARCHITECTONICS AND EDIFICE

1.

In our attempt to understand the concept of critique, we may refer to its appearance in PLATO as connoting separation or distinction. PLATO says in *Politicos*[84] that the attempted division of the totality of the sciences leads to two major classes or groups of sciences, the one which is theoretical, giving a vendid and the other which furthers action by its command. The theoretical group of sciences is called pure, while the other is called applied.[85] PLATO analyzes the statesman and his political behaviour as pertaining to applied science. But what is important for our context is the statesman's performance in relation to subordinates. In this division of the totality of the sciences there is a theoretical, or critical approach, that of a spectator placed on an upper level who purviews the sciences on the level below.

2.

Critique as distinction has been identified by PLATO and cannot be seen as an innovation and, by the same token, as characterizing exclusively KANT's critique. It is our first task to identify some aspects of the notion of critique which would seem to be characteristic of KANT's understanding of the term. In a letter written to MARCUS HERZ at the end 1773, KANT uses the term: the procedure of reason which isolates itself. The concern with reason, its essence and activity, is a concern in which reason reflects upon itself. The first manifestation of reflection is the very identification of reason, an identification which implies as its basis or perhaps as its methodical instrument the isolation of reason. That isolation cannot be performed, let alone imposed, by any other agent, if we may use that term, but by reason itself. Thus reason is both the subject of the activity and its object or subject-matter. Hence criti-

[84] *Politicos.* 258, 260; *Statesman.* Ed. by E. Hamilton. Princeton 1980. 1021, 1023.
[85] *Briefwechsel.* The above mentioned edition, 113.

que of reason is in the first place critique of pure reason, that is to say, that the distinction made by reason is between itself and the various sciences, as well as between the performance of reason in different directions — like the direction of knowledge and the direction of morality. Critique of pure reason applies therefore to reason both in the sense of *genetivus subjectivus* as well as in the sense of *genetivus objectivus*. We can add that in spite of KANT's preoccupation with morality as practical reason, the critique of pure reason was bound to precede the critique of practical reason, not only — or not mainly — because knowledge has to be analysed in its performance and limitations before morality is posited, but mainly because pure reason is co-terminous with isolated reason. Before that isolation is established, no distinction between sciences or the various orientations and interests of reason can be introduced as a major concern of critique. The difference between KANT's approach and PLATO's is not only that KANT presents a developed system of distinctions, but that the spectator looking at the totality of the sciences is an agent of reason as isolated and placed on the upper level of the philosophical discourse. In the same letter to HERZ, KANT says that critique of pure reason enables him to proceed to the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals (ibid. 100; cf. note 85).

3.

But here, too, there is a kind of intermediate stage. In his letter of February 21, 1772 to MARCUS HERZ, KANT mentions the establishment of the limits of sensuality and of freedom, in two parts — the theoretical and the practical. As a matter of fact, we may doubt whether this statement does justice to what KANT meant in the context of the isolation of reason, since it is only from the point of view of reason as isolated that we move further to the distinction between the theoretical and the practical. Moreover, the distinction between reason and sensuality is again a distinction performed by reason — which as such appears here on two levels: the comprehensive outlook from the perspective of reason, which, in turn, leads to the distinction between reason and sensuality. Perhaps KANT mentions the latter without going into the self-reflective essence of reason on the upper level not only because he was aware of the relation between reason and sensuality as two distinct faculties, or as he says two stages of our approach to the world, but also because he has seen as a major innovation, the identification of sensuality as a permanent element of knowledge or theory. This innovation led him — and this is obvious — to identify synthesis as the major manifestation and presupposition of any knowledge. This assumption led him subsequently to reject explicitly or implicitly the traditional approach to sensuality as a stage which can and must be overcome in order to reach the highest stage of knowledge — as, for instance, PLATO and SPINOZA viewed it. Instead of pointing to the direction of

overcoming sensuality. KANT goes in the direction of putting aside sensuality by the very step towards morality, which is the more adequate manifestation of reason within the context of the dichotomy between sensuality and reason. What is significant here is that the critical approach does not lead to a distinction between the sciences, a distinction which is committed to the view that sensuality, being a lower faculty than reason or understanding, has to be overcome. Instead, sensuality loses its impact in the sphere of morality, where the imperative creates the response, leaving no room for a mode of receptivity related to sensuality.

4.

The distinction between levels of reason, which can only partially be seen as synonymous with the distinction between reason and understanding, is significant from various angles of the argument of KANT's critical philosophy. KANT says, for instance, that we can regard a science of the mere examination of pure reason, of its sources and limits, as *propaedeutic* to the system of pure reason: "as such, it should be called a critique, not a doctrine, of pure reason" (*KdrV* 25; transl. 59). KANT uses the term "critique" as connoting the preparatory step, i. e., the propaedeutic one, to the system of pure reason. He probably does that because critique connotes here the very approach of introducing distinctions. These are not of a historical character but of a basic character, like, for instance, the distinction between knowledge and morality. The making of the distinction does not as such imply that we have already identified the positive relations between the various areas which have been distinguished. Yet it has to be pointed out that according to the above statement of the critical perspective, a system is possible, because the subject matter is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding which passes judgment upon the nature of things.

Moreover, the reference is to understanding in respect to its a priori knowledge (*KdrV* 26; transl. 59). The critique of pure reason has to lay down the architectonic plan for the system or for what is called transcendental philosophy (*KdrV* 27; transl. 60). Here too we notice a kind of ambivalence in KANT as to the position of his critical approach. In so far as we look upon critique as preparatory in character, it is preparatory in terms of what he calls metaphysics — metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals. Nature and morals are metaphysical dimensions probably in the sense that they are ultimate spheres, that is to say, nature cannot be reduced to morality nor morality to nature. The critical approach can be viewed in this sense as a perview of disciplines whereby the disciplines as such are to be listed as metaphysics. Obviously the very fact that there are two parallels — nature and morals — leads KANT to a further critical question related not to the distinction but to the relation pertaining between the distinguished spheres.

KANT said in one of his pre-critical books that metaphysics is a science related to the limits of human reason[86] which allows us to wonder whether the distinction between the critical approach and the metaphysical one can be maintained. Yet it is clear that were it not for the distinction between reason and sensuality, which indeed implies the notion of limits of reason, since reason cannot be made identical with sensuality nor sensuality can be viewed as a stage leading to reason — the very distinction between nature and morals would lack foundation. This is so since the critical approach identifies nature as related to data which have to be brought into the horizon of knowledge through the medium of sensuality, and also the interaction between will and imperative refers to sensuality whereby will is already either inherent in freedom or manifesting itself in it. That interaction is a characteristic feature of the point of departure of morality but does not contain in itself an element of sensuality in the first place. We do not have to overcome sensuality in order to outline the scope of morality grounded in reason. We are from the very beginning in a sphere without sensuality.

5.

KANT says that the critique limits speculative reason and is indeed negative (*KdrV* XXV; transl. 26). The meaning of "negative" is, apparently, the inherent limitation of speculative reason so that it can make no theoretical advances beyond the structure of the synthesis between reason and sensuality into the field of pure reason proper which is the domain of practical reason alone. KANT says this when he points out that this negative limit removes the obstacle which stands in the way of practical reason. The critique's positive position is to enable the assertion of the employment of practical reason, since the moral or practical employment of pure reason must go beyond the limits of sensuality. The role of critique here is not only to present the limits of the speculative or cognitive employment of reason, but also to make certain that by moving beyond the limits of sensuality — and by the same token beyond the limits of cognitive activity — reason may not be brought into conflict with itself (*KdrV.* XXV; transl. 26-27). KANT uses a rather striking metaphor in order to bring out the positive character of the critique, that is to say, that its negative character does not exhaust its relevance. He says that denial of its service in this case would be like saying that the police are of no positive benefit in as much as their main function is preventive (there).

[86] *Träume eines Geistersehers.* Akad. Ausg. Bd 2. 367-368.

We may wonder in which sense the term "critique" is used in this context. Is it critique as a self-isolating faculty, or is it critique as distinguishing between reason and sensuality? The very distinction between the faculties is a performance of reason as a self-isolating faculty, referring to reason as cognitive and to sensuality as an essential element of cognition. Yet, when KANT moves to emphasize the positive aspect of critique, that is, morality as going beyond the structure of cognition, he employs the notion of reason in the reflective sense by pointing to the limitations of the synthesis characteristic of cognition. Were it not for that reflective level of critique, we wouldn't know that there can be spheres or disciplines outside of cognition, and, concomitantly, outside of sensuality relevant to cognition and precisely not relevant to morality. Positively speaking, KANT presents the self-asserting critique as arriving at all of its decisions in the light of fundamental principles of its own institution (*Einsetzung; KdrV* 779; transl. 601). Self-assertion, or, as we are entitled to call it in this context, spontaneity (which can be seen as *Einsetzung*) is indeed both a manifestation of the reflective character of reason — because reflection and self-isolation as correlated and these wouldn't be possible without spontaneity. Spontaneity is also present on the level of reason as a component in the synthesis — because spontaneity is juxtaposed to receptivity and as such is a characteristic of reason or understanding.

Again, when KANT uses the metaphor: tribunal of a critical reason (*KdrV* 815; transl. 624), the metaphor seems to point to reason as a spectator. But in terms of *genetivus objectivus* the spectator looks upon critical reason as reason being aware of its limitations. Immediately there follows the insistence of critical reason on those limitations (there), where critical reason can be both reason in its reflective capacity as well as in its cognitive capacity. To be sure, when the concern is with critique establishing our unavoidable ignorance of things in themselves and the concurrent limitation of theoretical knowledge to appearances (*KdrV* XXIX; transl. 29), the term critique or criticism relates to the cognitive approach in the strict sense of the term. This is so, although again we can say that when the cognitive approach is aware of its fundamental limitations it turns into the reflective approach. *Mutatis mutandis* the same would apply to the well-known distinction between bounds and limits, where the reference is not to the present bounds of reason but to the necessary and inherent ones, that is to say, to limits (*KdrV* 789; transl. 607). Here too we can say that the distinction can be made manifest from the reflective point of view but not from the immanent cognitive point of view. In any case, what is subjected to examination are not the facts of reason but reason itself in the whole extent of its powers, regarding its aptitude for pure a priori modes of knowledge (there). In this sense the critical system does not presuppose anything but reason itself, which is a re-statement of the self-isolating character of reason. The distinction between modes of knowledge is made by the critique as concerned with distinction (*Prolegomena* § 43;

transl. 77-8). We come back to te sampe point where reason in the cognitive sense is by its essence reason in a partial connotation, and where reason in the reflective sense is of a total connotation. But in spite of this the notion of critique is applied to both levels, though KANT was probably not consistent in referring to these two connotations. Every so often when he refers to the concept of critique, he refers to critique applied to the assessment of cognition and its limitations — because of the various considerations which we have already explored.

6.

The introduction of distinctions, which, as we have seen, is the major aspect of the critical approach, contains in itself the argument for the distinctions identified. It is not enough to say that the spheres of knowledge or guidance are two different spheres. We have to add *pari passu* the component of justification, that is to say, why the two spheres are to be distinguished and what are the characteristic-irreducible features which justify the distinction. To be sure, KANT went a step further to say that the justification is the laying of the foundations of the spheres distinguished — as for instance nature and morality. It is in this context that the aspect of transcendentalism comes in. We shall look into that aspect, but may say at this juncture too that the concept of transcendentalism does not lack a certain ambiguity.

"I entitle *transcendental* all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*" (*KdrV* 25; transl. 59). In this statement we notice the basic relationship pertaining between transcendental and a priori. But at the same time we notice that "transcendental" refers to knowledge and thus to objects and, negatively speaking, it does not refer to acts or to morality. This can be termed as the cognitive aspect of the transcendental. It raises the question whether the concept of transcendental can be enlarged in order to be employed in the sphere of morality. The same question applies to another statement: "The distinction between the transcendental and the empirical belongs therefore only to the critique of knowledge; it does not concern the relation of that knowledge to its objecs" (*KdrV* 81; transl. 56). This statement places the distinction pertaining to transcendental versus empirical within the context of the critique of knowledge. It even tends to identify the concern of the critique with its outcome — that is to say, the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical. The negation of the concern with the relation of knowledge to object gives to the concept of transcendental an exclusively cognitive meaning. But here too, it is perhaps an exaggerated meaning, because the transcendental does point to relationship to the objects from the point of view of the a priori. This is not,

however, outside the horizon of knowledge. In any sense, the aspect of justification is manifest in what KANT says (*Prolegomena.* Anhang 380 ff; transl. 129 ff) that the concern by which the transcendental is meant only to make knowledge of experience possible — probably the inquiring into the possibility of every experience (*KdrV* 401; transl. 330) is meant among other things to prevent the possibility of moving from apperception ("I think") to assertion ("I think" is a substance, a cause etc.). This applies even to the unity of apperception which is entitled the *transcendental* unity of self-consciousness, in order to establish the possibility of a priori knowledge arising from it (*KdrV* 132; transl. 153). We may say that that statement is an interpretation of the transcendental component of philosophy.

Whether this interpretation of transcendental coincides with the critique of reason, or whether it is only one major manifestation of it, is somehow ambivalent. What we can say is that if the acitivity of the critique manifests itself in putting forward the basic distinction whereby the distinction has to be justified. Hence it goes without saying that the introduction of the concept of the transcendental is in the line of the critical approach. Again, returning to our previous suggesion as to the two aspects of the critique, we may say that the justification of the concept of transcendental, which amounts to drawing the boundaries of the a priori concept, is perhaps a manifestation of its reflective aspect.

This limitation of the critique to the transcendental becomes explicit in another aspect, when KANT says that metaphysics in its narrower meaning consists of transcendental *philosophy* and *physiology* of pure reason (*KdrV* 813; transl. 662). Physiology amounts in this context to a theory of the character of a certain object — obviously not connoting what we call physiology today. Physiology would be a kind of phenomenological description of the structure and composition of a certain area of inquiry. Yet when we move to an analysis of what KANT calls transcendental philosophy, the limitation — that is to say critical limitation — of the aspect of knowledge becomes less clear than it has been in the analysis up to now. It is said, for instance, that transcendental philosophy is the only idea of science for which the critique of pure reason has to lay down the complete architectonic plan. It is a system of all principles of pure reason (*KdrV* 27; transl. 60). In this context we may ask the basic question: whether the system of all principles of pure reason is to be confined only to the cognitive aspects of pure reason, or whether it will also contain the principles of practical reason. We may put it differently by asking whether pure reason refers only to cognitive reason or, as it should, to practical reason as well, since practical reason is — to say the least — a manifestation of pure reason. At this point KANT says in addition that this critique is not in itself to be entitled a transcendental philosophy, since in order to be a complete system, it would have to contain an exhaustive analysis of the whole a priori constitution of human knowledge: "our critique

must, indeed, supply a complete enumeration of all the fundamental concepts that go to constitute such pure knowledge" (*KdrV* 27; transl. 60).

From these statements it may follow that transcendental philosophy in its essence is a broader concept than the critique, since it has to apply to all principles of pure reason while the critique applies only to pure knowledge. Moreover, KANT says subsequently that the highest principle and fundamentals of morality, although they are a priori knowledge, do not have a place in transcendental philosophy. What is characteristic of the moral sphere is the absence of the a priori, which is to say that reason does not lay at the foundation of morality vis-à-vis what is posited — like pleasure and pain, desires and inclinations, which are of empirical origin. In the construction of a system of pure morality these empirical factors must necessarily be taken into account and brought into — as negation of — the concept of duty, since duty would be meaningless were it not for the explicit overcoming of the allurement of the inclinations, the search for pleasure and the fulfillment of desire, etc. The empirical sphere is present in a negative sense; the requirement of duty is not to make the empirical urges the motivation of our actions.

But if this is so, and the empirical element appears in the moral sphere as a hindrance to be overcome rather than as datum to be interpreted in the sphere, then it follows that transcendental philosophy is a philosophy of pure and merely speculative reason (*KdrV* 28-29; transl. 61). Here again we encounter the ambiguity of the concept of transcendental — whether its case is only cognitive, or extends to the whole sphere of philosophy. In the first, "transcendental" amounts to the critique in the limited connotation; if the second, it is, to say the least, of a broader meaning. In any case, the presence of the empirical element is relevant not only to cognitive — but to moral activity as well. The basic difference in this presence is that between application of pure components to the empirical ones — in knowledge or negation of them by overcoming them in the moral sphere.

At this point it is appropriate to introduce another statement concerning the theory of transcendental. KANT says: "The question is whether in transcendental philosophy there is any question relating to an object presented to pure reason which is unanswerable by this reason, and whether we may rightly excuse ourselves from giving a decisive answer ... transcendental philosophy is unique in the whole field of speculative knowledge, in that no question which concerns an object given to pure reason can be insoluble for this same reason" (*KdrV* 505; transl. 431). Do we have to take literally the concept of "an object presented to pure reason?" — that is to say that the very employment of the concept of object points to the theoretical dimension and to the transcendental in the limited sense, or do we have to look at pure reason in its broad sense and conclude that transcendental philosophy is capable of answering all questions posed by reason. If the latter is valid, then

moral questions could be subsumed under the heading of transcendental philosophy. But, as we noticed, KANT distinguishes in this context between transcendental philosophy and speculative knowledge — and speculative knowledge refers to unanswerable questions, like those posed by the Antinomy of Pure Reason, for example. Thus we have sufficient ground for assuming that transcendental philosophy points here to the cognitive aspect and thus would be a kind of a positive manifestation of the critical approach.

7.

In a sense, KANT's concern with the architectonics of pure reason is an attempt to resolve the dilemmas of reason by what might be called, metaphorically, the mapping out of the scope of reason within the limits and limitations outlined by the critique. Human reason is by natue architectonic, that is to say, it regards all of our knowledge as belonging to a possible system (*KdrV* 502; transl. 429). As such, human reason refers to a systematic unity; architectonic is a doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge and therefore necessarily a part of doctrine of method (*KdrV* 860; transl. 653). Here too we notice that in spite of his emphasis on the architectonic nature of human reason in general, KANT identifies the inner relationship pertaining between human reason and its cognitive manifestation. The same applies to the notion of the transcendental doctrine of method which amounts to determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason (*KdrV* 735; transl. 573). Yet when architectonics is understood as the art of constructing systems, it is understood thereby as a doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge (*KdrV* 860; transl. 653). Nevertheless, when the architectonic enquiry leads to the statement that human reason is characterized by legislation, and moreover that philosophy is understood in terms of the legislation of human reason, we arrive at a fundamental quality of reason as such; the legislation of reason is not confined to one sphere of philosophy's concerns. It has two objectives or objects, namely, nature and freedom, and therefore contains not only the law of nature but the moral law as well. Philosophy is meant to present the two in two distinct systems at first, but ultimately in one single philosophical system. "The philosophy of nature deals with all *that is*, the philosophy of morals with that which *ought to be*" (*KdrV* 868; transl. 658-659). The aspect of the critique comes to bear in the very distinction between what is and what ought to be the preliminary distinction between nature and morality. But that distinction, without being obliterated is ultimately sublated *(aufgehoben)*, if we may use Hegel's term, into one system outlined from the point of view of the architectonics of reason. We may add the well-known last sentences of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which proclaim that the critical path is still open: "If the reader has had the courtesy and patience to accompany me along this path, he may now judge for himself whether, if he cares to lend his

aid into making this path into a high road, it may not be possible to achieve before the end of the present century what many centuries had not been able to accomplish; namely, to secure for human reason complete satisfaction in regard to that with which it has all along so eargerly occupied itself, though hitherto in vain" (*KdrV* 844; transl. 668-669). We may wonder what is the meaning of the satisfaction expected. Did KANT assume that a full-fledged philosophical system, or, metaphorically, edifice, can be erected by the architectonics of pure reason, or did he think that the architectonic structure itself, without realization of the full-fledged system, is the philosophical edifice which will satisfy the momentum of pure reason?

8.

One of the ways to understand Hegel's relation to KANT is to analyse the concepts which we have just explored, namely, critique, criticism, as well as transcendentality. That analysis will shed additional ligt on Hegel's interpretation of the concept of speculation, an interpretation in which he also differs from KANT.

We start with the concepts of critique and criticism. In the course of an observation which is not essentially related to KANT's philosophy, Hegel says that philosophical critique presupposes the idea of philosophy itself as a condition and presupposition. Related to this is the statement that philosophy is only one as reason is one (*Krit. Journal*, 173-4). This statement is rather significant in its implied criticism of KANT's critique, namely, that the critique, being a reflection, is not necessarily to be identified with a specific trend of philosophical exploration. To be sure, we could say formally that the idea of philosophy itself is the condition and the presupposition for philosophical critique, but we may wonder what kind of philosophy is involved. Is it a philosophy in the systematic-overriding sense, that is to say, philosophy as Hegel understands it, the one philosophy manifesting the one reason, or is it philosophy as an overriding reflection on different areas e. g. of theoretical and practical activity? In a different rendering we could say that for KANT, philosophy in the ultimate sense of the term is the goal and not the condition or presupposition.

Hegel's characterization of critical philosophy as a conception which does not allow reason a constitutive relation to knowledge but only a regulative one,[87] brings us into a more defined area of KANT's philosophy. Textually speaking, this is a correct rendering of the trend of KANT's system. At this point Hegel would attribute to reason *(Vernunft)* a constitutive validity, not

[87] *Krit. Journal* 181-182. On the whole issue consult: *W. H. Walsh: Kant as seen by Hegel.* In: *Idealism past and present.* Ed. by G. Visey. Cambridge 1982, 93 ff.

confining that validity to understanding *(Verstand)* alone. Hegel's description of the trend of KANT's system implies that the chasm between understanding and reason cannot be taken as the ultimate outcome of the philosophical critique; on the contrary, interpretation of philosophy itself leads us to a dynamic relation between understanding and reason, that is to say, understanding is sublated to the level of reason.

To be sure, this is the hard core of Hegel's critique of KANT's criticism, which sometimes characterizes the latter's deficiency in psychological terms: for example, that the critical philosophy is afraid of the object; hence it attributes to logical determinations an essentially subjective meaning (*Wiss. d. Logik.* I, 47). This explanation is meant to underline the gap existing in the critical philosophy between rational determinations, called here logical ones, and the sphere of objects. This line of criticism is extended to the concept of the thing in itself, to which we shall return presently. The same criticism is applied to the position that thoughts are mediating aspects between ourselves and states of affairs. This mediating link actually closes up states of affairs from us, instead of bringing about a comprehensive sphere which would embrace both ourselves and the state of affairs (ibid. 27).

Hegel recognizes a positive aspect of that limited conception of thought and rational determination, which is that critical philosophy rightly recognizes the determinations of understanding as finite and therefore as incapable of conceiving the true (*Enz.* 1817 § 32). Since critical philosophy is concerned with understanding and its concepts it rightly points to the limitations of understanding. The gap between thought and state of affairs, or between the formal and the true, is a legitimate description of rationality as such. The same applies to what is called subjective idealism (*Enz.* 1817. § 33), since finite cognition is coterminous with the subjective concept. But the shortcoming of the critical philosophy lies in the fact that it remains on the level of the finite and the subjective, yet takes it as if it were the absolute (*Enz.* 1817. § 35). The major impact of KANT's philosophy is his view of reason and its independence (*Enz.* § 60). Yet he limits reason and its independence to understanding — and here we refer again to the statement of Hegel quoted above, as to the absence of constitutive principles on the level of reason.

9.

This aspect of the critical philosophy is related to the notion of objectivity, since that philosophy relates objectivity to the element of universality and necessity, attributing to objectivity the determinations of thinking. This being so, there is ultimately no distinction in KANT between objectivity and conformity to thought (*Enz.* § 41). This in turn, blurs the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, once thought is understood as being separated

from content of thought. Hegel distinguishes between three ways of conceiving objectivity: (a) that which exists externally (b) that which has the connotation of the universal and necessary and (c) that which connotes the in-itself-thought-of (*Enz.* § 41). Applying this distinction to the KANTian system, it is clear that we cannot take its notion of objectivity, grounded in the determinations of thinking, as objectivity proper or at least as objectivity in the highest sense of the term.

There is an interesting point here, namely, the synthesis or even identity pointed to by Hegel, between the subjectivity of the artist and the true objectivity of presentation (*Ästh.* Bd 1. 391) — which, without going into the details of the difference between Hegel and KANT regarding the position of work of art — is to be seen in the context since art is placed by Hegel on the level of the absolute spirit. Hegel's structure of objectivity is bound to have its manifestation on the level of the work of art, though it cannot be assumed that objectivity proper in its adequate sense finds its true realization within the framework of art. As against KANT, Hegel tries to show that the concept of objectivity contradicts the notion of independent concepts, and implies an infinite struggle between the I and the object whose end result is eventually that which exists in itself and for itself (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II, 178). Thus it overcomes the distinction between the conceptual and the remote reality designated as the thing in itself. Indeed, Hegel takes this view in its negation of the position of the thing in itself; that position cannot be maintained when an ultimate synthesis between thinking and reality is meant to be included within the dialectical process of thought, and is not meant to be a position outside the boundaries of the understanding of reality. Hence Hegel's formulation that for KANT reason is the canon of truth but not the organ of it (*Enz.* § 52), is probably an adequate resumé of KANT's view, since according to KANT the canon is the sum total of the a priori principles of correct employment of certain faculties of knowledge (*KdrV* 824; transl. 630), while the organon is to serve as an instrument that professes to extend and enlarge our knowledge (*KdrV* 86; transl. 99). As a matter of fact, within the philosophy of pure reason the organon is not an instrument of extension but a discipline for the limitation of pure reason. Instead of discovering truth, it has only the modest merit of guarding against error (*KdrV* 823; transl. 692). This error is, probably, in the context the taking of phenomena as things in themselves or — symmetrically — not to observe the distinction between understanding and reason.

The critical interpretation of knowledge tends to ground knowledge in subjective principles which can never turn out to be of an objective character. That grounding leads, among other manifestations, to the thing in itself being the correlate of the abstractness of formal determination of thinking. Hence the critical philosophy finally endows the ignorance of the eternal and divine with what Hegel describes metaphorically as "a good con-

science". Once it enlarges the scope of subjectivity and nothing remains vis-à-vis itself but the thing in itself, the critical philosophy assures that it has proven the unknowability of the eternal and the divine. In this sense it is akin to the vacuum of the atomistic philosophy since it leaves God without determinations, predicates and qualities. It denigrates the position of God by placing it beyond knowledge, or, put differently, by turning it as lacking any content (*Werke.* Bd 17, 14-15).

Summing up this first part of the comparative analysis of KANT and Hegel we can say that Hegel did not take the view that the critique as reflection is not to be identified with the particular distinctions between faculties or levels of knowledge. Hegel tries to show that the critique can be only a first step in the continous progress of knowledge, which will eventually overcome the various distinctions and not be content with them as such. The implications of this criticism of the critical philosophy come to the fore when the concept of speculation replaces the concept of criticism; in between Hegel's notion of the transcendental is to be lodged.

10.

In his critical approach to KANT, Hegel says that the expression "transcendental philosophy" in KANT's sense is concerned only with the origins of the various determinations, whereby that origin is placed in the consciousness. In this sense the "transcendental" is but the other side of the coin of "subjective". The task of transcendental philosophy is to point to the rational determinations within the sphere of subjective thinking (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 599). Hence, built into the notion of transcendental philosophy is the notion of the subjective reason which as such is taken to be an absolute position (*Krit. Journal.* 142-3). In KANT's version of transcendental philosophy the empirical material or the manifold of intuition is as such the first step. Understanding comes in in the second step, in order to introduce into the material elements the unity which, through abstraction, elevates them to the level of universality (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II, 19-20). For KANT, the distinction between the material and the formal element is a primary distinction; from the position of transcendentality this distinction can't be overcome or sublated. The transcendental aspect of philosophy is meant to build a bridge within the context of the distinctions. Hence Hegel speaks about KANT's unity of self-consciousness as requiring the "plus" of the empirical (*Krit. Journal.* 322) and in this sense the "plus" is obviously an external aspect or element. It cannot be viewed as essentially related to the aspect of thinking, since such a relation would imply the overcoming of the distinction we start off. Hence within KANT's critical philosophy the transcendental is an attempt to establish contact between the elements which have been distinguished. Their distinction is an ultimate one, whereas Hegel would look for a contact between

the conceptual and the empirical components of knowledge which would not exhaust itself in an external conjunction referred to as a "plus". Hegel's positive attempt to replace transcendentality with speculation can be understood in this context — and we turn now to an exploration of the difference between transcendentality and speculation. An in-between step will be a look at the concept of the thing in itself.

11.

We do not need to restate that KANT's concept of the thing in itself is not always consistent, and that it raises several questions which have been addressed by 19th century philosophy. We shall mention only a few aspects in order to put forth Hegel's point of departure, which in terms of the concept of the thing in itself is rather critical, very explicitly so vis-à-vis KANT's view of it.

KANT wavers as to the employment of the notion of reality or existence regarding the thing in itself. For instance, he says that the existence of the thing that appears is not destroyed; we cannot know it by the senses as it is in itself. Idealism asserts that existent things are none but thinking beings, whereas KANT takes things as the objects of our senses. The distinction between the thing in itself and appearances amounts to — or is symmetrical to — the distinction between thinking and sensuality or sensibility. Ultimately the thing in itself is unknown to us but is not therefore less actual (*Prolegomena.* § 13 Anm. 2; transl. 36-37).

The term *noumena* introduces an additional nuance, viewing the things in themselves as constituting an intelligible world. KANT says that appearances are based upon a thing in itself, and "affected" by this unknown something. At this point it is not clear whether KANT is inclined to stress the parallelism between understanding and the things in themselves, or whether by the very assumption of appearances the existence of things in themselves is granted too. Moreover, the representation of such things as causes of appearances is not only admissible but unavoidable. We find here a conjunction of several elements: the symmetry between different modes of perception or conception, i. e. sensuality with its parallel to appearances and understanding with its correlate in the things in themselves, and in addition, the architectonic argument whereby cause and causality refer to a content or a thing which is outside experience. But the fact is that even the notion of a Supreme Being is listed within the context of the thing in itself. KANT attributes to the thing in itself the quality of being immaterial, and thus again it is symmetrical to understanding or reason. At this point, in one of his justifications for the introduction of things in themselves as one of the axes of his system, KANT says that reason finds in them the completion and satisfaction for which it can never hope from appearances, adding that appearances always

presuppose an object in itself whether we can know more of it or not (ibid. § 57; transl. 103). It is in this context that a kind of combination or synthesis comes to prominence in the concept of "an intelligible cause" (*KdrV* 565; transl. 467): "While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, an intelligible cause, together with its causality is outside the series of causality. Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause and, at the same time in respect of appearenaces, as resulting from them, according to the necessity of nature" (ibid.). We notice here the conjunction of intelligibility and freedom as against the phenomenal causality and necessity. Intelligibility can be understood only in a noumenal way, when it is said, for instance, that whatever is not in itself appearance and thus not an object of the senses, is entitled intelligible (*KdrV* 566; transl. 467). To be sure, KANT wavers again about placing the intelligible as a correlate of understanding or of reason. Perhaps the explanation for his hesitation lies in the fact that as far as the regress from appearances to the thing in itself is concerned we still employ understanding, since we address ourselves — be it negatively — to appearances; but insofar as intelligibility hints at the moral world its reference is to reason and not to understanding.

Be that as it may, we can say that the main issue in Hegel's criticism of the thing in itself is that he finds in it a kind of built-in contradiction, where reference is made to intelligibility, but that intelligibility is not understood or conceived. In Hegel's terms, the thing in itself, though it is intelligible, it is not for itself, and thus lacks the basic correlation, even identity, characteristic of the rational sphere. Hegel takes this lack of consistency in the concept of the thing in itself as implying an abstraction from being for something other. This characterization in turn points to its lack of all determination, and to its ultimate conception as nothing (*Wiss. d. Logik.* II. 27, 137). Thus, things in themselves, which are meant, either from the point of view of senses or of reason to be not only outside appearances but above them, turn out to be a non-reality. This would be the built-in paradox of the KANT's conception, or its dialectical consequence. Parallel to that, the very fact that things in themselves are not to be known from the vantage point of finite cognition exhibits the limitation of that cognition, which as such cannot be taken as the climax of knowledge at all (ibid. 270). In this sense Hegel describes things in themselves as the empty form of the opposition which is objectively expressed (*Krit. Journal.* 34). We have to be meticulous in reading all these terms since the notion of the empty form corresponds to the description of vacuous abstraction; the notion of juxtaposition objectively stressed points to the position of the things in themselves as correlates of appearances. But once these descriptions are introduced into the context, Hegel shows that an absolute objectivity is possible — in the way the dogmatists pointed to things (ibid.) What is meant to be a corollary reality to the existence of appearances is essentially only a product of thinking, which is the meaning of hypostasis

or what Hegel describes as *caput mortuum (Enz.* § 44). The concept of the thing in itself cannot fulfil the function of supplementing, as it were, the synthesis characteristic of knowledge. It only enhances the view that knowledge remains within the boundaries of subjectivity (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 572). Hence the only way to overcome this limitation is to make a different start, which would be to view knowledge as a primary synthesis and not as a synthesis constructed by way of combining concepts and sensuality. In other words, the notion of synthesis has to be understood differently from the way understood by KANT. Indeed, KANT says that synthesis in its most general sense is the act of putting different representations together and of grasping what is manifold in them in one act of knowledge (*KdrV* 103; transl. 111). This is what is meant by transcendental synthesis.

12.

Related to this is the position that the synthetic act is self-activity or spontaneity of the subject and it cannot be performed save by the subject itself (*KdrV* 132; transl. 152). Being an act of the subject, pure synthesis gives us the pure concept of understanding (*KdrV* 104; transl. 112). Transcendental Logic teaches how we bring to concepts not representations but the pure synthesis of representations — since the same function which gives unity to the various representations and judgments also gives unity to the pure synthesis of various representations in an intuition (*KdrV* 104,105; transl. 112). We find in KANT an affirmation of a basic superiority of the conceptual element which, while it goes beyond itself by referring to data provided by intuition, at the same time remains the ground of the unity characteristic of the synthesis. Hence the synthesis is a unification whose active factor is understanding — or, to put it broadly, the intellectual capacity.

Hegel does not start with a distinction or heterogeneity of elements but with what he himself describes as a whole. Synthetic knowledge develops the determinations of a whole. These elements are not entailed in an immediate way in the whole. We might observe that, were they so entailed, there would be no need for knowledge as development of their determinations. This development is a characteristic activity of knowledge and of synthetic knowledge at that. These determinations do not flow from any identity, but rather have a position of distinction or difference regarding one another. It is the task of synthetic knowledge to show the necessity of the determined relationship of one determination vis-à-vis the other (*Phil. Prop.* 175). The point of departure lies in the general or the universal, proceding from which the particularization takes place (*Enz.* § 230). We move from the synthetic character of science to the philosophical method which as such has sublated both the analytic and the synthetic matter. That matter is in each one of its

movements both analytic and synthetic (*Enz.* § 238). This last point is rather essential in our attempt to understand the fundamental difference between KANT and Hegel: KANT is concerned with synthesis as characteristic of scientific knowledge, whereas Hegel is concerned with philosophical knowledge and attempts to identify its essential steps. Hence for KANT synthesis is a synthesis of understanding with its forms on the one hand and appearances or data mediated by sensuality on the other. Whereas for Hegel the ultimate point is philosophical knowledge which as such overcomes all the methods employed in its attainment, including synthesis which by definition refers not to the self-development of the whole but to the unification of the data of understanding. This again is part of Hegel's attempt to overcome the concept of transcendental philosophy with its problem, and move on to speculative philosophy. That philosophy has as its method the dialectical one. Hence our concern will be the two issues, namely speculation and dialectic as opposed to KANT's conjunction of transcendentality and synthesis.

KANT's concept of synthesis and its position within the system is based on the primary distinction between sensuality and understanding as two stems of human knowledge, with the reservation added by KANT that perhaps the two spring from a common, but to us unknown, root (*KdrV* 29; transl. 61). The synthesis is a deliberate attempt from the position of reason or spontaneity to bring about a construction which would relate the two stems and thereby essentially subsume the data of sensuality under the propositions of reason. Hegel's understanding of synthesis starts from a different perspective when he says that synthetic knowledge develops the determination of the whole.

13.

This programmatic description of the position of synthesis places the emphasis on the necessity of the mutual relationship between the various determinations. This conception is not a construction accomplished by bringing together two originally disparate stems. It is a sort of development of determinations by explication of the necessity of their belonging to one whole. To put it differently, the very emphasis on the whole as a point of departure runs counter to KANT's emphasis on the primary distinction between two stems. One could say that whereas KANT alludes to an unknown common root, Hegel turns that unknown common root into a present — to be made explicit — whole.

Because of the fundamental affinity between the determinations, it is in the nature of the synthesizing activity to receive *(die Aufnahme)* the object in the forms of the concept (*Enz.* § 227 ff). In this sense there is no construction imposing forms on data *(legislation)*, but rather a conception of and elevation of the object to the level of the forms of concepts *(exposition)*.

Hegel is aware of the presence of thesis, antithesis and synthesis in KANT. But the way he interprets this structure is obviously related to his view of the whole which is now explicitly understood as the spirit. Distinctions present in KANT become modes of the spirit through which the spirit is authentically itself and is therefore endowed with consciousness. From the position of consciousness the distinction between thesis, antithesis and synthesis is brought forth (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 601). Here again the point of departure lies in the spirit; what occurs in the process is not the construction of a unity but an explication of that which is inherent in the essence of the spirit. Perhaps Hegel proceeded a step further compared with the above mentioned necessity of the reciprocal relationship, because the various distinctions are *pari passu* explications of the whole which is identical with the spirit. The basic difference between the two systems, i. e. between the one which conceives of reason as legislation and the other which conceives of it as exposition, becomes visible in their different understandings of the notion of synthesis and its position vis-à-vis legislation on the one hand and exposition on the other.

The aspect of synthesis has to be considered as meaningful in its own right. It also has its own specific relation to the notion of dialectic in each of the respective systems. KANT's dialectic exposes the illusion of transcendent judgments and takes precautions to prevent the deception by that illusion, since it is a natural and inevitable one. Even when the deception has been exposed it will not cease to play tricks with reason. The ground of the drive towards the inevitable illusion lies in the endeavour of reason to reduce the variant and manifold knowledge obtained through understanding to the smallest number of principles or universal conditions. Reason tries thereby to achieve the highest possible unity (*Phil. Prop.* 601, 304).

It goes without saying that this objective of the transcendental dialectic and its ambivalent position of being an illusion on the one hand, and an inevitable illusion on the other, is the main point in KANT's theory of dialectic. What is characteristic of Hegel's theory of dialectic is that the attempted unity is not understood any more as an illusion but is within the reach of reason as developed. The thoughts themselves become fluid; what is given up is the rigid aspect of the posited determination. What is added is the development to which we already referred in the concept of synthesis. Through that development or movement, concepts become self-developments and thus exhibit spiritual essences (*Phän.* 35). A correlate of this is the idea that the negative is positive as well: the null is only a negation of a particular content but not a universal negation. This aspect of particularity inherent in negation is moved from the position of external reflection, by means of the process of self-development, into the attempt to integrate the negative into the whole. Essentially there is no distinction between the content and the dialectic and thus, in traditional terminology, there is no distinction *(Gegensatz)* bet-

ween the content and the object. The dialectical moment is the self-sublation of fixed determinations of understanding, that is to say, the transition into contradictory determinations. Its essence is the identity of each one of the determinations with the others, an identity which is to be derived from each of these determinations. In this sense the true dialectic is the mode of proof characteristic of philosophy (*Werke.* Bd 17, 248).

14.

It goes without saying that the two aspects, that of synthesis and that of dialectic, are two sides of the same coin. Dialectic in KANT pointed to the overstepping of the borderlines of synthesis, once synthesis has been understood as the construction of a unity between the capacity of understanding (or reason inherent in understanding) and the data of sensuality. Dialectic leaves us without a synthesis, and this is so by definition because dialectic points beyond the meeting with sensuality. Synthesis is precluded since data are not present within the range of dialectic. There is an essential difference between synthesis, which is of a constitutive character, and dialectic which points to that which is out of reach of our knowledge, and thus cannot be brought within the scope of constitution which is essentially a construction. For Hegel, there is no distinction of that sort between synthesis and dialectic, since synthesis is characteristic of every step present in our understanding. Consciousness as negation of that which is grasped immediately is the sublation of the given to the level of consciousness. Construction is excluded because there is a necessary relationship between the determinations, including the determinations which KANT took as belonging to the two different spheres of sensuality and understanding. For Hegel the whole process of knowledge is not only a process of knowledge but also a process of reality. Each step in that process winds up eventually with a synthesis. Thus the very dialectic of knowledge and reality is characterized by successive steps of synthesis — and the ultimate point in the process is likewise a synthesis. Here again the difference between legislation and exposition comes to the fore. Legislation imposes certain rules on the area of its jurisdiction and by the same token leaves out areas which cannot be subsumed under its jurisdiction. The leftover areas belong in KANT's view to the scope of dialectic. The situation looks different when exposition is the main philosophical approach; from the point of view of exposition we can assume that there is no limit to the exposition once we become engaged in it. What we have to do is to step over from one stage of the exposition to the next, and eventually arrive at the stage of concreteness. Hegel criticizes KANT for not realizing that the subjective is in itself concrete, or, to express it differently, that the categories are concrete (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 572ff). The highest level of concreteness would be, according to Hegel, the unification of the infinite with the finitude

of cognition or even of perception. For KANT the notion of the idea as related to reason is an abstraction which is precisely lacking in concreteness. Concreteness would be only the unification of the unconditioned with the conditioned (ibid. 576), which is lacking in KANT because the unconditioned belongs to dialectic and the conditioned to the transcendental construction. For Hegel, the true aspect of thought is that thought is concrete; it posits itself as distinguished into two sides, but in such a way that the two sides of that which has been split into two contradictory determinations of thinking are eventually viewed in terms of their unity as the idea (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 2. 39). The ultimate manifestation of all these differences is Hegel's conception of man from the point of view of thought in general: man is the spirit. KANT, as is well known, understood the essence of man through three questions: what can I know, what should I do, what am I entitled to hope for. Hence even the conception of man in his essence cannot be brought under one universal heading, like Hegel's concept of the spirit. Man's essence has to be seen in a more determined — or even empirical — way, expressed in the three different questions which are related to one another but cannot be included in one conception.

We have seen that the different understandings of transcendentality present in KANT and in Hegel are manifested in their different understandings of the nature and position of both synthesis and dialectic. We may say somehow naively that KANT is far more modest in his presentation and justification of knowledge than is Hegel. A basic difference between the empirical and the trans-empirical looks central in KANT's system, while Hegel makes that distinction fluid and eventually places the empirical within the trans-empirical or, in reverse, makes the trans-empirical empirical through the notion of concreteness. For KANT there is always something which has to be left out, whereas for Hegel there is a comprehensive sphere in which all aspects are to be comprised. It goes without saying that the position of the distinction between empirical and trans-empirical does not allow for a comprehensive system, while the inclusion of the empirical in the trans-empirical by way of sublation is already a manifestation of a comprehensive system. This would be one more formulation of the difference between KANT and Hegel. We are confronting a kind of well-founded philosophical decision about the acceptability of either of the two, in addition to the methodical point that one system sheds light on the other — and this applies in both directions.

The concept of speculation as it appears in the two systems is an indication of the difference between them and even an amplification of that difference. KANT's employment of the concept "speculation" or "speculative" is not always consistent. For instance, he applies it to mathematical knowledge which he describes as purely speculative being a purely rational science (*KdrV* 508; transl. 433). Yet KANT's attitude and evaluation are mainly

negative: "Theoretical knowledge is *speculative* if it concerns an object, or those concepts of an object, which cannot be reached in any experience. It is so named to distinguish it from the *knowledge of nature*, which concerns only those objects or predicates of objects which can be given in a possible experience" (*KdrV* 662-663; transl. 527).

Hegel's concept of speculation or speculative knowledge has *ab initio* a different direction since it emphasizes as a principle of speculation the identity of subject and object expressed in the most determined way (*Krit. Journal.* 34). For speculation the components of finitude are only manifestations of the infinite focus which radiates them and at the same time is formed by them (ibid. 68). This is why speculation conceives of contradiction or opposition as such as a unity (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 2. 40). Here we find what is perhaps the central issue, that the unity is not meant to be the unity of knowledge only, as in KANT's concept of the idea, for instance, but it is the unity of knowledge and of reality. In this sense Hegel's concept of speculation goes even beyond the classical concept of theory. Since it is in the nature of the speculative approach to have the contradiction before itself and to resolve it (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 3. 656). Hence even the distinction of knowledge and reality is eventually sublated. Since the main feature of speculation is unity, the latter cannot be confined to the realm of knowledge. It has to move in the direction of conceiving all objects of pure thought, of nature and of the spirit in the form of thought, and thus to conceive of them as the unity of the difference (*Phil. d. Rel.* Bd 2. 40). One of the outcomes of this position is that philosophy as such is endowed with its own mode of cognition, that is to say speculation. Philosophy is not just an analysis or an interpretation of modes of knowledge outside itself or even below itself, but is positively characterized by speculation. In this context an additional aspect should be mentioned: speculation is a philosophical rendering of what Hegel calls the mysteries of religion; what is true is only that which is called the mysteries of religion, which are identified as the speculative component of religion (*Gesch. d. Phil.* Bd 1. 111).

It is clear that for KANT the drawing of the boundaries of knowledge in general and of knowledge vis-à-vis reality in particular is the central issue, while for Hegel the central issue is not only the approximation of identity but the achievement of it in the most comprehensive sense. The difference in their fundamental approach which we developed above becomes very prominent in the different understandings of the nature and position of speculation — whether we employ a kind of "modest" understanding of knowledge, or opt for knowledge as an achievement without limitation. This difference must be emphasized, in spite of Hegel's attempt to reduce it to the difference between letter and spirit within the system of KANT (*Krit. Journal.* 383).

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